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Drawing on fifteen battlefield novels written in Weimar Germany between 1928
and 1930, this dissertation examines various models of masculinity construction in terms
of their cultural and political significance. A pioneer work, Erich Maria Remarque’s best-
seller, Im Westen nichts Neues (All Quiet on the Western Front) (1928/1929), was a
major provocation that unleashed a Culture War. The Dolchstoßlegende, designed to
account for the defeat of the German army, had not convinced everyone, so war veterans
waited for a better explanation, which Remarque and other leftist-bourgeois novelists
provided. Remarque’s group also included Ludwig Renn’s Krieg (1927/28), Edlef
vii
Köppen’s Heeresbericht (1930), Ernst Johannsen’s Vier von der Infanterie (1930), Ernst
Glaeser’s Jahrgang 1902 (1928), Georg von der Vring’s Soldat Suhren (completed 1923,
published 1927), Karl Federn’s Hauptmann Latour (1929), and Arnold Zweig’s Der
Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa (1927).
Extreme opposition in this Culture War came from the right-wing militarists,
including Franz Schauwecker’s Aufbruch der Nation (1929), Werner Beumelburg’s Die
Gruppe Bosemüller (1930), Joseph Magnus Wehner’s Sieben vor Verdun (1930), and
Hans Zöberlein’s Der Glaube an Deutschland (1931), who all sought to validate the war
experience through disproportionate magnification of the German warrior-man.
Alternative literary models, including Adrienne Thomas’ Die Katrin wird Soldat
(1930), one of the rare war novels by a female author, as well as Theodor Plivier’s Des
Kaisers Kulis (1930), and Adam Scharrer’s Vaterlandslose Gesellen (1930), reveal the
war in its senseless inhumanity affecting men and women alike, thus serving as rare
counterpoints to the dominant masculinist constructions.
What this dissertation contributes to existing research is a new interpretive
approach about how a text may play into public discourse. The prevailing images of
German masculinity that had guided generations of German males were destroyed in the
trenches. For ten years thereafter, war literature offered very little that individual male
readers could use to reconstruct a positive image of the German man as a social and
political being. Since traditional perceptions of masculinity had been shattered, literature
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The Weimar Republic (1919-1933) was a brief, yet culturally fecund intermission
between the two World Wars. While Germany had experienced four comparatively calm
decades between the founding of the German Empire and the outbreak of World War I
(1871-1914), the Weimar years were charged with passionate cultural and political
debate. In fact, the opposing factions were so fiercely at loggerheads with one another
that it is apt to speak of a Culture War: wave after wave of economic and socio-political
upheaval washed over Germany’s already brittle national bedrock and ultimately broke it
apart. After 1918, little was left of the smug confidence and the political sedateness the
Empire had rested on before the war. The catastrophic losses and dire consequences of
the war and the revolution left the nation traumatized for the next decade or more.1
Die gute alte Zeit, the golden age of Bismarck and the Empire, including
Germany’s ambition to establish itself among the other colonial powers, was irretrievably
lost. Instead of securing for itself a “place in the sun,” building up its military and
commercial fleets, and getting rich from colonial trade, Germany had shrunk in
geographical size, fallen into bankruptcy, and become a pariah loathed by its neighbors.
1 For detailed overviews of political, cultural, and economic developments between the end of World War I
and the beginning of Hitler’s dictatorship, see Detlev Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt a.M.:
Suhrkamp, 1987); Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Gerhard Schulz
ed., Ploetz Weimarer Republik: Eine Nation im Umbruch (Freiburg, Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz, 1987).
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Since wartime censorship and propaganda had kept the population ill-informed about the
actual state of affairs, especially during the second half of the war, many Germans, not
only right-wingers, perceived the new status quo as an unbearable humiliation.2 The
common people continued to believe that Germany -- in 1914 -- had mobilized troops to
defend the country against the threat of allied invasions, so they failed to see the justice
or the moral justification behind the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty.3 With the
exception of pacifists and certain left-wing intellectuals, the nation felt so brutally
subjugated by the peace conditions imposed upon them by the allies that rebellion against
the new reality, embodied by the parliamentary government, began to ferment
2 The terms “left-wingers” and “right-wingers” need clarification. The political left wing of the Weimar
Republic consisted of the SPD (Social Democratic Party), the USPD (Independent Social Democratic
Party), and certain splinter groups like the Spartakus Bund (Spartacus Group), which blended with the KPD
(Communist Party) on Jan. 1, 1919. The DDP (German Democratic Party) was a leftist liberal party that
recruited many of its members from the Bildungsbürgertum (educated bourgeoisie). Apart from political
parties, millions of blue-collar workers organized in unions, which gained fundamental importance in
Weimar Germany through political involvement and the implementation of workers’ rights. However, not
all unions were ideologically leftist; ones that harbored conservative-nationalist or anti-semitic ideas
existed as well. Right-wing ideology is associated primarily with the right wing of the Zentrum (Center
Party), the Deutsche Volkspartei (German People’s Party), the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German
National People’s Party), its affiliated paramilitary organization, Stahlhelm (“Steel Helmet,” founded 1918
in Magdeburg by Franz Seldte, reached 500.000 members by 1930), and the NSDAP (National Socialists)
with its militant organizations SA (Sturmabteilung, “Storm Division”) and SS (Schutzstaffel, “Protection
Squad”). German society during the Weimar years displayed huge readiness to organize itself. Thousands
of clubs and associations existed for every conceivable interest, be it athletic, religious, artistic, or political.
The extreme right-wing adhered to neo-nationalist ideology and consisted of Freikorps (paramilitary units),
veterans and rifle clubs, and other völkische associations. As the cultural historian Walter Laqueur explains,
it was nearly impossible to keep track of all the organized activity because the socio-political landscape of
the Weimar Republic was so complex: “[…] both left and right are split into countless factions and groups,
almost constantly engaged in internecine quarrels” (Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History [New
York: Capricorn Books, 1976], 43).
3 Unfortunately, most Germans continued to believe that other nations had caused World War I until the
1960s, when the historian Fritz Fischer documented German hegemony, annexionism, and warmongering
in his book Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag 1964). The revelation of the truth shocked
the nation. The German historian Konrad H. Jarausch stated in a recent interview with Der Spiegel that the
Fischer controversy also involved a generational conflict. Older historians, some of whom had been
soldiers in the war, denounced Fischer’s revelations as libelous. Egmont Zechlin, one of Fischer’s
adversaries at the time, exclaimed that he was not about to “let that guy rob him of his war experience” (“er
lasse sich von dem ‘Kerl’ nicht das Kriegserlebnis rauben”). See Karen Andresen, “Ein Buch wie ein
Sprengsatz,” Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20. Jahrhunderts, No. 1, 2004, 135-36.
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immediately.4 Even though the Republic survived a period of civil war (1919-1923),
galloping inflation and subsequent currency reform (1923-24), as well as many smaller
crises in between, the escalation of unemployment after “Black Friday” (October 25,
1929) on top of widespread political corrosion eventually led to the collapse of the
republican system, which had been fragile to begin with.5
In the late twenties, the National Socialists seized the moment to scoop up many
of those who felt frustrated and angry. They managed to imbue Germans with a new
sense of hope, purpose, direction, and national völkisch identity.6 Many Germans did not
4 Reactionary forces blamed the social democratic government under Ebert for accepting the Versailles
treaty too easily. According to them, the Novemberverbrecher (November Criminals) had betrayed the
nation when they proved unable to negotiate more favorable peace terms with the allies. For a detailed
account of the various groups that brought their anti-democratic potential to bear, see the first chapter of
Michael Gollbach, Die Wiederkehr des Weltkriegs in der Literatur: Zu den Frontromanen der späten
Zwanziger Jahre (Kronberg/Taunus: Scriptor Verlag, 1978) 6-36.
5 In a nutshell, these are the circumstances and problems the fledgling republic had to face. Studying the
Weimar Republic one sees, not without sadness, great potential for positive development that did not come
to fruition. One cannot help but wonder what might have been if history during those fourteen years had
taken a slightly different course. If there had been more willingness among the population to accept the loss
of the war, as well as the new reality resulting from it, maybe the republic might have had a chance to
prevail. If Germans, like other European nations, had had a democratic tradition, they might have put more
faith in the ability of the Social Democrats and the varying coalitions in charge of the Weimar government.
If the economic depression had not devastated everything that had just been rebuilt, the outcome might
have been a different one. If the population had not been largely deceived about what had really caused the
outbreak of World War I, or who had really lost it, reactionary forces would have found it more difficult to
scapegoat their enemies for Germany’s ostensive demise.
6 The historian Eberhard Kolb describes several expert opinions on the question why the Nazi movement
was so successful in Germany. Two of these opinions are particularly convincing. Martin Boszat is quoted
as saying that “mass appeal of the NSDAP seems ‘undramatic’ and ‘sudden in appearance only’, because
the new, anti-Marxist and anti-liberal, catch-all party to a great extent simply took over and united ‘what
had already existed far and wide, though in a scattered form, in the way of ideology and sectional interest
with a political potential’. The watchword of a ‘national community’ (Volksgemeinschaft) proved the most
effective element of National Socialist propaganda, and the party became highly popular with the younger
generation, in particular, thanks to widespread social discontent.” And J. Kocka, another historian, claimed
that the NSDAP’s allure was “primarily due to its ‘Janus-like character.’ ‘National Socialism made it
possible to be simultaneously, on the one hand, radical and anti-élitist, opposed to capitalists and ‘big
shots’, and, on the other, fiercely anti-socialist, nationalistic and conscious of one’s social standing.’ The
fact that large sections of German society were attracted by this dualism – National Socialism was both
dynamic and anti-modern, reactionary and revolutionary, opposed to capitalism and also to socialism – is
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need much convincing but readily succumbed to the Nazis’ allure. Before the Republic
was finally dead, however, there was a period of exciting public debate about the front
lines and “the truth.”
The heated public debate began shortly after the newspaper version of Im Westen
nichts Neues by Erich Maria Remarque (1898-1970) was published by the Vossische
Zeitung in the fall of 1928 (November 10 – December 9), and ended with Hindenburg’s
famous handshake, handing power over to Hitler on January 30, 1933. After Hitler had
been appointed Chancellor, it became increasingly dangerous to voice dissident opinions,
but before 1933, alternative views could still be injected into the public discourse. That is
what Remarque did when he published Im Westen nichts Neues. It caused a huge stir.
Debate over this battlefield novel became heavily politicized almost immediately.
It was clear that the critics from opposite ends of the political spectrum argued over much
more than the literary merits the novel did or did not have.7 Critics of every political
color vied with one another to sway public opinion, and many searched in unlikely places
for “evidence” which would corroborate their personal interpretation of this incredibly
popular book. What was the truth? Did Remarque describe things truthfully, or did he
simply invent this gut-wrenching story for the sake of popularity? Was this a heartfelt
outcry against the atrocities of war, a book to end all wars, as the liberals thought, or was
it really a weakling’s act of treason, as Remarque’s opponents said? The reactionaries,
attributed by Kocka to the persistence of strong pre-industrial, pre-capitalist and pre-bourgeois traditions”
(The Weimar Republic [London: Unwin Hyman, 1988] 187-188).
7 As Hans-Harald Müller asserts, “the general social significance that All Quiet on the Western Front
gained in the late twenties can certainly not be attributed to the literary competence of the author or the
personal problems he sought to resolve with his writing” (Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller: Der
Kriegsroman der Weimarer Republik [Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986] 60).
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mostly nationalists and militarists, denounced both the novel and its author, and soon
blacklisted both. Some liberals and pacifists, on the other side of the spectrum, hailed
book and author but, unfortunately, did not manage to forge one coherent position among
themselves. In fact, there were also critics on the far left who debunked Remarque’s
novel as bourgeois and pro-war. Therefore, these discordant voices lost the power
struggle over who would come to dominate public discourse about the book’s messages.8
What this dissertation contributes to existing research about Im Westen nichts
Neues and other German battlefield novels is a new interpretive approach about how a
text may play into public discourse. Virtually all the present research on the phenomenon
of war novels in this era is based on the journalistic reception of Im Westen nichts Neues
and other war novels, as these novels were received in the years of their publication.
Researchers have, for example, analyzed possible reasons why Remarque’s book became
so successful, and why critics from all political corners responded to it the way they did.9
8 For a detailed analysis of the contradictory reception All Quiet on the Western Front received from leftist
critics, see Michael Gollbach, Die Wiederkehr des Weltkrieges in der Literatur: Zu den Frontromanen der
späten Zwanziger Jahre (Kronberg/Taunus: Scriptor Verlag, 1978) 305-313.
9 Thomas Schneider points out that the journalistic reception of All Quiet on the Western Front had ceased
to focus on the actual text only four months after the book came out: “Am Text selbst wurden diese Urteile
bereits seit Frühjahr 1929 nicht mehr entwickelt, sondern die stark aufeinander rekkurrierenden
Rezeptionszeugnisse verdeutlichen, daß seit diesem Zeitpunkt nurmehr vorgefaßte Vorurteile vorgebracht
wurden. Im Westen nichts Neues hatte den Status eines Symbols mit nicht von ihm zu lösenden
Konnotationen erreicht: kriegskritisch, desillusionierend, überparteilich. Je nach Vor-Urteil wurde diese
allgemein konsensuelle Lesart des Textes entweder als positiv und produktiv im kriegskritischen Sinne
interpretiert oder als den deutschen Frontsoldaten diffamierend” (Thomas F. Schneider “’Krieg ist Krieg
schließlich’ - Erich Maria Remarque: Im Westen nichts Neues (1928),” Thomas F. Schneider, Hans
Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg, Amsterdamer
Beiträge zur neueren Germanistik, 231). For detailed discussions of Remarque’s stormy journalistic
reception, see Johannes Brautzsch, “Die Publikumswirksamkeit der Romane ‘Im Westen nichts Neues’ und
‘Der Weg zurück’ von Erich Maria Remarque vor 1933” (Dissertation phil. Pädagogische Hochschule
Potsdam 1969); Michael Gollbach, Die Wiederkehr des Weltkriegs in der Literatur: Zu den Frontromanen
der späten Zwanziger Jahre (Kronberg/Taunus: 1978); and Hans-Harald Müller, Der Krieg und die
Schriftsteller: Der Kriegsroman der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986).
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The present project is my initiative to enter that particular academic discourse from
another perspective on reception and to agree or disagree with a number of existing
findings by taking a different intellectual course.
My work repositions the debate on German battlefield fiction in a productive and
important fashion. It takes into account that popular fiction is, above all, a commodity, or
a product, that is consumed (= read and interpreted) by a mass audience for very specific
reasons. My thesis is that, in 1929, these reasons had to do with the male readers’
destroyed sense of self; or, one could say, with their inability to position their personal
war experiences within the vast and contradictory memory of the Great War: it did not
seem to make sense. I claim that nobody at the time read Remarque or the other war
novelists for the purpose of political education. Everyone’s political position regarding
the war had been fully formed years before that, in a series of memoirs and novels about
World War I reaching back over a decade, and that I will call to witness in deciphering
Remarque.
The war experience, I argue, was a huge, unassimilated trauma both on the
personal level (for most of the veterans) and on the national level, since the havoc was so
obvious, yet the Weimar Republic failed almost completely to address that trauma.
Weimar had very little healing power, not only because of the hated Versailles Treaty. In
terms of politics, Weimar was forward-looking, progressive, and concerned with getting
on with life. Millions of veterans balked at that. They resented the fact that their large
collective wound, which Klaus Theweleit refers to as a “narcissistic wound,” was given
no chance to heal, that it was not even seen or appreciated. This irked veterans from both
7
ends of the political spectrum: their wounds, disfigurements, sacrifices, and lost comrades
had become as worthless as the German currency by 1923. This oversight on the part of
the new men in power had serious consequences, as students of the period's politics have
long known. Yet a number of the psychological consequences of that war left traces in
memoir and fiction of that era that have not yet been called to witness. This project aims
to fill that gap.
In so doing, I will assume that this war fiction was written by men for men,
specifically by veterans for other veterans -- it is an insiders’ discourse -- although there
is evidence that the younger generation of men, born around 1910, also felt drawn to it.
Women play only minor roles in it, and there is scant information on women as readers.
Moreover, these novels are fictionalized accounts of the war. Authors used the war novel,
in the guise of the old Bildungsroman, for therapeutic reasons, as a free medium to blend
personal experience, historical verisimilitude, and a variety of male fantasies. The many
nuances on the same issue add up to a kaleidoscopic picture of German men in crisis.
If my basic position is right, then most of the research that was done on these
novels so far missed the target. It seems to me that many researchers, especially the
German ones, focused too heavily on the war novels’ critical reception, and take it for a
"truth" about the novels and their public. It is tempting to do so because such analyses
yield clear black-and-white results. On the other hand, the critical reception might well
reflect nothing other than the political standpoint of the critics at the time (or of the
newspapers and periodicals they worked for). In point of fact, detailed discussion of the
various books’ literary qualities did not even take place: critics tended to bypass whatever
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literary merits a book had, and instead attacked it on political grounds. Hans Harald
Müller does, to be sure, pay attention to literary strategy: he describes Im Westen nichts
Neues as a new poetic matrix, when compared with the older genre of officers’ memoirs
and factual war diaries. Michael Gollbach, on the other hand, simply puts the different
novels in different camps. Both critics focus exclusively on the resultant political
controversy. What images these novels offered their readers remains comparatively
unknown.
I want to accomplish something different than a simple political diagnosis of these
texts. In approaching these novels, I do not want to posit any particular theory a priori,
but treat them with appropriate sensitivity as narrative gestures -- as books that did or did
not speak to their audiences, judged by sales figures as a crude index to popularity. I want
to recreate, to the degree possible, at least one original perspective that would have been
familiar to German male readers in the late 1920s. My goal is to explore the personal
level on which these texts resonated, the matrix of expression and representation that
their original readers would have recognized and that mark theses texts as "authentic" for
the World War I experience.
For this reason, I will apply the reception (or reader-response) theory developed
by Iser and Jauss in the late 1960s. Iser and Jauss, the central figures of the Constance
School, revealed that traditional literary history and criticism had focused too heavily on
either the authors or the texts themselves, but blotted out the reader. They argued, and I
agree with them, that the actual meaning of a text is constructed through the reader’s
interaction with it. Depending on his cultural and intellectual environment, every reader
9
has a particular horizon of expectation that the text acts upon and answers to.10 Iser
created the concept of Leerstellen, blank spaces, that the reader fills in or interprets
according to what he knows.11 These battlefield novels are excellent examples of the
explosive power that such an interaction can release when appropriate Leerstellen are
provided to a readership that had earlier not had a voice or a chance to identify with what
is perceived as the truth and what is not, or what eventually emerges as the dominant
discourse on the war experience.
Iser’s theory of aesthetic response (Wirkungstheorie) differs from other theories
of reader response (Rezeptionstheorie). Significantly, Iser does not analyze actual
readings of texts, but proceeds from an ideal "implied reader." For Iser, the reader does
not mine out an objective meaning hidden within the text. Rather, literature generates
effects of meaning for the reader in a virtual space created between reader and text.
Although reader and text assume similar conventions from reality, texts leave great
portions unexplained to the reader, whether as gaps in the narrative or as structural limits
of the text’s representation of the world. This basic indeterminacy "implies" the reader
and begs his participation in synthesizing events of meaning throughout the process of
reading.
Such a theory of aesthetic response denies the simple dichotomy of fiction and
reality. According to Iser, fiction proposes alternate worlds created within the virtual
reality of the text’s meaning. In other words, in literature the actual and the possible can
10 Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, trans. Timothy Bathi (Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota P, 1982), 21.
11 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U P,
1978), 125.
10
exist simultaneously. Literature thus takes on a greater human function of imagining
beyond the given constraints of experience. For example, in the political sphere, Iser’s
theory of reading might commend a critical democratic politics that urges constant re-
examination of social and individual conventions by "deforming" and defamiliarizing
accepted perspectives. After The Act of Reading (1976), Iser began exploring these
broader implications of reading for human experience and constitution.
While battlefield fiction clearly had the potential to challenge social and
individual conventions with regard to the accepted model of masculinity, it ultimately did
not succeed in refashioning it. In the chapters which follow, I aim to recreate a likely
Erwartungshorizont of the German bourgeoisie in the late 1920s. My most important
source in doing so is certainly George Mosse, whose research shed light from various
angles on the tenacity of the nineteenth-century masculinity stereotype. Like Mosse, I
support the conclusion that the ideal of the German warrior-man prevailed in the Weimar
Republic and, to the extent that it was reshaped at all, the innovative impulses largely
came from writers like Ernst Jünger and other pro-war figures, not from the left. In other
words, the old manly ideal of the Prussian and then German-Imperial military of the
nineteenth century was not only maintained after the Great War, but actually
remilitarized, in consciousness as much as in reality. The left missed its chance to
articulate a different version of what that war meant for Germans and for a German
future.
One thing is certain: it would have been absolutely crucial for the left to unite and
gain the upper hand in the discourse about World War I in order to help stem the growing
11
influence of those from the right who refused to accept the hard lessons (not) learned
about Germany’s history. A novel alone could neither start nor resist such strong national
sentiments. Yet once the liberals had been muffled or become inaudible, and once the last
word in this public debate was ceded to the vociferous militarists and new nationalists,
this meant that they had free reign in the propagation of their own version of the historic
truth. Essentially, then, what motivated the quarreling over Im Westen nichts Neues as a
public representation of “the” war experience was the desire to win authority over “what
really happened,” to “own” the frontline experience. Trench warfare had been a crucible
for a generation, and ten years later, public opinion suddenly erupted into a fight over
how that crucible actually had affected the nation: did it “destroy an entire generation” –
as Remarque claimed – or “forge a new man” – as the new militarists and nationalists
wanted to believe.12
One of the central elements in the reactionaries’ spin on the historic truth was a
fabrication that became well-known as the Dolchstoßlegende. This myth, first professed
by Hindenburg and then adopted by other (para-)military leaders, claimed that the
“obedient troops” of the German army had never actually lost the war, but had in fact
been stabbed in the back. According to Hindenburg’s testimony before an investigative
commission in 1919, certain forces at home (meaning the social democrats in power)
caused “a secret intentional mutilation of the fleet and the army,” from which “the
12 Gollbach supports this view: “Das Fronterlebnis war für ihn [den soldatischen Nationalismus B.F.] das
zentrale Bildungserlebnis, Rechtfertigung und stete Bezugnahme. In den Materialschlachten hatte sich für
den soldatischen Nationalismus (so wie er von Ernst Jünger wesentlich mitgeprägt und propagiert wurde)
das neue Menschenbild des heroischen Kämpfers herausgebildet, für den Kampf und Krieg absolute Wert-
und Verhaltensweisen sind,” (Wiederkehr des Weltkrieges 33).
12
obedient troops who remained immune to revolutionary attrition […] suffered greatly.”13
In the aftermath of this outrageous refusal to accept Germany's national -- much less his
personal -- responsibility, Hindenburg’s charges were expanded, generalized, and
sensationalized to include the so-called “bolsheviks” and “the international Jewry” as
likely culprits. This myth was far-fetched but circulated widely among those who wanted
to believe it. When the Nazi movement gathered momentum in the late twenties, their
agitators gladly revived it to support their cause, with special emphasis on the supposed
role of the Jews. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the Dolchstoßlegende, like
any other conspiracy theory, initially seemed unlikely to many people.14 Im Westen nichts
Neues opened up a different vision of what had happened in the First World War, an
account different than that of the governments.
The war experience thus became a central negotiating point in Germany’s
national consciousness between 1918 and Hitler’s coming to power, particularly for the
frontline veterans who were being left behind. Battlefield novels (Frontromane), which
suddenly appeared en masse after 1928, play a central role in this context because they
touched old wounds that had not healed. Im Westen nichts Neues was an instant success
and, to many, nonetheless a major provocation.
13 Quoted in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Sourcebook (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994) 15.
14 Willi Wolfradt, one of the early contributors to the leftist periodical Die Weltbühne, discusses this very
question in an article that was published on June 15, 1922. At the beginning of the editorial, he flat-out
rejects the Dolchstoßlegende: “A stab in the back from the rebellious homeland caused the army to collapse
– no, the preponderance of enemy forces and severe mistakes on the part of the leadership were to blame.”
But then he makes a tactical mistake, in my opinion. The mistake is Wolfradt’s back-handed admission that
a stab in the back is not necessarily a bad thing: “No one has the courage required to own up to the heroic,
saving act of a stab in the back. […] The stab in the back, if it did occur, was self-defense, the desperate act
of a people in mortal danger.” Again, presenting a disunited front concerning crucial debate issues
weakened the left as a whole. Quoted in A. Kaes, M. Jay, E. Dimendberg eds., Weimar Sourcebook, 17.
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After outlining the background against which these novels were read
(representative officers’ memoirs) I will argue in this project that several factors came
together to make Remarque’s novel such an explosive topic of public discourse. Since the
Dolchstoßlegende and its offspring, the purported status of Germany as Im Felde
unbesiegt (undefeated on the battlefield), had the foul smell of a fabrication by a
government that had never taken care of its people, millions of war veterans waited for a
better explanation of Germany's calamity, which Remarque’s book provided -- an
explanation that somehow felt truer than any official party line.15
Im Westen nichts Neues took on this role when it represented the common
soldier’s response to the Dolchstoß, as it were. The new message it offered read: the
grunts in the trenches were not betrayed by their folks on the Heimatfront, but carelessly
tossed into the war by certain arrogant figures of authority.16 These figures of authority,
for example the infamous Sergeant Himmelstoß, are then exposed as cowardly and inept.
This establishes a dichotomy between good Germans/soldiers and bad Germans/soldiers.
As readers, we understand that the war was lost not by good Germans, but by an
incompetent military leadership that wasted the service and patriotism of their troops and
their homefront.
15 I make this assumption because the stereotypes of the war experience presented in Remarque's book
become the pattern for the era's war novels -- his novel becomes the "story grammar" which others reflect,
a very different kind of narrative than the war memoirs of the immediate post-World-War-I era or
nineteenth-century war novels.
16 It was clear that the last word about the war experience had not been spoken. The accounts of the war
that had been published between 1918 and 1923 were almost exclusively officers’ reports and diaries,
which presented only the officers’ perspective, talked about maneuvers and strategies, but contained very
little the common soldier could relate to. They were as unsatisfactory as the allegations that the
Dolchstoßlegende had made against social democrats, Jews and bolsheviks – the common soldier’s
experience in the trenches most likely did not support one or the other. See Hans-Harald Müller, Der Krieg
und die Schriftsteller, 34-37.
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Remarque’s book filled a void, it resonated, and it offered more believable
explanations for the World War I catastrophe -- an imminent cause rather than an abstract
conspiracy theory. Moreover, it was written in easy-to-read language, generously larded
with sentimentality and kitschy imagery, especially with regard to male bonding and
camaraderie. Remarque wrote, be it intuitively or intentionally, what millions of readers
wanted to hear, he catered to the needs and expectations of a mass audience that had not
yet found a reason for the catastrophic historic moments they had lived through. The
timing of the publication was also good because it came after a five-year lull during
which not much new had been said about the war, even though national consciousness
had found no healthy way of assimilating the trauma the war had caused. In fact, literary
consumption throughout the Weimar years up until that point was heavily dominated by
simple Unterhaltungs- and Abenteuerliteratur.17 Vergangenheitsbewältigung, a coming
to terms with traumatic history, had not yet begun on that level. War veterans were more
concerned with bringing their lives back to normal, and trying to forget the terrible losses
that the war had inflicted on many of them. Reading about innocent young lads who died
senselessly in the trenches touched a nerve with them.
17 Hagen Schulze points out that of the thirty-four book titles that sold over half a million copies between
1918 and 1933, only three were even written by Weimar writers (Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues,
Kästner, Emil und die Detektive, and Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks). Although Schulze forgets Manfred
von Richthofen, Der rote Kampfflieger, which sold over 700,000 copies by 1933, he makes an important
point. Above all, Weimar readers wanted to be distracted or lured into far-awar adventures: “Das Publikum
liest Hermann Löns, Walter Flex, Hans Carossa, vor allem aber Felix Graf Luckners Seeteufel, Gustav
Frenssens Jörn Uhl, Werner Beumelburgs Gruppe Bosemüller, Gorch Focks Seefahrt ist not!, Hans
Grimms Volk ohne Raum oder Clara Viebigs Wacht am Rhein – eine Mischung aus gemütvoller
Innerlichkeit und nationalpathetischem Kriegserlebnis, stilistisch epigonal bis belanglos. Die größten
Auflagenerfolge haben noch immer die Abenteuerromane von Karl May, und Hedwig Courths-Mahler hat
nie so viele Leser gefunden wie in dem Jahrzehnt zwischen 1918 und 1928” (Hagen Schulze, Weimar –
Deutschland 1917-1933 [Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1982] 125. For a listing of the most popular works
related to the war, see Appendix I.
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The fictional Paul Bäumer and his friends from school, like Remarque himself,
were immediately stylized into poster boys of what Gertrude Stein labelled “the lost
generation” -- men derailed by the war who would otherwise have enjoyed a safe
bourgeois existence. Remarque’s publisher, Ullstein Konzern Berlin, launched a major
advertising campaign to enhance the impression that this was a story of humanity ruined,
not a political tract. Remarque maintained in interviews that he had written the
manuscript in about six weeks after coming home from the office, and that is the way the
story had been printed, first by the Vossische Zeitung, and then by Propyläen-Verlag. He
repeatedly emphasized that writing down these “events” was a cathartic act, self-
administered therapy, an attempt to shake off recurring bouts of depression caused by the
traumatic experiences ten years prior. This story of genesis has now been revealed as
fiction. Remarque, in fact, reworked his manuscript according to his publisher’s
suggestions, which were clearly aimed at de-politicizing the story and making it a
commercial success.18 The publishers then touted the book as “the truth” penned by some
“unknown soldier” from “the gray masses” (compare Schneider 228).
All of these characteristics (and machinations within the public’s horizon of
expectation) contributed to the novel’s mass success, both inside and outside Germany.
Im Westen nichts Neues opened up the floodgates, and what starting pouring out were all
of the things that had not been said about the Great War. This sudden deluge of belated
war writings was certainly therapeutic to the national trauma, a statement of the
18 For a detailed account of Remarque’s interaction with his publisher, see Thomas F. Schneider “’Krieg ist
Krieg schließlich’ - Erich Maria Remarque: Im Westen nichts Neues (1928),” Thomas F. Schneider and
Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg,
Amsterdamer Beiträge zur neueren Germanistik 53 (New York and Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003) 218-232.
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heretofore unstated. But, in retrospect, it seems that no one was actually healed. At least
those who made a physical recovery and managed to come to terms with the carnage they
had seen in the trenches did not manage to convince the rest of the nation that the war
was worse than folks at home seemed to think, and so that the talk of new wars needed to
be unthinkable. Talk of enduring peace and moderate politics certainly did not win the
day. Instead, very quickly people were blinded, bullied, or coaxed along by the National
Socialist movement into embracing precisely the kind of war that had brought the nation
to its knees once earlier. The insane idea took hold that the damage of the First World
War could somehow be undone, and that the nation could regain its former strength, as if
the losses of one war could be compensated by waging another war.
Therefore, it was not surprising, but rather to be expected, that Im Westen nichts
Neues, a huge success as a work of popular literature, would be the catalyst for a fully-
fledged Culture War. I will try to substantiate the claim that the book resonated not only
on a political, but even more so on a more visceral level, as a kind of objectification of a
socio-political trauma that ended up being used in other than therapeutic ways. I intend to
show that the Culture War between the various critics and authors was fought principally
over two main contentious issues: (1) the political and cultural legacy of the lost World
War, a familiar perspective; and (2) an attendant and necessary redefinition of German
masculinity which the war experience had brought with it, a cultural concept which had
been severed from its nineteenth-century roots due to the horrific failure and lasting
disorientation in the aftermath of the war. The gestalt of this objectified war experience -
- the representations of these experiential reference points presented in its more distilled
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form in Im Westen nichts Neues -- were, in this Culture War, actively refashioned for
various purposes. The novel thus became more than a topic of conversation, it became the
worldview which sponsored many related conversations.
That a war novel formed the center of this particular public discourse is not in
itself surprising. It is fair to say that battlefield novels are normally written by male
authors with sufficient military knowledge to present a convincing case to predominantly
male readers who may or may not be experts on the matter of war. Employing a male
code of communication is thus part of the trade, and so creates a context expressive of
male concerns. In the historical context of the late Weimar years, the readers of the semi-
fictionalized war accounts were certainly experts in the discourse that Remarque’s book
had again made public; in fact, many of them were probably war veterans who knew
more about the war than Remarque did. He and the other war authors had to be aware that
their readers already had a subjective realm of experience that might clash with the one
they described in their novels (the problem of describing “the right war”). They had to
overcome understandable reluctance on the part of the readers to identify with the people
and events they depicted, if those events were still painful.
Little wonder that left-wing and liberal war novel authors provoked much outrage
and anger. Yet I believe these emotional responses are related to the issue of
identification and its political and social consequences, and more deeply than critics
dealing with the novels’ reception have assumed to this point. As I assess the situation,
veterans needed these books, they were overdue; these lost men wanted to identify with
the soldiers in the novels to see their own fate in a new light.
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What if this identification left a bad taste in their mouth -- what if the familiar
references in this discourse took the readers to an uncomfortable place? I am going to
investigate the possibility that identification with the fictional characters automatically
could, if blocked, actually produce scorn and fury among the readers who were
transacting different forces in identifying their new roles in Weimar as soldiers and men
and hence were forced to confront (but not necessarily to accept) dichotomies in their
roles. Keep in mind that writing about World War I meant in many cases that writers put
their fingers directly on open wounds. Veterans were not only officially defeated as
soldiers of the German Imperial Army, but also emasculated as German men -- they
could no longer be Imperial soldiers or citizens of anything but a defeated nation.
Therefore, special attention will be given to the problem of masculinity and its literary
renditions in this context.
STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT
The prevailing images of German masculinity that had guided generations of
German males into the ethical and social codes of the nation were destroyed by the events
of World War I and its aftermath. For ten years thereafter (in First-Generation memoirs
from front generals and politicians), literature about the war offered very little that
individual male readers could use to reconstruct a positive image of the German man as a
social and political being, specifically, to recast the (defeated) German war veteran as
part of a new Germany. They had no Erwartungshorizont of images that expressed their
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experience in terms that could tie it to the future of the nation. Since traditional
perceptions of masculinity were shattered by the war, literature had to take up the same
war and rework its memory to have a therapeutic effect and fill this gap, and it was
Remarque's novel that did so most clearly.
In general, literature can only have such a popular, therapeutic effect if readers
can identify with at least one of the protagonists. That is the reason why First Generation
war literature about World War I -- memoirs by officers and politicians -- was both
ineffective and unpopular among popular readers, as elucidated in the first section of the
project below. A mass readership would be barred from identification with it in many
ways, but most often because this literature consisted of officers’ diaries or personal
memoirs. That first wave of war literature, while a powerful expression of what was lost,
thus did not qualify as a literature that could redefine masculinity for a more general
public, or for more general social and political purposes. It looked backwards to the
world that was lost rather than forward into Weimar.
Starting in 1928, a Second Generation of fictionalized war literature flooded the
nation, and these narratives about the war experience proved much more popular than the
old-school "factual" accounts of the earlier generation because they dealt with common
war experiences, not just the facts of individual lives (heroes, martyrs, or politicians).
This fiction provided realistic story-lines and protagonists that acted out archetypal
conflicts between “good” and “bad ” as experienced in the war and as the nation framed
it. Because of the general economic downturn and social unrest, war veterans and other
German readers whose masculine self-image had been adversely affected by the war were
20
in the late 1920s in desperate need of positive role-models, positive images of
masculinity with whom they could identify in order to reestablish their self-worth as part
of the nation, warriors for the social and national good. The new generation of battlefield
novels provided such images, in a very nuanced fashion, to readers of the entire political
spectrum, from the far left (Scharrer, Plivier) to the leftist bourgeoisie (Remarque, Renn,
Köppen) to the conservative bourgeoisie (Federn), to the right-wing individualist
(Jünger), to the right-wing militaristic collective (Beumelburg, Schauwecker, Zöberlein).
But Remarque is the one who remains most visible today, perhaps because he came
closest of all to creating something like a community of experience that spanned
generations and classes, to a degree at least.
In the Second Generation of war books after World War I, verifiable factual
information about the war as a larger historical event is secondary to representations of
the roles which many shared in the trenches and on the front lines. Instead, battlefield
novels provide a vision of society to their readers by offering them positive and negative
images of masculinity that help the male reader reassess his personal self-image and
(historic) role as a man in a world transformed by conflict. To make this case, I will
discuss a number of novels in which the relevant role models are all German soldiers and
whose tacit or overt goal is to tie the experience of World War I into various interwar
political needs.
These novels work for their audiences, I argue, because they take up one of the
traditional master signifiers of the German nation (military as an honorable career
supporting the nation), and offer their readers specifically retailored images of the
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German soldier as masculine ideals for the nation. Masculinity, in this context, always is
portrayed as equivalent with being a soldier. Because of this commonality, I claim that
most of these novels share a number of universals aimed at rewriting the image of the
German man for the postwar world, regardless of the particular politics the novel
espouses. These universals are the more unpolitical attributes of masculinity, e.g.
courage, loyalty to friends/camaraderie, resourcefulness, a crude sense of humor, physical
strength, and the ability to endure hardships. These elements of the male code play a
positive role in any battlefield novel of this era (and perhaps beyond), regardless of the
political orientation of the author. However, there are some attributes that right-wing
authors (and critics) reject as effete or un-German, while leftist-bourgeois authors (and
critics) value them. These attributes include artistic talent, sensitivity, and above-average
intellectual ability.
How these general tropes of masculinity are handled in detail, then, allows these
novels to emerge as distinct political statements, despite the fact that they rest on a
common perception that Germany needs to redefine the masculine. What distinguishes
left-wing war fiction from right-wing war fiction are two main differences: (1) the
ideological orientation of the main protagonist(s) with regard to fighting the war; (2) the
extent to which the main protagonist displays individuality, independent thinking, and
even disobedience.
In right-wing war fiction, for instance, the “good soldier” readily subjects himself
to a more competent Führer-figure who shoulders the responsibility and takes charge of
decision-making in his stead (unless he is a born Führer-figure himself, as Ernst Jünger
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believes). Left-wing authors, in contrast, like to endow their protagonists with the ability
to think critically for themselves, which often leads to ideological repositioning vis-à-vis
the war. Male readers across the political spectrum and across social classes mechanically
latch on to those soldier-characters with whom they want to identify: characters that are
heroic and brave, but otherwise act and think similarly. In this way, I believe, this
particular war literature emerges as a distinct contribution to the new nationalist project
of Germany, not just as a narrow Tendenzliteratur, but as a narrative of postmemory
specifically tailored for the larger German cultural traditions.
Chapter one examines the issue of the war experience and German masculinity
from the both the right-wing nationalist and leftist-bourgeois points of view. It argues that
both mechanisms of masculinity construction share a wider range of traits than one would
expect. They also both omit a number of uncomfortable truths about trench warfare the
way it had actually taken place. Section two of the first chapter addresses these omissions
which, while universally suppressed in both left and right bourgeois war fiction, did
surface in the far left proletarian works, as well as in the one better-known war novel by a
female author. The literary evidence in support of these findings include Adrienne
Thomas’ Die Katrin wird Soldat (1930), Theodor Plivier’s Des Kaisers Kulis (1930), and
Adam Scharrer’s Vaterlandslose Gesellen (1929). Section three provides the historical
context to these literary models of masculinity construction. Leaning on George Mosse’s
extensive research on the subject of German manhood between the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, I will show that virtually none of the war novels actually covered new
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ground. Interestingly, it was only the proletarian protagonists who took an unflinching
look at the failure of German masculinity to assume agency.
Chapter two contains an analysis of the right-wing nationalist myth fabrication
that ultimately helped the man = soldier equation to prevail. The first section describes
the political impact of the Dolchstoßlegende as it was propagated by Ludendorff and
Hindenburg. It also shows how this myth was incorporated into a body of existing
discourse on the demise of German society and the necessity to re-erect German national
strength via the creation of a new man. Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, and Arthur
Moeller van den Bruck are among the champions of this new masculinity and new
nationalism.
Section two focuses on the similarities and differences between authors around
Remarque and the right-wing militarists and nationalists who wrote pro-war novels. The
most prominent authors in this category are certainly Manfred von Richthofen, with his
bestseller Der rote Kampfflieger (1917), and Ernst Jünger, who had already written a
powerful testimony with his first novel In Stahlgewittern (1920), which was based on the
events Jünger himself recorded in a diary during the war. Jünger was a prolific writer and
a colorful, not to say eccentric, person. In terms of his political views, he cannot be
classified as easily as the other völkisch right-wing writers this chapter deals with. Most
critically, Jünger was an intelligent individualist, able to form his own opinion, and he
knew how to write: his prose has a uniquely factual style, and his descriptions are eerily
powerful. He was able to move his audience to a level of abstraction that seemed to
sublimate the mud, blood, and gore into a surreal landscape.
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Other pro-war writers of the era, such as Franz Schauwecker, who wrote Aufbruch
der Nation (1929), Werner Beumelburg, who produced Die Gruppe Bosemüller (1930),
Joseph Magnus Wehner, who authored Sieben vor Verdun (1930), and Hans Zöberlein,
who penned Der Glaube an Deutschland (1931), might not have become known for what
they wrote under normal circumstances because their works are very formulaic. What
made them so popular was the fact that the German readership of battlefield novels
around 1930 was already polarized into pro-war and anti-war factions. It did not matter
that these books were often badly written, brimming with clichés, and monodimensional;
if you preach to the choir, sometimes all you have to do is support and dramatize the
point of view the audience already has.
In this case, the point of view of these right-wing novels hinges on the
Dolchstoßlegende and the condemnation of the democratic government. These writers
make every attempt to shift the responsibility onto their political adversaries – social
democrats, communists, pacifists – to exculpate the heroic German fighter, with whom
they strongly identify. They insinuate that German soldiers, if they had been left to their
own devices, would not have lost the war. The resurrection of such manly virtues as
courage and fighting spirit, which had been crushed by the troops’ actual war experience,
was one of the most important functions of pro-war militarist fiction written at that time.
In their minds, the entire heritage of the German nation and its embodiment, the German
soldier, was at stake. The new nationalists felt that they had to counter the defeatist
notion, propagated by Remarque and others, that civilization and humanity itself had
been destroyed by the war. They could not admit that the strongest and ablest members of
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the German nation, namely fighting men between the ages of seventeen and thirty, had
been annihilated in such vast numbers with no benefit to the country. Just as much as the
Remarque alternates, then, these writers felt the urgent need to make sense of the
senseless war experience, only that their construction of meaning was largely based on
myths and irrationality.19 They sought to revalue the German soldier as a paradigm.
Das Fronterlebnis, the front line experience, the way the right-wingers pictured it,
was a baptism of fire associated with strength, courage, endurance and camaraderie, with
everything that was good, noble and “truly German.” They associated the Weimar
Republic, in contrast, with everything that was weak, corrupt and decadent. Therefore,
the pro-war writers positioned their fiction as a counterpoint to the parliamentary system
and linked the virtues of the heroic German warrior to nebulous political principles
regarding the new völkisch society they envisioned. As writers they form a homogeneous
group that played out variations of a main theme: “The German soldier was stabbed in
the back. He is really made for fighting and much stronger than it seems after the lost
war.” As opposed to those authors like Remarque, the right-wingers, with the exception
of Ernst Jünger, do not remain true to their personal war experiences. Their writings are
more ideological and overtly motivational (for other men in distress).
Chapter three, then, takes up the most contentious of all the war novels, namely
Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues, including all the details and motivations
19 Again, the most popular myths were the Dolchstoß/ Im Felde unbesiegt, as well as the jubilant
excitement of the “August Days” of 1914 when hundreds of thousands of young Germans volunteered for
military conscription. The völkisch ideas that informed the new nationalism, e.g. viewing the nation as one
able body, are actually elements of the old nationalism of the early nineteenth century as propagated by
Jahn, Arndt and others.
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surrounding its wild reception. It also discusses the ingredients of Remarque’s amazingly
successful recipe as giving voice to a specific kind of experience. I will argue that his
novel made such a powerful impact precisely because it was unpolitical, innocuous and
unobjectionable: everything in the book is so general that it is unlikely any reader felt
irritated by the specificity of information -- there is no information that would polarize
readers into categories. Its message is that “soldiers suffer.” In this way, it is fair to say
that Remarque created an epitome of Trivialliteratur -- “literary fast food” -- a book that
aims at mass taste and offers little morsels of pickle, mustard, or tomato to everyone, with
no attention to any (intellectual) nutritional value. The magic behind this simple recipe is
that every consumer is accommodated, with a high likelihood of similar experiences, so
that most readers can relate to the events of the book on some level. His story dovetailed
nicely with most Germans’ horizons of expectation (Erwartungshorizont) at the time.20
Chapter four discusses other authors who seemed to share Remarque’s world
view and semi-fictionalized the war experience in a comparable fashion. Im Westen
20 Hans Robert Jauss created and popularized the term “horizon of expectation.” The horizon of
expectation varies from reader to reader because everyone has a slightly different disposition toward, say, a
new novel about World War I, which is determined by factors like one’s previous exposure to literature or
one’s personal education and life experiences. I claim that Remarque responded masterfully to the horizon
of expectation not only of certain individuals, but of hundreds of thousands of war veterans whose war
experiences had not been processed or addressed by an appropriate literary form. Jauss suggests three
factors that can help an author determine what the Erwartungshorizont of an anonymous mass readership
may be: “Die Möglichkeit der Objektivierung des Erwartungshorizontes ist aber auch bei historisch
weniger profilierten Werken gegeben. Denn die spezifische Disposition, mit der ein Autor bei seinem
Publikum für ein bestimmtes Werk rechnet, kann beim Fehlen expliziter Signale auch aus drei allgemein
voraussetzbaren Faktoren gewonnen werden: erstens aus bekannten Normen oder der immanenten Poetik
der Gattung, zweitens aus den impliziten Beziehungen zu bekannten Werken der literaturhistorischen
Umgebung und drittens aus dem Gegensatz von Fiktion und Wirklichkeit, poetischer und praktischer
Funktion der Sprache, der für den reflektierenden Leser während der Lektüre als Möglichkeit des
Vergleichs immer gegeben ist. Der dritte Faktor schließt ein, daß der Leser ein neues Werk sowohl im
engeren Horizont seiner literarischen Erfahrung als auch im weiteren Horizont seiner Lebenserfahrung
wahrnehmen kann.” See Hans Robert Jauss, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft,
ed. Gerhard Hess (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag 1967) 34-35.
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nichts Neues clearly stole the show, but other anti-war novels also contributed important
psychological insights into the front soldier’s growing rebellion against the parent
generation and the senseless slaughter of war. Im Westen nichts Neues becomes the
bellwether for a mini-genre, namely narratives that describe a coming-of-age during
wartime, resulting in a rapid loss of innocence, broken dreams, frustration, brutality,
cynicism, and occasionally severe estrangement from the bourgeois world, which
manifests itself in the rejection of authority -- a narrative appealing to a particular
generation, to the young front-line soldier now seeing ahead a disappointed middle age.
In fact, these narratives can easily be considered modern adaptations of an older
genre, the Bildungsroman, which Goethe popularized with his Wilhelm Meisters
Lehrjahre (1795).21 Several of these war-time adaptations of the genre predate
Remarque’s novel and probably surpass it in literary quality. Ludwig Renn’s Krieg
(1927/28), Edlef Köppen’s Heeresbericht (1930), Ernst Johannsen’s Vier von der
21 Bernard Selinger refers to Jerome Buckley’s helpful description of the Bildungsroman in this passage:
“A child grows up in the country or in a town where he finds ‘constraints’ placed upon him. He leaves to
make his way in the city -- which usually brings disenchantment -- where his ‘real education’ begins and he
is compelled to ‘reappraise his values,’ usually after ‘at least two love affairs and sexual encounters, one
debasing, one exalting’ […]. Once he decides, after much ‘soul-searching, which sort of accommodation to
the world he can honestly make, he has left his adolescence behind and entered upon his maturity. His
initiation complete, he may then visit his old home, to demonstrate by his presence the degree of his
success’ […]. Although, as Buckley concedes, no one novel follows this pattern exactly, most
bildungsroman novels adopt the majority of the genre's principal elements: childhood, the conflict of the
generations, provinciality, the larger society, self-education, alienation, and ordeal by love. Also, the child
will normally be an orphan or […] fatherless or repelled by a living father. According to Buckley, ‘The loss
of the father, either by death or alienation, usually symbolizes or parallels a loss of faith in the values of the
hero's home and family and leads inevitably to the search for a substitute parent or creed’ […]. David Miles
notes that nature often becomes a central part of the sought-for creed, serving the protagonist as ‘protectress
and guide, in typically Rousseauean fashion, in place of ill-advised 'bourgeois morals.'" Compare Bernard
Selinger, "House Made of Dawn: A Positively Ambivalent Bildungsroman," MFS Modern Fiction Studies
45, No. 1 (Spring 1999), 38-68.
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Infanterie (1930), Ernst Glaeser’s Jahrgang 1902 (1928), Georg von der Vring’s Soldat
Suhren (completed 1923, published 1927), Karl Federn’s Hauptmann Latour (1929), and
Arnold Zweig’s Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa (1927) were the seven most
widely-read novels in this group, and therefore form the basis of my discussion. All of
these novels, some of which reached considerable popularity, feature eighteen- or
nineteen-year-old protagonists from the middle or lower middle class.
Typically, the coming-of-age process in these narratives unfolds along a certain
trajectory that mirrors the structure of the traditional Bildungsroman: the protagonist
enlists for military service voluntarily and enthusiastically -- with or without high school
friends -- goes through basic military training, is sent to the front lines, makes contact
with the enemy, sees other soldiers die, loses comrades, experiences the importance of
male bonding, rebels against unfairness or frivolous abuse of authority, reflects on the
meaninglessness of the war, is wounded and sent home for recovery, feels out of place at
home and has difficulty communicating with family members, returns to the front line
and eventually reaches an end. That end could be the end of his own life (Remarque), the
end of the war (Renn), or the end of his active participation in the war (Köppen). It is
usually a first-person narrator who steers the reader through the terrible course delineated
by these milestones and invites him to identify with his experiences.
Not surprisingly, women play almost no role in these narratives because women
were largely absent from day-to-day existence in the trenches. There are mothers and
nurses, of course, who care for the wounded or hungry soldier, but female figures in other
roles are conspicuously rare. Episodes of love and sexual encounters are important
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components of the traditional Bildungsroman. In the battlefield novel, these episodes are
replaced with scenes of male-male affection or descriptions of romantic camaraderie. The
soldiers’ yearning for women, young, clean women in summer dresses, seems to belong
to the other world, a world they have left behind. Women are the other. The intense male
bonding that occurs in the trenches transcends sexual love and rises to a non-sexual level
approaching pure love.22 The reader understands that such pure love defies the brutality
of the setting, overcomes class distinctions as well as bourgeois notions of shame, and
does not require a material basis. That love is also strictly non-verbal; everyone knows it
but nobody talks to the others about it. It is a platonic love that shines through in
cherished rituals, e.g. smoking, playing cards, stealing food, or using the latrine together,
as well as in courageous acts of selflessness and solidarity. These frontline soldiers
become each other’s brothers, fathers, mothers, and absent lovers. These various
functions and types of interaction are also taken up again in chapter one, where I will
discuss these issues on the language level to show how masculine code is employed for a
nuanced redefinition of masculinity in these novels.
My conclusion will corroborate the view that the debate about the war, the truth,
and German masculinity was never really literary, but, in fact, overtly political and
covertly gender-ideological. Authors and critics cared less about the war then about their
self-image as men. These are issues that are largely unresolved even today, especially in
Germany. For instance, German men are conflicted about issues like patriotism or
22 Theweleit discusses this issue in Male Fantasies (vol. I, 52-62), but chooses to approach it in terms of
“repressed sexuality” or “latent homosexuality.”
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military service, and do not know if they can be “proud to be German men” -- many feel
burdened or guilty and look for foreign role models. I claim that there is a chink in the
“male armor” -- the discourse on German masculinity has not been “intact” since 1918,
and the 1920s novels depicting German men at war did little to help restore it. Therefore,
it is likely that the analysis of male code can produce important results in other areas and
later eras of German (or Austrian) literature as well.
I will suggest instead that history overtrumped public discourse, and that the
Frontromane were never able to complete the task they set for themselves: the age of
modernity accelerated human endeavor in almost every aspect of life, while the
development of discourses about modern (German) masculinity was actually decelerated,
even stymied, by the traumatic experience of losing two subsequent wars.23 The Weimar
years, as well as the periods following World War II and the 1989 German reunification,
again assigned to many groups of German men new gender roles that many perceived as
powerless and humiliating. In terms of its psychological and social functions, literature
(and, after 1989, films) containing viable and positive models of (German) masculinity
thus again gained special importance during those times.
Other researchers of Weimar battlefield novels have hitherto largely overlooked
that the political positions held by authors and critics at the time reflected their gender
ideologies, hence their beliefs about masculinity. Yet in 1928, as my cases show, and as I
will return to in the conclusion of this study, the German male public struggled over the
power to create -- through war literature -- the dominant male role model, a particular
23 Compare Kingerlee, Models of Masculinity, xiii.
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soldier-type, which included the right to write the dominant discourse on the war
experience in general. Due to the cultural conditioning that bourgeois and aristocratic
German men had undergone since the early nineteenth century, the man-athlete-warrior
equation continued to be so powerful between 1919 and 1945 that every criticism of the
war, or the German soldier, was a simultaneous attack on the German man and the
patriarchal military hierarchy he had erected. At the same time, that self-image had
grown so arcane and rigid that it could not easily be modified by the bourgeoisie. During
the last five years of the Weimar Republic, then, only certain authors on the far left of the
political spectrum started the grinding and painful process to rethink nineteenth century
masculine ideals.24
The male cult of the Nazi era sought to stop that process. Yet the Third Reich did
not produce any gender role models that German men (or women) could adapt or
perpetuate after 1945. This void created a vacuum of acceptable models of masculinity, a
repeat of the World-War-I situation after World War II, both in West-Germany and the
GDR. The GDR’s new model became the socialist worker who readily subordinates his
own needs to the benefit of the socialist state -- he is a team player rather than
hypermasculine. This model, however, was artificial because it was officially prescribed
from the top down; it lost all its relevance after the 1990 reunification. In West Germany,
the issue was more complex because men relied on a variety of role models, mostly from
24 As Roger Kingerlee proves with his work on shifting concepts of masculinity during the Weimar
Republic, literature was indeed the experimental nexus from which a redefinition of the old gender role
originated. His work focuses on Alfred Döblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), Robert Musil’s Der Mann
ohne Eigenschaften (vol. I, 1930; vol. II, 1932), and Hans Henny Jahnn’s Perrudja (1929).
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the sports world or from U.S. movie culture. “What kind of man am I supposed to be?”
has remained an open question in both the old and the new Germanys.
RELATED RESEARCH AND METHOD
As noted above, much has been written about the reception and mass success of
Im Westen nichts Neues and other battlefield novels, but very little appeared before the
late 1960s. It is as if the literary treatment of World War I as an academic research topic
lay dormant for several decades before scholars seized upon it. I believe this neglect has
to do with the fact that most of the battlefield novels published by German authors in
Germany were essentially pulp fiction. As I mentioned above, these novels seem
calculated to fulfill the important function of alleviating some of the trauma caused by the
war, but they definitely did not climb to literary heights. Therefore, they were of little
interest to old-school literary scholars, whose primary concern was literary analysis.
From the other side, the social sciences at that time did not necessarily recognize the
importance of popular fiction, either.
Two of the earliest German scholars who published their research on Weimar
battlefield novels were Johannes Brautzsch and Michael Gollbach, whose books came out
in 1969 and 1977.25 These two dissertations laid important groundwork for later research
because they documented and preserved evidence of the original reception very carefully.
25 Johannes Brautzsch, “Die Publikumswirksamkeit der Romane ‘Im Westen nichts Neues’ und ‘Der Weg
zurück’ von Erich Maria Remarque vor 1933” (Dissertation phil. Pädagogische Hochschule Potsdam
1969); Michael Gollbach, Die Wiederkehr des Weltkriegs in der Literatur: Zu den Frontromanen der
späten Zwanziger Jahre (Kronberg/Taunus: 1978) (comp. Müller 61).
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They also began to categorize the sheer volume of the stormy reception into politically
identifiable camps so that the individual critics’ likely motivations became more
transparent. Nevertheless, and I agree with Hans-Harald Müller here, both of these
seminal works did not provide a satisfactory explanation of Remarque’s unparalleled
success. Brautzsch rejected the hypothesis that the novel’s popular appeal was somehow
connected to the devastating economic crisis of 1929, which is an explanation that
socialist GDR scholars subscribed to at the time, but he produced no alternative
explanation of his own. Gollbach attributed the success to “a re-awakening of popular
interest in war as a literary topic,” following a period of “repression” from national
consciousness (see Müller 61). Müller acknowledges both explanation attempts but sees
no evidence to support them. He reminds us that contemporary scholars have the
disadvantage of not being able to conduct first-hand empirical research because all the
original readers of Remarque’s novel are dead. He points out that we have to rely on the
critical reception that was published in newspapers and journals during the last years of
the Weimar Republic, which means that any of our explanation attempts are not entirely
free of speculation (see Müller 62).
With this caveat in mind, Müller formulates three hypotheses that he considers
central to our understanding of Remarque’s huge success. He claims that: (1) readers at
the time had problems that were similar to the problems (they believed) the novel
addressed; (2) the novel fulfills a number of elementary demands regarding concepts with
which readers could solve their problems; and (3) the novel was hailed as a success by
journals (comp. Müller 62, my own translation). What he suggests is that, ten years after
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the war, many readers realized that their lives did not measure up to the dreams and
ambitions they once had. Many had not reached their professional goals, were
impoverished, sick or disabled, and had lost friends and family members. As long as
civilian life in the Weimar Republic was marked by a series of social, political, and
economic crises, people may not have noticed the crisis in their own lives as much, but
when a certain level of stability had been reached, they started looking for explanations.
Plausibly, then, with more pressing problems to deal with in their daily lives, war
veterans did not have time to think.26
Müller’s second hypothesis, namely that Im Westen nichts Neues also offered
strategies to help readers cope with their own problems, is less convincing. It is true, the
novel’s simple explanation that “the war destroyed the lives of an entire generation”
constitutes a significant “reduction of complexity,” as Müller puts it, but, of course, it
also reflects a more or less banal perspective (see Müller 63). According to Müller, the
therapeutic effect of reading Remarque in the late 1920s was two-fold. First, war
veterans were presented with the blanket explanation that the war itself was to blame for
whatever may have gone wrong in their lives afterwards. Therefore, they could stop
searching for more specific or more uncomfortable reasons behind their plight. Second,
they also did not have to feel as guilty in the eyes of society for their postwar failure. The
alienating and traumatic circumstances described in Im Westen nichts Neues exculpated
them from any and all personal failures in civilian life.
26 In fact, it would be interesting to investigate this matter with veterans of other lost wars; Vietnam, for
example. It is conceivable that there are parallels between All Quiet on the Western Front and whichever
book or movie was most popular among Vietnam veterans around 1985.
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Arguably, Im Westen nichts Neues made identification easy for most veterans
from the bourgeoisie or the working class. To the extent that these readers accepted
Remarque’s “problem-solving concept,” they could follow his lead and blame the parent
generation for leading innocent youths into a senseless and horrible war. However,
Müller’s entire argumentation that Remarque’s novel was primarily autobiographical, or
that Remarque wrote it for the personal benefit of alleviating his feelings of depression
and guilt, has been disproved. It is also highly unlikely that he wrote the book in six or
eight weeks after coming home from the office. According to Thomas F. Schneider, one
of the most eminent Remarque scholars, the author carefully edited the manuscript in
order to comply with the marketing strategy suggested by his publisher (Ullstein,
Berlin).27 Schneider debunks the myth that the book was particularly “authentic” or
somehow expressed “the truth.” I share his view that Im Westen nichts Neues is a piece of
commercial popular fiction that was particularly open to all kinds of interpretations.
The scholarship on Remarque and other Weimar war novelist is only one side of
the project. It is complemented by scholarship on the masculinity issue, whose best-
known contributor is probably Klaus Theweleit. Theweleit is a German cultural critic and
art historian who gained considerable acclaim with his massive two-volume book Male
Fantasies, originally published in Germany in 1977, then translated into English in
1987.28 This book gave a push to the developing area of masculinity studies, which
27 For more details about the pre-publication history of all Quiet on the Western Front, see Thomas F.
Schneider, “Krieg ist Krieg schließlich,” 219-232.
28 Klaus Theweleit, Männerfantasien, 2 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld Verlag, 1977 and 1978);
Male Fantasies (Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1987 and 1989). According to Roger Kingerlee,
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eclectically combines insights and methods from literary and cultural studies, sociology,
psychology, and anthropology. Male Fantasies was an illustrated study of the relations
between misogyny and the fascist mindset. More precisely, he undertook a Freudian
interpretation of the letters, fiction, and propaganda created by members of the Freikorps.
“Theweleit examines the mind of the soldier and provides a theory of the functioning of
the soldierly psyche with special reference to its relationship to power and the struggle
for survival” (Kingerlee 2).
He demonstrates that Freikorps mercenaries’ militarism, misogyny, and anti-
Semitism “were driven by a fear of dissolving boundaries, a reactive need to affirm the
body’s hardness and invulnerability, a phobic resistance to the ‘oceanic,’ and to flows
and flexibilities of all sorts: these latter being associated with the maternal, the sexual, the
feminine, etc.”29 Theweleit tied his analysis very closely to “the particularities of time,
place, culture, and social class; and suggested how the pathology he uncovered had larger
resonances throughout the history of misogynistic Western culture.”30 Essentially,
Theweleit produced an extensive Freudian case study. Its results confirm (the early)
Wilhelm Reich’s analysis of “the mass psychology of fascism” and of rigidified,
repressive “character armor.” In a nutshell, Theweleit’s psychological analysis of the
Freikorps soldiers yielded the presumption that because they found women threatening,
soldiers attempted to banish them from the men’s world.
Männerfantasien is “the highest-selling doctoral work ever written in Germany” (Kingerlee, Männliches,
Allzumännliches, 2).
29 Dagmar Herzog, A liberal studies blog@USF » Blog Archive » BOOKFORUM review of “Sex After
Fascism” September 26th, 2005 at 6:55 am, http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=280.
30 Ibid.
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Most of what Theweleit used as written evidence was solely first-hand non-
fictional writing, a relatively specialized genre with limited readership. Moreover,
psychological themes of the body that Theweleit uses occlude real sociological and
political differences among the populations who might be susceptible to Freikorps
propaganda -- that the same literature might have had different readings, or that different
publics might have very similar texts in the era. Yet my examples argue that we need to
look beyond the war and beyond censorship, and at the ways in which first-hand war
experiences were fictionalized, to find the important answers.
The present project thus re-examines all of Theweleit’s findings and seeks
evidence for or against them in the original battlefield novels. In a series of close readings
offered as the bodies of the chapters which follow, therefore, primary attention is given to
the male code embedded in the war discourse on which these novels read, and to the way
it would have been read by German men, especially war veterans, in the late twenties.
Based on a historical excursion into the nineteenth century, I will reconstruct the basic
elements of German masculine ideals leading up to World War I. Combined with the
historical knowledge of the traumatic events during and after the war, one can make
informed assumptions about the cultural horizon of expectation German readers had vis-
à-vis the Frontromane of the late 1920s, and thus add nuance and perception of how the
dislocations of the First World War were signaled within to many sectors of the German
populace, to condition personal choices and identity politics.
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Chapter One:
The War Experience and German Masculinity
This chapter sets the stage for the various manifestations of German masculinity
as they appear in the fifteen war novels discussed in the following chapters. In the first
section, I will compare and contrast the leftist-liberal construction of the male ideal with
that of the right-wing militarist novels. The conclusions of this comparison reveal that
there is considerably more common ground between the two than meets the eye. In
opposition to most of the existing research on Weimar battlefield fiction, I will argue that
novels from politically opposite camps rest on essentially similar masculinity
constructions. This means, then, that the left and the right relied on largely the same
reference points to establish a dialogue between author and reader, e.g. strength, courage,
loyalty, pain endurance – the archetypal recipe of Wilhelminian Männlichkeit.1
Section two examines which aspects of the war were not taken up for the
fictionalization of the war experience, hence the construction of masculinity, by any of
1 Researchers like Johannes Brautzsch, Michael Gollbach, and Hans-Harald Müller, for example,
overemphasized the obvious (politically motivated) differences between pro-war and anti-war novels,
neglecting that the subtext of positive masculinity construction is virtually identical in all of them. To be
popular, leftist bourgeois writers like Remarque had to use the existing (nineteenth-century) repertoire of
positive male characteristics; an alternative model of masculinity did not yet exist in 1928.
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the bourgeois novelists. These aspects include historical facts like instances of
fraternization with enemy troops or the many unheroic attempts made by German soldiers
to escape combat duty through desertion, self-mutilation, and even suicide. I will also
provide a brief outlook on competing literary models that challenged the bourgeois
concept of the war experience and its masculinity construction, including one novel by a
female author, namely Adrienne Thomas’ Die Katrin wird Soldat (1930), as well as two
novels by authors advocating revolutionary Klassenkampf against the Prussian capitalist
power apparatus, which are Theodor Plivier’s Des Kaisers Kulis (1930) and Adam
Scharrer’s Vaterlandslose Gesellen (1930).
In the third and final section of this chapter, I will draw on George Mosse’s
Fallen Soldiers (1990), and selected other masculinity research to historicize the war
experience and its delayed literary processing as cultural necessities from a male gender
role point of view. As we will see, the leftist-bourgeois attempts to redefine German
masculinity would almost automatically be condemned to failure because the nineteenth-
century cultural script that informed the dominant model of masculinity during and after
the Great War equated masculinity with obedience, misogyny, and military aggression. It
was hence too monolithic and one-sided to be dislodged by leftists using fraternization
across social classes and individual emotional reactions rather than emotionally charged
symbols, especially in war narratives, which history proved to be the home turf of the
right wing.
This synthesis aims to support my original argument that the flood of war novels
around Im Westen nichts Neues was released and received within a specific historical
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constellation in Germany in which the male gender role offered individuals a minimum
of security and a maximum of confusion rather than the kind of social scripts which
would aid them deal with a rapidly changing present. Out of those floodgates in the late
1920s and early 1930s streamed hundreds of fictionalized war narratives, most of them
reactionary, not only because the political climate had become increasingly polarized, but
because Remarque’s explosive popularity had drawn attention to the fact that the pre-
1914 authoritarian model of masculinity had begun to erode since 1918. The left
approached this problem by trying to create space for the re-interpretation of social
scripts of masculinity and causal narratives about the Great War. In contrast, the radical
right reacted to Im Westen nichts Neues with such vehemence, even hatred, because it
perceived as desperately important the need to counteract the surging pressure of the
Neue Männlichkeit becoming defined by war critics like Remarque, Renn, Köppen, and
others. In their view, the narratives of men in war and about the war itself threatened the
image of the nation itself that their politics rested on.
The right-wingers knew that the stakes were high. If they allowed the leftist
authors around Remarque to spread their influence unhindered, the malleable next
generation of young German men, born around 1910, who had been children during the
war and very often grew up fatherless, might yet accept their anti-war message. This
would mean, of course, that they would grow into a political opposition, while the
militarist right-wing intended to recruit them as followers of a vision of traditional
German greatness. This also explains why the pro-war novelists were activist and overtly
political while the Remarquians from the left, splintered as they were in their political
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opinions about class and individual positions in Germany and about their objectives in
addressing them, did not see the urgency of speaking with one political voice.
Overall, as we shall see, Remarque remains an extreme case in his refusal to say
anything about politics, but by-and-large, the left wing novelists disempowered
themselves through individualism and political subtlety, which sent diffuse messages to
the readers and contributed to their disunited model of the new German man being
crushed by the right. That is, the left lost the battle of establishing a vision of masculinity
to replace that which had been in place essentially since Wilhelminian Germany. The
images of masculinity at play in the Remarquian field contrast in significant political as
well as psychological ways.
1.1 LEFT VERSUS RIGHT: DIFFERENCES IN MASCULINITY CONSTRUCTION
Novels from both left and right adduced only a very limited number of male social
types. Each correlated with a clear position about the war and with explicit class biases;
each thus represented a specific vision about what "real men" do in times of difficulty.
(A) Beginning to Think: the Leftist-Bourgeois Homo Cogitans
Remarque and the other anti-war novelists painted a picture of the war that
depicted it in its senseless brutality and dehumanizing reality. With the exception of
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Remarque himself, the Remarque parallels sought to authenticate their narratives through
the development of sensitive, psychologically convincing characters.
Only the prototype of the genre, Paul Bäumer, is a bland everyman, while all the
other novels’ protagonists emerge as individuals because they have a particular
background and a carefully developed personality. In most cases, authors of war literature
adopted the classical model of the Bildungsroman as a literary foil to construct their
narratives; they are thus anchored in the humanist tradition.2 Edlef Köppen’s
Heeresbericht is a special case because it frees itself from the Bildungsroman recipe in
favor of adopting a modernist montage or collage as his genre paradigm, one that
chillingly juxtaposes authentic documents with the actual narrative.3 Similarly, as a
Justizroman, Arnold Zweig’s Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa also emerges as
exceptional because the front line experience does not even enter the picture and there is
no first-person narrator who becomes “educated” by the war.4
Within the spate of novels that will be discussed below, the leftist anti-war camp
fictionalized the war theme in a number of ways. Within this spectrum, the various
2 See chapter two for details on the various adaptations of the Bildungsroman. Von der Vring’s Soldat
Suhren is a Künstlerroman, Zweig’s Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa is a Justizroman, and Ernst
Glaeser’s Jahrgang 1902 is a Jugendroman, for example.
3 Jutta Vinzent evaluates Köppen’s literary strategy as follows: “Da der Roman aber nicht nur aus fiktiver
Handlung besteht, sondern in sie Dokumente eingeschoben sind, tritt neben die unmittelbare Erfahrung des
Protagonisten die Reflexion des Krieges, dessen Maschinerie entlarvt wird. Die Kritik am Krieg übersteigt
das Individuelle oder auch typisch Existentielle. Sie entwickelt sich zu einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung
mit der wilhelminischen Politik und geht darin über die Lyrik Köppens, in der nur aus humanitärer und
pazifistischer Gesinnung heraus der Krieg verurteilt wird, hinaus” (Jutta Vinzent, Edlef Köppen –
Schriftsteller zwischen den Fronten [München: iudicum verlag, 1997] 113).
4 Precisely because Zweig and Köppen abandoned the Bildungsroman mold, I regard their novels as the
most successful pieces of war fiction ever written in Germany. Both authors targeted the larger systems that
drove and sustained the war effort, and managed to create compelling accounts of the difficulty to escape
from these systems. Unfortunately, both Heeresbericht and Sergeant Grischa are largely unknown today.
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reactions to the war experience range from resigned obedience (Von der Vring, Soldat
Suhren, Renn, Krieg) to plaintive lament (Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues) and
aggressive refusals to participate in the madness any longer (Frey, Pflasterkästen,
Köppen, Heeresbericht). What they share, however, is their progress from unknowing to
knowledge, their Bildung: the protagonists each undergo a perversely accelerated
learning process that teaches them the reality of war: “Ja, so denken sie, so denken sie,
die hunderttausend Kantoreks! Eiserne Jugend. Jugend! Wir sind alle nicht mehr als
zwanzig Jahre. Aber jung? Jugend? Das ist lange her. Wir sind alte Leute” (Remarque
24).
However, once the protagonists have reached the point where they reject the war,
they fail to channel this new-gained knowledge into a political platform or mission; they
remain caught in their original bourgeois mold of obedience.5 Not one of the protagonists
ever tries to convince his comrades to take collective action against the war. Each first-
person narrator thus remains a singular entity, faced with the painful realization that the
war is wrong for him, but maybe not for everyone. This results in the novels conveying
senses of isolation, hopelessness, and depression rather than offering a political catalyst
for analyses of the politics of the post-war generation.6 Renn states, in his typical laconic
5 The key experience that opens the anti-war protagonists’ eyes is often clearly identified. In Heeresbericht,
Reisiger’s eye-opener occurs during a minor artillery attack early on in the story. He witnesses how a
superior loses his hand: “Reisiger hat ein Zittern in den Knien, das ihn schüttelt. Und im Hals würgt etwas.
Das also ist der Krieg! Da steht ein Mensch, laut und kräftig, mit provozierendem Mut. Die Sonne scheint,
und es ist blauer Himmel. Plötzlich liegt der Mensch am Boden. Und Blut spritzt. Und der Mensch wird
nach Hause gehen und niemals im Leben wieder eine linke Hand haben. Das ist ja ekelhaft!” (Köppen,
Heeresbericht, 43).
6 Renn in Krieg and Reisiger in Heeresbericht had difficulty integrating themselves into the
Frontgemeinschaft to begin with. Renn does not like to play Skat and Reisiger hates drinking, which makes
them potential outsiders.
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manner: “Wenn ich einmal kriegsbegeistert gewesen war, wie nach dem Übergang über
die Maas, war meine Begeisterung schnell abgestanden, und ich hatte mich nach anderen
Gefühlen gesehnt” (Renn 164). It is only Paul Bäumer, the victim, who functions as even
a potential spokesperson for the whole generation of young men who, as Remarque
suggests, were deceived into signing-up; the rest of the protagonists speak only for
themselves. They learn to think, emerging as homo cogitans, but not to achieve the
traditional goal of Bildung, since they are not integrated into a new social-political vision.
The leftist homo cogitans thus simply deals with a sad emotional reality and
learns to make up his own mind about what war really means. Unfortunately, his dawning
awareness usually remains somewhat superficial. To be sure, the typical narrative of this
sort does have sufficient depth for the soldiers to realize that the French enemies are in
the same miserable situation as the Germans, and that their men in the trenches are not
essentially different. These are the thoughts that Heeresbericht's Reisiger has, for
example, when he is in charge of a group of French prisoners: “Das alles überlegt
Reisiger, aber er tut nichts. Es fällt ihm ein, daß er 21 Jahre alt ist und daß vor ihm
wehrlose Menschen sitzen, die seiner Schätzung nach zum größten Teil gute zehn Jahre
älter sind als er. Das beschämt ihn” (Köppen, Heeresbericht, 48).
These are also very much the thoughts Paul Bäumer expresses, larded with
Remarquian pathos, when he is trapped in the same shell hole as a French soldier:
“Vergib mir, Kamerad, wie konntest du mein Feind sein. Wenn wir diese Waffen und
diese Uniform fortwerfen, könntest du ebenso mein Bruder sein wie Kat und Albert.
Nimm zwanzig Jahre von mir, Kamerad, und stehe auf, - nimm mehr, denn ich weiß
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nicht, was ich damit noch beginnen soll” (Remarque 222). Like the good bourgeois
humanists that they are, these men know what they do cannot be right, but this
knowledge does not help them to envision a new future, a new Germany.
Their “war education” thus never reaches the level of profundity that would be
required for sociopolitical analysis. The spectrum of perspectives ranges from Bäumer
and Renn, who are totally naïve, to Johannsen’s Four Infantrymen, who expose the
perverse culture of slavish subordination to German military heroism. Reisiger’s
analysis, in Köppen’s Heeresbericht, develops a rather keen understanding of the foul
game turning fouler, although even he is muffled by his ingrained sense of obedience
until the very end (when he is declared insane): “Ich glaube, denkt er, ich hätte gestreikt.
– Er zerbeißt sich die Unterlippe: was heißt streiken? – Die Mannschaften fühlen sicher
so wie ich. Daß es gemein ist, plötzlich wieder zu schießen. Und sie müssen es doch tun.
Wir alle müssen ja doch tun, was befohlen wird” (Köppen 300). Therefore, even Reisiger
and Funk (in Frey’s Pflasterkästen), as well as the men in Johannsen’s Vier von der
Infanterie, who are clearly the most rebellious figures created by the leftist bourgeois
camp, ultimately do not succeed in breaking free from the authoritarian structure of the
military, or from the authoritarian pathways of their own worldview.
The wartime Bildungsroman in which they play the starring roles thus ultimately
fails them on other than the emotional level. On the one hand, as we have seen, the war
experience does “educate” them brutally and at a precipitous pace. They outgrow the
beautiful illusions of a humanist education and burst the narrowness of their safely
bourgeois pre-war surroundings. They do come to appreciate a radically different social
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model as a substitute for family and friends, namely the egalitarian community of the
Frontgemeinschaft. On the other hand, the wartime brutality stymies their emotional
growth and limits their perspective (a process one could describe as Rückbildung). The
men become bitter, cynical, and pessimistic -- changes they describe as “getting old,”
rather than looking for the cause of their distress externally. They found comfort in their
circle of Kameraden, but unlike their right-wing counterparts, the anti-war protagonists
do not invest in the hope that the Frontgemeinschaft might be carried home once the war
is over. These are the heroes who will be reflected in the existentially terrorized heroes
familiar from Expressionist art and drama -- lost and utterly singular.
Therefore, one must posit that the leftist bourgeois battlefield novelists did not
construct a viable new model of masculinity for their readers, even as they met them by
reflecting their emotional experiences. Their homo cogitans hero typically feels, thinks,
and suffers (especially Paul Bäumer, the innocent victim), but fails to grasp the collapse
of the German bourgeoisie, or to analyse the cultural pressures that compelled him, like
hundreds of thousands of other men, to volunteer for military service in the first place. In
a broader framework, there is no awareness that the Great War was no accident but the
consequence of Wilhelminian culture and politics, including the systematic absorption of
young men into the Prussian military power apparatus.
Even with the benefit of hindsight and a temporal distance of ten years, most of
the middle-class anti-war writers (exceptions include Edlef Köppen and Ernst Johannsen)
seemingly did not understand that the mass slaughter of the Great War could not easily be
contained in a nineteenth-century literary form that, in its original concept, actually
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prepared the protagonist’s successful reintegration to society. Adorno said there could be
no poetry after Auschwitz. I would add: “there could be no Bildungsroman after World
War I.” Ironically, authors like Remarque paid lip-service to this in what sounds almost
like a parody of the Bildungsroman: “Wir lernten, daß ein geputzter Knopf wichtiger ist
als vier Bände Schopenhauer” (27).7 Nevertheless, he and others opted for what to
bourgeois readers would seem to be a realistic, authentic, believable, and pessimistic
perspective on the war experience, laid out in relatively harmless bourgeois
Rückbildungsromane that were condemned to copy the limitations and, ultimately,
replicate the failure of the German Bildungsideal from the outset. The novels'
protagonists, obviously permanently damaged by the war, were victims, not heroes, and
victims remain ultimately unattractive for male readers trying to rebuild their sense of
self.8
7 Even Renn in Krieg makes several attempts to derive meaning from books amidst the chaos of the war.
He reads Simplicissimus and a philosophy book but winds up discarding both because they do not give him
the answers that he seeks.
8 Eckart Koester’s analysis contradicts this. In his opinion, the leftist-bourgeois literary production made an
important contribution to the anti-war movement despite its failure to provide political directives: “Auch
wo es ihnen an konkreten, praktisch realisierbaren Handlungsangeboten fehlte, konnten die
schriftstellerischen Äußerungen gegen den Krieg wichtige emotionsbildende Wirkungen auf ihre
Rezipienten ausüben, indem sie den inhumanen, gegen die Interessen der Völker gerichteten Charakter des
Krieges eindringlich darstellten und so Stimmungen hervorriefen, die zum Widerstand gegen dessen
Fortsetzung und zur Auflehnung gegen den deutschen Militarismus disponierten. Von ihrer Anlage her
waren wohl am ehesten die künstlerischen – lyrischen, dramatischen, novellistischen – Werke der
aktivistischen Kriegsgegner dazu geeignet, Emotionen dieser Art auszulösen und damit, wenn nicht
handlungsorientierend, so doch zumindest handlungsstimulierend zu wirken” (see Eckart Koester,
Literatur und Weltkriegsideologie. Positionen und Begründungszusammenhänge des publizistischen
Engagements deutscher Schriftsteller im Ersten Weltkrieg [Kronberg/Ts.: Scriptor Verlag, 1977] 367-368).
I believe that Koester underestimates the power ratio between leftist anti-war voices and the massive
ideological bloc of reactionary militarist thought. Even in quantitative terms, only Remarque and Renn
reached substantial sales volumes between 1929 and 1933.
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(B) Refusing to Think: the Right-Wing Bourgeois Homo Oppugnans
History suggests that the leftists' right-wing militarist colleagues understood this
problem and thus took a different route in drawing out conclusions about German
masculinity and the German nation. As will be addressed in chapter two, the right wing
successfully constructed positive male figures out of the chaos of the lost(!) war. Homo
oppugnans, the battling man, is portrayed as the world’s most formidable warrior, the
type who overcomes the limitations of the homo cogitans and his bourgeois milieu. The
war is his world, waging war his raison d’être. In Richthofen and Jünger, killing the
enemy thus can be described as the ultimate male sport. This type of soldier-man feels
depressed only when he cannot fight, not because he has to fight or because he does not
know what he is fighting for. What dismays him is that not all German soldiers belong to
the top tier of combat excellence. Homo oppugnans endures almost any amount of pain
or physical exhaustion, it is always the others who are weak. If not God, at least rectitude
is on his side.
These fantasies were invented, of course, but they were not new. In fact, myths
and legends about the historical greatness of the German warrior (e.g. Arminius defeating
the Romans in 9 A.D.), or the former unity of the German nation (e.g. during the Wars of
Liberation against Napoleon, or even during the “August Days” of 1914), formed an
integral part of this model of masculinity construction. So did the ancient repertoire of
anti-Semitic stereotypes, as well as nineteenth-century racial ideas of white European
superiority. Whether or not the tenets of this German masculinity ideology were
verifiable was beside the point. First and foremost, right-wing militarist novelists
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developed fictionalizations of the war experience that would embolden and fortify their
veteran readers politically and psychologically; an end that justified almost any means.
The consequence is that at least one vision for a new Germany was built into the
right-wing novels, albeit one that did not necessarily help develop images of a new
nation. One central message that was broadcast in these novels to the World War
veteran, who was likely to be unhappy and socially unappreciated in 1929 as he read his
war novels, was the promise of community. Any pro-war book would reassure him that
he was not alone, but in fact a member of a vast völkisch-nationalist community that, like
he, viewed the “unmanly” Weimar Republic as a temporary historical aberration that
could be overcome by a return to the traditions of German warriors.
Another message enountered in the right-wing novels was that this invisible
community in the new Germany could be a direct product of the (heavily mythologized)
Frontgemeinschaft of Kameraden, fighting and dying heroically in the trenches, as the
veteran himself remembered so well. Pro-war novels suggested that the spirit of the
trenches was not dead but only waiting to be reawakened by either men like him or a
powerful Führer. The limits on this model, however, were clear -- these were men of
spirit, not of the real world.
The literary characters that came out of this ideological passion were predictably
not very subtle, but bore all the hallmarks of the idealized right-wing warrior hero. In
other words, they most often were monodimensional cardboard characters who simply
functioned as the authors’ mouthpieces. While emotionally satisfying, the novels' plots
did not move to political analyses, for example. In most of them, the whole war
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experience is presented as a transparent case study of “good” battling “bad.”
Nevertheless, as one look at the popularity statistics of Weimar battlefield fiction proves
beyond any doubt (see the statistics included as the Appendix to this study), these were
the novels that resonated with by far the most readers during the late 1920s and early
1930s. From the point of view of most male readers at the time, it seems that figures like
Paul Bäumer (Im Westen nichts Neues), Renn (Krieg), Funk (Pflasterkästen), or Reisiger
(Heeresbericht) had registered as confused, “un-German,” and “un-manly” aberrations,
while larger-than-life heroes like Erich Siewers (Gruppe Bosemüller), Junne (Sieben vor
Verdun), or Albrecht Urach (Aufbruch der Nation) gave them the symbolic power they so
desired.
Although the right-wing militarists and nationalists took great pride in defending
the memory of “their” war experience against the “historical inaccuracies” and “lies”
with which Remarque and others supposedly sullied “their” war legacy, the right-wingers
themselves took extraordinary amounts of freedom with embellishing historical facts to
make their novels more universal in impact. Wehner’s Sieben vor Verdun is only one
example of such bold distortion. This novel makes it seem as if the German army, held
back by General Falkenhayn’s indecision, was only inches away from a great victory in
the battle of Verdun.9 In contrast to the left-wing bourgeois camp, the pro-war militarists
presented a united front and a unified picture of the war experience, which contributed to
9 See, for example, the following passage: “Er dachte nun heftig an die Gegenwart. Er beschwor noch
einmal die Stürme der letzten Tage. Er sah die Franzosen fliehen, bis nach Verdun hinunter, sah Generäle
aus der Zitadelle treten und flüchtige Offiziere niederschießen. Er fühlte, wie das blaue Meer brach und
wankte. Jetzt nur nachstoßen, nur jetzt nachstoßen! Aber da senkte sich aus dem Himmel die schwarze
Schranke eines Befehls. Und der war nicht zu wenden” (Wehner, Sieben vor Verdun, 150).
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their victory in the late 1920s literary culture war. Theirs was a gigantic and ruthless
advertising campaign that laid claim to the war legacy as a chapter in history and as a
testing ground of their version of manhood.
However, the stock repertoire of their manhood-model coincided with that of the
left, with the exception of the actual mental, emotional, or political response to the war.
(C) The Common Ground: the German Bourgeois Homo Teutonicus
Since the late 1920s culture war had such important implications for the future
course of German history, it is understandable that most of the academic research on
Weimar war novels so far was focused on their reception and political aspects. I would
argue, however, that this perspective is too limited and indeed avoids a central theme of
the cultural struggle that the war novels catalyzed. I venture to claim that an exclusive
focus on all the venom that was spewed back and forth between the left and the right
detracts from the importance of the cultural middle ground that existed universally in
terms of masculinity construction, regardless of the diametric political opposition
between the warring factions. That middle ground was the most successful of the images
of German masculinity encountered in the novels discussed below.
Despite their salient ideological differences, the left-wing and the right-wing
novelists nevertheless ultimately described, in hindsight, the same type of man as their
ideal for a future German type -- homo teutonicus --, one who would grow out of the
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same class of men: an army of working- and middle-class German soldiers who will rise
up and reclaim the dignity lost to them in the First World War.
Any close readings of the battlefield novels reveals that they run on astoundingly
parallel tracks up to a certain point. For example, Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues
and Beumelburg’s Die Gruppe Bosemüller feature two otherwise identical nineteen-year-
old protagonists, namely Paul Bäumer, whose response to the war is famously negative,
and Erich Siewers, an anti-Bäumer, whose response to the war is passionately positive.
Bäumer’s qualities as a combat soldier are toned down accordingly, while Siewers’ are
exaggerated, but underlyingly, they share many social and physical characteristics.
It is, in fact, straightforward to show evidence that the leftist and the right-wing
writers were really in agreement on the basic ingredients of German masculinity. The
hallmarks of that ideal German masculine type are agreed upon by almost all the novels.
i) The Significance of Physical Appearance
As already noted, Remarque managed to create the only effective left-wing myth
about who he believed bore responsibility for the injustice of the war by writing an anti-
war novel focused principally among individuals as the victims of that injustice. In the
name of the “lost generation,” his was a powerful new Dolchstoß aimed at certain
elements of the parent generation of authoritarian “Wilhelminians.”10 Yet that too-simple
representation of the war can be complicated when the importance of bodies and their
10 Compare Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues, 18; 24.
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physical description in the language of this myth is assessed. Bodies and class positions
yield reader identification with these novels' protagonists.
In Im Westen nichts Neues, for example, the culprits who inflict harm on German
masculinity are Kantorek, the schoolmaster, and the sadistic Sergeant Himmelstoß. Since
these men are clearly not intended to be read as positive individuals, but as allegorical
types to be met in the ruling class or parent generation who "sold out" Germany, chances
were high that most readers knew “people like them” and could thus relate to the
constellation of the novel as a compelling explanation for German society in general. At
the same time, Remarque was able to take the sting out of his accusation in the sense that
the main positive figure of identification, Stanislaus Katczinsky, a forty-year-old, is
obviously exempted from the charges. Katczinsky is the conciliatory token that the parent
generation was not universally guilty of driving the young men into the trenches.
Remarque thus adopted a positive father figure as an integral part of the magical
Frontgemeinschaft.
The way their physical masculinity is constructed underlines the simple scheme of
good versus bad. Kantorek and Himmelstoß, both bad, are virtually identical with regard
to their physique. Remarque himself draws the direct conclusion that men of their frail
build are generally vicious and dangerous:
Kantorek war unser Klassenlehrer, ein strenger, kleiner Mann in grauem
Schoßrock, mit einem Spitzmausgesicht. Er hatte ungefähr dieselbe Statur wie der
Unteroffizier Himmelstoß, der “Schrecken des Klosterberges.” Es ist übrigens
komisch, daß das Unglück der Welt so oft von kleinen Leuten herrührt, sie sind
viel energischer und unverträglicher als großgewachsene. Ich habe mich stets
gehütet, in Abteilungen mit kleinen Kompagnieführern zu geraten; sie sind
meistens verfluchte Schinder. (Remarque 16)
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Himmelstoß, “der schärfste Schinder des Kasernenhofes,” is described as “ein kleiner
untersetzter Kerl, […] mit fuchsigem, aufgewirbeltem Schnurrbart, im Zivilberuf
Briefträger” (28). The detail about the red, twisted moustache creates a direct link
between him and Kaiser Wilhelm. In a nutshell, Himmelstoß is a small and vain man who
is obsequious to his superiors (135) but sadistic to the men subordinated to him. When he
appears at the front line, he turns out to be a coward. Bäumer finds him hiding in a hole
during one attack: “[…] finde ihn, wie er in der Ecke liegt mit einem kleinen Streifschuß
und den Verwundeten simuliert. Sein Gesicht ist wie verprügelt. Er hat einen Angstkoller
[…]” (134). The reader cannot help but loathe this character.
Katczinsky, by contrast, is a big, brave, likeable fellow with a calm voice (154)
who is admired by his younger comrades not because he wields authority, but because he
exudes it nonverbally. He is fair, considerate, generous, knowledgeable and unfailing in
his judgment, which he derives from his extraordinary common sense. Bäumer and the
other nineteen-year-olds love this man:
Stanislaus Katczinsky, das Haupt unserer Gruppe, zäh, schlau, gerissen, vierzig
Jahre alt, mit einem Gesicht aus Erde, mit blauen Augen, hängenden Schultern
und einer wunderbaren Witterung für dicke Luft, gutes Essen und schöne
Druckposten. (Remarque 9)
Katczinsky is anti-intellectual and rejects the war, which, according to Remarque, is a
positive trait of most common people.11 He never questions his duty as a soldier and is
11 “Am vernünftigsten waren eigentlich die armen und einfachen Leute; sie hielten den Krieg gleich für ein
Unglück, während die bessergestellten vor Freude nicht aus noch ein wußten, obschon gerade sie sich über
die Folgen viel eher hätten klar werden können. Katczinsky behauptet, das käme von der Bildung, sie
mache dämlich. Und was Kat sagt, das hat er sich gut überlegt” (Remarque, Im Westen, 17).
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not interested in political discussions. Due to his earthy wisdom, Kat stands for a personal
autonomy that remains untouchable by the military command structure. He does his duty
well when it is called upon, but his next thought is always on the next meal or the next
game of Skat with his beloved Kameraden. This then is the man Paul Bäumer adores, and
presumably, the masculine ideal Remarque seeks to convey.
The only detail about his physique that seems to contradict the masculine ideal is
the fact that he has “sloping shoulders.” The simple explanation for this is that such
shoulders "befit" the confident working man, reflecting the burdens on him -- no matter
that such shoulders can be taken as signs of degeneration. Nonetheless, like the giant
Lennie in Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men (1937), Kat feels secure about his strength -- he
may even be unaware of it -- and thus sees no need to worry about his Haltung, which,
Remarque insinuates, is just a vain aspect of military comportment anyway: “Schultern
raus” and “Strammstehen” is for toy soldiers.
This simplistic juxtaposition between good soldiers and bad soldiers is a
ubiquitous motif in any of the war novels, be they for or against the war. As a general
rule, moral turpitude often correlates to physical shortcomings, meaning men who are
bald, short, narrow-shouldered, narrow-chested, bespectacled, red-haired, or high-
voiced.12 This includes “the nervous type” of men who speak too much or too quickly;
12 Exceptions to this rule are more likely to be found in left-wing war fiction than in pro-war books, since
the latter category has a strong distaste for ambiguity. It is therefore rare to find a positive, yet physically
inept character like Lamm in Renn’s Krieg: “Und Zache behandelte ihn auch sehr schlecht. Lamm war
nämlich ungeschickt in allen körperlichen Dingen, dazu schwächlich. In seinen, übrigens sehr
ausdrucksvollen Augen war fast immer eine Ängstlichkeit, die Zache zu ärgern schien, mir aber gefiel”
(Renn, Krieg, 21). Also, in another passage, he reverses his first impression of a soldier named Eilitz: “Der
war gewaltig groß und breit und hatte eine breite, gebogene Nase. Zum Reden schien er nicht eingerichtet.
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such Quasselköppe also betray their unmanliness. Heroic men tend to be blue-eyed like
Kat. The criterion of body weight is ambiguous. Skinniness is usually negative: “Unser
dünner Hauptmann, der allgemein verhaßt war, saß im Grase, und der große, dicke
Leutnant Fabian hatte eine Haarschneidemaschine in der Hand […].”13 Big men are
associated with Gemütlichkeit (exuding a sense of well-being) and fatherly qualities,
hence not particularly aggressive: “war bald wieder gesund und dick wie früher. Er trank
gern Wein und Schnaps, aber sonst lebte er mit uns sehr einfach” (Renn, Krieg, 152).14
In terms of body types and appearance, then, one must say that positive soldier
figures also tend to be physically ideal types in these novels.15 Remarque’s polarization
of Katczinsky versus Kantorek/Himmelstoß sufficiently illustrates the issue of physical
appearance; even the pro-war writers, who tend to attribute greater importance to it, do
not deviate from this pattern. It would be an exaggeration to claim that physical
appearance plays a fundamental role in battlefield fiction. Nevertheless, the descriptions
of the soldiers’ physique and facial characteristics function positivistically as male code.
Übrigens hatte er eine ganz hohe, dünne Stimme. Zuerst hielt ich ihn für einen Dummkopf wie die Perle.
Aber dann merkte ich, daß er sogar sehr gescheit war und seinen Verstand nur unter einer fabelhaften
Gutherzigkeit verbarg” (Krieg 187).
13 See Ludwig Renn, Krieg, 18.
14 The right-wing militarists disprefer heavy-set men as positive protagonists. In pro-war novels, the lean,
sinewy fighter-type is more likely. In some cases, he is even short, like Vizefeldwebel Krüger in
Schauwecker’s Aufbruch der Nation: “und er übertrieb nicht, bei weitem der beste Soldat der Kompanie,
klein, lebhaft, wie auf Sprungfedern gesetzt” (64). Like Leutnant Fabian, Krüger likes to drink a lot but
never loses control: “Er trank gern. Alkohol war ihm Bedürfnis. ‘Das lernt man in Treptow.’ Aber er blieb
auch im stärksten Rausch bei Verstand und benahm sich nie so, daß er nicht gewußt hätte, was er tat. Der
Alkohol schien nur anfeuernd auf diesen bis zur Nervosität lebhaften Mann zu wirken” (ibid.).
15 There is abundant textual evidence for this phenomenon. See, for example, the description of Albrecht
Urach’s Kamerad Brenn, a positive figure: “Brenn war Akrobat. Er war unermüdlich und von einer
Albrecht völlig unverständlichen gleichmütigen Heiterkeit, die sein hübsches, knabenhaftes Gesicht im
grauesten Elend belebte. Die Uniform, die bei anderen locker hing, saß bei ihm unerhört straff, und er ging
mit dem Tornister beinah elegant und nichtachtend durch den zähesten Kot” (Aufbruch der Nation 44).
This physical description is typical not only because Brenn is strong and good-looking, but also because he
has an air of boyish purity about him, like Richthofen, the “Red Baron.”
57
This male code, i.e. the tacit understanding which physical characteristics
correlate to which type of personality, seems to be universal among German men of the
early twentieth century, both from the right and left. The third section of this chapter
argues that it is part of a much older cultural script largely based on physical stereotypes
of masculinity.
ii) Endurance of Pain and Physical Exhaustion
The novels cannot rest on such too-simple dichotomies between "good guys" and
"bad guys" drawn on birth inheritance alone. How well the men in the novels cope with
pain and physical exhaustion thus often becomes more relevant than how they look.
Looks, the war novelists seem to agree, can be deceptive about an individual's
masculinity and Germanness. A man’s toughness and physical stamina, on the other
hand, cannot be faked. What a man is really made of shows itself in how well he handles
pain. And again, it turns out that there are more similarities than differences between the
opposing camps of novelists.
There is a consensus that it is acceptable for German soldiers to groan from the
strain of, for example, long marches in the heat with weapons and heavy backpacks.16 It
is also acceptable to be miserable after cold and rainy nights spent in the trench or in the
16 Compare, for instance, these nearly identical scenes from Renn’s Krieg and Schauwecker’s Aufbruch der
Nation: “Am nächsten Tag begannen die Märsche. Die Tage waren heiß, und wir waren nicht ans Gebirge
gewöhnt. In den ersten Tagen blieben viele an der Straße liegen, im Schatten einer Eberesche, mit
aufgerissenem Rock und dem Taschentuch auf dem Kopf” (Renn 16). “Sie waren schon fünf Stunden
unterwegs und hatten den zwanzigsten Kilometer zurückgelegt. Es war der erste Frontmarsch, und er war
länger und schwerer als ein Garnisonübungsmarsch. Mindestens hundert Mann von den tausend lagen
marschkrank rückwärts an den Wegrändern. Zwei Unteroffiziere waren fluchend hinten geblieben, um die
Schlappmacher zu sammeln” (Schauwecker 42).
58
open field. The men are often tired, thirsty, or hungry. It is understandable, the authors
suggest, that the men feel afraid, even terrified during artillery bombardment or before an
attack; after all, they are only human. It is natural that they scream in pain when they are
injured. Renn even breaks down and cries in one scene because he feels guilty for causing
harm to his group and ashamed of what he believes was a cowardly decision: “Aber als
ich seine Augen sah, und daß sie freundlich waren, da drehte sich der Boden unter mir.
Ich legte mich auf den Tisch und weinte. Die Perle streichelte mir die Schulter. Wenn sie
sich doch nur nicht um mich kümmern wollten!” (Renn 48). War novels thus do allow for
signs of physical and emotional pain -- warriors are not feelingless robots.
However, and this is the golden rule of the successful battlefield novelist, the
heroic soldier figure must never let these feelings get the better of him. Regardless of the
situation, he must quickly summon the self-control to withstand or overcome the crisis.
He must not yield to fear, pain, despair, exhaustion, or deprivation.17 Like a tacit contract
between the literary soldier figure and the presumably male reader, the soldier must cope
with almost any degree of physical hardship so that the reader can vicariously enjoy the
exhilarating experience of his toughness and heroism.18 At a visceral level, this is what
motivates the often pornographic brutality of war films, war fiction, and other adventure
17 This mechanism is not limited to Weimar battlefield fiction. It also surfaces, for example, in Joseph
Vilsmaier’s 1993 film version of Plivier’s Stalingrad (1945). In one scene, soldier Rohleder receives a
letter from his wife telling him that she is having an affair with a Frenchman. Rohleder suffers visibly,
rebukes his comrades for their attempts to console him, and then quickly overcomes the pain in order to
resume his soldierly duties. If he did not come to terms with the emotional agony, he would lose his man-
hero status. A similar scene occurs in Wolfgang Petersen’s Das Boot (1981). Johann, the machinist, suffers
a nervous breakdown and is almost shot by the Captain for refusing his orders. Johann, like Rohleder,
overcomes the crisis and turns into an even better soldier for it.
18 In this sense, Weimar Republic battlefield fiction is no different from modern-day action movies. Images
from Rocky, Rambo, or The Terminator come to mind. In both cases, the protagonist endures absurd
amounts of pain, thereby vicariously empowering the adoring men and boys in the audience.
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books.19 Their characters are meant to be larger than life so that the voyeuristic reader,
attempting to identify with the protagonist, can feel the adrenaline rush and fantasize
about himself withstanding the pain under such horrific circumstances.20 It is a process
that yields cathartic relief.
The protagonist’s courage, pain control, and continued ability to fight are thus
meant to be the decisive factors in the reader’s/viewer’s assessment of his masculinity: he
must impress the audience with extraordinary pain endurance. This rule applied to
gladiators in Ancient Rome as well as to the participants in male initiation ceremonies
throughout world history. It applies to matadores in bull fights. It also applies to
battlefield fiction written in Germany in the late 1920s. To be sure, the right-wing
novelists exploited this mechanism of heroic suffering to a much greater extent than did
the left-wing writers.21 Nevertheless, even Im Westen nichts Neues might not have sold
one million copies if Paul Bäumer were not a proud and fear-mastering soldier who keeps
on fighting anyway: “Wir sind schwach und stumpf, und nur das hält uns, daß noch
19 It would be interesting to see what the opposite would look like. To my knowledge, there is no well-
known war book or film that depicts man in his actual biological frailty. Such an account would not be very
uplifting because it would show that lice, fatigue, and an ingrown toenail are already enough to make a
soldier’s life miserable. In the dirt of the battlefield, any scratch can develop into a life-threatening
infection. Instead, we have become so accustomed to grotesque exaggerations of manly resilience that we
expect our hero to continue fighting even if he has just lost an arm. Im Westen nichts Neues also features
such pornographic gore: “Wir sehen Menschen leben, denen der Schädel fehlt; wir sehen Soldaten laufen,
denen beide Füße weggefetzt sind; sie stolpern auf den splitternden Stümpfen bis zum nächsten Loch; ein
Gefreiter kriecht zwei Kilometer weit auf den Händen und schleppt die zerschmetterten Knie hinter sich
her; ein anderer geht zur Verbandstelle, und über seine festhaltenden Hände quellen die Därme; wir sehen
Leute ohne Mund, ohne Unterkiefer, ohne Gesicht; wir finden jemand, der mit den Zähnen zwei Stunden
die Schlagader seines Armes klemmt, um nicht zu verbluten […]” (Remarque 137-138).
20 When little boys play war, they already feel stronger just by holding a wooden rifle or by tying a
bandanna around the foreheads, like Rambo. The props facilitate identification and thus heighten the
adrenaline rush of mock combat.
21 Wehner’s Sieben vor Verdun is a typical example of grotesquely exaggerated human endurance.
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Schwächere, noch Stumpfere, noch Hilflosere da sind, die mit aufgerissenen Augen uns
ansehen als Götter, die manchmal dem Tode entrinnen können” (Remarque 136).
Extreme pain endurance coupled with courage is thus a common denominator of
war fiction, regardless of the author’s political conviction. This ability distinguishes the
heroic protagonist from his not-so-tough comrades and enemies -- this is a personal trait
based on personality, not on genetic inheritance, so that it can apply to all in the war
Männerbund. While the right-wing novelists often draw attention to this heroic
distinction, the left-wing writers tend to understate their protagonists’ ability to withstand
pain. Nevertheless, they, too, are well above average in this archetypal masculine
category.
iii) Angriffslust, the “Lust of Attack”
Significantly, there is one additional trait for the new German soldier-warrior.
One would assume that this trait, Angriffslust, might be an exclusive hallmark of the pro-
war novels, but that is not the case. As the following passages from anti-war novels
illustrate, the irrational and powerful “lust for attack” gripped even those soldiers who
wound up rejecting the war later. It becomes the novels' symbol for the common
experience binding soldiers of all stations who are proper men.
In Im Westen nichts Neues, for instance, the ecstasy of attack appears in a
somewhat modified guise; it is not so much the thirst for blood that drives Bäumer and
his friends, but rather the animalistic desire to fight for their lives and retaliate against the
enemy:
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Aus uns sind gefährliche Tiere geworden. Wir kämpfen nicht, wir verteidigen uns
vor der Vernichtung. […] Wir haben eine wahnsinnige Wut, wir liegen nicht mehr
ohnmächtig wartend auf dem Schafott, wir können zerstören und töten, um uns zu
retten, um uns zu retten und zu rächen. […]
Das Krachen der Handgranaten schießt kraftvoll in unsere Arme, in unsere
Beine, geduckt wie Katzen laufen wir, überschwemmt von dieser Welle, die uns
trägt, die uns grausam macht, zu Wegelagerern, zu Mördern, zu Teufeln
meinetwegen, dieser Welle, die unsere Kraft vervielfältigt in Angst und Wut und
Lebensgier, die uns Rettung sucht und erkämpft. Käme dein Vater mit denen
drüben, du würdest nicht zaudern, ihm die Granate gegen die Brust zu werfen!
(Remarque 116-117)
The strength and physical courage of these men, therefore, lead them to a kind of
selflessness -- or the loss of self in blood lust.
Most often, such bloodlust is actually shown as positive. Renn, the main
protagonist in Krieg, is wounded during one attack and talks to the field physician about
it afterward. What he describes as “wonderful” is how the attack freed everyone from
fear:
“Erzählen Sie noch etwas vom Sturm! War das nicht schrecklich?”
“Nein, es war herrlich, wie die vorstürmten alle, - die vorher im Tunnel klagten!
Einer hat gesagt, - ich hörte es im Vorübergehen, - es wäre ihm gleich, ob er
gefangen würde. Und der ist vorgerannt und hingestürzt. Wahrscheinlich ist er
tot.”
“Aber das ist doch nicht herrlich!”
“Doch, Herr Oberarzt, wie sie auf einmal alle Angst verloren hatten! Daß es sie
gepackt hatte und sie angriffen, das war unvergleichlich schön!”
Die Angst kam wieder, aber durchleuchtet von dem Gedanken an den herrlichen
Angriff. Noch konnte sie nicht Herr werden. (Renn 223)
As these passages illustrate, the various authors share the point of view that there is
something primal and cathartic about the act of storming out of the trenches and attacking
the enemy.
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With few exceptions (e.g. Köppen’s Heeresbericht), all the bourgeois war novels
that describe the war activity of infantry soldiers capture the emotional intensity of these
moments. In the pro-war novels, predictably, the German troops appear all the more
fearless and fierce:
Sie rannten in einem einzigen Schwunge hindurch und weiter vor. Mit Hurra
kamen sie gegen den neuen russischen Graben an, in den deutsche Granaten
hineinbarsten. Sie schrien toll und rasend, als sie von oben hineinsprangen.
Es gab keinen langen Kampf. Es war nur ein kurzes Durcheinander, dann war der
Graben in ihrer Hand. (Schauwecker 118)
It is certainly true that the pro-war novels contain a greater number of such attack
scenes, and they also carry a higher emotional charge: storming head-on into the range of
enemy fire is the quintessential act of soldierly bravery. However, the exhilaration that
accompanies the storming of the enemy trenches is a motif that surfaces consistently in
any of the bourgeois infantry novels.
iv) Alienation from the Heimatfront and Abandonment of the Bourgeois Bildungsideal
Another virtually universal motif that grows out of this physical description of the
ideal German man is psychological: the alienation from familiar surroundings that the
front soldiers feel after a longer period away from home. The men of the physical type
described above line up psychologically in very precise ways. The issue of a
psychological type and its alienation from the homefront German of the day tends to
come up either when the soldiers receive mail in the trenches, which occasionally makes
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them aware that the sender of the letter has not the vaguest idea of the Frontalltag,22 or
when the soldiers are granted home leave (Heimaturlaub), which often fills them with
apprehension because they anticipate communication problems.
The extreme brutality of the soldier’s job is at the heart of this problem, yet they
have become so used to the business of war that they find it emotionally easier than
dealing with their parents. As was mentioned above, the front line routine is so merciless
that the soldiers are rapidly “re-educated” in the sense that many of the bourgeois niceties
are stripped away; they are brutalized. Therefore, the soldiers usually feel as though they
have lost their connection with the pre-war world, like they no longer belong to the
bourgeois families most of them come from.
Moreover, their sense of alienation results from the fact that their comrades in the
trenches, with whom they might have spent every day and every night for months, have
become more “real” and more meaningful to them than their parents, siblings, girlfriends,
or wives back home. In many cases, the de facto new family of the front soldier has taken
on virtually every function and begun to fulfill all of the soldier’s needs. This hard-to-
communicate fact makes them reluctant to even face the family of their past. Many of
them also do not want to be confronted with the evidence of how drastically the war has
changed them -- “how old they have become” -- a realization that is almost inevitable
when faced with reality at the Heimatfront, a constant reference point. Also, they usually
want to “protect” their family from finding out the real nature of trench warfare, lest their
22 Compare, for example, Schauwecker’s Aufbruch der Nation, 162-164.
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mothers be afraid to let them go back to their units, so when they tell stories, they leave
out the terrible parts.
When Albrecht Urach is wounded, for example, he is sent to his home town for
recovery. The conversation with his parents goes relatively well:
Er erzählte von den Tagen der Front. Die Eltern hörten wortlos zu. Der Vater
verschlang jedes Wort mit einem starren, fast düstern Ernst; die Mutter strich ihm
manchmal über die Hand, die auf dem Tisch lag. Er selbst war ganz
hingenommen von dem Erlebnis und sprach mit einer fortreißenden Lebendigkeit
von dem Ungeheuren, das man nur in Tatsachen berichten, dessen Sinn und
Endergebnis aber man heute noch nicht in Worte fassen konnte. Die Dinge des
Grauens verschwieg er. Der Krieg war noch nicht zu Ende, und er mochte seine
Eltern für die Zukunft nicht zu sehr beunruhigen.
“Wie braun du bist,” sagten die Eltern. “Wie gesund du aussiehst!”
(Schauwecker 134).
In a later meeting with the important men of his town, Urach is so disgusted by their
idiotic questions and pompous demeanor that he does not know what to tell them. That is
the exact same feeling that Paul Bäumer has about his father during his Heimaturlaub:
Doch schon mit meinem Vater ist es anders. Er möchte, daß ich etwas erzähle von
draußen, er hat Wünsche, die ich rührend und dumm finde, zu ihm schon habe ich
kein rechtes Verhältnis mehr. Am liebsten möchte er immerfort etwas hören. Ich
begreife, daß er nicht weiß, daß so etwas nicht erzählt werden kann, und ich
möchte ihm auch gern den Gefallen tun; aber es ist eine Gefahr für mich, wenn
ich diese Dinge in Worte bringe, ich habe Scheu, daß sie dann riesenhaft werden
und sich nicht mehr bewältigen lassen. Wo blieben wir, wenn uns alles ganz klar
würde, was da draußen vorgeht.
So beschränke ich mich darauf, ihm einige lustige Sachen zu erzählen.
(Remarque 167-168)
Renn’s brief visit home is so insignificant that it fills exactly two pages. He observes that
his mother makes him a bed in the “honor room” normally reserved for guests: “Jetzt
wohnte ich im Ehrenzimmer. Ich galt etwas in der Familie” (Renn 175). He also registers
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his own discomfort when his mother prompts him to tell stories: “’Nu erzähl mal!’ sagte
meine Mutter. Was erzählen? Ich hatte ein Grauen davor. Aber dann kam ich doch ins
Reden, und so, daß ich gar nicht wieder aufhörte” (Renn 176).
Therefore, the soldiers’ alienation from their pre-war social network, including
the emotional reluctance to rejoin that network, should be added to the list of universal
features of pro-war and anti-war novels. As mentioned above, this can be attributed to the
powerful function of the trench community, which absorbed the soldiers’ pre-war ties
with family, friends, and girlfriends. Moreover, due to their rapid “re-education” through
the war, the soldiers also feel compelled to reassess their pre-war education negatively.
The universal consensus is that all the schoolbook-type facts, including history, literature,
and philosophy, amount to superfluous triviality compared to the type of knowledge the
war requires:
Von dem ganzen Kram wissen wir nicht mehr allzu viel. Er hat uns auch nichts
genutzt. Aber niemand hat uns in der Schule beigebracht, wie man bei Regen und
Sturm eine Zigarette anzündet, wie man ein Feuer aus nassem Holz machen kann
– oder daß man ein Bajonett am besten in den Bauch stößt, weil es da nicht
festklemmt wie bei den Rippen. (Remarque 89)
The alienation from home and the abandonment of the humanist Bildungsideale provide
the soldiers with a rigorously pragmatic frame of mind.
Yet this new spiritual state is also directly connected to the physicality of the war
experience, a hardening and tempering of the German in the "crucible of experience" that
has transformed himself into something else.
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v) Fraternization Across Social Class Boundaries; Experience of Frontgemeinschaft
That "something else" is, critically, not dependent on education, the homefront, or
its social traditions. That the soldier has been tempered in battle does not mean that they
have become without feeling, but rather that they are seeking new kinds of psycho-social
bonds.
Many of the bourgeois war novels, for example, contain testimony to the
emotional comfort that front soldiers derived from the camaraderie in the trenches.
Köppen’s Heeresbericht, Frey’s Pflasterkästen, Johannsen’s Vier von der Infanterie, and
Renn’s Krieg are exceptions in the sense that they all maintain a decidedly individualistic
perspective: Renn does not like playing Skat and Reisiger hates drinking, for example.
Nevertheless, even those soldier figures relate to some of their Kameraden with
considerable affection, although they never wallow in the general community of soldiers.
In other words, their Frontgemeinschaft may consist of only one or two friends or fellow
soldiers they feel close to.
More typically, however, the men perceive of themselves as a member of a
clearly defined group that often transgresses social class boundaries and fulfills most of
their emotional needs, like a family of a different sort than they would encounter at home.
Paul Bäumer, for example, goes through the war as one of eight friends, half bourgeois
and half working-class, who tragically die one after the other. Katczinsky is the father of
their group, and due to his “uncanny ability to find food,” they sometimes have a very
good time:
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Hauptsächlich sollen wir auf das Proviantamt achten, das noch nicht leer ist.
Verpflegung müssen wir uns aus den Beständen selbst besorgen. Dafür sind wir
die richtigen Leute, - Kat, Albert, Müller, Tjaden, Leer, Detering, unsere ganze
Gruppe ist da. Allerdings, Haie ist tot. […] Kat und ich machen einen kleinen
Patrouillengang durch die Häuser. Nach kurzer Zeit haben wir ein Dutzend Eier
und zwei Pfund ziemlich frische Butter gefaßt. […] Gleich darauf stehen wir wie
verzaubert: In einem kleinen Stall tummeln sich zwei lebendige Ferkel. Wir
reiben uns die Augen und sehen vorsichtig wieder hin: sie sind tatsächlich
immernoch da. […] Das gibt ein herrliches Essen. (Remarque 230-231)
Part of Remarque’s recipe is the extreme juxtaposition between the horror of the
battlefield and the blissful moments of camaraderie behind the front lines, which are
usually filled with playing cards, collective laziness, latrine talk, and gluttony. Remarque
says it loud and clear: “Das Wichtigste aber war, daß in uns ein festes, praktisches
Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl erwachte, das sich im Felde dann zum Besten steigerte,
was der Krieg hervorbrachte: zur Kameradschaft!” (Remarque 32).
The deep emotional comfort of the Männerbund in the trenches has loud echoes
in war fiction across the political spectrum. It is often heightened by idyllic descriptions
of surrounding nature. Compare, for instance, the following nearly identical passages
taken from Schauwecker’s (pro-war) Aufbruch der Nation and Remarque’s Im Westen
nichts Neues.
Allmählich kamen sie wieder zu sich, reckten sich und standen auf. Sie aßen und
tranken. Sie betrachteten die grünen Bäume und die wenigen Blumen und
glaubten es nicht. Sie befühlten die Blätter, und da begannen sie es zu glauben. Es
wuchs Gras. Wenn der Wind kam, warf er Licht und Schatten durcheinander. Die
Post war da. Sie aßen Konfekt und tranken Cognac. (Schauwecker 194)
Und rund um uns liegt die blühende Wiese. Die zarten Rispen der Gräser wiegen
sich, Kohlweißlinge taumeln heran, sie schweben im weichen, warmen Wind des
Spätsommers, wir lesen Briefe und Zeitungen und rauchen, wir setzen die Mützen
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ab und legen sie neben uns, der Wind spielt mit unsern Haaren, er spielt mit
unsern Worten und Gedanken. (Remarque 15)
Such idyllic moments often prompt the soldiers to ponder the healing power of such
unlikely beauty amidst the war, as well as the reasons for their emotional well-being
among friends. Urach tells his sidekick, Herse:
“Mensch, Herse – eins weiß ich: so wie es gewesen ist, kann es nie wieder
werden. Und wenn sie es tausendmal und mit allen Mitteln so lassen möchten in
der Welt – nie wieder kann es so bleiben! Niemals!” […]
“Ich meine,” antwortete Albrecht, “daß ich mit dir und mit Radke und mit
Schramm und Gericke lieber zusammen bin als mit allen meinen Freunden vorm
Kriege, und daß ich das bis dahin nie so gemerkt habe wie jetzt.”
“Ja?” sagte Herse. “Es wär’ gut, wenn das so bleibt. Bis jetzt – ich meine bis zum
Kriege, haben sich immer nur ganz bestimmte Sorten von Leuten gekannt. Und
von den andern hatte man keine Ahnung. Jetzt ist das anders. Ich hab’ früher auch
nich gewußt, daß Leute aus deinem Stande so sind, wie du bist. Ich meine so
einfach und gut.”
“Es ist viel, daß man das heute merkt,” sagte Albrecht.
“Man muß sehen, ob es so bleibt.” (Schauwecker 194-195)
Herse is clearly from a lower social class than Urach, who is a university student from a
bourgeois family, yet both freely admit that they have never known such intense
friendships in their previous lives and that they would never have gotten to know one
another under normal circumstances.
In Im Westen nichts Neues, the tight-knit connection between the four bourgeois
schoolboys and the working-class soldiers is already established early on. In one longer
conversation with each other, they daydream about what life could be like if the war were
suddenly over. The original question was what everyone would do. Answers ranged from
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going back to school and learning a profession to getting drunk and spending a week in
the bedroom with a woman. Only Bäumer’s answer remains vague and impractical:
“Wenn ich darüber nachdenke, Albert,” sagte ich nach einer Weile und wälze
mich auf den Rücken, “so möchte ich, wenn ich das Wort Friede höre, und es
wäre wirklich so, irgendetwas Unausdenkbares tun, so steigt es mir zu Kopf.
Etwas, weißt du, was wert ist, daß man hier im Schlamassel gelegen hat. Ich kann
mir bloß nichts vorstellen. Was ich an Möglichem sehe, diesen ganzen Betrieb mit
Beruf und Studium und Gehalt und so weiter – das kotzt mich an, denn das war ja
immer schon da und ist widerlich. Ich finde nichts – ich finde nichts, Albert.”
Mit einemmal scheint mir alles aussichtslos und verzweifelt. (Remarque 90)
These passages show that both Schauwecker and Remarque considered the pre-war
bourgeois social order as bankrupt. The only essential difference between them is that the
right-wing author suggests that the Frontgemeinschaft can be maintained beyond the war,
so his perspective is inherently hopeful, while Remarque is under no illusion that the
front community will disperse with the end of the war. Bäumer surrenders to despair; his
outlook is utterly hopeless. Since he supposedly speaks for an entire generation, his
hopelessness must have been a devastating blow to male readers looking for constructive
impulses during the 1929 social, economic, political, and often personal crisis.
As this catalogue of shared traits illustrates, both leftist and right-wing authors
drew on the same stock repertoire of positive masculine attributes, although they
obviously modified them to suit their political objectives. Taken together, these attributes
of the new German type are very clearly drawn and recur universally in the era's war
novels. Before coming to the conclusion of my argument, it is instructive to see which
political perspectives might have been competing with these overwhelming images of
masculinity. It is also important to examine what all of these bourgeois war novels
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intentionally did not mention, the things they suppressed or omitted. As we have just
outlined, both the leftist and the right-wing writers worked toward a positive model of
masculinity.
In doing so, however, a number of uncomfortable historical facts about trench
warfare were considered taboo, since they would have marred the image of the heroic
German soldier. To complete the picture, the following section examines a number of
such omissions.
1.2 SUPPRESSED ISSUES IN BOURGEOIS BATTLEFIELD FICTION
While the bourgeois battlefield novels created the illusion of transparency and
clear distinctions between “good soldiers” and “bad soldiers,” or between acts of bravery
and acts of cowardice, the reality of the war was obviously much more complicated and
contradictory. The following overview provides a brief sketch of war experiences that did
not enter the fictionalized world of the bourgeois novels.
A) Fraternization with the Enemy: The “Christmas Truce 1914”
On the Western Front, on a thirty-mile stretch between the infamous Belgian
battle site of Ypres and the La Bassée canal, German and British soldiers laid down their
arms on Christmas Day, 1914. This truce was not entirely surprising because the enemies
had begun to coordinate sporadic ceasefires since the fall of 1914, when the initially
dynamic attack of the Germans ground to a halt and the men took shelter in trenches and
increasingly fortified positions. In the beginning, these ceasefires were intended to give
each other a chance to eat, use the latrines, and recover the wounded and dead from the
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no-man’s land between the lines. Such spontaneous ceasefires could last hours or days.
Sometimes both sides also made their rhythmic pattern of artillery bombardment
predictable so that the resulting enemy casualties would be minimal.
In the fall of 1914, the Westphalian soldier Franz Töns wrote in a letter home:
Die Dreizehner aus Münster sind an einigen Stellen fünfzehn Meter vom Feinde
entfernt, bei Tage sind die französischen Offiziere nicht da, dann wird nicht
geschossen, die Feldwebel setzen sich auf beiden Seiten auf den Schützengraben
und unterhalten sich miteinander. Die Mannschaften wechseln gegenseitig
Kognak und Zigaretten aus.23
These initial acts of fraternization with the enemy led to the so-called “Christmas Truce”
of 1914, in which mostly British and German forces participated. When the German
soldiers sang Christmas carols their singing was greeted by applause from the enemy
trench. Then the British started singing and the Germans cheered. Eventually, the men
were brave enough to light candles, put up little Christmas trees on the trench parapet,
and actually leave the trenches to share with the enemy whatever Christmas gifts they had
received: “Tagelang kehrten die Soldaten […] dem Krieg den Rücken, trafen sich mit
ihren Gegnern im Niemandsland, beschenkten sich mit Plumpudding und Zigarren,
tauschten Uniformknöpfe gegen Koppelschlösser und spielten Fußball.”24
It is unclear exactly how many soldiers were involved in this illegal truce;
historians estimate the number to be between a few hundred and several thousand.25 The
23 Quoted in Stefan Storz, “Der Krieg gegen den Krieg,” Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20.
Jahrhunderts, Nr. 1, 2004, 44-45.
24 Ibid., 44. Most recently, this event was fictionalized in the French film Joyeux Noël (dir. Christian
Carion, 2005).
25 Compare Michael Jürgs, Der kleine Frieden im Großen Krieg (München: C.Bertelsmann Verlag, 2003)
and Simon Rees, “The Christmas Truce,” viewed on April 22, 2006, at 10:30 am,
http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/christmastruce.htm.
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truce was officially over when the British waved a banner in the air that said “Merry
Christmas” and a German Captain climbed out of the trench to fire two shots into the air.
The war started anew after that. When Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the German
Army High Command, heard of these activities, he issued an order that every man who
left his position to communicate with the enemy be shot on the spot for high treason.
Nevertheless, soldiers on both sides continued to disobey orders through clandestine
communication or lulls in artillery activity well into 1915.26
These events were wildly reported in Britain but received much less media
coverage in Germany. It is very likely, however, that the news was passed on quickly
among the soldiers. Today opinions are divided as to how this truce should be assessed.
Pragmatists argue that it was “nothing more than a ‘blip’ – a temporary lull induced by
the season of goodwill, but willingly exploited by both sides to better their defenses and
eye out one another’s positions.”27 More romantic interpretations view these events as
testimony to human sanity and the common sense of the common soldier, who had
already grown tired of the senseless slaughter at this early point.
Regardless of the interpretation, the Christmas Truce is a piece of historical
evidence that the Generals occasionally lost control of their armies’ activities and that
acts of fraternization with the enemy did occur. With the exception of one scene in
Köppen’s Heeresbericht, none of the battlefield novels discussed in this project mention
communication with the enemy. Even Köppen does not state that fraternization did
26 For more details, see Jürgs 12-48.
27 Compare Rees, <http://www.firstworldwar.com/features/christmastruce.htm>.
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happen, only that Reisiger has the spontaneous idea to climb out of the dugout and shake
hands: “Mir wurde beschämend klar, daß ich kein guter Soldat bin. Ich spielte sogar mit
dem Gedanken: Wie einfach wäre es, jetzt aufzustehen und ‘Monsieur’ zu rufen. Und
dann ginge jeder von uns einundeinenhalben Meter, und wir schüttelten uns die Hand”
(Köppen 190). The audience may well have remembered the facts which would only
strengthen convictions that the army leaders did not know as much as their soldiers did.
Fraternization with the enemy was a corrosive activity that could obviously not be
tolerated by the Army Command. However, it was a relatively harmless phenomenon
compared to other desperate means that soldiers reverted to in order to get out of combat
duty.
B) Desertion, Self-Mutilation, and Suicide
In the fictionalized world of the bourgeois battlefield novels, the protagonists are
universally heroic in the sense that they never attempt to escape from combat duty. To be
sure, the more sensitive characters in the leftist novels do suffer from fear and
hopelessness, even depression, but even they always follow orders and attack with gusto
when they must.28 Ernst Johannsen’s novel, Four Infantrymen, for example, aggressively
exposes this paradoxical mindset (Gehorsam und Pflichtgefühl) in Nietzschean terms as a
“slave” or “herd mentality” (see chapter two). Schauwecker, a pro-war author, also sees
the moral problem of unquestioning obedience. On the one hand, he regards it as a virtue
28 Remarque’s Paul Bäumer, Johannsen’s Four Infantrymen, Köppen’s Reisiger, as well as Renn in Krieg
all register their own war fatigue to an extreme extent. However, their heroic disposition (Haltung) is
constructed in such a way that they cannot allow themselves to disobey. They are trapped in their good
faith in authority; warriors despite themselves.
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and a military necessity, but he also warns against the potentially catastrophic
consequences that could arise if the soldiers’ trust in authority should turn out to be
misplaced:
Was würden die Frontsoldaten tun, wenn sie plötzlich vor eine Lage gestellt
würden, in der sie ohne Leitung von oben als eine geschlossene Masse handeln
müßten? Er wußte es nicht, weder vermochte er es in einem bejahenden, noch in
einem verneinenden Sinn zu beantworten, und das erschien ihm schlimm genug.
Denn auch sie da draußen, sie waren im Grunde nur ein herrliches “Material,” wie
es kein zweites in der Welt gab. Sie waren alle von einem herrlichen Pflichtgefühl
getrieben, aber sie entbehrten wohl einer gewissen Selbständigkeit, die anderseits
für den Soldaten wohl nicht gut war, nämlich der Verantwortung aus dem
Gewissen heraus. Mit ihrer Pflicht erfüllten sie jeden Befehl, ohne über ihn
nachzudenken, und das war wohl das richtige, wenn da auch ein Fehler war,
jawohl, ein Fehler in dieser Berechnung. Was war das? Solange mußte es gut
gehen mit der bedenkenlosen Pflicht, als der Befehl gut und richtig war. Aber wie
nun, wenn der Befehl versagte, wenn er falsch war? Und hier in der Heimat
schienen die Befehle falsch zu sein. Ja – was dann? (Schauwecker 263)
Most of the novels resolve this conundrum in the same fashion, namely by deflecting
responsibility from the individual soldier. Someone else is always to blame.29
However, identifications of culprits vary. In Remarque’s case, responsibility for
the senseless carnage of the war is shifted onto certain parent-generation Wilhelminians.
The right-wingers account for losing the war through a number of variations of the
Dolchstoß-legend. Schauwecker and others focus on the incompetence of the military
command, the cowardice of the shirkers behind the lines (Etappenschweine), and on the
treason that Germans on the homefront supposedly committed by not supporting the war
29 The crux of this matter is the problematic tendency to justify and equate actions with military duty. The
invocation, “er hat nur seine Pflicht getan,” reverberates throughout twentieth-century German history:
Remarque successfully used it to stylize men like Paul Bäumer as innocent victims, and Adolf Eichmann
tried to use it in his 1961 Jerusalem trial as if he, too, were a victim. There seems to be a cultural tendency
in Germany that individual moral judgement can be suspended and virtually any action be exculpated as
long as a superior gave the order for it.
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effort to the best of their abilities. Much of their venom is also aimed at able men who
faked their way out of military duty (Drückeberger), and especially at the profiteers who
grew rich through the war (Kriegsgewinnler).
With the possible exception of Johannsen’s Four Infantrymen, none of the
bourgeois battlefield novels take issue with the front soldiers themselves. Contrary to
historical fact, the reader is led to believe that the fictionalized German soldiers always
did the best they could. According to Wehner’s Sieben vor Verdun, they were even held
back by the High Command. This is the central message of the novels’ positive
masculinity constructions: “you played well, even if you lost the ballgame.” Only
Johannsen draws attention to the fact that a soldier who fulfills his duty against his own
moral judgment is merely obedient but not really a hero. But if Johannsen’s judgment is
the harshest one among the novelists, historical reality is an even less forgiving arbiter of
the German soldier. That soldier was considerably less a fighting machine than memory
would admit.
Stefan Storz describes that the disintegration of the German army and its morale
had reached epic proportions by the fall of 1917: “Auch im deutschen Heer kippte die
Stimmung. Einige Einheiten mussten von ihren Offizieren mit vorgehaltener Waffe ins
Gefecht getrieben werden” (Storz 45). According to Omer Bartov and others, the military
justice system at the time was much more forgiving toward deserters than during the
Second World War.30 Storz asserts: “Es gab lediglich 49 Todesurteile, nur 18 wurden
30 See, for instance, Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich. (New York:
Oxford UP, 1991) 28-32.
76
vollstreckt. Schätzungsweise 20,000 deutschen Soldaten gelang es, sich ins neutral
Ausland abzusetzen” (ibid.).31 By the time of the 1918 Spring Offensive, however,
hundreds of thousands of German soldiers refused to fight.32 Large sectors of the army
were paralyzed: “Hunderttausende Leichtverwundete marschierten Richtung Heimat oder
stürmten Krankenzüge, um nach Hause zu kommen” (ibid.).
The men used any means at their disposal to sabotage their transfer to the Western
Front, including vandalizing trains and train stations. Twenty percent of the replacement
troops simply ran away during the transport. The crisis in German Kampfmoral became
so pronounced that thousands let themselves be captured by the Entente troops without
putting up a fight: “Teile der Infanterie hielten die Hände hoch, wenn der Feind noch
einen Kilometer entfernt war” (ibid.). Storz concludes:
Allein im ersten Halbjahr 1918 desertierten beim deutschen Heer etwa 40,000
Soldaten, bis Kriegsende stieg ihre Zahl auf schätzungsweise 200,000
Fahnenflüchtige. Insgesamt entzogen sich in den letzten Kriegsmonaten
vermutlich eine Million Soldaten dem Schlachten. Die deutsche Armee war am
Ende nicht viel mehr als ein Offizierskorps ohne Truppe. (Storz 45)
Apart from such mass-scale refusal to fight, soldiers reverted to the most drastic means of
escaping combat duty: they mutilated themselves or, as the historian Bruno Schrep
estimates in about 3,000 cases, they committed suicide.33 Some men used the same
31 On the French side, rebellion against the Army Command under Robert Nivelle grew so massive
between April and September, 1917, that 23,385 soldiers were court-martialled and the General had to step
down. The disintegration of the German army grew rampant in the fall of 1917, when many divisions were
transferred from the eastern theatre to the western front. Approximately ten percent of the soldiers deserted
the army during that time, and 20,000 fled to neutral foreign countries. See again Storz, 45.
32 Also compare Romain Leick, “Das große Sterben,” Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20.
Jahrhunderts, Nr. 1, 2004, 34-43.
33 Bruno Schrep, “Gebrochen an Leib und Seele,” Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20.
Jahrhunderts, Nr. 1, 2004, 58-60.
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strategy as Kantorek in Im Westen nichts Neues: during an attack, they pretended to have
been hit and lay flat on the ground. The fear of even worse injuries or death through
gunfire and exploding shrapnel also drove the men to all sorts of self-mutilations:
Um dem Inferno zu entkommen, fügten sich kriegsmüde Soldaten schwerste
Verletzungen zu, häufig mit dem eigenen Gewehr: Sie jagten sich Kugeln in einen
Fuß oder eine Hand, einzelne schossen sich die Finger ab. Im kalten Russland
entledigten sich manche ihrer Stiefel, um mit erfrorenen Füßen nach Hause
geschickt zu werden.
Feldärzte meldeten Rekruten, die Säure geschluckt hatten, die sich Petroleum
unter die Haut gespritzt oder sich mit ätzenden Tinkturen eingerieben hatten –
alles, um nicht weiterkämpfen zu müssen. (Schrep 60)
Since none of these events appear in the battlefield novels of the era, it appears that the
authors could be said to have actively suppressed the uncomfortable historical truths of
desertion, auto-mutilation, and suicide, in order to uphold and protect a heroic, if
unrealistic, image of the common soldier.34
C) Revolutionary Activity and Klassenkampf: Theodor Plivier’s Des Kaisers Kulis
(1930) and Adam Scharrer’s Vaterlandslose Gesellen (1930)
The novelists also did not allow alternative political discourses to enter their
fictional world, which, at least among the leftist bourgeois writers, existed within a
bizarre political vacuum. While Paul Bäumer and Renn maintain a façade of total
political cluelessness, the working-class men in Plivier’s and Scharrer’s novels register
34 While the late 1920s war novels avoided images of unheroic behavior, there are several films about the
Great War that did include them. See, for example, Stanley Kubrick’s Paths of Glory (1957) and Jean-
Pierre Jeunet’s A Very Long Engagement (2004); as does Christian Carion's recent Joyeux Noël (2005) .
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the signs of the times and act on them. In so doing, they adduce further moments of
history almost totally absent form more famous war novels of the era.
Theodor Plivier (1892-1955) came from a Berlin working-class family. His
colleague, Adam Scharrer (1889-1948), was the oldest son of a shepherd from a small
Bavarian village. He had sixteen siblings. Scharrer attempted to evade conscription when
the war broke out, which is one of the many autobiographical traits he shares with Hans
Betzold, the protagonist in Vaterlandslose Gesellen. While Scharrer left school at the age
of thirteen to work as a shepherd and then as a locksmith, Plivier had an adventurous
youth. He even traveled to South America aboard a ship to work in a Chilean saltpeter
mine until he returned to Germany and was forced by the police to join the navy after a
1914 Hamburg bar brawl. Scharrer spent the war years in the infantry on the Western
Front and in the east. After he was wounded, he returned to Germany and worked in an
ammunitions factory. As a die-hard communist, he was a member of the Spartakus-Bund
and participated in the strikes of the munitions workers in 1917 and 1918. Plivier was
sympathetic to the communist cause and spent eleven years (1934-1945) in exile in the
Soviet Union, but he never joined the party. He is sometimes described as an
“Individualanarchist.”35
Their respective political affiliations had a great impact on the success of their
literary work and distinguished their story-telling from that of their contemporaries. The
35 Compare Maggie Sargeant, “Roman der deutschen Kriegsflotte oder Roman der geschundenen
deutschen Arbeiter? Theodor Plievier: Des Kaisers Kulis (1930)," in Thomas F. Schneider and Hans
Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam and
New York: Rodopi, 2003) 359-373.
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danger inherent in that difference emerges in the publication history of the two books.
Initially, Plivier’s publisher had been Gustav Kiepenheuer, but after Kiepenheuer had
read Des Kaisers Kulis, he decided that the novel would not fit into his Verlag’s program
after all. Plivier himself rejected the offer from Internationaler Arbeiter-Verlag because it
was affiliated with the Communist Party (KPD). He wound up publishing his novel
through the leftist Malik Verlag, Berlin, although Malik insisted on a serial pre-
publication in the communist periodical Die Rote Fahne. The book became a great
success, and by 1932, it had been translated into eighteen languages.36 By contrast,
Scharrer’s Vaterlandslose Gesellen was published by the KPD in Berlin and Vienna in
late 1929 and early 1930, and even reprinted by two newspapers, but it still never took
off. In fact, it would have vanished into oblivion if the GDR Aufbau-Verlag had not
retrieved it through two reprintings in 1951 and 1952.37
The historical incidents in these two novels make them very susceptible to being
denounced as defeatist, socialist, or communist. Des Kaisers Kulis describes the events
that led up to the sailors’ rebellion of 1917.38 Authenticated through Plivier’s personal
history in the navy, the novel intersperses documentation with fiction, resulting in a
convincing portrayal of social injustice. The men who suffer the effects of this social
injustice, a loose band of sailors named Jan Geulen, Dierck Butendrift, Karl Kleesattel,
Kuddl Bülow, Alwin Köbis, Alrich Buskohl, and Vierkant, are initially not interested in
36 For more details, see Sargeant 361.
37 For more details, see Ulrich Dittmann, “Das erste Kriegsbuch eines Arbeiters. Adam Scharrer:
Vaterlandslose Gesellen (1930)” Thomas F. Schneider and Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis
Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2003) 375-386..
38 Plivier decided to write this book after he had read the Vossische Zeitung pre-publication of Remarque’s
Im Westen nichts Neues. Compare Sargeant 361.
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strike, mutiny, or any kind of insubordination. The narrative makes it clear that their
dissatisfaction gradually grows, and finally erupts, as the gulf between their own plight
and the officers’ privileges widens. All of them are hard-working and experienced sailors
who can actually assess nautical questions much better than their commanding officers.
The arrogance and injustice with which the officers treat the Kulis (sailors) are
emblems of what Plivier finds wrong with the Prussian system:
Immer wieder zeigt Plivier die Kluft zwischen Unterkunfts- und
Arbeitsbedingungen der Mannschaften und der Offiziere, insbesondere in Bezug
auf Nahrungs- und Seifenration, Heimat- und Landurlaub. Die pragmatischen
Angelegenheiten bewegen die Matrosen dazu, kleine Widerstandsakte gegen die
Marinehierarchie zu leisten. Der Feind ist nicht die britische Grand Fleet, sondern
die Offiziersschicht, deren Kriegsdienst bis hin zum Flottenchef durch Untätigkeit
und Inkompetenz charakterisiert ist. (Sargeant 362-363)
Aside from the sailors’ anger and frustration about their scanty food rations and shore-
leaves, they feel genuine professional outrage at the farcical (mis-)management of the
Imperial Navy. They understand that the officers only “do time” aboard a ship to improve
their reputation and to get promoted: they do not need to know anything.
The sailors themselves, by contrast, are used to hard work from their history on
merchant ships and cannot accept the idleness to which they are condemned.39 They
perceive the war as a gigantic waste of time, knowing full well that the British fleet
cannot be defeated simply because their ships are faster and have a better firing range.40
This knowledge sets them apart from their clueless colleagues in the western trenches:
Die Matrosen […] verstehen den gesellschaftlichen und politischen Rahmen, in
dem die Marine operiert, und, im Gegensatz zu den Soldaten in Remarques Im
Westen nichts Neues, können sie Schlußfolgerungen über die Strategien, die an
39 Compare Sargeant 363.
40 See Theodor Plivier, The Kaiser’s Coolies (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931) 205-206.
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der Spitze der Organisation eingesetzt werden, ziehen. In einer Diskussion über
die Diskrepanz zwischen deutschen und britischen Fähigkeiten auf See besitzen
die Matrosen genug Informationen, um Lösungen für das Problem anzubieten.
(Sargeant 363)
In short, Plivier’s novel effectively extrapolates from the microcosm of the navy to
Wilhelminian society in general. The reader understands that the subordination of the
competent sailors to the pompous and inept officers is as unjustifiable as the exploitation
of the poor urban working class by factory owners. Unlike the infantry novels, then,
Plivier’s story thus presents a much larger, socio-political perspective that explains the
war as a product of a faulty and outdated system. It also pays tribute to the enormous war
effort that women made, while the bourgeois novels universally sidelined women in the
roles of (sick) mothers, sad girlfriends, or little French concubines (see paragraph iv).
That is the reason why, when Jan Geulen visits his mother and sister during one
home leave to Mülheim an der Ruhr, the picture that emerges from the novel is radically
different from the one that Paul Bäumer or Albrecht Urach painted. They spoke of
alienation when they conveyed representations of German workers, where Geulen speaks
with compassion, understanding the role these classes have played in German history:
“The street ran right through Thyssen’s Rolling and Steel Mills. Workshops and blast-
furnaces, railway tracks, and clouds of steam, and beside it all a dusty row of houses”
(Plivier 188). His mother is at work in the factory and his little sister, Katie, has been
waiting in line for potatoes all day. Jan sees all the women patiently waiting in line:
Women! They stood in fours, a long queue, nearly a hundred” […] Jan sauntered
along past the queue. Those women – their skirts hung in stiff folds, and they
wore heavy boots or wooden clogs. No figures, no faces – not feminine faces.
They looked at Jan and remained quite hard. (189)
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Many of the women are emaciated. Some of them are so desperate that they stuff
cushions under their clothes to make it seem as if they are pregnant, hoping for
preferential treatment. His thirteen-year old sister puts him in the picture about the harsh
reality of the homefront:
Women stuffed cushions under their skirts! Those were Russians! In the barracks
there the “yellow girls” lived, the “canary birds.” “What, don’t you know that?
The women from the powder-mill. They live there because nobody’ll have ‘em.
They cough and spit so. But they earn a mint o’ money. They always wear gloves
and put on veils when they go marketing.”
A week’s home leave. Jan asked no more questions. (Plivier 191)
When Jan’s sister and two little brothers undress at night, he is appalled by their
malnutrition: “what skinny arms and big, protruding stomachs! Jan had seen children
with stomachs like that in the famine quarters of Chinese seaports” (191).
The effect of these harrowing impressions is two-fold. Firstly, Plivier establishes
a balanced connection between the women’s hard work in the steel mills or ammunitions
factories and the men’s work on the ships, resulting in a de facto gender equality. And
secondly, the reader comes to appreciate the sailors’ erupting mutiny not only as a form
of political protest, but also as a humane rebellion against the obscenity of social
exploitation. Therefore, sailor Köbis’ call for peace and a national Klassenkampf seems
quite justified in the end:
“We’ve got eighty admirals fussing round, and they’re nearly all ashore,
occupying positions that draw princely pay. And then there’s the generals and the
governors of the conquered provinces, and not one of them will give up his post if
he can help it. And the shareholders and dividend-eaters earning millions on guns
and substitute materials.”
“The war’s one vast business deal.”
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“And there’ll be an end of the swindle when we recognize it and refuse to go on.
Comrades! It’s each for all, and all for each! Better an end with horror than a
horror without end! Down with the war!” (Plivier 272)
While Plivier meticulously constructs this passionate appeal for peace and social justice
through gradually rising pressure on the sailors’ already unfortunate position, Scharrer’s
Vaterlandslose Gesellen: Das erste Kriegsbuch eines Arbeiters takes this political
momentum as its starting point.
From the beginning, it is evident that Scharrer sees Heimat and Front, hence
capitalist production and the war, as closely connected (a graphic realization of the
alignment of the military-industrial complex), while all of the bourgeois authors that we
will encounter present the two worlds as clearly divided. As was mentioned above,
Scharrer’s protagonist, Hans Betzoldt, shares the social background and political
perspective of the author. To avoid conscription, he had been hiding with forged papers
among worker friends, which in turn subjected him to the permanent fear of being
discovered. He also suffered from living in anonymity and isolation, so he finally
presents himself to the officials.41
Class position is the key to experiences of the war. Betzoldt is a twenty-five year
old lathe operator from a poor, rural Bavarian family. Due to the hunger and misery he
experienced in his childhood, he feels a natural allegiance to the cause of the proletariat:
he is a “klassenbewußter Arbeiter” with a political and social worldview that is already
fully formed as the war breaks out.42 Since the war is portrayed as simply a “continuation
41 See Dittmann 382.
42 Compare Gollbach 129.
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of capitalist politics by other means” (Scharrer 226), Vaterlandslose Gesellen is not a
Bildungsroman; there is no re-education, Betzoldt already knows what war is.43 Various
figures in the novel, including Betzoldt, a French working-class woman, and a Polish
worker, speak in unison about the war as “Gier nach Profit” (53), fought in the interest of
big capitalists and bank conglomerates, as well as in the name of capitalist nations and
their politics of imperialist expansion, a “Konkurrenzkampf um den Absatz auf dem
Weltmarkt” and a “Platz an der Sonne” (187). But Scharrer’s/Betzoldt’s view on the war
goes beyond the political perspective.
Given this opposite political ethic, it is no surprise that this novel reverses each of
the elements that the bourgeois novelists employed for their positive masculinity models:
whatever they painted “white” and “good” is now “black” and “bad.” Betzoldt hates the
army from day one. Already on his way to the barracks, he likens himself to a man who
was sentenced to death: “die freiwillige Kapitulation eines flüchtigen Todeskandidaten,
der, lückenlos umzingelt, keinen Ausweg mehr sieht” (Scharrer 38-39). He is as resentful
during his military training as he is later on at the front. He perceives all aspects of being
a soldier as a humiliating subordination to the military hierarchy, which makes him
angry, depressed, stubborn, and obstinate. However, he never lets himself be intimidated
by his superiors, even if they threaten to punish him, culminating in one scene where he
refuses to obey a direct order, which, had he followed it, would have cost him his life.44
43 See Adam Scharrer, Vaterlandslose Gesellen. Das erste Kriegsbuch eines Arbeiters (Berlin, Weimar:
Aufbau-Verlag, 1974) 187.
44 See Gollbach 131.
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Scharrer uses Betzoldt’s front line experiences to expose the standard bourgeois
model of Kameradschaft and Heldentum as false. The only friends he makes are like-
minded fellow proletarians. He loathes the obedient young soldiers from the bourgeoisie
(“Herrensöhnchen” [139]), who he regards as “pliable material in the hands of the ruling
class,” yet physically unable to endure the harsh requirements of the war, “verlaufene
Küken” (139).45 To Betzold, the bourgeois-military education that these men underwent
deprived them of critical thinking and prepared them for “das Morden”: “Man macht die
Menschen zu solchen Idioten, damit ihnen später das Verbrecherische ihres Tuns nicht
zum Bewußtsein kommt” (Scharrer 49). While the bourgeois authors maintained that the
front community of soldiers often transcended social class boundaries, Scharrer/Betzoldt
does not tolerate blurred class divisions: only the enlightened worker passes the test.46
This insight, in turn, prompts him to dismiss front line camaraderie as a fake and
“cheap” (67) by-product of the war that is automatically generated by the shared fear of
death.47 He debunks the myth of Frontkameradschaft by calling it a lie: “Die
Kameradschaft im Krieg ist die größte Lüge, die je erfunden wurde. Sie war niemals eine
freiwillige, sondern immer eine Gemeinschaft von Todeskandidaten” (Scharrer 67).
There is also no heroism, but pervasive fear, which makes men cower instead of attack:
“keiner will vorgehen, keiner will der erste sein” (69), “jeder sinnt, wie er sich vor der
großen Ehre, diesem Heldentod, drücken kann” (73). Although Scharrer’s sabotage of the
45 Ibid., 132; 134.
46 Scharrer claims that the bourgeois “Herrensöhnchen” (139) are “too afraid to declare solidarity to the
common Muschkoten” (139). The only exception to this pattern is one Lieutenant, who is a “Vertreter der
feinen Welt,” yet helps Betzoldt find employment in the industry. Later on, this Lieutenant is also forced to
admit defeat against the bureaucrats and chauvinists in power. Compare Dittmann 383.
47 Gollbach 133.
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heroic ideal of the German soldier is obviously politically motivated, it bears a closer
resemblance to historical reality than the fiction of the bourgeois narratives.
Like Plivier, Scharrer locates the Klassenkampf (historically attestable in
Weimar society) in the opposition between the common (proletarian) soldiers and the
ruling elite of the military hierarchy. Officers appear as a uniform group that
distinguishes itself through arrogance and cynicism (an ahistorical depiction because of
real differences between families with generations of military traditions, versus newly
minted officers): “Die Kerls können doch nicht ewig leben!” (Scharrer 102).48 They
enjoy good food and accomodation throughout the war and usually find a way to stay out
of danger: “Von den Offizieren kam keiner mit” (213-214). The common soldiers register
this social injustice and react with growing discontent and obstinacy, hence engage in the
beginning stages of rebellion against the military oppression. Like Plivier, Scharrer
transfers this exact constellation to the homefront, where the industrial workers are faced
with, and finally go on strike against, the same type of oppression, exploitation, and
injustice. This tale thus uses a fictionalization to motivate a historically attested event
and render it plausible to a reader who likely had been told that such protest was clear
defeatist.
48 Scharrer/Betzoldt gives the mid-ranked Sergeants the benefit of the doubt and exempts them from his
scathing judgment. Although they do represent the military hierarchy, hence the interests of the ruling
class, they can still be good people and good soldiers: “Er ist zweifellos – auf seine Art – ein guter Mensch
und ein noch besserer Soldat. Er ist der deutsche Militarismus ohne ‘Auswüchse’. Er ist gut, dumm,
kindisch, willenlos, ein exakt arbeitendes Rädchen in der großen Maschinerie, die die Menschen und alles,
was Menschen schufen und entwickelten, zu Blut und Schutt und Dreck stampft und brennt” (Scharrer
117). See Gollbach 135.
87
Therefore, Plivier and Scharrer share with their fellow novelists from the radical
right wing the ability to transform the war experience into something productive, into a
political vision. Both political visions essentially advocate the abolition of the German
bourgeoisie, albeit from diametrically opposed ends of the political spectrum: Plivier and
Scharrer advocate a communist revolution while the right-wing, if one can call their
vision a political concept, strive for a German nation unified by a strong leader and a
militaristic ideology, hence, a dictatorship. However, the right-wingers tend in general to
downplay and mythologize the suffering and sheer human cost of the war in favor of a
heroic masculine ideal, hence abandoning humanist compassion. Plivier and Scharrer, in
contrast, reveal the hollowness of military manliness by emphasizing its
inappropriateness vis-à-vis the enormity of human agony:
Scharrer schildert eindringlich Grauen und Elend an der Front, den Krieg “in
seinen vielfältigen barbarischen Erscheinungsformen.” Er beschreibt
Verletzungen und Tod, Hunger und Strapazen, Krankheiten und Wahnsinn als die
sinnlose Zerstörung des Humanen und der Zivilisation. Im Vordergrund stehen
die Erniedrigung und Vernichtung, die Schändung, das Leid und die Verelendung
des einfachen Soldaten. Der Autor beton den ursächlichen Zusammenhang mit
dem Leid der unterdrückten Menschen in der Heimat und in den von Deutschland
besetzten Gebieten und hofft auf die Revolution der Unterdrückten […].
(Gollbach 136)
The brutality with which the war destroys everything that is good and beautiful is
reflected in Scharrer’s descriptions of people.
In the following typical scene, Betzoldt is talking to his wife (Sophie), trying to
make her understand that he has no choice but to return to his unit, just before Christmas
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of 1915. Hence, he is on his way from his home to the front. At the same time, a
monstrous emblem of the front (Alfred) comes home to them:
Das "Fest der Liebe" naht zum zweiten Male. An den Bahnhöfen stehen sie in
langen Fronten. Sie schreiben keine patriotischen Sprüche mehr an die Wagen, ihr
Gesang ist verstummt. Die Fähnchen auf den Kriegskarten machen nicht mehr
viel Arbeit, es ist oft "Nichts Neues" zu melden. Die Preise klettern, klettern; der
Hunger geht um im Lande. Von den Kanzeln herab eifern die Diener Gottes, um
im Namen ihres Gottes zum heiligen Mord aufzurufen. Scharen von
Kriegsfreiwilligen - von Kindern - sind schon geschlachtet. Man muß auf immer
jüngere Jahrgänge zurückgreifen.
Wir sind nicht überrascht, als uns drei Wochen später der "Rote Schein" von
neuem zufliegt.
Als ich ihr sage: "Ich gehe, Sophie", drückt sie kaum merklich meine Hand. Mein
Entschluß war längst fertig, schon an jenem Abend, als sie zusammenbrach, und
sie mir, der ich um sie fürchtete, bestätigte:
"Hans, ich bin schwanger!"
Daß sie so bitterlich weinte, hatte jedoch noch einen andern Grund.
Alfred ist hier. Ich hätte ihn fast nicht wiedergekannt. Sein Mund hängt durch den
abgeschossenen Unterkiefer so schräg ins Gesicht, als wäre ihm das Fundament
weggerissen. Als hinge diese Seite nur an dem Auge, das viel größer scheint als
das andere und immer läuft. Ein ungleichmäßiger Bart versucht das Heldentum zu
verdecken, das ihn zeichnet.
So kehrte er heim, will seinen Jungen auf den Schoß nehmen. Aber sein Kind
fürchtet sich. "Geh fort, was willst du hier? Du bist nicht mein Papa. Ich mag dich
nicht!" (Scharrer 145)
Like Remarque, Scharrer simplistically projects negative physical attributes onto what he
regards as (ideologically) negative figures. Alfred, in the quote above, is an extreme
example, but the black-and-white scheme appears consistently throughout the novel, as I
have noted is common practice. The enemy in the Klassenkampf looks like this: “Seine
langen Haare […] fallen ihm wie eine verwaschene Perücke über seinen ausdruckslosen
Schädel. Seine glattrasierte Fratze unter dem schmutzig-gelben Haargarten verrät nur zu
deutlich, daß ihn an Hinterlist und Verschlagenheit so leicht keiner übertrumpfen kann”
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(Scharrer 54-55).49 Ideological friends, by contrast, are also beautiful: “Ich schaue mir
Klaus von der Seite an. Sein kräftiges Kinn sitzt auf dem muskulösen Hals wie aus
Marmor gemeißelt. […] Seine massive Stirn ist in der Mitte durch eine große Falte
geteilt. […] Ein Bild urwüchsiger Kraft und Selbstlosigkeit” (19).
As these examples illustrate, left-wing authors like Scharrer strove to deconstruct
the heroic image of military masculinity by offering additional entry points into history
for their readers, in order to replace general stereotypes about little-heard groups in
World War I with images that evoke human compassion, implicitly synonymous with
communist ideology. Still, the aesthetics of the masculine ideal have not changed in the
process, only in that its physical form is filled with a non-militaristic ideology. This new
man of the radical left is also a brave fighter, but only in the Klassenkampf. His enemies
are not the Russians or the French, but the greedy capitalists and pompous officers that
represent the German ruling class.
Hence, for writers across the political spectrum, the ideal German man is strong
and beautiful. There is no such thing as an ugly hero. What their heroes think, say, or do,
however, is simply a matter of each author’s political opinion. One fundamental
difference that does exist between bourgeois and communist writers, however, is how
“their men” view women. In the above discussion of Plivier, we have seen that he
depicted women as hard workers and fellow sufferers of social exploitation, while the
bourgeois authors tend to stereotype women in the relatively sheltered roles of mothers or
49 There is abundant evidence of Scharrer expressing his disdain for the bourgeoisie or for military men
through descriptions of their physique: “Sein häßlicher Mund unter dem lächerlich dünnen Spitz- und
Schnurrbart bleibt aber in einem blöden Grinsen stecken” (Scharrer 259). For more details, see Gollbach
137.
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girlfriends. Here again, leftist history is being fairly represented to call the master
narratives of the German army and the German home front into question by pointing to
real historical evidence otherwise repressed in the front novels encountered to this point.
D) Women and Their Perspective: Adrienne Thomas, Die Katrin wird Soldat (1930)
One other set of representation conventions emerge across the board in these
novels: they are written for a particular male point of view. In Remarque’s Im Westen
nichts Neues, as well as in most of the other bourgeois battlefield novels, women play
extremely insignificant roles. They appear sporadically as absent wives or in the sexual
role of French girlfriends, tending to the soldiers’ erotic needs, often in return for food.
They also appear as (sick) mothers, as in Im Westen nichts Neues, or as crying, caring but
naïve mothers, as in Schaufwecker’s Aufbruch der Nation or Köppen’s Heeresbericht:
Die Mutter: “Ach mein Junge, wer hätte das gedacht. Aber ihr wolltet ja ins Feld.
Wir Frauen verstehen wohl nichts davon.” Reisiger, für sich: Nun weint sie auch
noch. Wenn ich doch wieder an der Front wäre. Hättet ihr Frauen euern Männern
und Söhnen verboten, mit Inbrunst und Zorn verboten, ein einziges Gewehr
anzufassen – Aber was wissen Frauen vom Krieg! (Köppen 212)
Occasionally, women also enter the picture in the guise of nurses. In some novels, for
instance Renn’s Krieg, they do not appear at all.
The general consensus in bourgeois battlefield fiction is that women exist in a
parallel universe, from which the soldiers are severed and estranged, and that women
ought to remain outside the “manly” world of war. As was mentioned above, the men in
combat undergo a process of re-education that is marked by an extreme reduction of
emotional and physical needs. The bourgeois fictionalizations of the war experience
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suggest that the all-male Frontgemeinschaft functioned as a comforting receptor of the
soldiers’ reduced emotional needs, thereby absorbing one of the primary functions of
women. This is the more benign mechanism of women displacement.
In more extreme cases, women were entirely replaced with “material” that was
available in the soldiers’ universe. Due to the complete physical absence of women, the
men in uniform developed a symbolic concept of femininity distilled into an abstract
category that they could freely project on the objects with which they had formed an
emotional relationship, for example their weapons. “Femininity” or even “virginity” also
served as labels that could be attached to persons, objects, or behaviors that broke the
meticulously defined male code. Any man who did not abide by the male code of
discourse, appearance, or behavior, was not a man, therefore a woman. Anything outside
the male code could became “feminine” by default. In most cases, soldiers who deviated
from the male code were judged negatively: they became “sissies” or “pansies.” In rare
cases, deviation from the male code was perceived as un-manly yet awesome in the sense
of “sexually pure.”
One such example is Manfred von Richthofen, the "Red Baron" of flying history.
The projection of purity went so far as to make Richthofen a virgin, in the public mind. In
one episode, which Richthofen classifies as a “sehr niedliche Geschichte,” a captured
British pilot mentions a rumour that is being told on the other side: “daß in der roten
Maschine Richthofens ein Mädchen säße, so etwas Ähnliches wie Jeanne d’Arc.”50
50 See Jörg Bernig, “Anachronistisches Kriegsbild, Selbstinszenierung und posthume Heroisierung.
Manfred von Richthofen: Der rote Kampfflieger (1917),” Thomas F. Schneider, Hans Wagener, eds., Von
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Richthofen’s comment: “’Er hatte damit keinen Witz machen wollen, sondern war selbst
davon überzeugt, daß tatsächlich in der pervers angestrichenen Kiste nur eine Jungfrau
sitzen konnte’” (Bernig 108). Jörg Bernig identifies this episode as the only mentioning
of sexuality or eroticism in Richthofen’s otherwise non-sexual memoirs: “Aus dem
knabenhaften Richthofen, strahlender jugendlicher Held, als der er auch durch die
posthumen Heroisierungen im nationalen Gedächtnis aufbewahrt werden sollte, wird
durch Ausstattung mit ‘perversen’ Attributen ein Mädchen, eine Jungfrau” (108).
“Perversion” in the context of the military male code, therefore simply signifies
an extreme deviation from it, like Richthofen’s red airplane. He is aristocratic, odd, and
hence oddly gendered. On the language level, the transfer of sexual attributes to objects
or machinery seems to have been common practice when an author or orator tried to turn
a potentially positive public figure into something less acceptable. For instance, Bernig
quotes from a 1915 volume of the Zeitschrift für den deutschen Unterricht, in which a
certain Rudolf Mothes provides the following insight into pilot language
(Feldfliegersprache):
Wer zum ersten Male im Flugzeug aufsteigt, wir entjungfert […]. Einzelne Teile
des Flugzeuges entlehnen ihre Bezeichnung dem Menschen- oder Tierkörper. […]
Umgekehrt werden auch einzelne Teile des menschlichen Körpers mit
Flugzeugteilen verglichen. So bezeichnet man Beine als Fahrgestell. […] Das
höchste Lob für eine Kiste ist, daß sie schnell ist. […] Deshalb bedeutet schnell
die guten Eigenschaften überhaupt. […] Ein schnelles Mädchen ist ein schönes
Mädchen. Ein sehr schnelles Mädchen ist ein sehr schönes Mädchen. […] Als
lobendes Beiwort wird in gewissen Verbindungen neben oder statt ‘schnell’ auch
‘sauber’ gebraucht. […] Wie Löhnung, Kommißbrot und Quartier empfängt der
Flieger eine saubere, gnädige Frau. (Bernig 108)
Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi,
2003) 97-111.
93
On the one hand, this transfer of attributes can be interpreted as reflections of affection
for the weapons that soldiers rely on for their personal protection. On the other hand, this
male language code reveals blatant misogyny (and anti-aristocracy) because calling an
airplane or a rifle “woman” (or worse) also implies that the soldiers regard their
indiscriminate treatment of the two as justified, an abuse of privilege. “She” is at his
service, he is in control, and she had better not refuse his command.
With a number of harmless exceptions, such displacement mechanisms remain
invisible in the bourgeois battlefield novels. The soldiers’ sexuality is reduced to a
minimum or non-existent. Sexual aggression is an absolute taboo. Where it does exist, it
is trivialized or veiled in jovial terms:
“Meine Fresse nochmal,” sagt Haie, und sein Gesicht taut auf, “dann würde ich
mir so einen strammen Feger schnappen, so einen richtigen Küchendragoner,
weißt du, mit ordentlich was dran zum Festhalten, und sofort nichts wie rin in die
Betten! Stell dir mal vor, richtige Federbetten mit Sprungmatratzen. Kinners, acht
Tage lang würde ich keine Hose wieder anziehen.” (Remarque 82)
What is most important in this discussion is the fact that all women in the bourgeois war
books are reduced to either their sexual “function” or their nurturing function. They never
appear in any other capacity. Only the communist war books developed a fuller
appreciation of women.
One of the era's few novels written by women, Adrienne Thomas’ novel Die
Katrin wird Soldat, must be seen in this light. If women had no place as literary
characters in battlefield fiction, they were, of course, even more rigorously excluded from
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authorship.51 The consensus was that women knew nothing about the war, so they could
not possibly produce compelling accounts of it. Adrienne Thomas chose the most elegant
approach to make her voice heard against such massive opposition. She wrote a war book
from the point of view of a nurse working at a dressing station in Metz, Alsace-Lorraine,
thus presenting a perspective that cut right into the juncture between the civilian world
and the battlefield, and the geographical border between Germany and France.
Through this novel, Adrienne Thomas "rectified" a deficiency in the all-male
world of war fiction because she proved compellingly that the war not only destroyed the
men who fought it, but also the women had lived through it behind the lines -- a historical
fact which is almost universally excluded from the Front literature I will be describing in
the next chapters. The novel follows a diary format (often considered a "women's genre")
and consists of three sections, the third of which is entitled “Die Katrin wird Soldat” and
covers the time frame from August 4, 1914, to December 9, 1916, shortly before Katrin
dies of pneumonia. While the first two sections describe a normal existence for a young
girl from a bourgeois family, the third part sucks her into a maelstrom of horrific
experiences. Katrin is in a unique position to distinguish between the official victorious
51 This is the reason why Die Katrin wird Soldat was initially not even recognized as Kriegsliteratur. Helga
Schreckenberger explains: “Anfänglich wurde Die Katrin wird Soldat vom Verlag jedoch nicht als Anti-
Kriegsbuch sondern vielmehr als eine für Frauen geschriebene Liebesgeschichte vermarktet. Darauf
verweisen nicht nur die acht Herzen formende Umrahmung der Ankündigung des Buches im Börsenblatt
für den deutschen Buchhandel, sondern auch der Inhalt der Ankündigung selbst: Es führt den Titel ‘Die
Katrin wird Soldat’ und ist ein Liebesroman in Tagebuchform, Niederschlag aus fünf Lebensjahren eines
jungen Mädchens voll Charme und Klugheit’. Auch daß Propyläen mit der Frage ‘Hat Ihre Gattin schon die
Katrin gelesen?’ für das Buch Werbung betrieb und die Buchhändler aufforderte: ‘Geben Sie es Ihrer
Gattin! Auf diese Weise prüfen Sie auch gleich, wie das Buch auf Frauen wirkt!’, zeigt, daß sich der Verlag
vor allem bei weiblichen Lesern Erfolg für das Buch versprach.” Compare Helga Schreckensberger, “’Über
Erwarten grauenhaft”: Der 1. Weltkrieg aus weiblicher Sicht, " Adrienne Thomas: Die Katrin wird Soldat
(1930),” Thomas F. Schneider, Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige
Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2003) 387-398.
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propaganda and the terrible human reality that is transported back to her field hospital at
the Metz train station day after day.
She soon recognizes that not the Russians, not the French, but the war itself,
embodied by old men in uniforms, is the terrible enemy of mankind. These are her
thoughts when she briefly encounters Count Haeseler, a war hero of 1870:
Seine stahlgrauen Augen sahen durch uns hindurch, als seien wir Luft. Er liebt die
Menschen nicht, lebt wie ein Einsiedler – das weiß man. […] Menschen, für ihn
ein Haufen Staub. […] Ganz nah war uns das zerfurchte Gesicht – diese
Stahlaugen müssen dem Krieg selbst gehören – so mitleidlos hart gegen sich und
alle und so voller Verachtung für sein eigenes Metier. Nein, die Menschen haben
keine Schuld, die Russen nicht und die Franzosen nicht. Ich hab dem Krieg in die
Augen gesehen heute – er ist ewig und kann nicht sterben.52
Katrin unmasks element after element of German war propaganda as untrue, especially
the image of the supposedly terrible French enemy: “Und da seh ich nun das Ungeheuer
[…]. Ein kleiner, vielleicht achtzehnjähriger Mensch, flankiert von zwei deutschen
Soldaten” (Thomas 151). Like Köppen in Heeresbericht, Thomas thus attacks the war for
the gigantic lie that it is, as well as for the terrible price of human life that it demands:
“Immer dasselbe doppelseitige Bild: Oben auf dem Bahnsteig ausziehende, singende,
nichtsahnende junge Menschen – unten in in der Baracke die Zurückgekehrten mit
blutleeren Gesichtern, zerschmetterten Gliedern” (Thomas 202).
Thomas’ account is especially compelling through its authenticity and first-person
narrative perspective of an eye-witness. We realize, she is not a “little nurse” but an
intelligent and compassionate observer. Although Katrin does not fight in the trenches,
52 Adrienne Thomas, Die Katrin wird Soldat. Ein Roman aus Elsaß-Lothringen (Berlin: Propyläen, 1930)
162.
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she deals with the human waste of the trenches, which is equally horrifying. At a time
when most readers had just managed to gain distance from the war experience, the
immediacy of this diary-novel brought the painful memory back to the surface. Unlike
her male colleagues, she had no reason to embellish the male role in the war in any way.
To her, the dead and the wounded are just unnecessary casualties of a barbaric war.
What ends up here as critical for my argument is that she, too, uses much the
same set of images as the other novels from left or right, even as she offers a very much
more detailed critique of what the war means for the ordinary soldier. She shares, in other
words, the horizon of expectation for the ex-front-soldier turned reader of war novels, the
horizon whose elements I have outlined in this chapter. As the conclusion to the present
discussions about the shared images of manliness espoused by war novels of all political
stripes, I now turn back to the shared historical background against which all these novels
function, no matter if from the left or right, or as part of the war discourses I have just
outlined, the almost suppressed interpretations of the Great War.
1.3 THE HISTORICAL IMAGE OF MASCULINITY IN THE ERA OF WILHELM II
It is not untoward to treat these tropes, stereotypes, and exclusions as part of
Weimar's horizon of expectation and to assume their familiarity to many readers of the
age. In fact, the images of masculinity that I have been tracing in this chapter even recur
in the most infamous of autobiographical fictions of the era, Mein Kampf (1927). In his
autobiography, Hitler exclaims: “Why couldn’t I have been born a hundred years earlier?
Say at the time of the Wars of Liberation when a man, even without a ‘business’ was
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really worth something?!” (Hitler, Mein Kampf, 157). I will pursue Hitler's memoir in
more detail below, but it is worth mentioning here how fiction and non-fiction parallel
each other in "explaining" Germany and masculinity in the era.
Judging by how ubiquitous representations of similar scenes are in the fiction,
Hitler’s feeling was typical for a male member of the petit-bourgeoisie during the 1910s -
- or was at least the preferred image used by these males to think about themselves. If the
home front's documented enthusiastic response to the outbreak of the war is any
indicator, German middle-class men "felt" (were almost universally represented as
feeling) that the imminent war gave them the opportunity to prove the value of their own
existence to themselves.53 German society had not seen war since 1870/71 and the
subsequent forty years had been peaceful, so the younger generation, remembering the
tradition of the German soldier of the early Empire, was eager to get “their war.” Waging
war against the Russians, the French, and the English -- “Auf in den Kampf, mir juckt die
Säbelspitze” -- seemed the ultimate escape from the fetters of the bourgeois world; a
chance to feel like “real men” again, the way their ancestors had (supposedly) felt in the
heroic wars against Napoleon.
53 George Mosse confirms the universal appeal of warfare as a test of manhood: "However, the urge to
serve in a cause higher than the individual, to put manliness in the service of an ideal, had also been part of
the definition of masculinity from the very beginning. The nation fulfilled this requirement; it was a
constant presence during the history of modern masculinity from the Napoleonic Wars onward to the Great
War." (George Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity [New York and Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1996] 109).
This seems to hold true only for the bourgeoisie. There is no evidence that the working class necessarily
shared the Kriegsbegeisterung. The German aristocracy, of which I regard Kaiser Wilhelm II as a perfect
representative, was generally pompous and arrogant, and therefore eager to prove their masculinity, even if
this amounted to mere showing-off.
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What Hitler perceived, like so many others, was the need to prove his masculinity
through acts of courage and demonstrations of physical endurance, and he himself
realized that this need originated in a time period that had been mythologized in German
society for a century. Wanting to fight and come out on top was especially tempting for
men who were actually not physically strong, able, or robust, but weak like Hitler (who
was ultimately rejected for military service by the Austrian authorities).54 For men of his
build, the war offered a unique opportunity to prove their manliness by simply enlisting
in the army. In the civilian world, it was unlikely that frail men like him would gain
reassurance of their manliness through male-male competitions, like wrestling, boxing, or
fencing (they would lose). A historical opportunity would allow any recruit opportunities
to represent himself as a real German male.
The defeat in World War I was such a catastrophe for German men on the level of
personal identity because that representation and sense of masculinity, based on
traditional reference points established in the nineteenth century, was shattered
completely. Not only did they come home humiliated, wounded, maimed, or otherwise
disabled, but also had they lost their original function as men doing service for the
German Imperial Army. German men were supposed to make the best soldiers in the
world, or so they had been told, and they had been steeped in the völkisch and Prussian-
militarist doctrines of masculinity since at least the Wars of Liberation (1813-1814), yet
54 Hitler had left Austria while still subject to military service. Ian Kershaw observes that “already in
August 1912 the Linz police had started inquiries about Hitler’s whereabouts because of his failure to
register for military service. Evasion of military service was punishable by a hefty fine. And leaving
Austria to avoid it was treated as desertion and carried a jail sentence.” Hitler did eventually present
himself in Salzburg where he was in fact “found to be too weak to undertake military service. (Ian
Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936. Hubris. [New York and London: W.W.Norton and Company, 1998] 85-86.)
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the war had taught them that they were by no means invincible or in any way superior to
their enemies.55 This is extremely important in the discussion of World War I literature
because it adds a new dimension to the debate.
To this point, I have summarized the reference points for the war novels that
appeared en masse in the late 1920s mainly in terms of representations against which any
political orientation might define itself. My central argument has been that the political
tendencies (right or left, pro- or anti-war) of World War I fiction are actually less
important for judging their impact on the public mind than the therapeutic effect it had on
the individual male reader at the time. I believe that men did not read these war novels to
clarify their personal political attitudes toward the lost war -- which were already clear --
but in order to find some sympathy and encouragement in their acutely felt identity crisis,
as historical norms for "what men do" lacked any outlet in an increasingly narrow sphere
of activity that was the German nation in the Great War. One might go as far as to to say
that was once a nineteenth-century German masculinity-cult had become a masculinity
self-help group.56
From this perspective, war stories were a perfect disguise for authors (in the role
of therapists) to send encouraging messages to their readers (who were their patients).
55 Nicolaus Sombart even traces the development of German masculinity back to the “Soldier-King,”
Frederick William I of Prussia (1688-1740), who reigned from 1713-1740. (Nicolaus Sombart, Jugend in
Berlin 1933-1943: Ein Bericht [München und Wien: C. Hanser, 1984] 181-183).
56 The catastrophic collapse of German masculinity was only temporarily alleviated by the National
Socialists. When World War II was lost, the situation was actually exacerbated, and although similar
therapeutic novels were written about World War II, e.g. Theodor Plivier’s Stalingrad (1945), I believe that
German masculinity is still struggling to find a viable model. Evidence from my own research on student
organizations suggests that certain groups of young German men still attempt to fashion themselves after
nineteenth-century ideals of masculinity (especially the so-called “Schlagende Verbindungen”).
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The most important message read: “We know you lost the war, but you fought very
bravely, and because of your German virtues, you are still a respectable man.” In this
sense, the war novels mitigated an acutely felt sense of loss and pain by resuscitating
nineteenth-century characteristics of masculinity, especially courage, patriotism, and
loyalty to one’s brothers-in-arms (Kameradschaft).57 What supports my argument is the
fact that these virtues are emphasized in any of the war novels, regardless of the political
orientation of the author. They are, in this sense, part of the shared discourse space of
Germany in the era, the elements that any "credible" history of the Great War had to
include for its readers. And they recur in memoir and diaries, non-fiction and fiction,
from the era.
These soon-to-be standard story elements had, moreover, distinct psychological
correlates. In August 1914, when the Great War broke out, the average bourgeois young
German male could thus only be overwhelmed by joy about the opportunity to finally
fight “his war.” Even Renn, who later winds up hating the war, can represent himself as
sitting on a train car that is taking him to the Western Front and thinking: “Bin ich nicht
57 Simultaneously, as Roger Kingerlee points out, left-wing liberal authors like Alfred Döblin, in Berlin
Alexanderplatz (1929), Robert Musil, in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (I/ 1930 II/ 1932) and Hans Henny
Jahnn, in Perrudja (1929), embarked on a search for a new model of masculinity to counter the existing
one. He argues that although modernity accelerated the pace of almost all human endeavors, “it also
prompted the European male to decelerate, albeit momentarily, and take a long hard look at himself – as
early as the 1920s and such an apparently unlikely location as Germany and other German-speaking
countries. The psychological and social chaos and confusion that existed after 1918 meant that liberal
intellectuals, sometimes unconsciously, became involved in a search for an answer as to how one should
properly exist as a male human being at a time when the foundations of religious belief had been, as
Thomas Leahey (1997) says, ‘steadily eroded by science’, when the shattering recognition had been made
that many of our feelings and thoughts […] ‘appear to occur in automatic fashion, without conscious
volitional effort, and are often beyond [a] person’s control’, and when accepted and traditional modes of
male conduct had led to unprecedented carnage. The German novel, at least for some prominent writers,
became a tool for this courageous and sometimes desperate search” (Roger Kingerlee, Psychological
Models of Masculinity in Döblin, Musil, and Jahnn. Männliches, Allzumännliches [Lewiston, Queenston,
Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001] xiii).
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glücklich daran, einen Krieg zu erleben! Es ist doch irgendeine Loslösung. Wie schlimm
für die, deren Jugend ohne das vergeht!” (Renn 14). Talking in a parallel context about
the Wars of Liberation a hundred years before, George Mosse explains, “the volunteers
wanted to find freedom and they found it in war. Freedom in the past had often meant
individual freedom, and sometimes collective freedom, but violence and freedom had
never been so closely linked.”58 So why was violence and freedom such a magic mixture,
both in 1813 and 1914 (and probably in all the intervening wars, as well)?
Here, a standard interpretation recommends itself for the persistence of these
tropes of masculinity, even when they run against the historical facts of wars and lives
lost. As most historians agree, in the early nineteenth century, the political climate in
Germany continued to be affected by the French Revolution, coupled with French
enlightenment ideals of universal rights and political emancipation. The German
bourgeoisie was only just beginning to emerge and soon made significant contributions to
discussions in the public sphere. Besides Herder, few had thought of Germany as a united
nation until French troops began to occupy the German territories. The occupation
brought about strong anti-French sentiments and helped shape a concept of German-ness
that was diametrically opposed to what was perceived as the French national character.59
The development of the so-called “German national character” and the social
construction of masculinity that dominated German culture in 1914 thus can be seen as a
58 See George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1990) 27.
59 Compare, for example, Fichte’s lecture series at the University of Berlin, entitled “Reden an die deutsche
Nation,” 1807.
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direct extension of these earlier developments: "German identity" coalesced as an
identity under siege from within and outside.
The leaders in the debate in the early nineteenth century were Johann Gottlieb
Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-
1860), Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher (1768-1834), and Jakob Fries (1773-1843). Once
German national pride had begun to stir, however, it had become unpopular to credit the
French with paving the way toward German national unity.60 Faced with such constraints,
these theorists and their followers began to "invent" a number of supposedly German
characteristics that they claimed had always lain dormant in the recesses of the German
soul and that could emerge only now, under the heavy yoke of the French occupation.
Benedict Anderson quotes the anthropologist Ernest Gellner in this context. Gellner said:
“’Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations
where they do not exist’” (Anderson 6). Eric Hobsbawm concurs:
Plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and groups – not least in
nationalism – were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be
invented, for example by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical
continuity, either by semi-fiction (Arminius the Cheruscan) or by forgery
(Ossian). (quoted in Anderson 7)
The struggle against the French occupation (1805-1815) can thus be said to be the driving
political force behind the invention of such German national characteristics, while the
worldview of romanticism served as a philosophical backdrop.
60 Benedict Anderson quotes Ernest Renan, who said pithily: “’L’essence d’une nation est que tous les
individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun, et aussi que tous aient oublié beaucoup de choses.’” = The
essence of a nation is that all the individuals have many things in common, and also that everyone has
forgotten many things. (Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism [London: Verso, 1991] 6.
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In this reading, moreover, romanticism constituted a turning-away from the
rational ideals of the Enlightenment, and thus enabled Jahn, Moritz, and Fries to dilute
rational discussions of German nationality with myths and legends, as well as with
biological metaphors for the German people as a “strong body” and “organic whole” that
had supposedly derived its strength from German soil since the mists of time. This
romantic mystification of German national character in the nineteenth century is
customarily referred to as Deutschtümelei. The basic idea is that German culture and
traditions are unique by virtue of a sacred essence or “spirit of the people” (Volksgeist)
that non-Germans cannot understand and do not have access to.
Jahn, who had already founded the secret society of Deutscher Bund in 1810,
proceeded by pouring his nationalist fervor into the burgeoning gymnasts’ movement that
traditionally convened on the Hasenheide fields outside of Berlin, while fellow
nationalists (e.g. Karl Friedrich Friesen) focused on the shaping of university students.
Athletic activity, especially gymnastics, rowing, and fencing, became fundamentally
important in the shaping of young German men. George Mosse explains:
[Jahn] believed that the ancient Germans had already competed in sport in order
to show their manly nature and virility. His gymnastic festivals took place […] on
days designated to recall the events of the wars of national liberation. The singing
of patriotic or church songs, the patriotic sermon, torchlight parades, and the
sacred flame all at times accompanied the gymnastic exercises. The cult of
manliness through physical competition became an integral part of such rites, and
some national monuments specifically designed their sacred spaces in order to
accommodate them. For Jahn, such manly exercise got rid of the ‘sins of youth’; it
turned young people away from the frivolities which Rousseau had castigated.61
61 George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in
Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1975) 83.
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Jahn and the other nationalists aimed for a combination of discipline, militant physical
fitness (Wehrhaftigkeit), and Protestant-nationalist chauvinism. Jahn was a patriarch and
an anti-Semite who decreed that women and Jews be excluded from any such activity. At
the same time, he was opposed to traditional privileges of the aristocracy. His movement
introduced the progressive policy of addressing one another with the informal ‘Du’
regardless of one’s social background. The gymnasts accepted members from the
bourgeoisie, held democratic elections for all offices, and pledged solidarity to help one
another whenever fellow members faced difficulties.
To summarize, Jahn’s ideal of a German man was a physically fit, disciplined,
militant Protestant male -- most likely from a bourgeois background -- who admired
German history, especially Martin Luther, nature, traditions, and myths, was ready to
fight for freedom and honor, supported his fellow Germans, believed that women should
not play an active role in public life, resented Jews and hated the French. “Manliness was
understood as the embodiment of those ideals, and through fighting the good fight men
attempted to translate them into action.”62 Throughout the nineteenth century, this vision
maintained its strength and made a lasting impact on the upbringing of German boys
from the middle class. It was spread through the countless athletic clubs and associations
that existed all over Germany, and manifested itself most saliently in academic student
organizations.63 This was the dominant male discourse of the German bourgeoisie.64
62 See George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York, Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1990) 26.
63 To this day, some German sports clubs bear the name of “Turnvater Jahn,” e.g. “TV Jahn Rheine.”
64 For more details, compare Björn Freitag, Imagined Democrats: German Fraternities and the
Reinvention of Historical Identity, M.A. Thesis, University of Texas, 1999.
105
The next important historical date for the development of such commonplace and
shared images of German masculinity was the founding of the Empire in 1871. Again, a
series of successful and quickly won wars gave an enormous boost to German men,
specifically to those who were associated with student associations, athletic clubs, or the
Prussian military. This was the generation a “Wilhelminians” that would wreak so much
havoc on the German nation, and indeed, on all of Europe. Above all, this shared view
was a question of mentality. Age-wise, these were the men who had been born between
1855 and 1865, like Wilhelm II. (1859) or Erich Ludendorff (1865), and who therefore
experienced the Wars of Unification as boys. In hindsight, one can say that many of these
men displayed common characteristics, including “Autoritätsfixiertheit, Harmoniestreben
in den Formen von Anpassung einerseits und Ausgrenzung andererseits und vor allem
eine spezifische, nämlich von ‘Panzerung und Angriff’ bestimmte Aggressivität.”65
Unfortunately for them, Bismarck had successfully pulled the German Empire
together and cushioned it so well through his various non-aggression pacts that no war
was fought for the next forty-three years. Max Weber and others referred to this fact as
the “Fluch des Epigonentums,” meaning the curse of those born too late.66 Reulecke
explains:
Diese Wilhelminer mit ihrem – wie man zugespitzt sagen könnte –
Minderwertigkeitskomplex und gleichzeitig aggressivem Selbstbehauptungs-
willen besetzten um 1900/1910 die Führungspositionen in Politik, Militär und
öffentlichem Leben, bestimmten mit ihren Vorstellungen maßgeblich die
65 Compare Jüren Reulecke, “Neuer Mensch und neue Männlichkeit. Die ‘Junge Generation’ im ersten
Drittel des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts” Uta Gerhardt, ed., Zeitperspektiven: Studien zu Kultur und
Gesellschaft. Beiträge aus der Geschichte, Soziologie, Philosophie und Literaturwissenschaft (Wiesbaden:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003) 171-201.
66 Ibid., 177.
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Werthierarchien, Stilformen und Verhaltensnormen des Wilhelminischen
Deutschland und definierten dabei nicht zuletzt auch das, was – wie es damals
hieß – “Mannhaftigkeit” ausmachte bzw. zu sein hatte. (Reulecke 177)
Reulecke quotes from the 1910 Ratgeber für den Guten Ton in jeder Lebenslage, in
which proper “Mannhaftigkeit” is colorfully defined. Above all, it says, “the true man
stands firmly in his place like an oak tree”:
Er bricht lieber über die Welt den Hals, als er von ihr den auf richtige
Überzeugung gewurzelten Kopf sich brechen ließe. Der Mann muß Schierling
trinken und in Lava baden können, wenn es gilt, um für andere und fürs Gute zu
handeln und zu leiden. […] Hoher, stolzer Sinn ist des Mannes edelster Schmuck,
Edelsinn, der das Niedere, Gemeine, Schmutzige verwirft, zwar nicht schwärmt,
zwar die Welt nimmt, wie sie ist, aber sie beherrscht und sich nicht nach ihr
modelt. (quoted in Reulecke 177)
Such guidelines for manly behavior are quite significant as a background to the novels
that have been the topic of my discussions because they reflect a cultural consensus
which probably also influenced teachers in their pedagogy and parents in the way they
brought up their children, in this case, sons. Apart from the brutality with which boys
were “made into men” during the German Empire, it was also a time of unparalleled
sexual prudishness. Especially female sexuality was suppressed into complete
invisibility. This mixture clearly is echoed in the novels I have presented here and in
earlier chapters of the present discussion.
Just as interesting is the fact that this ideology of masculinity became a quasi-
official state discourse, as historical circumstance intervened. Wilhelm II himself, born
with a crippled arm, became the unfortunate victim of child abuse, even torture, as
several physicians attempted to stretch and strengthen his left arm or “remedy” his
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disturbed sense of balance with electric shocks. Nevertheless (and not surprisingly), he
himself became a champion of the masculinity cause. An extremely vain and neurotic
man, he proclaimed in a 1906 address to the Norddeutscher Regattenverein in Cuxhaven
the necessity
Daß wir Männer, daß wir Charaktere haben, daß unsere Männer sich bewußt sind
der Wichtigkeit der deutschen Männlichkeit. Der deutsche Manneswert kann sich
bewähren auf verschiedenen Gebieten, im Heere, im Zivildienst, auf der Flotte,
im Dienst der Einzelstaaten, in den Gemeinden, aber am besten wird er
ausgebildet, am besten und klarsten wird unseren Deutschen das Auge gemacht,
wenn sie auf das Salzwasser kommen. (quoted in Reulecke 178)
Needless to say, not all the German boys and adolescents were as enchanted by Prussia
and the navy as the Kaiser and his minions. The turn of the century thus marks a
profound generational crisis during which the young began to rebel against the stifling
atmosphere of bourgeois prudishness and boring conservatism that their fathers had
created for them -- the atmosphere that characterizes the world view of the later
generation's front-line heroes, the atmosphere in which characters like Remarque's Paul
Bäumer grew up.
Here I must emphasize that this "imagined community" of masculinity was not
aimed simply at the war experience, but had wider adoption within German nationalism.
Two of the prominent voices in this struggle against the dominant German bourgeoisie
were Friedrich Nietzsche and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (born 1876). Van den Bruck,
for instance, accused the Wilhelminians of political incompetence and cultural
dilettantism in very telling terms: “Ein Blutwechsel tut der Nation not, eine Empörung
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der Söhne gegen die Väter, die Ersetzung des Alters durch die Jugend.”67 Yet this
dominant view -- dominant also in the novels traced here -- was not the only historically
attested voice of Germany. German youth culture after 1880 was not as homogenous as
it had been at the founding of the Empire. The urban proletariat began to develop an
identity of its own, and many young men organized in social clubs that were not as
conservative as the youth organizations of the past. Moreover, Sigmund Freud’s
psychoanalysis and certain reform movements in pedagogy began to reflect how these
inherited images of masculinity were already beign questioned before the actual war.
One of the most important reformers was Ludwig Gurlitt (born 1855). In 1906, he
published a provocative treatise, entitled “Erziehung zur Mannhaftigkeit,” in which he
argued that traditional family life, dominated by an authoritarian father, as well as the
school system designed to produce “unterwürfige Untertanen” would never produce free
and self-confident men, but only “unmännliche Duckmäuser, angepaßte Schwächlinge
und gebrochene Persönlichkeiten.”68 Gurlitt advocated a general liberalization of
education, as well as officially sanctioned opportunities for young men to vent their
anger:
Um den zunehmenden Verfall der Sittlichkeit und die sinkende Wehrtauglichkeit
der jungen Männer, deren Demoralisierung, nicht zuletzt infolge der Trinksitten
der Studenten, deren Verweichlichung, “geistige Erschöpfung und Überreizung,”
“Pietätslosigkeit” usw. zu bekämpfen, forderte er nach dem Vorbild der
Amerikaner, denen er eine “geistige Elastizität und körperliche Tüchtigkeit”
sowie – im positiven Sinn – “Respektlosigkeit” bescheinigte, auch in Deutschland
demokratische Verhältnisse und den “Zorn der freien Rede,” um bei der “besseren
Jugend” das Selbstbewußtsein des freien Mannes zu erzeugen und ihr die
67 Quoted in Reulecke, 178.
68 Ibid., 180.
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vorherrschende grenzenlose Hochachtung “vor Beamten, Betitelten,
Ordengeschmückten und tönenden Namen” auszutreiben. (Reulecke 181)
Even if such ideas cost Gurlitt his teaching job at a Berlin Gymnasium, a new concept of
youth was born out of logics like this which transformed the images of the Turnvater's
generation into a more modern discourse of masculinity, the one which our novels' heroes
took with them to the front. Men like Gurlitt saw the harm in the excessive drill and
authority of the old system; instead they supported physical exercise, singing, and hiking
through nature so that young men could develop a sense of freedom.
The two decades before the outbreak of the First World War, in consequence, can
be said to be explicitly marked by these two basic cultural tendencies. The supporters of
freedom and independent youth culture included Ludwig Gurlitt, Gustav Wyneken (both
reform pedagogues), Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (cultural critic), Alfred Weber (Max
Weber’s brother), and Paul Natorp (philosopher). Their antagonists were the old-school
Prussian authorities, including Kaiser Wilhelm, the entire elite of the military, as well as
the upper echelons of civil servants and educators. What they had in mind was
Eine umfassende Disziplinierung der männlichen Jugend durch eine
Staatserziehung, die letztlich auf die Einrichtung einer verpflichtenden
paramilitärischen Staatsjugendorganisation aller Jungen ab etwa zwölf Jahren
hinauslief. Ein entsprechender Gesetzesentwurf lag übrigens schon vor Beginn
des Ersten Weltkriegs in der ministeriellen Schublade. Durch Kriegsspiele und
Geländeübungen sollten Willen und Ausdauer, durch Unterrichtsstunden am
Abend in den Herzen der Heranwachsenden patriotische Gesinnung und “Zorn
gegen den Feind” erzeugt werden. (Reulecke 183)
And these social values were almost immediately aligned with military causes, even as
they spread through general society. For example, a certain Generalfeldmarschall
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Colmar von der Goltz (born 1843) had founded the Jungdeutschlandbund with the intent
of incorporating different patriotic youth organizations, sports clubs and boy-scout
associations. In the beginning of 1914, the Jungdeutschlandbund had 750,000 members.69
To be sure, the liberals, often affiliated with the Wandervogelbewegung,
advocated the emancipation from these heavy-handed militaristic models. Alfred Weber
admonished the German youth to “stand on its own feet.” Paul Natorp appealed to young
Germans in 1913 “not to let themselves be dragged into the war among the Kulturvölker,
in which human beings were only numbers or parts of a machine”: “Sein Leben zu wagen
[…] mache allein noch keinen Helden, zumal im modernen Krieg von freiwilliger
Beteiligung sowieso keine Rede sein könne.”70 And Gustav Wyneken implored the
audience at the Freideutsches Jugendfest auf dem Hohen Meißner (October 1913):
“Möge nie der Tag erscheinen, wo des Krieges Horden die Täler des Vaterlands
durchtoben. Und möge nie der Tag erscheinen, wo wir gezwungen sind, den Krieg in die
Täler eines fremden Volkes zu tragen.”71 But as has been argued here, even as these men
rejected militarism, they were loathe to surrender the images of masculinity on which that
militarism and their own images of a new Germany rested.
The rest of the bridge between these nineteenth-century models and the early
twentieth-century novels under consideration here is straightforwardly made. With regard
to sexuality, it has already been mentioned that Wilhelminian Germany was hostile to it.





nineteenth century was also attributed to a general process of cultural decadence.
Physicians, for example the neurologist Hermann Oppenheim (born 1858), believed to
have found a mysterious nervous weakness in men, which they called “Neurasthenie,”
and which supposedly led to permanent nervous disturbances, depression, listlessness,
and “zum Gefühl des Versagens und morbiden Schwelgen in der Décadence […] und
letzlich eine Verweichlichung und Verweiblichung der Männer im Gefolge hatte”
(Reulecke 182).
Male hysteria, “Neurasthenie,” and rampant nervous disorders were also
connected to the moral problem of libidinous behaviors, especially masturbation, and
associated quite directly with both a crisis in German masculinity and with the war itself.
The primary socio-cultural response of the bourgeoisie was the recommendation of
abstinence.72 Reulecke also mentions a “flood of sexual education books for young men”
that came out at the turn of the century, one of which contained
Horrorbeschreibungen von den Folgen sexueller Zügellosigkeit und gab
Ratschläge, wie der Heranwachsende mit der “fast feindlich erscheinenden
Macht,” die das Wertvollste, was der junge Mann besitze, seine Ehre, bedrohe,
dem Geschlechtstrieb, durch Willenstraining, Abhärtung des Körpers z.B. mittels
häufiger kalter Bäder, durch intensive sportliche Betätigung, Meidung von
Alkohol usw. umgehen sollte. (Reulecke 182)
Note how the "cure" for these male illnesses is described almost identically with the male
values shared between the right and left in their descriptions of the (largely bourgeois)
heroes engaged in their Bildung on the front and in the trenches of the First World War.
72 Also compare Walter Flex, Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten: Ein Kriegserlebnis (1916). This war
novel contains the motto: “Rein bleiben und reif werden – das ist schönste und schwerste Lebenskunst.”
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Taken together, these descriptions paint a sad picture of young German men
during the decades leading up to the First World War. It is impossible to describe all the
nuances of bourgeois culture that might have influenced the mindset of German
adolescents prior to 1914, but the influences outlined above are certainly among the most
significant, and they need to be brought into juxtaposition with the images of maleness
that recur throughout the literature of the First World War. It is safe to say that most
young men were frustrated by the joyless, sexless, and boring atmosphere of German
bourgeois culture and therefore welcomed the outbreak of the war as a release from these
constraints and as an opportunity for manly adventures.
Yet more critical is the very comparison between left-wing and right-wing
construction of masculinity in Weimar war novels, and the gaps left in the dominant
discourses that characterize options for identity-construction available to men in a state
born out of a defeat and near to ruin. The century-long tradition that I have sketched
briefly here is what grounds the following thought experiment, which would probably be
successful, and which thus offers interesting confirmation of how ubiquitous these tropes
were: If one were to switch out characters between novels from opposing political camps,
say, put Paul Bäumer in a pro-war novel and Albrecht Urach in an anti-war story, this
switch-over would remain fairly unnoticeable as long as the men did not open their
mouths with any overt political pronouncements.
One reason for this similarity is that there is no essential difference in the war-
behaviors that heroes from any political camps find desirable: raised on a century's
tradition of German manliness, both are valiant soldiers who obey orders and care for
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their comrades. Both have the same manly traits. They differ mostly in what they say and
how they react to the war emotionally. Nonetheless, they are almost identical physical
and psychical types, as I have outlined, and they are defined against the omitted, largely
un-German elements suppressed in the war novels that were not successes.
This chapter has brought the reader full circle, back to the culture of German
masculinity that enabled the success of novels like Im Westen nichts Neues. There was
quite literally "nothing new in the West," in a Germany that had not yet managed to
rethink its Bildungsideal and the appropriate roles in the twentieth century for its heroes
like Paul Bäumer who would die in the trenches or survive to be utterly lost in Weimar.
The crisis of masculinity that I have traced here, however, has not been traced in the
secondary literature as I have done here, using the war novels themselves.
Let me now turn to the novels and memoirs themselves in more detail, to recover
not just the sameness of the representational material shared by the many war novels in
the era of Im Westen nichts Neues, but the specific uses of these materials in the
Bildungsromane of the German war novel around Remarque, as well as in the era's non-





This chapter examines the socio-political significance of the Dolchstoss-myth and
provides thumbnail sketches of some of the men who became the ideological trailblazers
for the conservative, right-wing forces in the Weimar Republic, founders of a New
Nationalism and inventors of the new German masculinity, precursors to the vision of
Remarque's generation, men such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, Arthur
Moeller van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Manfred von Richthofen, and Ernst Jünger.
Moreover, I will undertake an analysis of exemplary right-wing literary reactions to
Remarque’s bestseller, reactions that took the form of a specifically conservative
approach to the inheritance of the war experience. That investigation will begin with the
tacit reference points to all this generation's war novels, the politics of Hindenburg and
Ludendorf.
Hitler's own Mein Kampf will set up how these historical narratives of national
justification can be turned into myth-building strategies, as will be confirmed by an
almost contemporary fiction, Franz Schauwecker’s Aufbruch der Nation (1929), which
was the only right-wing novel coeval with Im Westen nichts Neues.1 Schauwecker was
1 Compare Müller, Krieg und die Schriftsteller, 297.
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the first to appropriate for his fiction what George Mosse refers to as the “Myth of the
War Experience” and hereby clearly set the stage for likeminded novelists to follow.2 As
a representative sample of further war novels from the more conservative camps, I will
further examine Werner Beumelburg’s Die Gruppe Bosemüller (1930), Joseph Magnus
Wehner’s Sieben vor Verdun (1930), and Hans Zöberlein’s Der Glaube an Deutschland
(1931).
Compared to the leftist-liberal war novelists to be assessed in a later chapter of the
present study, the right-wing militarist writers created a much larger, yet more
homogenous body of literature.3 What characterizes and unifies the latter group are the
shared tenets of an aggressive ideology that seeks to elevate and defend the central
Fronterlebnis against anyone they suspected of denigrating it, both during and after the
war. All the right-wing writers tended to employ similar literary stratagems with which
they upheld or resuscitated the memory of the valiant, and ideologically incorruptible,
German warrior. The central message of right-wing war novels is that these German front
heroes were, in fact, not defeated by the French, British, or Americans, but betrayed by
2 Compare George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York and
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990) 70-106; 159-181.
3 Thomas F. Schneider of the Erich-Maria Remarque Friedenszentrum and Hans Wagener, Professor of
Germanic Languages at UCLA, are among the leading experts on German war literature written during the
Weimar Republic. In the introduction to Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I.
Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2003), they point out that only a small fraction of the entire
literary production about World War I has been analyzed by literary scholars so far. Only 20-30 works
currently form the canon, while its total historical size is estimated to be in the thousands (16). Michael
Gollbach points out that “the number of novels that were critical of the war or condemned it was very low
compared to the number of nationalist and völkisch novels” (Die Wiederkehr des Weltkrieges in der
Literatur, 247). Schneider and Wagener support that claim: “Das Leserinteresse war im
Untersuchungszeitraum eindeutig auf Repräsentation des Krieges als Abenteuergeschichte ausgerichtet
oder zielte auf jene Titel politisch rechter Provenienz, die einer Re-Interpretation und Dienstbarmachung
des Krieges für eine aktuelle politische Gestaltung der Gegenwart das Wort redeten (um es vorsichtig
auszudrücken)” (Von Richthofen bis Remarque, 14).
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“un-German” forces and their influence, including Bolsheviks, revolutionaries, Jews,
war-shirking profiteers on the Heimatfront, and, first and foremost, the Social Democrats
who came to power after Erich Ludendorff, head of the Supreme Army Command,
stepped down on 29 September 1918. Readers are supposed to accept the idea that the
German army could have or would have won the war if these traitors (later to be called
Novemberverbrecher) had not been given free rein in their corrosive activities.
Historical evidence, of course, does not support the claim that Germany lost due
to a lack of support from the Heimatfront. Operations “Michael,” “Georgette”, and
“Blücher-Yorck,” the vast final spring offensives in the west (Kaiserschlacht), had failed,
and Germany thus lost the war militarily.4 The German forces under Hindenburg and
Ludendorff could eventually not withstand the combined military power and superior
matériel of the western allies and “the OHL made this declaration of bankruptcy at the
GHQ conference at Spa in Belgium on 28-29 September” (Kolb, Weimar Republic 4).
But to the right-wing writers and their fellow nationalists/ militarists, this was a truth too
painful to face, and a fact they were not willing to accept. By and large, the nationalist/
militarist circles were like-minded in this regard, which made it easy to create myths with
which to blur the truth. The Dolchstoss-myth, among others, was fabricated and
constantly propagated until Hitler came to power, aiming to persuade the public that
4 Eberhard Kolb explains that the majority parties of the Reichstag “had pursued their policy of extending
the power of Parliament with caution rather than impetuosity” until the summer of 1918. “But from July-
August onwards, as the military situation of the Central Powers grew rapidly worse, drastic changes soon
ensued in home affairs. After the Austro-Hungarian peace note of 14 September and the collapse of
Bulgaria (armistice, 30 September), the Army High Command (Oberste Heeresleitung, OHL) was obliged
to recognize that Germany had lost the war and that only an immediate armistice could prevent a military
disaster” (Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic [London: Unwin Hyman, 1988] 4).
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German forces had remained “unconquered in the field” (im Felde unbesiegt), and that
Germany’s surrender would not have been inevitable. In the opinion of Walter Laqueur,
[t]his allegation, made by among others Hindenburg, the future President of the
Republic, was not just factually untrue. It was the grossest slander, for the ‘home
front’ had for more than four years accepted without grumbling countless
sacrifices simply because it had been told to do so by military leaders of
indifferent quality. Nevertheless the ‘stab in the back’ legend was to play a central
role in anti-republican propaganda during the years to come.5
Due to the censorship during the war, the public was largely misinformed to begin with,
and so it was not surprising that they were susceptible to a story about the war that was
largely false.
Steeped in the belief that Germany was militarily far superior to its enemies, and
thinking that the German man-warrior was stronger than der Franzose or der Engländer,
the idea that the army had been defeated seemed outrageous to many of this public, and
“many were only too willing to believe in the existence of a ‘hidden hand’, of all-
powerful forces which had brought about Germany’s ruin” (Laqueur 5). This was the
national catastrophe whose consequences would eventually overpower and absorb any
pacifist activity that existed beforehand. Let us now outline the Dolchstoßlegende in its
history.
2.1 SLY STRATEGISTS TO THE END: HINDENBURG AND LUDENDORFF
Paul von Hindenburg (1847-1934) and Erich Ludendorff (1865-1937), as well as
many other generals who published memoirs, recognized the importance of manipulating
5 Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History 1918-1933 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1974) 5.
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public opinion in their favor at the end of the war.6 They set to work almost immediately
after the armistice, with obvious motivation: both former military leaders had personal
stakes in exculpating themselves and legitimizing the old military command, as well as
political objectives for shifting the blame for Germany’s defeat to the unsuspecting and
naïve left. Hindenburg audaciously rejected responsibility for the failure of the German
army in a hearing before an investigative committee on 18 November 1919:
An English General said with justification: ‘The German army was stabbed in the
back.’ No guilt applies to the good core of the army. Its achievements are just as
admirable as those of the officers corps. Where the guilt lies has clearly been
demonstrated. If it needed more proof, then it would be found in the quoted
statement of the English general and in the boundless astonishment of our
enemies at their victory.
That is the general trajectory of the tragic development of the war for Germany,
after a series of brilliant, unsurpassed successes on many fronts, following an
accomplishment by the army and the people for which no praise is high enough.
This trajectory had to be established so that the military measures for which we
are responsible could be correctly evaluated.7
In his memoirs, entitled Aus meinem Leben (1920), Hindenburg’s pathos is even more
pronounced: “Wir waren am Ende! Wie Siegfried unter dem hinterlistigen Speerwurf des
grimmen Hagen, so stürzte unsere ermattete Front; vergeblich hatte sie versucht, aus dem
6 This was a historical moment for which the French reaction to the defeat in 1870/71 had actually set a
precedent. Faced with the humiliating peace treaty they were forced to sign by Prussia, the French
representatives of the emerging Third Republic recognized the importance of inciting public scorn against a
scapegoat, which they found in Napoleon III. Eberhard Kolb explains, “Aber die französischen
Republikaner wurden nicht müde, die ausschliessliche Verantwortung für Kriegsniederlage und
Friedensvertrag Napoleon III. und seinem Regime anzulasten, und sie vermochten die Nation davon zu
überzeugen, dass Napoleon III. der alleinige Sündenbock sei. Auf diese Weise gelang es ihnen, trotz
Friedensvertrag und zeitweiliger Okkupation einzelner Landesteile, die neue Ordnung schrittweise zu
stabilisieren und ihr eine nationale Legitimation zu verschaffen” (Eberhard Kolb, “Vom Kaiserreich zur
Republik. Politische Neuordnung im Zeichen von militärischer Niederlage und Staatsumsturz,” Gerhard
Schulz ed., Ploetz Weimarer Republik: Eine Nation im Umbruch [Würzburg: Verlag Ploetz Freiburg, 1987,
18-31] 20).
7 Quoted in Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg, eds., The Weimar Sourcebook (Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London: U of California P, 1994) 16.
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versiegenden Quell der heimatlichen Kraft neues Leben zu trinken.”8 In both cases, the
army was "admirable" but defeated by external agents -- the high command.
Not surprisingly, to make their cases, Hindenburg and Ludendorff also lied about
the crucial question under which circumstances the armistice came about, and who really
requested it. Their distortions went unnoticed by the public because both displayed
extraordinary slyness during the last days of the war, especially in their negotiations with
the newly formed government. According to the historian Eberhard Kolb, events actually
unfolded as follows:
[After the armistice of Bulgaria, September 30, 1918], the Army High Command
(OHL) was obliged to recognize that Germany had lost the war and the only an
immediate armistice could prevent a military disaster. The OHL made this
declaration of bankruptcy at the GHQ conference at Spa in Belgium […]. It was
decided to address an appeal immediately to President Wilson for an armistice
and peace, and to support this on the home front by establishing a parliamentary
government, a decree to this effect being issued on 30 September. On this basis,
with the OHL still pressing for the immediate dispatch of the request for an
armistice, negotiations were conducted for the formation of a new government.
[…] If, in September 1918, matters did not come to a showdown between the
OHL and the Reichstag majority, it was because Ludendorff, seeing that the
military situation was hopeless, judged it wiser to let the parties take over, and
thus place on them the responsibility for terminating the war effort.9
Yet Ludendorff paints a completely different picture in his war memoirs, which he wrote
from the safety of his Swedish exile at Hessleholmsgard between November 1918 and
February 1919. He conveys the impression that Hindenburg and himself stayed in control
and were determined to fight to the last man in a heroic effort to avert the crippling
conditions of the allied armistice.
8 Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1920) 403.
9 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988) 4-5.
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Upon Wilson’s reply to the second German note of appeal for an armistice, in
which he demanded that Germany stop the submarine war immediately, a War Cabinet
meeting took place in Berlin on October 17. Ludendorff was asked to assess the military
situation, and whether or not continued fighting might still yield success. According to
the testimony in his memoirs, he replied:
War is not a sum in arithmetic. There are in war many probabilities and
improbabilities. What will actually happen no man knows. When we went to East
Prussia in August 1914, and the orders were given for the battle of Tannenberg,
even then none knew how things would go, or whether Rennenkampf would
move or not move. He did not move, and we won the battle. Part of war is luck,
and luck may come Germany’s way again.10
At the same meeting, the military leaders present discussed the question of transferring
some 26 divisions from the east, especially those scattered in the Ukraine, over to the
west, where 185 divisions were deployed. Ludendorff deplores that these men were ill-
suited for reinforcing the western front because “the temptations to which the men were
exposed from the corruption of Jewish traders in the East and from Bolshevist
propaganda, and, indeed, also by propaganda from home, had broken their fighting spirit”
(Ludendorff 409). Two sentences later, he admits that the military situation in the west
was hopeless, whether or not these men would be transported there: “Nothing they could
do could produce any such alteration in the military situation as would bring the enemy to
negotiate with us” (409). Even from his own memoirs one gets the impression that
Ludendorff was engaged in double play. It seems clear that he knew full well the war was
10 Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff’s Own Story: August 1914 – November 1918, The Great War from the
Siege of Liege to the Signing of the Armistice as viewed from the Grand Headquarters of the German Army
(New York and London: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1919) vol 2, 408.
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lost after the armistice in Bulgaria, but, depending on whom he spoke to, he continued to
be evasive about the true state of affairs.11
Another instance where Ludendorff creates the impression that he was given
misleading information, and therefore deceived by the politicians, is in the context of
mobilizing more troops from Germany, instead of transferring existing divisions from the
east. Ludendorff reports:
We now turned to discuss the vital question of how much the people could and
would still give to the army. Everything else depended on this. I had hoped that
the Government would have been clear on this point. The new Minister of War
gave me a more optimistic account of the prospects for reinforcements that I had
hitherto received. He estimated a figure of 600,000 men. I could not check his
figures. I was very greatly impressed by the statement that 60,000 to 70,000 men
were immediately available to be sent into the army. Why had they not been sent
sooner? I said, ‘If I have these reinforcements now, I can face the future with
confidence, but I must have them immediately.’ The Minister promised not to lose
a day. (Ludendorff 411-12)
Again, the implication is that Ludendorff and his army would have managed to turn the
hopeless situation around if the men in charge at home would have kept their promises. In
the context of the same discussion, the Social Democrat Scheidemann describes the
general sentiment on the homefront with the German saying: “’Better a terrible end than
terrors without end’” (412). This hopeless attitude was to be attributed, above all, to the
dire food situation, Germans were starving. Ludendorff promised his support: “I agreed
instantly to adopt, so far as lay in my power, every measure that could relieve the
shortage. In general, his statement constituted a serious indictment of our Government,
which had allowed the splendid spirit of 1914 to be so terribly changed” (412).
11 Ludendorff himself mentions in passing that others confronted him about his evasiveness: “Secretary
Solf accused me of a change in front” (415). “This, taken together with Secretary Solf’s idea that I had
changed my views, led me to discuss once again […]” (Ludendorff 416).
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The impression of Ludendorff’s evasiveness and probable mendacity run like
threads through the chapters of his memoirs in which he discusses the final stage of the
war. Statements like the following are typical because they downplay his own
maneuvering and highlight the degree to which everyone else was supposedly involved
with what went wrong:
The majority of the German people were ready and willing to sacrifice the last of
their strength to the army, and it was the duty of the Government to carry out this
sacrifice. I spoke to this effect, […], and also suggested that Ebert, the leader of
the Social Democrats, should be given some leading post, in order by his help to
strengthen the resistance of the people and bring new strength into the fight.
(Ludendorff 414-15)
Wilhelm II, Ludendorff, and Hindenburg were of course not the only military
commanders who acted in bad faith although they could see the larger picture. There
were many other generals and military experts who would have been capable of giving an
accurate report on the circumstances of Germany’s military defeat, yet none of them
spoke out to inform the German public of the truth.12
In the erupting Politik- und Kulturkampf between supporters and enemies of the
new republic, the new men in power failed to recognize the fundamental importance of
clearly assigning the responsibility for the military defeat to Kaiser Wilhelm’s old power
apparatus; one could have seized the opportunity to officially blame the true culprits once
and for all. But the new leaders did not anticipate how much resentment, humiliation, and
12 In fact, large portions of the German public continued to live with the historically false belief that World
War I had been fought in defense of the fatherland, not as a war of aggression. Fritz Fischer’s publications
of 1961 (Der Griff nach der Weltmacht) and 1969 (Krieg der Illusionen) were the first major works by a
German historian to question that assumption. See Paul Bookbinder, Weimar Germany: The Republic of the
Reasonable (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996) 8.
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hatred the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty would release in Germany, despite the fact
that Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the Lansing-Note of 5 November 1918 foreshadowed
the terms of the treaty as severe.13
In fact, Ebert and his fellow Social Democrats, as well as the representatives of
the revolutionary government, did nothing to prepare the German populace for May
1919, when the conditions of the treaty were officially announced and indeed left the
nation stunned. On the contrary: they even made the tactical mistake of contributing to
the unfounded hope that President Wilson might be able to grant more lenient peace
agreements to the conquered Germany.14 In a welcoming speech to returning front
soldiers, Ebert himself was unwise to express his respect to the German army for being
“undefeated in the field,” thus lending legitimacy the the right-wing militarist myth. It
must also be called a tactical blunder that Matthias Erzberger of the Centre Party was sent
to the armistice negotiations in France, instead of insisting on sending an emissary from
the ex-military High Command (a military High Command that no longer existed legally,
but whose presence was long felt in Germany and so needed to be accommodated in the
public mind). This gesture must have given the impression to the world that the new
government did indeed share the responsibility for the lost war and the peace terms.
The new German government underestimated the ultimate danger embodied by
the reactionary right wing and the risk of releasing them from responsibility for what the
Army High Command had actually done (miscalculate and misjudge the war). In fact,
13 For a more detailed discussion, compare Kolb, “Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik” 20.
14 For more details, see Kolb, The Weimar Republic 6.
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they even granted the old army, now under General Groener, a new position of power in
return for assisting the new government in their struggle against a take-over from the
radical left. This misjudgment had long-lasting and severe consequences for the new
republic because it prevented its broader acceptance by German citizens who failed to
understand the old army's culpability. In this sense, the Culture War between the ancients
(embodied by the right-wing militarists and nationalists) and the moderns (left wing
democrats and other supporters of the Republic) was already decided early on in the
game. Ludendorff and Hindenburg managed to shroud the reality of Germany’s military
defeat in a myth. Since the left failed to see the significance of this tactic, and could not
offer a more convincing version to counter the Dolchstoß, they alone wound up
shouldering the responsibility for the national disaster.
There was little the left could do to make the new parliamentary system, the
Republic, more appealing to Germans. The new system was perceived as bureaucratic,
tedious, and weak rather than as a corrective to the errors of the old army. There was
nothing to love. “It was in way quite characteristic that the very idea of ‘loving’
democracy or the Republic should have been an issue at all, as if a political system was
evil unless it evoked emotions of this kind,” Laqueur observes (5). “The thought itself
would have struck Frenchmen and Englishmen as absurd, an exalted Romantic notion.
But many Germans were romantic in their attitude towards the state, and since the
Republic was so unromantic, it was mal-aimée (5).
The war memoirs and novels from the right reflected this state of affairs.
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2.2 ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1925)
One of the first populists to take full advantage of these anti-republican feelings
was Hitler himself. With the assistance of Rudolf Heß, he wrote the autobiographical
manifesto Mein Kampf during his nine months of incarceration at the Landsberg fortress
(April 1 – December 20, 1924). Not a novel (no matter how much fiction might be in it),
it is nonetheless instructive to examine how Hitler personally assessed the lost war
because his narrative reveals the continuity between Ludendorff’s subtle, but deliberate,
twisting of the truth and Hitler’s own full-blown racial hatred and demagoguery. Hitler
and Ludendorff had similar political objectives after the war -- the removal of the
Weimar Republic government -- and had already cooperated in the attempted coup d’état
that took place in Munich on November 8-9, 1923 (Beer-Hall Putsch).15
In terms of the right-wing nationalist perception of the lost war, then, one might
say that Ludendorff sowed the seeds that Hitler brought to germination. Hitler, among
others, also gave the Dolchstoßlegende its decidedly anti-semitic slant:
This most of all shows the assertion that the lost War was the cause of the German
collapse to be a lie. No, this military collapse was itself only the consequence of a
large number of symptoms of disease and their causes, which even in peacetime
were with the German nation. This was the first consequence, catastrophic and
visible to all, of an ethical and moral poisoning, of a diminution in the instinct of
15 At the time, Hitler vied with Gustav Ritter von Kahr for the leading position in Munich’s extreme right
wing (Kampfbund). In an attempt to replicate Mussolini’s March on Rome, Hitler and his fellow agitators
brought the Bürgerbräukeller, a beer hall where von Kahr was giving a speech, under their control, took
von Kahr, Seißer and Lossow as hostages, but ultimately failed to rally sufficient support for a “March on
Berlin” to topple the government and “drive out the Jewish-Marxist brood.” Ludendorff joined in on the
evening on November 8, released the hostages, and led the march to the Feldherrenhalle on the next day
(“Wir marschieren!”). Unlike Hitler and the other insurgents, Ludendorff was acquitted due to his
famousness and connections in high places. For more details, see Heinrich August Winkler, Weimar 1918-
1933: Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1993) 234-235.
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self-preservation and its preconditions, which for many years had begun to
undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich.
It required the whole bottomless falsehood of the Jews and their Marxist
fighting organization to lay the blame for the collapse on the very man who alone,
with superhuman energy and will power, tried to prevent the catastrophe he
foresaw and save the nation from its time of deepest humiliation and disgrace. By
branding Ludendorff as guilty for the loss of the World War, they took the
weapon of moral right from the one dangerous accuser who would have risen
against the traitors to the fatherland.16
In this excerpt, Hitler brings up several key ideas that resurface in many pro-war novels
five years later. Reminiscent of the cultural pessimism expressed by such thinkers as
Nietzsche, Spengler, and Moeller van den Bruck (to be discussed in the next section),
Hitler speaks of “disease” and “moral poisoning” that affected the well-being of the
German nation even before the war. He also mentions “the instinct of self-preservation,”
a term he might have adopted from Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) or Ernst Haeckel (1834-
1919), a German biologist whose “biogenic theory” offered a version of Darwin’s theory
of evolution that the National Socialists could coopt.17 In a sweeping generalization that
is typical of Hitler’s style, he equates Jews with their “Marxist fighting organization”
without providing any evidence or support for the link between the two. And finally, he
16 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, Sentry Edition) 231.
17 Ernst Haeckel (February 16, 1834 – August 8, 1919). Haeckel advanced the “recapitulation theory,”
which proposed a link between ontogeny (development of form) and phylogeny (revolutionary descent),
summed up in the phrase “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.” He supported the theory with embryo
drawings that have since been shown to be inaccurate, and the theory is no longer generally accepted.
Haeckel was also known for his “biogenic theory,” in which he suggested that the development of races
paralleled the development of individuals. He advocated the idea that “primitive” races were in their
infancies and needed the “protection” and “supervision” of more “mature” societies. He extrapolated a new
religion or philosophy called Monism from evolutionary science. In Monism, all economics, politics, and
ethics are reduced to “applied biology.” His writings and lectures on Monism provided scientific (or quasi-
scientific) justifications for racism, nationalism, and social Darwinism. It has even been argued that
Monism thus became the de facto religion of Nazi Germany. Other scholars disagree, arguing that Nazi
ideology was not comfortable with evolutionary theory, which describes a common descent of all human
races. January 19, 2006, at 9:35 pm, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Haeckel>.
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bestows upon Ludendorff the attributes of a Nietzschean Übermensch, namely
“superhuman energy and willpower,” the qualities of a true Führer.
Hitler and the war novelists discussed in this chapter share a particular style.
Neither seem to see a need to justify any of their cultural or historical assumptions.
Reading Mein Kampf or any of the pro-war novels written in the late 1920s, one feels as
though one is expected to know the dim backgrounds of a glorious German history or the
qualities of the ancient German soul to which they steadily allude. Hitler and these
writers are extremely eclectic in their choice of historical evidence for acts of heroism,
instances of national unity, or undiluted fighting spirit. Reminiscent of Nietzsche’s
aphoristic style, they often evoke a Golden Age that is never clearly defined, but that is
apparently characterized by certain virtues still being intact, including manly courage,
strength, instinct, honesty, camaraderie, and often the subordination of the individual to a
strong Führer-figure. Likewise, they tend to insinuate the desirable recurrence of such a
Golden Age without any indication of how this could be established.
Due to this evocation of a nebulous, distant past and an equally hazy future,
Hitler’s writing and the pro-war novels share a peculiar way of dealing with the present
time. With an air of aloofness, it is taken for granted that German culture and society are
in demise, and that the reader detests the present historical situation as much as they do.
Therefore, Mein Kampf and the pro-war novels are essentially motivational writings for
readers who are frustrated with the current state of society. Their primary aim is not
necessarily to offer practical solutions, but to signal to the reader that something must be
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done and that there is a community of like-minded men who share his loathing,
frustration, and anxiety.
There thus clearly exists a common denominator between the adherents of the
nationalist-militarist (and often anti-Semitic) creed. Apart from blind acceptance of the
war as a test of the nation’s mettle, one tangible aspect of this common denominator is
the shared sense of euphoria that washed over Germany when troops were mobilized in
late July, 1914 (Kriegsbegeisterung). This is how Hitler describes his emotions when he
heard the news in Munich:
To me those hours seemed like a release from the painful feelings of my youth.
Even today I am not ashamed to say that, overpowered by stormy enthusiasm, I
fell down on my knees and thanked Heaven from an overflowing heart for
granting me the good fortune of being permitted to live at this time.
A fight for freedom had begun, mightier than the earth had ever seen; for
once Destiny had begun its course, the conviction dawned on even the broad
masses that this time not the fate of Serbia or Austria was involved, but whether
the German nation was to be or not to be. (Mein Kampf, 161)
Hitler’s reaction, even by pro-war writers’ standards, is quite exalted. However, many
seemed to have felt the same sense of national pride, unity, self-confidence, and release
from the stifling world of the bourgeoisie, even those who eventually rejected the war.18
Looking back from today’s perspective, and taking into account the unimaginable horror
that would ensue, it is inconceivable what could have motivated millions of young
German men to welcome the outbreak of another German war, at a time when memories
of the Great War were still so alive.
18 Compare, for example, Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues, Renn’s Krieg, and Glaeser’s Jahrgang
1902.
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One hypothesis attributes this new Kriegsbegeisterung to the general Zeitgeist:
“Im imperialistischen Zeitalter sei eben alles Denken unterschwellig von der Vorstellung
einer naturwüchsigen Auslese der Stärksten durchdrungen gewesen.”19 Another
hypothesis seeks the reason in the elementary, irrational allure of mass psychology. And
the literature scholar Helmut Fries explained the German case in his two-volume study
Die große Katharsis as follows: “Deutschlands Dichter und Denker hätten den Krieg als
Chance missverstanden, ihre angestammte Rolle von geistigen Führern der Nation
zurückzuerobern – die sei ihnen nämlich im 1871 einsetzenden Triumphzug der
kapitalistischen Mechanisierung entrissen worden.”20 Apart from these different attempts
at explaining the chauvinism and mass hysteria, it also seems fair to assume a high level
of naïveté: no one knew what to expect, and many people thought the war would be as
short as the wars of German unification. If the civilian people had known what trench
warfare, artillery bombardment, flame-throwers, tanks, and gas attacks would do to the
soldiers, they would not have steered into the madness. I have already discussed the
nineteenth-century buildup to the 1914-Kriegsbegeisterung in more detail in chapter one.
For now, the “spirit of July 1914” became a historical moment in the narratives
through which the right-wing mythologized war, during and after the actual Second
World War, an embodiment of undiluted national unity and strength. Interestingly,
Kriegsbegeisterung engulfed not only those who already equated their sense of patriotism
with militaristic aggression, but also politically more moderate segments of society, first
19 Rainer Traub, “Der Krieg der Geister,” Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20. Jahrhunderts, (Vol.
1, 2004, 26-30) 30.
20 Compare ibid.. The exact literary reference is: Helmut Fries, Die grosse Katharsis: der Erste Weltkrieg
in der Sicht deutscher Dichter und Gelehrter (Konstanz: Verlag am Hockgraben, 1994-95).
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and foremost the intelligentsia. The euphoria seized people as different from one another
as Adolf Hitler, Thomas Mann, Rainer Maria Rilke, Rudolf Eucken, Gerhard Hauptmann,
Ernst Jünger, the scientists Max Planck and Wilhelm Röntgen, the theologian Ernst
Troeltsch, and the Jewish writers Stefan Zweig and Ludwig Fulda, all of whom left
written testimony as to how much the outbreak of the war excited them.21
21 Kriegsbegeisterung was not only a German phenomenon but affected all the countries that would be
waging war soon. In his essay “Krieg der Geister” (Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20.
Jahrhunderts, Vol. 1, 2004, 26-30), Rainer Traub mentions some of the details: In his autobiography, Die
Welt von Gestern, Stefan Zweig described the situation in Vienna after Austria had declared war on Serbia:
“Buchstäblich über Nacht sei dann – Anfang August – ‘der erste Schrecken über einen Krieg, den niemand
gewollt’, einem allgemeinen Enthusiasmus gewichen. Ganz Wien im Schwindel der Kriegsbegeisterung,
überall Fahnen, Spruchbänder, Musik. Der Rausch der Millionen habe ‘etwas Grossartiges, Hinreissendes,
sogar Verführerisches’ gehabt, versichert Zweig und bekennt, er wolle diese Erinnerung ‘trotz allem Hass
und Abscheu gegen den Krieg’ in seinem Leben ‘nicht missen’: ‘Jeder Einzelne erlebte eine Steigerung
seines Ichs, er war nicht mehr der isolierte Mensch von früher, er war eingetan in eine Masse, er war Volk,
und seine Person, seine sonst unbeachtete Person hatte einen Sinn bekommen […]. So gewaltig, so
plötzlich brach diese Sturzwelle über die Menschheit herein, dass sie, die Oberfläche überschäumend, die
dunklen, die unbewussten Urtriebe und Instinkte des Menschtiers nach oben riss’” (26). Rudolf Eucken,
Nobel Prize laureate, expounded his views on the war at the University of Jena in August, 1914: “Zwar
erweise sich der Krieg als schweres Übel […], wenn er aus niedrigen Beweggründen geführt werde – aus
Hass, Neid, Ruhmsucht oder Erfolgsgier etwa. Als ‘Quelle sittlicher Stärkung’ dagegen bewähre sich ‘der
Kampf eines ganzen Volkes für seine Selbsterhaltung und für die Wahrung seiner heiligsten Güter’. Dass
Deutschlands Krieg von ebendieser Art sei, also einer gerechten Sache diene, das zeige ‘die durchgreifende
Läuterung und Erhebung’, die er an ‘unserer Seele’ bewirke” (26).
It seemed like no one knew or dared to mention the real reasons behind the war. Germany’s leading
intellectuals proclaimed in unison that their country was culturally superior and that this eminent position
had to be defended against the onslaught of the enemy. In England and France, of course, the opposite
image of Germany was propagated, namely that this was a nation enslaved by Prussian militarism and its
blood-and-soil ideology. Like the huns, these barbaric hordes were again attacking the circle of civilized
nations. Ninety-three prominent members of the German intelligentsia published a manifesto on October 4,
1914, entitled “An die Kulturwelt!” – with which they protested against what they perceived as
international slander. A protest “gegen die Lügen und Verleumdungen, mit denen unsere Feinde
Deutschlands reine Sache in dem ihm aufgezwungenen Daseinskampfe zu beschmutzen trachten” (28). The
manifesto rejected the charges that Germany bore responsibility for the war, had invaded Belgium against
international law, or brutalized and killed Belgian civilians.
It also denied that militarism had usurped German culture. Paradoxically, the pamphlet was signed by
people like Ludwig Fulda (1862-1939), a liberal, multi-lingual, cosmopolitan writer and German patriot
who had been opposed to Wilhelm II’s reactionary politics before the war. “’Die Deutschen sind mehr als
ein gebildetes Volk’,” he proclaimed in “Deutsche Kultur und Ausländerei” (1916), “sie sind das gebildeste
Volk der Welt.” Even Shakespeare was understood and performed much better by the Germans, and if
England were to be defeated, one should put a clause in the peace treaty that Shakespeare had formally to
be surrendered to the Germans (29). Ludwig Fulda, after 1933, was libeled, isolated, and driven to suicide
by Nazi harrassment in 1939.
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The extent to which this excitement was really supported by the broad population
remains an issue of current debate.22 In the context of the literature-based culture war of
the late 1920s, however, the important fact is that, in their novels, the right-wing
militarists were able to draw on the “spirit of 1914” as a moment of German national
strength and glory represented in the right-wing war narratives of the later Weimar
Republic, whether or not a majority of Germans had actually shared that feeling. These
right wingers, notably, pursued the same strategy that the original nineteenth-century
German nationalists, including Jahn, Arndt, and Körner, had successfully employed by
invoking ancient battles, e.g. Arminius against the Romans, or the defeat of the French.
As Benedict Anderson has described in Imagined Communities (1991), these myth-
building moments of national glory can be real or imagined, and even have a more
powerful impact if they are, in fact, imagined.23 How such "imagined" moments of
national history became grafted onto the Dolchstoßlegende is particularly interesting.
22 Jochen Bölsche, in his essay “Ein Hammerschlag… Historiker widerlegen die Legende von der
Kriegsbegeisterung der Volksmassen im Herbst 1914” Spiegel Spezial: Die Urkatastrophe des 20.
Jahrhunderts, (Vol. 1, 2004, 32-33), mentions the historians Wolfgang Kruse (Germany), Jean-Jacques
Becker (France), and Jeffrey Verhey (U.S.), all of whom have studied Kriegsbegeisterung as a mass
phenomenon. He quotes Kruse as saying: “Nur wenige Vorstellungen sind so tief in unserem historischen
Bewusstsein verankert, wie die Kriegsbegeisterung von 1914. […] Es scheint, als habe die europäische
Bevölkerung des Krieg herbeigesehnt” (32). According to these historians, this was not the case, or only
one side of the picture. They have argued that “Der Geist von 1914” mainly affected bourgeois-urban
middle classes, but not workers, women, or the provinces. Bölsche says: “Tatsächlich belegen Unmengen
von Quellen die Ansicht, dass die These von der Dominanz der Kriegsbegeisterung in Wahrheit ein
‘Konstrukt’ gewesen sei, das die gelenkte Presse und die gezielte Kriegspropaganda sowie später die NS-
Ideologen zum ‘Mythos’ aufgeblasen haben” (32).
23 For more details, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991).
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2.3 EXCURSUS: FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, OSWALD SPENGLER, ARTHUR MOELLER VAN
DEN BRUCK
Familiarly, right-wing nationalist literature was characteristically heavy-handed in
its ideological fervor, low-brow in style, and limited in scope. It catered to male readers
whose horizon of expectation demanded both the emotive romanticizing of the German
“people’s soul” (Volksseele), as well as clear evidence of the physical superiority and
moral incorruptability of the German war hero. The creative reservoirs that the novelists
had at their disposal comprised, of course, their own war experiences, but what also
distinguishes these post-war novels is how they specifically targeted the diffuse legacy of
the nineteenth-century völkisch creed (e.g. Wehner), including its notions of masculinity
(see chapter one), the Dolchstoss-Legende, as well as certain other myths created to avert
the blame from the the military, the mythological allure of the “spirit of 1914,” a possible
knowledge of Hitler’s worldview (e.g. Zöberlein), and the teachings of lesser anti-
Semites or racists.
Besides this romanticism, the pro-war novelists liked to draw inspiration
selectively from certain predecessors with a penchant for irrationalism, including
Heinrich von Treitschke (historian), Friedrich Nietzsche (philosopher), Oswald Spengler
(cultural critic), Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (cultural historian), Hermann Löns
(völkisch writer), Manfred von Richthofen (pilot), and Ernst Jünger (writer). These men
were revered as intellectual pioneers and their texts represented a resource of images and
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ideas that regularly recurred in the pro-war novels.24 In them, they created not just the
everymen who had experienced the war, but also a new type of German, beyond class
and historical limitations -- a new type of German hero who would further ennoble the
front-line soldier familiar from Im Westen nichts Neues.
I will sketch their general significance only briefly here, which obviously does not
do justice to the complexity of any of their works. Yet such brief sketches are,
nevertheless, instructive because they reveal the pool of ideas feeding the generation of
“direct action” new nationalists as unsystematic, irrational, and contradictory as they are
grafted onto historical narratives to obscure historical facts. In this context, it is important
to remember that both the Kriegsbegeisterung of 1914 and the post-war nationalist
revisionism were not informed or fuelled by one coherent text or ethos, but by loosely
used Schlagworte and Parolen: disconnected catchwords and slogans that like-minded
supporters readily latched onto. All of these eclectic sources are relevant because they
contributed to the shaping of the novelists’ ideas of the new German masculinity, and
slowly, gradually, moving beyond the simpler analyses that the left's war novels had
offered.
It is due to one of the perverse twists of history that Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 -
1900) should even have to be mentioned in this discussion. To be sure, his philosophy,
often articulated in aggressive aphorisms, is not free from contradictions and thus lends
24 In 1938, Herbert Schack attempted to draw a geistesgeschichtliche genealogy of National Socialism. The
prominent figures he included were Richard Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Paul de Lagarde, Rudolf Eucken,
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Stefan George. For
more details, see Herbert Schack, Denker und Deuter. Männer vor der deutschen Wende (Stuttgart: Alfred
Kröner, 1938).
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itself to eccentric interpretations. However, “virtually all he stood for – cosmopolitanism,
intellectual excellence, beauty for beauty’s sake – was anathema to the leaders of [the]
political movement” that would later try to adopt him as an ideological forebear.25
Nietzsche was, in fact, an elitist who detested the petty-minded German bourgeoisie
(Spiessertum) and its völkisch ideology. As is well known, he accused this section of
society as being Herdenmenschen with a slave mentality. He was also not an anti-Semite,
as his bitter controversy with Richard Wagner about “the Jewish element in music” made
abundantly clear. As to why Nietzsche still appealed to the German chauvinists of the
beginning twentieth century, the Nietzsche scholar Geoffrey Clive explains:
[…] It is a matter of historical record that numerous self-elected Nietzscheans,
among them his own sister who went so far as to falsify some of his papers and
letters, chose to identify Nietzsche’s philosophy with the politics of racism and
virulent German nationalism. Why this should have occurred calls for a detailed
study. Suffice it to remark here that Nietzsche’s profound dissatisfaction with the
modern world and his ‘philosophizing with a hammer’ appealed to many who
lacked his rigorous habits of mind and who remained insensitive to his
Hintergedanken. […].26
It has been argued that Nietzsche’s philosophy resonated with the very philistines he
despised because, not unlike today, it offered attractive catchwords like “God is dead,”
“the will to power,” or Übermensch that even the not-so-voracious reader could start
using to give himself an intellectual air. Unfortunately, it is “human, all too human” to
reduce Nietzsche’s complex ideas to mere tidbits and items of vocabulary. His sister,
25 Geoffrey Clive ed., The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: Mentor Books, 1965) xix.
26 Ibid.
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Elisabeth, who was attracted by National Socialism, contributed to the further distortion
of his thought.
Let me rehearse the obvious: Nietzsche was attractive because of his glorification
of war, his rebellion against traditional norms, his anarchy, and “his abhorrence of
academic drabness and […] paradoxically Romantic repudiation of Romantic decadence”
(Clive xviii). During the late Wilhelmine empire, German adolescents felt a connection
between Nietzsche’s wrath and their own cultural fatigue:
With Nietzsche no longer able to speak for himself, German secondary-school
teachers and their overwrought students seized upon those aspects of his thought
which reinforced their frustrations and grievances. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century there emerged a widespread feeling, particularly among the
young, that life was passing them by, that the two-facedness of bourgeois
(Victorian) morality with its ludicrous show of constraints was intolerable to bear,
and that for the sake of general revitalization new horizons needed to be explored
in every area of endeavor. (Clive xviii)
In the present context, it is critical to remember that this pre-war source of a cultural
imaginary was almost completely absent from the most popular novels of the left that we
addressed briefly in the last chapter, just as it was in Im Westen nichts Neues. At the same
time, it was a rhetoric of dissatisfaction already in place by the Great War, and familiar to
the Bildungsbürgertum in particular -- to those who studied Nietzsche in Gymnasium and
college. The stereotype is that Nietzsche was carried in backpacks to the trenches; the
novels we will turn to below suggest that he was carried back in the minds of the
bourgeoisie, and that this reconstituted version of this thought was immediately deployed
to address a general dissatisfaction with the older generation. Yet it amplified the sense
that bourgeois morality was useless -- and hence the tools of the bourgeois, including
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parliamentary politics and diplomatic negotiations. When the older generation picked up
this rhetoric to emphasize how heroic the trench veterans were, the power of Nietzsche's
rhetoric helped obscure the real history that the Dolchstoßlegende was trying to hide. All
Germans, even those upper-class zealots whom the left had blamed the war on, could
become victims of small minds and traitors to personhood when they appealed to
Nietzsche.
What gradually became Germany's ultimate tragic narrative of history was used
strategically by many Bildungsbürger to assert that Oswald Spengler (1880–1936),
another introvert with frequent migranes, became Nietzsche’s spiritual heir. Thomas
Mann scornfully dubbed him “Nietzsche’s smart monkey.”27 He was unknown until the
publication of Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918), a pseudoscientific and portentous
work that completes the parallels needed to paper over any historical facts. He
expansively draws comparisons between the demise of ancient empires, real and
imagined, and what he saw as the current decline of Western civilization.28 “In Germany,
it soon became the center of the most excited and bitter literary controversy of the post-
war years.”29 H. Stuart Hughes describes the work as a “sombre, murky vision of the
doom of our civilization” (Hughes 7). In one sweeping generalization, Spengler dismisses
the conventional view of history as a “ridiculous distortion” (Hughes 10) which his novel
27 Compare Barbara Beßlich, Faszination des Verfalls: Thomas Mann und Oswald Spengler (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 2002) 12.
28 Spengler spoke with some authority about ancient Greek and Roman culture, ventured into cursory
discussions of Egypt and Babylon, and provided a “garbled account of a successor culture, unrecognized
until he himself ‘discovered’ it, which he called Arabian or ‘Magian’” (H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler,
A Critical Estimate [New York and London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952] 9-10).
29 Ibid., 1.
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approach would rectify. Significant for his particular appeal to the bourgeoisie is the
name he chose for his historical approach, “morphological” (ibid.), a concept he
borrowed from Goethe’s principles of natural research. His arguments pulled the
emphasis off specific politics, and onto a general perception of the decline of the/his
world.
Spengler spoke of “basic attitudes” within every culture that, taken together,
formed a “master pattern” from which the stage of development could be discerned for
any culture (Hughes 10). He viewed history as a gigantic representation of “universal
symbolism” (Hughes 11), a concept that replaced the conventional view of western
history as having progressed from the Greeks to modern times. Spengler distinguished
between eight cultures, e.g. die abendländische, all of which went through an organic
cycle of four stages: rise, associated with adolescence/spring, culmination, associated
with maturity/summer, decline, associated with old age/autumn, and a final stage,
associated with death/winter. For western culture, Spengler posited that it had not begun
with the Greeks but with the Christian Middle Ages, and that it was currently in its stage
of decline. By extension, Germany was in its winter, and thus no one was particularly
guilty of it from within. All Germany was in need of a new rise.
These ideas fascinated many, they were easy to relate to, and Spengler became a
popular “prophet of doom.” According to Barbara Beßlich,
Diese letzte Phase einer Kultur etikettierte Spengler als ‘Zivilisation’, die sich
auszeichne durch Rationalisierung, Bürokratie, Bedeutungszuwachs der Technik,
Urbanisierung und Vermassung, durch eine Hausse der Wissenschaft und eine
Baisse der Religion, durch depravierten Liberalismus, Kapitalismus und durch
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labile demokratische Herrschaftsformen, die dazu tendierten, sich cäsaristischen
und imperialistischen Modellen zu öffnen. (Beßlich 7)
The fact that Spengler borrowed eclectically from various sources also accounts for his
popularity. In his cultural pessimism and the “design of superhuman rulers” (Beßlich 7),
he was clearly indebted to Nietzsche. His morphological concept of history came from
Goethe, and his view of culture as entelechy stemmed from Marx, or ultimately, from
Aristotle. Altogether, then, he was speaking for a German bourgeoisie who had felt under
pressure since the late 1890s, when (like the Buddenbrooks) families were confronted
with new worlds that they did not understand and that their classical educations had not
prepared them for.
More critically, Spengler was disenfranchising the others to his own class. He can
thus insult his urban contemporaries as “nomads and parasites” – “der
Großstadtbewohner, der reine, traditionslose, in formlos fluktuierender Masse auftretende
Tatsachenmensch, irreligiös, intelligent, unfruchtbar, mit tiefer Abneigung gegen das
Bauerntum” (quoted in Beßlich 8). That is, city-dwellers as a class were in no way
"traditionally German," lacking relation to the land, the state religion, or any other of the
traditions that had held Germany together. On the other hand, he seemed to view this
rotting civilization as a political opportunity for Germany’s new rise as an empire, which
he advocated. Such ideas made him the laughing stock of leftist cultural critics like Kurt
Tucholsky and endeared him to the right wing, who supported Spengler’s disdain for
modernity. They played into the ideals of chivalry and honor present in the trenches,
rather than into the economic and political realities of interwar Germany.
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A third figure who was influential to the development of right-wing ideology and
the call for a new German nation-Reich during the 1920s was Arthur Moeller van den
Bruck (1876-1925). The man who coined the term Das Dritte Reich with a 1923 book
title, was a cultural critic and historian who had published an eight-volume history of
Germany in 1905, entitled Die Deutschen, unsere Menschengeschichte. He enlisted for
the war in 1914 and was soon detached to the foreign affairs section of the Oberste
Heeresleitung. In 1916, he published the essay “Der preußische Stil,” which glorified
Prussia’s “Wille zum Staat” -- a concept akin to Nietzsche’s “Wille zur Macht” -- and
thus marked his own vehement embrace of a nationalism that saw in Germany something
other than the state offered in Weimar Germany.
Moeller van den Bruck founded the Juni-Klub and soon gathered around him a
significant number of like-minded young conservatives (Jungkonservative), who were
united in their hatred of the Versailles Treaty. Although the National Socialists, later on,
usurped many of the ideas he had put forth, Moeller van den Bruck is unlikely to have
joined their ranks had he lived to see their rise to power. He was not an Anti-Semite,
actually appreciated Russians, and disagreed with the stereotypical arguments Hitler liked
to use. He was instead infatuated with the images of heroic Germaness from history and
from the heroes of the trenches. Thus when he met Hitler in 1922, he rejected him for his
“proletarian primitiveness.”30 Hitler was impressed with Moeller van den Bruck,
however. He told him: “Sie haben alles das, was mir fehlt. Sie erarbeiten das geistige
30 See Hans-Joachim Schwierskott, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck und der revolutionäre Nationalismus in
der Weimarer Republik (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1962) 145.
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Rüstzeug zu einer Erneuerung Deutschlands. Ich bin nichts als ein Trommler und
Sammler. Lassen Sie uns zusammenarbeiten!” (Schwierskott 144).
Like Spengler, Moeller was clearly influenced by Nietzsche’s ideas on culture.
Unlike Nietzsche, however, Moeller was at least nominally interested in the
reconciliation of the bourgeoisie and the working class in the name of a unified German
nationhood, and in establishing middle ground between the political left and right,
between the workers and the soldiers.31 Yet after the terms of the Versailles Treaty
became public knowledge in May, 1919, his conservatism took a sharp right swing. In
political terms, this would lead to an consolidation of goals and a reduction of the
distance between the new nationalists, like Ernst Jünger, and the young conservatives,
like Moeller himself. What Nietzsche had described psychologically, and the Dolchstoß
had politically, Moeller did in cultural terms, as he shared Spengler’s dissatisfaction with
modernity, which he called “Germany’s cultural poverty.” What he regarded as
destructive of “true culture” were the political manifestations of enlightened rationalism,
including liberalism and socialism, that were attempting to make a new Germany rather
than restore the greatness lost by the old because of the trenches and the traitors. Moeller
van den Bruck thus advocated the creation of a new German faith to stem European
culture’s flagrant signs of cultural disintegration and vulgarity. His dissatisfaction with
the German status quo after Versailles, as well as his support of a new German faith,
31 See, for example, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Das Recht der jungen Völker (München: R. Piper &
Co., 1919).
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were the main reasons why Moeller van den Bruck became a popular figure for the
radical right.
Taken together, what these three authors accomplish is to offer a layer of
metaphors that the right used to "unite" all Germans behind a notion of elite Germanness
that nonetheless pointed to the kind of heroics and victimhood that also occurred in the
leftist war novels. What they opened the door for, however, is a metaphor of German
heroicism that could present itself as truth. It is no accident, therefore, that it is called the
legend that Germany was stabbed in the back. It joins the heroic vision of the Great War's
trench soldiers familiar since before Remarque to another layer of story-telling,
facilitating the transition of a more nuanced, multiple perspective on German society in
times of war into the image of a beleaguered German Volk with a historical destiny.
2.4 THE INDIVIDUALISTS: MANFRED VON RICHTHOFEN AND ERNST JÜNGER
Yet it would be wrong to consider this elitist picture of Germany as a civilized
nation of a particular type the creation of proto-Nazi sentiment. There were other
prominent images of German heroes of more mythic proportions than those in the
trenches, with military provenances leading back to quite different sources.
Manfred Freiherr von Richthofen (1892-1918) was the most famous German pilot
who ever lived. Stylized as “The Red Baron” even by his enemies, he was also the most
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colorful figure that the First World War created – he actually became a pop star.32 With
over 700,000 copies sold by 1933, his war memoirs, entitled Der rote Kampfflieger
(1917), was the second most popular book besides Remarque’s.33 Like Ernst Jünger,
Richthofen was an extraordinarily fearless soldier who was decorated with the highest
military honor, the Pour le Mérite, for shooting down over eighty enemy planes. It is
emblematic of his playful arrogance that he painted his fighter plane bright red, taunting
the enemy, as if the whole war were a sport, a game, or a fox hunt. When he himself was
finally shot down in April 1918, British soldiers buried him with military honors to
express their respect for the brave and dignified enemy: “Es ist dies ein Ritual, das die
Superioren inter pares zelebrieren und das um den Begriff des Sportsgeistes kreist”
(Bernig 101).34
Yet his narrative stresses the heroism of the individual of whom much is asked,
even as it notes that this hero is somehow a member of his own order. Der rote
Kampfflieger ist a chronologically sequenced collection of episodes of the kind that
would be told in the officers’ casino (compare Bernig 106). Richthofen, the individual
warrior, takes center stage, while the war itself takes place hardly noticeable in the
background. The heroic deeds of the individual, reminiscent of jousting or dueling, form
32 For more details, compare Jörg Bernig, “Anachronistisches Kriegsbild, Selbstinszenierung und posthume
Heroisierung. Manfred von Richthofen: Der rote Kampfflieger (1917), Thomas F. Schneider and Hans
Wagener eds. Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New
York: Rodopi, 2003) 97-111, 98.
33 Ibid., 97.
34 For more details, compare George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars
(New York and Oxford: Oxford UP) 1990, 120-122.
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the antithesis to the true character of the anonymous mass warfare in the trenches. Jörg
Bernig explains:
Die erzählten Episoden sind immer an einen Konflikt gebunden, der sich stets
gleicht. Er ist -- hier äußert sich der als ritterlich suggerierte Kampf -- der
duellhaften Zusammenstoß mit dem Gegner. Reflexionen oder Brechungen des
Erzählten finden sich nicht. Der Einleitung einer gefahrvollen Situation […] folgt
eine dramatische Steigerung mit Höhepunkt, der sich eine Kadenz anschließt, die
den Erzähler als Sieger oder Entkommenen (was so viel bedeutet wie Sieger, da er
nicht getötet/ gefangen genommen wurde) zeigt. Die Handlung treibt rasch auf
den Höhepunkt des Zusammenstoßes zu; der Gegner fällt und macht damit Platz
für die nächste Episode. (Bernig 104)
Whenever ground soldiers do appear in the text, which is rare, they have the “status of
fascinated observers” who have not yet learned to distinguish between the different types
of airplanes, which Richthofen often refers to as “Apparate” (104-105). The proud pilot is
thus doubly removed from the foot soldiers: he controls a fighting machine that appears
to observers below as mysterious and futuristic, yet he likens his fighting effort to an
ancient aristocratic pastime, namely the hunt; he is thus a nobleman of the future and the
past, but he is not engaged in the present.35 This tendency toward archaic imagery is
something that Richthofen shares with Jünger: both withdraw from the immediateness of
the war through aloof references to bygone eras, even as they celebrate heroism. Yet here
we see an image of the art of war, as well as its horrors. In its own way, though, the
narrative brings that art of war into context of ordinary German experience.




Bereits die Bezeichnung Jagdflieger steht dafür. Die Front selbst wird zum
Jagdrevier, und Richthofen überträgt vermittels des Jagd-Topos im Text Bilder
aus seiner Passion, der Jagd auf Wild, auf den Krieg. Das Wild wird substituiert
durch den Gegner, durch den gegnerischen Flugapparat, hinter dem kaum je ein
Mensch erkennbar wird. Die Hoheitszeichen und Nummern der abgeschossenen
Flugzeuge werden entfernt und als Trophäen präsentiert wie auch die eventuell
überlebenden gegnerischen Flieger. (105)
From our perspective today, his callousness (“Menschen jagen”) stands in stark contrast
to the puerile style of his writing. He tells stories about horses or how much he loves his
dog -- “’Das schönste Wesen, das je die Welt geschaffen hat, ist die echte Ulmer Dogge,
mein ‘kleines Schoßhündchen’, der ‘Moritz’” (109) -- and welcomes the outbreak of the
war the way a young boy would welcome playing “Cowboys and Indians” in the woods
(Bernig 107): “’Jeder aktive Soldat war selig, nun endlich seine Persönlichkeit und sein
Können zeigen zu dürfen’” (100). “Dies sowie über den gesamten Text verstreute
Manierismen und Infantilismen verweisen auf die Jugend Richthofens und auf die
Diskrepanz von körperlicher und intellektueller Reife” (107). Richthofen’s youth was a
central aspect of his being elevated to a cult figure.36 Just like all the "real guys" who
were sent to the front and represented in the leftist war novels, his youthfulness became
equated with purity (see chapter four). Richthofen’s wartime memoirs thus represent a
perplexing mixture of asexual infantility, adolescent recklessness, aristocratic arrogance,
and martial cold-bloodedness. The author conveys the impression that he perceived the
war as a challenge to which he responded with the competitiveness of a good sportsman -
- that is, as an upper-class version of the "ordinary German" of the left-wing war novels
36 Bernig quotes Friedrich Georg Jünger as saying about Richthofen’s death: “’Rein und hart war dieses
Leben, und rein und hart war es vollendet worden. […] Wen erschüttert nicht diese schöne und reiche
Jugend, die wie ein Stern in der Nacht versinkt’” (Bernig 108).
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we have already seen. Like Remarque, then, this hero becomes one because he shows us
how heroes react -- he is not a member of a war effort, but a warrior, a different caste
altogether.
What this more upper-class warrior-soldier image can lead do emerges more
clearly in one of the best-remembered authors of the war novels, if not one of the most
popular at the time. Innocence or infantility are qualities that Ernst Jünger (1895-1998)
certainly did not have. What he and Richthofen had in common, however, was an
exaggerated sense of individuality and the general perception of war as the ultimate male
sport and the warrior as the archetype of the soldier's heart. Jünger remained relatively
unknown in the early 1920s. He gained prominence only gradually through his political
activism in support of revolutionary New Nationalism, as well as through the
publications of books and essays about his war experience. This success had few
analogues. Jünger was an intelligent and unique figure and, it seems, an absolutely
fearless soldier. He was wounded seven times during the war, yet kept returning to the
front. Like Richthofen, he was decorated with the highest military honor, the order Pour
le Mérite, which earned him the admiration of the other veterans. Jünger even served as a
Lieutenant in the greatly reduced Reichswehr after the war, which made him a personal
link to another Germany.
His first major literary work -- the war novel most remembered by literary
scholars today as being of "quality" where Remarque's was not -- was In Stahlgewittern
(1920), which was based on the diaries Jünger kept during the war. He states in the
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prologue that he was dismayed with the political turn of events after the armistice and the
cultural non-appreciation of the military’s accomplishments:
Möge dieses Buch dazu beitragen, eine Ahnung zu geben von dem, was ihr
geleistet. Wir haben viel, vielleicht alles, auch die Ehre verloren. Eins bleibt uns:
die ehrenvolle Erinnerung an euch, die herrlichste Armee, die je die Waffen trug
und an den gewaltigsten Kampf, der je gefochten wurde. Sie hochzuhalten
inmitten dieser Zeit weichlichen Gewinsels, der moralischen Verkümmerung und
des Renegatentums ist stolzeste Pflicht eines jeden, der nicht nur mit Gewehr und
Handgranate, sondern auch mit lebendigem Herzen für Deutschlands Größe
kämpfte. (quoted in Müller, 220)
Jünger paints an almost erotic picture of combat, while taking off from a rhetorical point
of view we have seen before. To him, combat is the epitome of existential exhilaration,
the ultimate proof of one’s personal courage, honor, and manly strength, as well as the
release of the most primitive instincts.
In his second influential publication, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (1922), he
illustrates such a “baptism of fire” in characteristically bright colors and quite openly
sexual terms:
Die Feuertaufe! Da war die Luft so von überströmender Männlichkeit geladen,
daß man hätte weinen mögen, ohne zu wissen, warum. O Männerherzen, die das
empfinden können! – O Leben du! Noch einmal, noch einmal noch, vielleicht das
letzte! Raubbau treiben, prassen, vergeuden, das ganze Feuerwerk in tausend
Sonnen und kreisenden Flammenrädern verspritzen, die gespeicherte Kraft
verbrennen vorm Gang in die eisige Wüste. Hinein in die Brandung des Fleisches,
tausend Gurgeln haben, dem Phallus schimmernde Tempel errichten… - Ein
letztes noch: die Ekstase. Dieser Zustand des Heiligen, des großen Dichters und
der großen Liebe ist auch dem großen Mute vergönnt. Da reißt Begeisterung die
Männlichkeit so über sich hinaus, daß das Blut kochend gegen die Adern springt
und glühend das Herz durchschäumt. Das ist ein Rausch über allen Räuschen,
Entfesselung, die alle Bande sprengt.37
37 Ernst Jünger, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1922) 12.
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Such passages prove that Jünger by no means catered to popular taste, like many of the
later pro-war novelists did. He was in a different category altogether because he exuded a
Nietzschean kind of aristocratic arrogance and elitism, even as he shows the same
trenches that his more leftist contemporaries had experienced. He was an eccentric
individualist, not a Kamerad. Nevertheless, he earned the admiration of his followers
through his proven courage in the war and his blend of sexual aesthetics and combat
imagery.
If Richthofen was the archetype of the elitist warrior, then Jünger was his martyr-
animal, the fulfillment of Nietzsche's description of the good German who is not a
member of the herd. What is critical to note here is that both stories actually are
constructed much like the left-wing novels I have discussed above: they center on
individual experience, downplay politics in favor of the individual, show individuals
transfigured into something more than human by the extreme experiences of the front,
and draw divides between the home front, with its "ordinary people," and the true
soldier/warrior caste that the Great War had generated for a Germany which then
discarded them.
More such symmetries emerge in the most popular rightist novels of the era.
2.5 THE NOVELISTS, (A): FRANZ SCHAUWECKER, AUFBRUCH DER NATION (1929)
According to Ulrich Fröschle, Aufbruch der Nation “had remarkable effects on
the contexts of the late Weimar Republic and the beginning of the Third Reich. It could
be transformed into a conceptual term affectively integrating conservative, national
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revolutionary, and National Socialist ideas concerned with a national ‘renaissance’.”38
Michael Gollbach too affirms that this title, along with Zöberlein’s Der Glaube an
Deutschland and Hans Grimm’s Volk ohne Raum, was elevated to a “frequently used
communication and combat formula of the New Nationalism and National Socialism.”39
Franz Schauwecker (1890-1964) was thus directly involved with building bridges
between pro-war nationalist fiction and pro-war politics for a German public that had a
firm grasp of the value of the soldier-warrior and supreme suspicion about politics.
Joseph Goebbels, for instance, noted in his diary on November 10, 1929, that the book
was “fabulous.” With some stylistic editing, Goebbels thought that this could become
“the German war novel.” He liked Schauwecker’s dictum of losing the war to win the
nation: “Wir mussten den Krieg verlieren, um die Nation zu gewinnen.”40 This was the
simple formula that could tie the hero into the national project that Spengler had
described, and to turn the winter of Weimar into a new spring.
Schauwecker was from Hamburg and had studied history, art history, library
science, and German in Munich, Berlin, and Göttingen. As a typical representative of the
conservative Bildungsbürgertum, he was unable to reconcile his personal reality after the
war -- especially the Weimar Republican system -- with the worldview of his formative
years. He thus devoted his entire productive energy during the Weimar years to a
refashioning of what he thought the war experience had really meant: the idea that the
38 Compare Ulrich Fröschle, “’Radikal im Denken, aber schlapp im Handeln’? Franz Schauwecker:
Aufbruch der Nation (1929) Thomas F. Schneider and Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque:
Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2003) 261-298.
39 Compare Michael Gollbach, Die Wiederkehr des Weltkriegs in der Literatur: Zu den Frontromanen der
späten Zwanziger Jahre (Kronberg/Ts.: Scriptor, 1978) 139.
40 Compare Fröschle, 261-262.
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war had, in fact, been a senseless and insane orchestration of mass death did not and
could not enter his thinking because it was anathema to anything he had ever believed.41
Although it turned out that neither Schauwecker nor his friend, Ernst Jünger, could easily
be integrated in the National Socialist movement once it had established itself, both
writers helped pave the way toward successful Nazi agitation in that attempt to find
meaning where the left had found principally carnage.42 Both writers insisted that the
war, despite its horrors, had also created something positive: they portrayed it as the
41 Fröschle describes at great length the various efforts Schauwecker made between 1919 and 1929 to
establish himself as a writer and as a journalist in the service of New Nationalism. In 1919, he still
published a collection of apolitical novellas, entitled Der Dolch des Condottiere. Living at his parents’
manor in West Prussia, he then wrote two war books, entitled Im Todesrachen. Die deutsche Seele im
Weltkrieg (1919) and Weltgericht (1920). Both works contain a “critical war history from the bottom up.”
Schauwecker tried to depict what “really happened at the front” and authenticated his texts with the
authoritative claim of “having been there” (267). In Weltgericht, he even expressed a certain sense of
sympathy for those who wished to desert from the army in late 1918. In the fall of 1921, he contacted Ernst
Jünger, whose novel Stahlgewitter (1920) he had just read. Through his correspondence with Jünger,
Schauwecker began to focus on political objectives aimed at the upheaval of the Weimar system
(nationalrevolutionäre Ziele). Schauwecker worked for the Stahlhelm veterans’ periodical called
Wochenschrift des Bunds der Frontsoldaten (as of 1925), then for Die Standarte, and eventually for the
Wochenschrift des neuen Nationalismus (as of 1926). The concept of Neuer Nationalismus was firmly
established when this periodical began to appear. Fröschle affirms that Schauwecker here first articulated
the ideology of New Nationalism that invoked as its myth of origin the irrational “Erlebnis” of the war
(270). Schauwecker stated in an essay published on May 8, 1927: Der Materialismus der Vorkriegszeit war
eine seelische Erstarrung. […] Da gab uns der Krieg einen Mythos, einen uralten Mythos in einer neuen
Form; er gab uns die Nation, das Volk als etwas im Blut lebendig erfundenes. […] Das deutsche Volk von
heute ist nur eine heimliche Nation. Der Neue Nationalismus will es zu einer offenkundigen Nation
gestalten. Der Neue Nationalismus stammt nicht aus einer Berechnung oder aus einer Erwägung oder
Wissenschaft, wenngleich dies alles als Methode zu seiner Verwirklichung notwendig ist, sondern er
stammt als der Mythos unserer Zeit und der Zukunft aus einem Urgrund, aus einer metaphysischen
untrüglichen Gewißheit seiner inneren Wahrheit” (quoted in Fröschle 270). The first time that Schauwecker
transformed the war experience into what he saw as the mythical beginning of a new Germany was in his
1925 novel Der feurige Weg (see also Gollbach 139).
42 Goebbels noted in his diary on October 17, 1930, after he had met Jünger and Schauwecker at one of
Arnolt Bronnen’s social gatherings: “Die Literaten sind versammelt. Am besten gefällt mir Bronnen selbst.
Er ist klar und nicht so eitel wie die anderen. Am schlimmsten ist das bei Jünger und Schauwecker. Fast
unerträglich. Sie können sich nicht einfügen. Trotzdem muß man ihre spitzen Federn gebrauchen. Ich will
mit ihnen für die Tageszeitung ein radikales Feuilleton machen. Das wird auch gelingen. Sonst viel
Literaten. Radikal im Denken, aber schlapp im Handeln.” (quoted in Fröschle, 262-263).
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crucible in which the new German man and the new German nation was forged -- a
compensatory invention.
The central concept of new nationalism was thus the transfiguration of the war
experience into a mythical event that supposedly separated the worthy from the unworthy
and produced the steely mentality of the new German man, even if he should have
perished in the process. The trench soldier, if not sold out by international politics, could
become the new nation. Strikingly many of the men who propagated these notions were
physically far away from the ideal warrior-type they fantasized about. Both Hitler and
Spengler, for instance, had been refused military service at least once; Goebbels, of
course, was entirely unfit for it with his birth defect (a club foot); and Schauwecker,
apparently, was a “small, bespectacled, nervous man of the masochistic type whose
Landsknechtstum and heroic war-enthusiasm were mere overcompensations of a
frightened Spießer.”43 Ernst Jünger certainly does not fit this mold, but for many others it
seemed to be the case that they were obsessively concerned with finding a way of
recasting their (frail) masculinity through the lens of the war, to assert that they
themselves were not weak, only the nation and its politicians were. The aftermath of the
Great War marked a historic culmination of the “little-man-with-the-fierce-dog-
syndrome, especially in the nations that had lost the war.”44
43 Thus reads Arnolt Bronnen’s description of Schauwecker in Bronnen’s 1954 autobiography (quoted in
Fröschle 263).
44 Kaiser Wilhelm II, of course, was another man who clearly overcompensated for his physical handicaps,
in this case, a left arm crippled from birth, with military ostentation. Among the many researchers who
have investigated this phenomenon, Erich Fromm, Klaus Theweleit, George Mosse, and Peter Sloterdijk
are the most prominent. For a detailed discussion of their findings, see chapter four. Also compare Fröschle
263-264.
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Schauwecker’s personal fantasy, as published in Aufbruch der Nation, was
personified in a typical hero for a World War I novel: a young man from a good
bourgeois family by the name of Albrecht Urach. The novel encompasses the time from a
few months before the war to directly after the November 1918 armistice. Urach is a
history student working on his dissertation in the beginning; he is the Bildungbürger who
would lose the most from the war.45 Later on, as the narrator, he represents the voice of
the front line soldiers in general; he is also clearly Schauwecker’s ideological
mouthpiece, which makes him flat and boring as a character, and pompous as an
omniscient narrator.
The novel's emphasis on front line soldiers is important because Aufbruch der
Nation works with simple dichotomies to drive home the message that Urach and Herse,
who is his sidekick, represent what is right and meaningful in Germany, while their
adversaries, including homefront profiteers (Kriegsgewinnler), the wrong kind of
officers, or “the pigs from the communications zone” (Etappenschweine), represent what
is senseless or frivolous.46 Urach is right, the rest are wrong, or at least a little off, like
Weigert (who is a Jew). In one scene, Urach speaks to him about the imminent war and it
turns out that Weigert is a Jewish humanist who believes in world peace and
“Verständigung der Völker im Namen der Menschheit.”47 After the conversation, Urach
45 Franz Schauwecker, Aufbruch der Nation (Berlin: Frundsberg Verlag, 1929) 16.
46 The simple black-and-white scheme is continued among Urach’s superiors. Reminiscent of Oliver
Stone’s Sergeants Elias and Barnes in Platoon (1986), Schauwecker created a good Sergeant named
Krüger, “the best soldier of the company (64), and a bad Sergeant named Mollwan, “tall and skinny with a
malicious grin around his narrow mouth” (64). Another good soldier is Lieutenant Bergenthin: “Das ist ein
überlegener Mensch […]. Zu dem kann man Vertrauen haben” (70).
47 Ibid., 24-25.
152
reflects on the “invisible glass wall” that separates people like Weigert (whose very name
means “refuses”) from himself:
Er dachte noch des öfteren an dies Gespräch mit einem sonderbaren Gefühl
Weigert gegenüber, wie er es vormals nie verspürt hatte. Eine kaum merkbare
Verschiedenheit stand zwischen jenem und ihm, vergleichbar einer dünnen,
unsichtbaren Glaswand, und das erschreckende Halbbewußtsein, daß an
bestimmten Punkten des Gesprächs – man mußte nur tief oder weit genug gehen –
eine Verständigung unmöglich sei. Er bedauerte das, und es machte ihm zu
schaffen. (Schauwecker 26)48
The hypocrisy of this scene is very interesting because Schauwecker, who otherwise
tends to be heavy-handed in his ideological sermons, can afford to be subtle here -- there
are, somehow, two German nations in these trenches. The subtext is, of course, that most
of his readers would nod their anti-Semitic heads and get the hint, “Jews are just different
from us,” no need to expound on that, “we all know what you mean, Franz.” What is
nauseating about Urach as a character, however, are lines like the last one in the above
quote: “He regretted this, and it caused him some misgivings.”49 In such
characterizations, Urach emerges to us today as the unfortunate product of an anti-
Semitic author attempting to draw a saint. He projects the same attitude toward the other
“wrong” characters he encounters throughout the book: he does not hate them, he only
registers what is wrong with them in order to do better himself. Aufbruch der Nation is
48 Anti-Semitism does not only play a role in the pro-war novels. Ernst Glaeser’s otherwise leftist-liberal
novel Jahrgang 1902, for instance, contains substantial amounts of anti-Semitic stereotypes directed at the
Silberstein family.
49 Later on he even apologizes to his comrades for accepting the offer to become an officer. We are led to
believe that Urach has a moral problem with abandoning his equals to become their superior: “‘Tja – ich
weiß nich’, überlegte Albrecht. ‘Ich fühl mich sehr wohl in der Kompanie. Nachher komme ich womöglich
woanders hin, und das käm mir wie Verrat an der Gruppe vor’.” His friend Herse reassures him that his
doubts are noble but unfounded. He tells him: “’Ich mein, ich möcht lieber, daß du so bei uns bleibst wie
jetzt. Von mir aus und auch noch von vielen andern aus. Aber du bist mehr als unsereiner, und da ist es
richtig, wenn du Offizier wirst. Wer soll denn sonst Offizier werden, wenn nich Leute wie du! Solche Leute
wie du sind gute Offiziere’” (Schauwecker 224).
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clearly educational in intent; Schauwecker wants to convert his readers into followers of
Albrecht Urach. In the process, they will learn to become better Germans, Germans of a
future instead of a past.
The black-and-white pattern of the novel unfolds along these lines: before the
war, day-in and day-out, Urach is surrounded by the meaningless routines of the
bourgeoisie -- a sentiment we have seen in many war novels. His fellow students, his
parents and their friends, do not seem to notice the shallowness of their life, but Urach
does because he is destined for the higher and the more profound. This occurs to him, for
instance, as he meets a General in the street:
Ein General begegnete ihm auf der Straße. […] Dieser Mann mit grauem Haar
war unantastbar. Hinter ihm standen Staat und Tradition, Armee und Geschichte.
Er repräsentierte konzentriert die Macht. Der Straßenlärm rührte nicht an seine
Knie. Ein Gefühl seiner eigenen Bedeutungslosigkeit ergriff den jungen Mann,
ein für Sekunden geradezu zermalmendes Gefühl des Nichts. Und so erging es
ihm öfter, wenn er Männern begegnet, die offensichtlich eine Stellung innehatten
[…]. (Schauwecker 18)
Then he joins the war, which promptly makes him a man and a first-rate officer.
Aufbruch der Nation is thus an activist Bildungsroman that equates the German nation
with the main protagonist. The things he learns are the things Schauwecker wants the
whole nation to learn, they are not only the means through which an individual discovers
himself. His attributes and principles are the attributes and principles the author would
like to see upheld by all members of the German nation.
His learning process involves both the acquisition of new knowledge and
convictions, as well as the undoing of previously held beliefs that are unmasked as
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meaningless one after the other. Since the acquisition of new knowledge and convictions
only takes place within the context of trench combat, Urach essentially shrinks into the
small identity of a trench-hardened front soldier that so many Weimar readers knew. The
war experience strips away previously dominant aspects of his social class, education,
and worldview, and replaces those with a political vision that emphasizes the same
principles that were relevant in the trenches. This narrative pattern has been used by
authors from all sides of the political spectrum. But then the text moves further to make
the affective truth of individual development into a metaphor for the nation.
One example of how this process plays out is Urach’s changing image of the
Emperor. Before the war, Wilhelm appears only as an image because Urach keeps his
picture in a thick gilded frame: “Kaiser Wilhelm II. in großer Uniform des 1.
Garderegiments zu Fuß sah aus mächtigem Goldstuckrahmen gebieterisch über ihn
hinweg” (Schauwecker 15). When he actually sees the Kaiser toward the very end of the
war, it becomes apparent that Wilhelm is one of the icons Urach should have never put
faith in: “Er stand da im Pelz und bezogenem Lederhelm, ein wenig zusammengesunken
in seinem großen Mantel, und sah auf die Masse unter sich herab. Dann sagte er mit einer
brüchigen Stimme: ‘Guten Morgen, Kameraden’” (359). On the one hand, the experience
of the front functions as a great leveller -- previous differences disappear among the
fighting soldiers; on the other hand, the front experience makes these soldiers unlike any
other men, especially distinct from those behind the lines and the cowards who shirk war
service, as well as from the bourgeoisie and the politicians who do not understand what
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forces they have unleashed. True men, according to Schauwecker, are only the valiant
soldiers fighting in the trenches.
Abundant evidence in the book drives home the point that only personality
matters in the end -- a not unfamiliar message for war novels. Social class is as
unimportant as education.50 War means that one leaves behind the narrow constraints of
personal background and outgrows parents and former superiors.51 Whatever happens at
the Heimatfront is not as important as the events at the front, even if people are
starving.52 The bizarre experience of becoming alienated from (former) friends and
family at home is unpleasant but essential because it helps the front soldier realize that
the old way was the wrong way. German society cannot go on the way it had. Urach
knows, it is perishing along with so many of its sons. In the end, however, a total
catastrophe for Germany may be narrowly avoided. Only very few of the best are left,
and only few of those will have the required leader-personality (Führer-Persönlichkeit)
to lead the disoriented into a brighter future for Germany instead of into organized
defeatism:
Es war im September 1918. In der vordersten Linie herrschte nur noch die
Persönlichkeit. Die Achselstücke für sich an irgendeinem Paar Schultern galten
nichts mehr. Es kam darauf an, wer sie trug. Wer Vertrauen besaß, war Führer,
und wer jetzt Vertrauen besaß, der hatte es sich mit Recht erkämpft. Sie fühlten
50 The following scenes illustrate both points: (Two soldiers talking about the new Regiment Commander,
Lieutenant Colonel von Monchart) “’Aber er is aus dem ältesten pommerschen Adel’, fügte Lange
gedankenvoll hinzu. ‘Du bist’n Dussel!’ sagte Herse scharf. ‘Hauptsache, er is’n guter Kommandeur’.” (88)
Shortly thereafter, Urach mentally prepares for the battle near Pracznycz: “Das war auch eine Prüfung,
dachte Albrecht, und er entsann sich der Gymnasial- und Universitätsjahre und ihrer Examina. Welcher
Wert war ihnen beigelegt worden! Wie entschieden die über Leben, Stellung, Einkommen, ja über den
Menschen selbst! Diese Prüfung der Schlacht vor Pracznycz erschien ihm entscheidender” (89).
51 This notion of liberation from the bourgeoisie is an interesting parallel between Schauwecker’s and
Remarque’s books.
52 Compare Schauwecker, 98.
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sich als das einzig Vorhandene. Sie überstanden sogar den Rückzug, der nie zur
Flucht wurde. (Schauwecker 336)
Instead of feeling lost, they feel purified into a new leadership role; their individuality
promises to bring them into a new brotherhood.
On their way home, Urach and Herse have one final conversation on the question
of what the war has taught them. Urach even feels liberated in the sense that he has
gained certainty about those elements in his worldview he can now freely discard. In this
scene, the men who started the revolution play the part of “wrong” to juxtapose Urach
and his friend being “right.” Urach even appreciates the revolution for showing him
clearly everything that is wrong:
[Die Revolution] sie hat einen dicken Wust abgebaut. […] Sie hat uns den Dreck
aus den Augen gewischt. Jetzt endlich sind wir seit Jahrhunderten so weit, daß wir
ganz von vorn mit uns selber beginnen können, ohne die alten Häute mit uns
herumzuschleppen, die alten Vorschriften, die alten Gewohnheiten. Jetzt können
wir endlich mal […] das Leben neu prüfen, wie wir uns selber geprüft haben da
draußen, wenn wir gegen den Tod mit unserem Leben anrannten. […] Wir
brauchen ja nur ein Wort zu sagen, dann verstehen wir uns im Blut: Front. Nicht
wahr, da haben wir einen maßlosen Stolz vor den anderen, vom Bürger bis zum
Munitionsarbeiter, der im wichtigen Moment gestreikt hat. (Schauwecker 381)
Hence, despite the catastrophic defeat of the German army, Urach and his friend emerge
from the war unscathed and even fortified in their resolve. They are now alienated from
the past, but at the same time united by the “sanguine understanding” of the front
experience and filled with “boundless pride” versus the “ammunitions worker who called
a strike at the critical moment.”
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Yet again, the subtext goes beyond the political implications into sexual imagery.
As the German forces retreat and throw their remaining ammunition into ponds and
rivers, Urach perceives this humiliating scenario as a “national self-castration”:
Das war der endgültige Schluß! Dies war nicht wieder gutzumachen! Jetzt erst
waren sie wirklich wehrlos! Hier schnitt sich die Nation auf Befehl zielsicher die
Geschlechtsteile ab – wozu brauchen wir die noch in den kommenden Zeiten der
internationalen Verbrüderung, des Weltfriedens, der Menschenliebe, des
allgemeinen Glücks? Wozu? (369)
In typical soldierly fashion, Urach associates male genitals with aggression against the
enemy and cynically advocates national castration as appropriate for the coming age of
“international fraternization, world piece, love of mankind, and general joy.” This
passage illustrates that his self-image as a potent man is inextricably linked to his ability
to combat the enemy.
In another scene, his friend Herse wonders why none of the front soldiers
interfered with the cowards who staged the revolution, and Urach replies that there is “no
man” on the other side, not even a proper revolution, just an “running away out of
weakness”: “Aber sieh dir bitte die andere Seite an. Wo hast du denn da einen Mann?!
Wo denn?! Das ist doch keine Revolution. Das ist ja bloß ein Nachgeben aus Hunger, ein
Auseinanderlaufen und Sichzusammenrotten aus Schwäche, Verbitterung, Haß, kurz aus
lauter minderwertigen Gründen” (376).
To summarize, Schauwecker’s Aufbruch der Nation is a classic work of the
transformative passion that drove new nationalism as a political movement. I would
argue, along with Mosse, Sloterdijk, and Theweleit, that this campaign to reinvigorate the
nation was politically motivated only on the surface, while its other objective was the
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rewriting of the German masculine code. These pro-war novels tend to equate the status
quo of the German nation with the given state of the German front line soldier, who they
regard as the only true indicator of German masculinity -- an image clearly more forward
looking than that in Im Westen nichts Neues, even though it is built of many of the same
elements. Other purportedly German men, including Jews, draft-dodgers, malingerers,
cowards, revolutionaries, etc., are not accepted as real men but only serve as projection
screens for unmanly characteristics. Schauwecker thus reconfigures the stab-in-the-back-
myth into an image of national castration.
The modified myth that this novel offers results in a soldier type who refuses to
let himself be castrated, a soldier who keeps on fighting even if it is not against the
French or the British -- a soldier who will continue his German battle on a home front
ruined by the war. In Schauwecker’s vision, men like Albrecht Urach were forced by
you-know-who to quit the official battle against Germany’s enemies only to continue
their mission by fighting against a new enemy, which was the new political establishment
in their own country: “Wir haben allerhand gelernt voneinander, das wir brauchen
können. Denn dieser Friede ist die Fortsetzung des Krieges mit anderen Mitteln. Jeder
geht an seine eigene Front. Die Front ist jetzt heimlich. Lebt wohl, Kameraden” (376).
As Schauwecker himself explained in a letter to Ernst Jünger, his literary
treatment of the war experience was not intended to create heroic individuals who stride
or fly across the battlefield like Jünger or Richthofen. His ideal man-warrior is heroic on
in the day-to-day business of quietly fulfilling his duty and sticking up for his comrades.
Not without a tinge of resentment toward the reckless warrior-sportsman, he told Jünger:
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“’Es ist etwas anderes, fliegend, hoch in den Lüften dem Tode entgegenzurasen, als dem
Tode verdreckt, verspeckt, hungrig, durstig, müde auf allen Vieren durch Kot, Draht,
Trichter, Leichen entgegenzukriechen’” (quoted in Fröschle 280). His warrior on the
home front, however, would set the pattern for the right-wing novels that would win the
day as publicity for the Nazis' eventual political program.
(B) WERNER BEUMELBURG, DIE GRUPPE BOSEMÜLLER (1930)
Quite naturally, this narrative strategy was found in many novels, as the soldier's
dignity in the trenches as seen in the 1920s gives way to this call for the soldier-warrior
to continue his engagement on the home front, proving himself a real man.
The ideal of comradeship in the trenches, which played an important role in most
of the novels I have discussed up to this point, was, for example, taken to a new level by
Werner Beumelburg (1899-1963) in Die Gruppe Bosemüller. This writer too was from
the bourgeoisie. He was a minister’s son and studied at the University of Cologne. He
had volunteered for military service and fought before Verdun, as well as “in other major
battles on the western front” (Gollbach 167). He returned as a Lieutenant decorated with
the Iron Cross, First and Second Class. Like Schauwecker, he worked as a journalist after
the war and became a freelance writer in 1926 (ibid.).53 His most popular work was
53 Beumelburg was a prolific (pro-)war writer. Commissioned and assisted by sources from the
Reichsarchiv, he published a series of “historically accentuated writings” on major battles of the Great War,
including “Douaumont” (1923), “Ypern 1914” (1925), “Loretto” (1927), and “Flandern” (1928). In the
comprehensive Sperrfeuer um Deutschland (1929), he intended to “blend the processes of the war with the
processes of the soul.” By 1939, the seventeen works he had published reached a sales volume of over
1,000,000. Die Gruppe Bosemüller was even read in schools, which proves that Beumelburg was readily
adopted by the National Socialists, who also honored him with the “Grosser Literaturpreis der
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Sperrfeuer um Deutschland (1928), which reached a sales volume of 328,000 by 1940
(ibid.).
In Die Gruppe Bosemüller, he focuses on the theme of camaraderie in the Battle
of Verdun during a time period of seven months (May – December, 1916). In German
national consciousness, this battle was heavily mythologized as the quintessential battle
of World War I, very much like Stalingrad later became the epitome of World War II.
Due to the “ominiscient and omnipresent third-person (plural) narrative perspective,”
Beumelburg “creates the impression of objective description” (Gollbach 168). His main
protagonists are the “young war volunteer, Erich Siewers, the Private Wammsch, and,
integrating both, the Bosemüller Group” (ibid.).
The group itself is composed for the most part of members of the lower
bourgeoisie and of farmers; only Siewers himself stands out because his father is a high
civil servant and young Siewers has attended the Gymnasium. The strategy of placing the
protagonists at the lower end of the social spectrum is quite clearly borrowed from
Remarque, who had created an even split between older working class and younger
bourgeois group members. Beumelburg, moreover, emphasizes that the group members
stem from geographically diverse regions of Germany, which makes their fusion into one
group identity even more remarkable. Like Remarque, the narrative perspective is
restricted to the war as the group perceives it (Schützengrabenperspektive), so there is no
overreaching discussion of the origins or effects of the war in any larger context.
Reichshauptstadt Berlin” in 1936 and the “Kunstpreis der Westmark” in 1937. (For more details, see
Gollbach 167-168).
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Another aspect that is similar to Remarque’s strategy is that Beumelburg chooses
not to develop his characters psychologically or individually. They remain mere types
that are loosely defined with humoristic labels or little anecdotes. The Lieutenant, for
example, “hat das Herz am rechten Fleck.”54 Someone else is “ein Prachtkerl, alle haben
Spaß an ihm” (Beumelburg 9). This literary strategy is the equivalent of the author
nudging the reader in the side, especially because the personal anecdotes about each
group member are intentionally light-hearted or humorous, as if no further explanation
were necessary. With regard to male readers’ horizons of expectation, this tactic amounts
to a direct appeal to fill in the blank where there is no information: “He is that type of
guy, you know?” Like Remarque, as we shall see, Beumelburg engineers reader
identification through superficial and deficient character development. The slight
differences that do exist do not interfere with the group dynamics (compare Gollbach
170). These similarities between Gruppe Bosemüller and Im Westen nichts Neues suggest
that Beumelburg crafted his novel as a direct right-wing response to Remarque.
Affirmative evidence for this claim stems from Beumelburg himself. In a 1933
statement, entitled “Das jugendliche Reich,” he explained that he could not accept the
memory of the war experience being sullied by pacifism or let it be “dragged into the
dust”:
Vor einem Dutzend und mehr Jahren, als wir achtzehn- und neunzehnjährigen
jungen Menschen von den Schlachtfeldern des Westens zurückkehrten, als wir,
einem negativen und erschöpften Zeitgeist zum Trotz, es wagten, so etwas wie ein
nationales Schrifttum zu beginnen – damals wurden wir von denen, die sich als
Pächter des deutschen Schrifttums und der deutschen Dichtung in einem
54 Werner Beumelburg, Die Gruppe Bosemüller (Oldenburg i. O.: G. Stalling, 1930) 25; 204.
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besonderen Sinne betrachteten, mit einem Lächeln des Mitleids über die Schulter
angesehen. […] Die Riesenwelle dieser besonderen neudeutschen Literatur, ganz
auf das destruktive Element gerichtet und auf die intellektuelle Zergliederung und
Verächtlichmachung aller uns heiligen Begriffe, erreichte ihren Höhepunkt in
jenem wahnsinnigen Versuch, unser Innerstes in den Staub zu ziehen, das tiefe
Erleben der Nation, das uns im Kriege unter Blut und Tod geworden war, zu
verwandeln in Abscheu vor uns selbst, in Pazifismus und in eine Gesinnung, die
uns die Schamröte vor unseren gefallenen Kameraden in die Stirn trieb. Aber da
erwachten wir. Damals empfanden wir die Pflicht vor unserer Nation, vor unseren
Toten und vor unserem eigenen Gewissen mit ganzer Entschlossenheit. Wir
warfen uns in die Bresche.55
Beumelburg’s novel, then, represents a direct contra to the new left-wing war literature
and its “destructive element.”
I would argue that, ten years after the war ended, the importance of its memory
superseded the importance of the actual experience, at least to the veterans on the radical
right wing, leading to a second wave of war novels in the 1930s, this time told from the
right. After all, they could not allow the “unmanly” lefties addressed next -- famous
names today like Zweig, Renn, or Remarque -- to write the script of this memory for
them, so they fought back with novels of their own to set the record straight.56 In
addition, as I will turn to in the next and final chapter of this study, the perceived threat to
German masculinity always lurked just below the surface. In the foreword to Sperrfeuer
um Deutschland (1928), for instance, Beumelburg stated that the book was meant to
55 Werner Beumelburg, “Dichtung und Nation,” in Das jugendliche Reich. Reden und Aufsätze zur
Zeitenwende (Oldenburg: [no publisher] 1933). This quote appears in Heidrun Ehrke-Rotermund, “’Durch
die Erkenntnis des Schrecklichen zu seiner Überwindung’? Werner Beumelburg: Gruppe Bosemüller
(1930)” Thomas F. Schneider, Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige
Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2003) 299-318.
56 The right-wing writer Friedrich Lehmann used the expression “unmanly books of young old men” in his
attack on the Remarque-camp in the foreword to his novel Wir von der Infanterie (1930). For more details,
see Müller, Krieg und die Schriftsteller, 298.
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enhance “Männlichkeit, Kameradschaft und Liebe zum Vaterland” as the “legacy of the
fallen soldiers” (Ehrke-Rotermund 301).
In order to blot out the possibility of a more left-oriented script as completely as
possible, then, and to reclaim the warrior out of a landscape that had threatened to turn all
soldiers into pacifists (and hence Weicheier, pansies), Beumelburg and others had to
compose novels that would work well as antidotes to Remarque’s Paul Bäumer group.
Beumelburg therefore fashioned Erich Siewers, a seventeen-year-old, as a direct anti-
body to Paul Bäumer, a nineteen-year-old:
Erich Siewers ist Gymnasiast wie Paul Bäumer. Beide hegen romantische
Vorstellungen vom Krieg und werden von der Schulbank weg in die Gräben der
Westfront versetzt. Sie finden sich in einer ‘Gruppe’ mit einfachen Handwerkern
aus allen Regionen Deutschlands wieder, mit denen sie freundschaftliche
Beziehungen entwickeln. (Ehrke-Rotermund 302)
The paradigmatic fatherly/motherly function of Remarque's Stanislaus Katczinsky is
taken over by Private Wammsch in Gruppe Bosemüller, as well as by the Lieutenant,
who thinks first and foremost in terms of what is best for his men. Up to this point,
Remarque’s and Beumelburg’s novels are practically identical in conception and
execution: both worship camaraderie as the best thing the war produced and both concur
that comrades in the trenches took over the pre-war social role of the family. A successful
coming-of-age is only possible for Bäumer / Siewers because of the protection and
guidance the “trench family” provides. Without it, they would be likely to make fatal
mistakes during the first days at the front. Moreover, that family represented a larger
range of German types than later novels would valorize.
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Once the accelerated maturation-process is complete, however, the right-wing
writers hasten to take opposite sides from Remarque in the continued character
development of their main protagonists. Siewers, for instance, never knows such feelings
as loss of perspective, depression, hopelessness, resignation, or fear of failure in his post-
war life.57 He makes exactly one mistake, out of fear, namely failing to rescue his
severely wounded friend from a shrapnel hole they both hid in, but in the end the group
comforts him and he emerges with the same steely resolve that also graced Albrecht
Urach in Aufbruch der Nation. The pattern may seem simplistic, but this is how the right-
wing novels would eventually create all its heroes: the young man endures the horror,
lives through it, and then ascends to a level where he can see the meaning and the
objective of the German nation’s mission.58 Typically, their bravery is recognized by a
superior and the men become officers, hence leader-figures. Siewers is moreover
decorated with the Iron Cross for his wound.
His commanding officer praises his good performance by telling him: “Machen
Sie Ihre Sache weiterhin so gut wie bisher, Sie sind mit Ihren siebzehn Jahren früh zum
Manne geworden” (Beumelburg 332). This evidence suggests that, in the right-wing
imagination, the war made men out of children, and to qualify for manliness one had to
57 Compare Ehrke-Rotermund, 303.
58 In Siewer’s case, his change of heart is reminiscent of either an orgasm or a religious apotheosis: “Da
überfällt ihn etwas, das zehnmal stärker ist als er selbst. Da krampft sich etwas in ihm zusammen und
breitet sich im gleichen Augenblick unendlich aus. Da wird es auf einmal ganz hell, ganz klar, ganz
einfach. Da ist auf einmal eine wilde, berauschende Feierlichkeit. […] Er hört nichts, er sieht nichts, er
denkt nichts, er ist nicht lebendig, und er ist nicht tot” (Beumelburg, Gruppe Bosemüller, 228).
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not only endure the war but embrace it, which one could do from any social position.59
Unlike Siewers, however, Paul Bäumer and his friends turned away from the war once
they had found out its true nature. That is what made them un-manly in the minds of the
right-wing militarists. In Gruppe Bosemüller, the Lieutenant, for example, has given up
hope in the war effort and thus serves as a counterpoint to Siewers’ determination, but the
Lieutenant still seeks death on the battlefield rather than succumbing to his despair. This
detail suggests that the right-wing imagination can accept that a soldier may feel
hopelessness (Lieutenant) or fear (Siewers), but it cannot tolerate that soldiers give in to
those feelings. It is from this angle one should interpret one of the heroic images in
Gruppe Bosemüller, when the eponymous Sergeant, like Atlas, supports a wooden beam
in a trench that caved in under artillery fire with superhuman strength until, much later
and out of nowhere, Private Wammsch appears to rescue the group out of the hopeless
situation. What thus emerges as the hallmark of the pro-war novels is the protagonists’
resolve not to lose sight of their personal function in the war effort.60
59 In a dream, Siewers has a conversation with his dead mother about his fear to carry on. In stark contrast
to Paul Bäumer’s mother, who advocates life, Siewer’s mother advises him to “overcome this one last
mountain of fear”: “’Ich kann nicht, Mutter, ich habe fürchterliche Angst vor dem Berg’. ‘Du mußt, mein
Junge, du mußt!’ Damit konnte Siewers sich erfolgreich von der dem Krieg antagonistisch
gegenübergestellten weiblichen Lebenswelt lösen und der bewunderten ‘Männlichkeit in ihrer rauhesten
Form’ annähern” (Ehrke-Rotermund 307).
60 While Siewers redeems himself through a flashy act of bravery, the stuttering Pioneer Casdorp is not as
fortunate. Heidrun Ehrke-Rotermund explains that Casdorp’s unmanliness is not redeemed, which leads to
his brutal exclusion from the Bosemüller Group: “Der Stotterer wird schon bei der ersten Vorstellung aus
der Gruppe ausgegrenzt; denn vor dem Angriff auf Douaumont ist er ‘der einzige, der Aufregung verrät’
[Beumelburg 28]. Dementsprechend bildet er sich auch ein, am Kopf getroffen zu sein, als das Gehirn eines
anderen Soldaten ihm ins Gesicht spritzt. Peter Schwarzkopf […] weist ihn stellvertretend für die Gruppe
zurecht: ‘Halt’s Maul, Mensch … wenn das dein Gehirn wäre, dann wärst du längst verreckt. Meinst du,
man kann sein Gehirn spazieren tragen wie einen Topf Reisbrei?’ [36]. Als Casdorp in der Folge das für
ihn traumatische Erlebnis nicht – wie erwartet – überwindet, vielmehr von panischer Angst überwältigt
wird und am Sturm auf Souville nicht teilnehmen möchte, versucht die Gruppe wieder, ihn mit ihrem
‘Humor’ lächerlich zu machen und dadurch zum Einsatz zu zwingen [148-152]. Der als ‘Schlappschisser’
166
Another essential difference between Gruppe Bosemüller and the more general
tactic that Im Westen nichts Neues represents is that Beumelburg painstakingly created
verisimilitude through verifiable place and time markers -- he was willing to take a
position on a real war and on the leaders and politicians who had failed their troops-
warriors. The events of the book take place between May and Christmas 1916 at a
precisely described section of the front near the fortress Douaumont. Siewers participates
in the defense of the fortress against a French counter-attack at the end of May, then in an
unsuccessful German advance toward the village of Fleury and Fort Souville, as well as
in the retreat from Douaumont in October of the same year.61 Beumelburg thus attempted
to invalidate Remarque’s account of the war as fabricated, while his own work would, by
comparison, appear closer to “what really happened.” His omniscient third-person
narration -- versus Remarque’s first-person narrator -- enhances the impression that
Beumelburg speaks with authority. He even dedicated the novel to “Private Wammsch”
as if he had been a real comrade in the war. Gruppe Bosemüller is also not structured in
loosely connected episodes, but follows a carefully crafted trajectory of heightening
tension that culminates in a climax of heroic failure.62
To summarize, Beumelburg created a fictional war -- a Kriegslegende rather than
a memoir or Bildungsroman -- in which a tightly-knit group, characterized by extreme
courage and altruism, replaces the individual soldier’s social network in civilian life. In
Stigmatisierte antwortet mit Selbstmord [153]. Wie alle, die die Gruppennormen nicht erfüllen und den
absoluten Einsatz im Kampf vermissen lassen, fällt er völlig aus der hochgelobten Kameradschaft heraus”
(Ehrke-Rotermund 308-309).
61 Compare ibid., 304.
62 Ibid.
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contrast to Jünger and Richthofen, he downplayed individual heroism in favor of the
group’s collective achievement. Through their fighting experience in the first line, the
members of the group appear more knowledgeable of tactical decisions than the
commanding officers behind the lines. Beumelburg’s main criticism is thus directed at
anyone who did or could not belong to such front-line groups, and especially at the
soldiers behind the lines (Stabsoffiziere and Etappenschweine). The political implication
of this novel is nonetheless utopian since Beumelburg seems to suggest that the altruism
of the trenches could serve as a model for a new German nation:
Der Autor hält diese Gruppenform für die Keimzelle einer qualitativ neuen
staatlichen (völkischen) Gemeinschaft für die Zukunft (Nachkriegszeit). Er erliegt
einem illusionären Wunschdenken, da er glaubt und fordert, diese an der Front
und unter ihren Bedingungen entstandene Gruppenform als Ideal
gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens auf eine friedliche Zukunft projizieren zu
können. Bar jeder gesellschaftspolitischen und historischen Fundierung bleibt
Beumelburgs Wunsch und Forderung mystische Vision ohne konkret politische
Kontur. (Gollbach 182)
This summary does not do justice to what Beumelburg has really achieved: the ability to
create a new German nation around the figure of the mystic warrior. Gollbach
particularly underestimates the political dimension of Beumelburg's narrative, its clear
call to continuing a politics of individual nobility and German warrior caste nationhood
rather than a modern political state of collective weaklings.
(C) JOSEPH MAGNUS WEHNER, SIEBEN VOR VERDUN (1930)
Others took up this synthesis as viable, creating more stories about one-time
trench heroes who would form the core of a new German and educated nation.
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Joseph Magnus Wehner's novel represents another didactic militaristic response to
Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues, even if it does not open a recognizable point-for-
point dialogue with it, like Gruppe Bosemüller did. Like many of his fellow war
novelists, Joseph Magnus Wehner (1891-1973), who had studied Philology, Philosophy,
and Art History in Jena and Munich, volunteered for the war in 1914, served as a
common soldier in Italy, Serbia, and France, and was seriously wounded in the battle of
Verdun in 1916. After the war, Wehner worked as a journalist for the Münchner Zeitung
until 1930, and the following three years as a theater and literature critic for the
Münchner Neuesten Nachrichten. He decided to become a freelance author in 1933.63
Like Beumelburg, Wehner could not bear the thought that Remarque’s best-seller
should have a prominent place in the public memory of the war and decided to rectify
what he perceived as distortions: “’Jetzt, als ich mein Volk in Gefahr sah, dem
kleinlichsten Ressentiment gegen alles Heldische zu verfallen, erhob ich mich und
schrieb meine Sieben vor Verdun” (quoted in Gollbach 187). To him as a right-wing
völkisch writer, the battle of Verdun was a “symbol of German heroism and unparalleled
sacrifice” (ibid.). In his own version of a forward-looking synthesis of the warrior and the
utopian nationalist, Wehner aims to derive meaning from the mass death of the Great
War by linking the troops’ sacrifice to the mystical idea of a God-sent nascent German
Reich that shall dominate the world: “’Das heilige deutsche Reich ist nicht gebunden an
Grenzen und Länder, es ist unendlich wie die Welt selber, eingesetzt von Gott, und den
63 For more details, see Gollbach 185.
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Deutschen als Auftrag der Ewigkeit gegeben, in der sichtbaren Welt Ordnung und Gesetz
zu schaffen’” (ibid.).
In terms of ideological zeal and literary purpose, Wehner’s book thus closely
resembles Beumelburg’s. He, like Wehner and Schauwecker, was spurred on in his
literary activity and political activism by a pronounced hatred of the Weimar Republic.
What resonates in his criticism of it, however, is not so much political hostility as a deep-
seated fear of modernity in general. According to Michael Gollbach, Wehner thus reveals
himself as a typical adherent of the nineteenth-century völkisch creed:
Der Regierung in den letzten Kriegsjahren wirft er vor, versäumt zu haben,
‘Meuterer, Gewinnler und Schmarotzer […] kurzerhand in den Tod zu schicken’.
Aus Wehners nationalistischer Perspektive haben die ‘damals regierenden
Parteien […] Schuld an dem kulturellen Zerfall des deutschen Volkes und an der
Not und Verzweiflung seiner schöpferischen Geister’. Massenkultur,
Intellektualismus, Zivilisation, Demokratie und politische Parteien als Entartung
des ‘Deutschen’ verwerfend, sieht Wehner in den Menschen der Weimarer Zeit
‘nur noch böse, brutale, geldgierige und in schmutzigem Materialismus
verkommende Tiergesichter’. (Gollbach 186)
This description of Wehner’s contempt for the Weimar system suggests that he believed
in a Golden Age that was not yet marred by “mass culture, intellectualism, civilisation,
and democracy.” Indeed, Sieben vor Verdun contains the message that there once was a
powerful German Reich, alluded to without specific historical details, and that the war
experience should be understood as a force to help veterans re-erect such an age of
national glory. Therefore, Wehner’s perspective on the German nation is split: it reaches
back into a nebulous period past (das alte Reich) and, in utopian fashion, it also reaches
forward to a future age of national maturity, which he likens to a nation becoming a man:
“Er [the eternal soldier, now calm and serene] weiß um das alte Reich und weiß vom
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neuen Reich, daß es noch kein halbes Jahrhundert alt war, als es sich selbst zerschlug.
Was will man von einem Kinde erwarten? Es wird einst wach werden und ein Mann.”64
What attracts attention here is the expression “the new Reich, which was not even
half a century old when it struck itself asunder.” Thus Wehner denies that Germany’s
defeat was in any way related to the power of the enemy forces or to the perfidy of
foreign politics. In fact, Sieben vor Verdun is virtually a study in racial contempt for the
French: they appear as feeble, incompetent cowards. But what does he mean by “struck
itself asunder?” Unlike many other right-wing novelists, Wehner names an actual culprit,
namely the Chief of the Supreme Army Command, General von Falkenhayn:
[Der Dämon des Krieges] sah den ehrgeizigen alten Mann, […], einen
Glücksspieler, der die letzte Karte nicht wagte, um nicht eine Stufe von seiner
Stellung herabzusteigen. Dieser Mann, der Chef der Obersten Heeresleitung,
General von Falkenhayn, ein verschlossener Charakter von gemachter
Liebenswürdigkeit […], hatte den Kern des Angriffsgedankens […] gespalten.
Während die Soldaten […] nichts sehnlicher wünschten, als den Feind […]
ungestüm zu überrennen, […] wie es dem riesigen Willen des Deutschen gerecht
wird, engte der Chef nicht nur die Grundlinie des Angriffs ein und strich von den
Sturmkorps soviel ab, daß ihm selbst noch genug verblieb, um überall stark zu
sein: er hieb dem Geiste des Sturmes selbst den Kopf ab. (Wehner, Sieben vor
Verdun 7)
The military command is thus juxtaposed with the will of the German soldier from the
outset -- a decadent old nobility compared to a new noble German spirit. According to
Wehner’s prologue, what drove the soldiers was “the gigantic will of the German” and
the “underworldly yearning for a great Reich of all German tribes” (8), while Falkenhayn,
64 Joseph Magnus Wehner, Sieben vor Verdun. Ein Kriegsroman. (München: Albert Langen/ Georg
Müller, 1934) 8.
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apparently, only thought of Verdun as “a tactical measure for the conclusion of a
temporary war, the sense of which no German had uttered yet” (8).
The novel ends on the same note. With grandiose pathos, Wehner elevates the
“immortal” survivors of Verdun into the realm of the eternal, where they remain satisfied
in the knowledge that one day their sacrifice will bear fruit:
Ihre Füße sind kalt von fernster Eiszeit, und ihre Häupter flammen von den
Sternen fernster Zukunft. Sie wissen, was sie der Welt geschenkt haben, das
Beispiel eines unerhörten Opfers die Jahrtausende hinauf. Sie wollen keinen
Dank, sie sind unsterblich. So summen und sagen sie unhörbar vom unsichtbaren
deutschen Reiche, das seine Wurzeln hat in ihren Wunden. Und sie wissen, daß
dieses Reich unsterblich ist mitten unter sterbenden Völkern. (Wehner 244)
The prologue and the final apotheosis form the fixed frame of the story, and they are
identical. What happens in between is actually the devastating defeat of the German
forces in the battle of Verdun, yet in Wehner’s book, the Germans keep winning. The fact
that they were, after all, defeated, is immaterial to Wehner’s portrayal of German heroism
or his utopian vision of German national glory. It is as if Verdun did not happen, or as if
it had no consequences, because politics was not real, only German spirit was.
Given this optic, the seven protagonists are psychologically indistinguishable
from one another because they all support the war and do not question its causes or
consequences. Their greatest joy is to attack: “Er schilderte den Sturmangriff als die
höchste Lust des Mannes und war ganz in Feuer geraten […]” (Wehner 26). Men are
reduced to their instinctual capacity for combat when they attack; their thinking stops -- a
phenomenon first described by Jünger in In Stahlgewittern (1920). Storming the enemy
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trenches provides these soldiers with cathartic relief from fear or physical exhaustion.
Wehner depicts Germans on the attack like a bloodthirsty pack of wolves on the hunt:
Die Leute waren außer sich. Sie schrien und sangen, einige warfen die Röcke ab
und gingen nacktarmig gegen den Feind. Unmöglich, den Haufen zu halten. Er
suchte Witterung […], horchte und spürte und stürzte sich im Nu auf neue
Batterien und Maschinengewehre. Der Kampf wurde zum Strudel. […] Es waren
Riesen und Jäger, die da stürmten, und sie waren entbunden. Die befohlene Linie
machte ihnen keinen Gewissensbiß, sie sprangen an den Feind, wo sie ihn
erblickten, und wo er floh, da rauschten sie ihm nach […]. (Wehner 156)
Wehner’s German soldiers are not only fearless and ferocious, they are superhuman -- or
human-animals in the blood lust of real being.
In one scene, for example, Sergeant Junne’s left leg is shattered by a shrapnel
fuse: “[…] der Oberschenkel ist von dem faustgroßen Zünder durchschlagen, die Sehnen
der Kniegelenkhöhle sind zerrissen, der Eisenbecher steckt tief in der Wade” (177).
While normal men would either bleed to death or lose their leg to an emergency
amputation, Sergeant Junne waits half a day in a shell hole and then starts operating on
himself: “Er dachte nicht daran, sich verloren zu geben, sondern machte sich zunächst
daran, den Zünder aus der Wunde zu entfernen” (178). In this situation, Junne’s shell
crater is already filled with the torn body parts of two dead Germans and one Frenchman,
which does not bother him. His attempt to pull out the fuse with his hands is
unsuccessful: “er nahm sein Messer, schnitt faules Fleisch heraus, und nun gelang es ihm,
das Trumm ein wenig zu heben” (ibid.). Eventually, he pulls out the fuse, bandages
himself, lays down to sleep, and makes up his mind to crawl back to the German position
at night.
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The scene verges on an existentialist orgy of self-assertion. The man in this
ridiculous scene struggles for almost two days to get out of the crater, slides back down
several times, is buried by soil thrown up by another explosion, digs himself out -- “wäre
das Granatloch in deutscher Erde, so wäre ich längst hinaus, aber die verfluchte
Gartenerde hier ist tückisch wie Sand” -- then drinks the dead Frenchman’s wine, writes a
farewell letter to his family, to be delivered to his officer, wraps it in his Iron Cross
ribbon, and throws it out on the battlefield. Miraculously, the right person finds it: “Der
[Offizier] strich, als er es zu Ende gelesen, den Namen des Toten durch und schrieb
darüber ‘Junne.’ So wurde der Tote namenlos, doch sein Schicksal steht für viele”
(Wehner 183).
Apart from such absurd manly fantasies, a version of the Dolchstoss surfaces
sporadically throughout the book. The implication always is that the German warriors
could have and would have won the battle of Verdun, if not the entire war, if they had not
been held back by their own military command or let down by reservists that never came:
Zwar der alte Joffre blieb fest, doch erzählten Gefangene, das deutsche Heer hätte
nach den letzten Angriffen bis zur Stadt vorstoßen können, ohne auf Widerstand
zu treffen.
Und das witterte der deutsche Soldat vorne an der Front. Das saß wie ein
Dolch in seinem Herzen, und wenn der Befehl kam, auf der erreichten Linie zu
halten und wenn er nun trotzdem nach rückwärts blickte und nirgends Reserven
sah, die den sicheren Sieg vollenden konnten, dann wurde der Dolch zum
siebenfachen Schwerte, und das war der schlimmste Schmerz des Soldaten.
(Wehner 151)
Sieben vor Verdun also propagates the myth that Germany did not start the war but was
attacked by enemy forces: “Denn man hat uns nicht gesagt, mit welchem Eifer die Feinde
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vor dem Kriege ihren Ring um uns schlossen und uns im Namen ihrer Götzen friedlich
erwürgt hätten, wären wir nicht aufgesprungen, früh und schrecklich wie ein Mann”
(204-205). With the exception of anti-Semitic accusations, Wehner thus explores the full
potential of right-wing ideology as it grew out of a specific political interpretation of the
First World War.65
The tools that Wehner uses are part and parcel of German thought. For example,
his final method of exaggerating the fighting power and moral determination of the
German soldiers is to juxtapose them with the French enemy: “[…] niemand könne dem
Deutschen seine Unsterblichkeit nehmen; und wenn der Deutsche nur noch als Gerippe
über die Erde wandele, sei er stärker als alle anderen” (192). This strategy of self-
aggrandizement had been popular among nationalists since 1815. Wehner amasses many
of the old stereotypes about the French: they are presented as effete, weak, fearful, and
easily captured: “Kaum waren die drei abgeführt, so brachten die Posten einen neuen
Gefangenen. Gelächter rollte die Stollentreppe hinab. ‘Er will ein deutscher Hauptmann
sein, er will Welsch heißen,’ riefen die Häscher und stießen einen riesigen Mann vor sich
her, den sie eben im Vorfelde gefangen hatten” (186). There are several scenes in which a
single German captures fifty or more French soldiers.
Wehner’s scornful descriptions of the French soldiers are only surpassed by his
racial hatred against the black (Somali and Senegalese) soldiers that also fought on the
65 Wehner also propagates that the German government tried to make deals with President Wilson without
the OHL’s knowledge, which is another historical falsehood: “Es war die Zeit […] da Bethmann-Hollweg
dem amerikanischen Botschafter ohne Wissen der OHL mitteilte, er verzichte auf den uneingeschränkten
U-Bootkrieg” […] (Wehner 108).
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French side against the Germans.66 They appear as “predators trained to attack their
pieces, their ‘Boches’” (206), as “incensed negroes” (206), as “leaving their trenches
dancing, kissing their leader’s hands and feet” (210), as “drunk blacks with thick lips”
who need to be given permission to smoke “like pleading children” (210). They “show
their teeth,” one can see “the white in their eyes” (213), and the “wooly heads” (224) also
cut the Germans’ throats (220) or massacre them with bayonets (224).
Compared to these “stinking jungle animals” (184), who also fight ferociously,
the Germans appear dignified and pure: “Wehners Darstellung der Minderwertigkeit der
Schwarzen hebt sich kontrastierend von der Heldenhaftigkeit, absoluten Reinheit und
kindlichen Unschuld der deutschen Soldaten ab” (Gollbach 200).67 As we shall see in the
following discussion of Zöberlein’s Der Glaube an Deutschland, Wehner’s often
grotesque exaggerations of German soldiers in combat, as well as his (racial) hatred of
the enemy, were common currency in radical right-wing war literature. Together, they
began to define not only the acts of the German warrior-hero, but now their mindset.
(D) HANS ZÖBERLEIN, DER GLAUBE AN DEUTSCHLAND (1931)
This new mindset, criticially, moved beyond the narrow frame of the
Bildungsbürgertum. Unlike most of his fellow novelists, Hans Zöberlein (1895-1964)
66 See, for example, the following passage: “Wo aber die Grauen auf die Schwarzen stießen, da gab es
selten Pardon. Sie stanken wie Urwaldtiere im Käfig, sie trugen bei 28 Grad ihre lockeren Mäntel, und
wenn sie den Weißen witterten, zogen sie ihre Messer. Auf Sprungweite ließen sie in herankommen, daß er
seine Waffen nicht mehr gebrauchen konnte: Gewehre und Handgranaten. So schlugen die Deutschen, da
sich jene nie ergaben, mit Spaten und Äxten drein und entfesselten ihre letzte Wildheit. Denn nun sprangen
die Bestien vom Senegal den Grauen an die Kehle” (Wehner 184).
67 The image of purity and innocence that Wehner drapes on the German soldier is nothing new. It also
came up in Manfred von Richthofen’s Der rote Jagdflieger, in which he proudly reported that the British
assumed the pilot of the red airplane would have to be a virgin.
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did not stem from the educated bourgeoisie. He was a brick-layer and mason who
participated in the war as an infantry soldier. He was seriously wounded and decorated
with both the Iron Cross, First Class, and the Bavarian Gold Medal for Bravery (see
Gollbach 210). After the war, Zöberlein became a member of the Freikorps Epp, which
fought for the liquidation of the Räterepublik in Munich. An admirer of Hitler, he joined
the NSDAP and the SA already in 1921 and assisted in the attempted Hitler-Putsch in
1923. In 1948, Zöberlein was sentenced to death because, as head of a Werwolf-
commando, he had been involved with the murder of nine anti-Nazi protesters in
Penzberg, Bavaria, in April 1945. During his trial, he professed to still be a staunch
National Socialist and anti-Semite. His death sentence was converted to life
imprisonment in 1949 (Gollbach 211).
His 1931 novel Der Glaube an Deutschland is a 890-page volume that was
instrumental in the establishment of the Führer-principle and Nazi ideology in German
cultural discourse -- another extension of the warrior metaphors traced to this point.68
Literary critics agree that this books belongs to the “vilest sorry efforts of National
Socialist anti-Semitic literature.”69 According to Karl Prümm, the text helped cement the
war as a useable paradigm in the culture war of the late 1920s. Certain maxims the
soldier had to obey in wartime, including the “belief in destiny, camaraderie, and
68 Compare, for example, Karl Prümm, “Das Erbe der Front. Der antidemokratische Roman der Weimarer
Republik und seine nationalsozialistische Fortsetzung.” Horst Denkler and Karl Prümm, eds., Die deutsche
Literatur im Dritten Reich. Themen-Traditionen-Wirkungen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1976) 138-164.
69 For more details, see Walter Delabar, “’Aufhören, aufhören, he, aufhören – hört doch einmal auf!’ Hans
Zöberlein: Der Glaube an Deutschland (1931) Thomas F. Schneider, Hans Wagener, eds., From
Richthofen to Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi,
2003) 399-421.
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combative virtue” now became transferable into civilian life.70 Walter Delabar supports
this claim and adds:
Dennoch reicht sogar dieser Text, dessen literarische Qualität nicht zur Debatte
steht, weiter. Die willfährigen Belegstellen, mit denen sich der Nationalismus des
Textes und der Blutrausch seines Protagonisten nachweisen läßt, sind
zweifelsohne vorhanden. Der Text enthält nachweisbar nationalistische,
rassistische, anti-semitische, antikommunistische und asoziale Passagen. Er hebt
die Neuerhebung eines geschlagenen Deutschlands hervor, die das Werk eines
Führers sein werde: “Ein Führer wenn rufen würde! Einer nur [Zöberlein 875].”
(Delabar 406-407)
The novel describes, from a first-person point of view, ten battles that took place
on the western front between 1916 and 1918.71 Except for its bulk, the novel largely
resembles Wehner’s Sieben vor Verdun. The narrator, a brick-layer named Hans
Zöberlein, feels no compunctions about the war; on the contrary, he thrives as a member
of the front-line community, especially when his comrades and superiors commend him
for his soldierly virtues: “Ich war unbändig stolz.”72 He perceives the war as an
exhilarating event that he readily accepts and desires as a model for post-war life: “Erst
der Krieg hat in uns diese Sehnsucht richtig entfacht. Größe, Wahrheit, Reinheit wollen
wir. Klar soll das Leben sein – und einfach, dann ist es schön. So soll es einmal werden,
wenn wir wieder heimkommen” (Zöberlein 126).
Heavily drawing on Jünger’s Stahlgewitter, Zöberlein projects the ecstacy of
combat as the quintessential manly endeavor, its irrestistible rush: “Das Gefühl der Macht
dieser Vorbereitung [für die Schlacht ist] wie ein Rausch” (Zöberlein 459). The imminent
70 See Prümm 148.
71 By 1940, it had reached a sales volume of 800,000, according to Karl Prümm. For more details, see
Delabar 402.
72 Hans Zöberlein, Der Glaube an Deutschland. Ein Kriegserlebnis von Verdun bis zum Umsturz.
(München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Franz Eher, 1934) 180.
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battle will be fought by the “best of German manhood”: “Deutschlands bestes
Mannestum, das uns die mörderischen Schlachten noch gelassen haben” (471):
Hier marschiert das Heer in seiner höchsten Vollendung, die es je erreicht hat.
Aus den Augen blitzt jener furchtbare Geist der weitab von allem Elan und
schäumender Begeisterung nur unsere Rasse beseelt. Erschauernd wie von einem
Hauch uralter Zeiten fühlen wir das im Blut. Es ist das Göttliche, Große in uns
Deutschen, das wir selber kaum kennen, das aber unsere Feinde tödlich lähmt. Sie
nannten es einst – und fürchten es heute noch als den “Furor Teutonicus.”
(Zöberlein 472)
In this particular battle, however, the Furor Teutonicus stalls at the British barrage fire,
which temporarily leaves Infantryman Zöberlein, who stayed in the trench, without his
comrades’ support. He watches from behind as the advancing Germans are mowed down.
Being the hero that he is, he then seizes a machine gun, jumps out of the trench, and
opens up enough space for the second line to start its attack, an action that is again
heavily inspired by Jünger’s belligerent individualism. The novel thus advocates
subordination of the individual to a group under a leader, but it also worships individual
heroism when the group effort fails and the single man is left to his own devices: “Das ist
ein Sinn dieses Krieges, uns erkennen zu lassen, wie unheimlich stark ein Mann sein
kann” (156). Under fire, a new German warrior is born.
Zöberlein’s novel thus conveys two central messages. Firstly, that he who lived
through this war emerges from it “steeled”: “Solch ein Erleben macht groß, stark –
gewaltig, daß man in solchen Minuten ahnt, wie der Schöpfergeist umwühlend über die
Welten geht und dabei unkennbar leise seinen Samen in die brechende Erde streut” (578).
And secondly, that the model out of which such strength was born in wartime, namely
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unconditional loyalty toward one’s comrades, is indeed transferable to civil society: “Wir
sind Kameraden, ganz einfach. Können wir nicht auch daheim uns als Kameraden das
Leben schöner, rein von gegenseitigem Haß, gestalten? Jawohl, das geht! Geht’s
heraußen, dann geht’s auch daheim!” (157-158). The war experience constitutes both the
evidence of the front soldier’s extraordinary masculine qualities and the recipe for an
ideal life in which male bonding has primary importance.
This viewpoint corresponds to history in some dimensions. According to Karl
Prümm and Walter Delabar, the simplicity of front line camaraderie held continued allure
for returning veterans because they found Weimar society in its modernity anything but
simple73: “Das Frontparadigma ist Teil jenes Komplexes phantasmatischer
Vorstellungen, die als Reaktion auf die Moderne klare und einfache Verhältnisse als
wünschenswert erscheinen lassen” (Delabar 420). Delabar also quotes Alexander Honold,
who -- in the context of Ernst Jünger -- suggested that the war paradigm thus functions
not in opposition to modernity, but as an extreme manifestation of its discrepancies.74
These discrepancies, in turn, appear as simple black-and-white schemes in the pro-war
novels, and are easily resolved because the protagonist is always “white.” Seen in the
light of the war paradigm’s post-war function, one can then understand why Remarque’s
best-seller, which threatened to rewrite and muddle the script of the war memory,
suddenly was such a contentious issue for these authors: it undermined the right-wing
73 See Delabar 420.
74 See Delabar 421.
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militarists’ entire raison d’être. Zöberlein himself was among its most aggressive
defenders when Remarque appeared on the scene.
In his 1929 review of Im Westen nichts Neues, entitled “Die Antworten eines
Frontsoldaten auf das Buch Remarques,” published in the National Socialist paper
Völkischer Beobachter, Zöberlein criticized Remarque’s novel with the expert authority
of one who knew “the trenches of the west” himself (compare Müller 68). Remarque, he
hypothesized, had either never been at the front or lied about the front experience for
some other reason:
Es ist eine jauchzende Entschuldigung der Deserteure, Überläufer, Meuterer und
Drückeberger und somit ein zweiter Dolchstoß an der Front, an den Gefallenen
aber eine Leichenschändung. […] Woanders hinge ein solcher Schmutzfink längst
von Staats wegen an einer Laterne auf einem öffentlichen Platz der Hauptstadt zur
öffentlichen Abschreckung. Oder er wäre von den Frontsoldaten in seinem
Element, der Latrine, ersäuft worden.75
The extreme hostility with which the right-wing received Remarque and the other anti-
war novelists becomes more understandable if one takes into account that their own war
memory was quite a fragile construct on which their worldview vis-à-vis postwar
Germany, as well as their self-image as men, depended.
Yet it is clear that these right-wing novels do something that the left-wing ones
had not, no matter how many elements they share. Most particularly, they belie the value
of the home front and of new politics as they glorify a cadre of conservative elites. That
is, they move their optic from the now to the future in a way that would facilitate the
transition of many readers into an acceptance of what came to be early Nazi ideology.
75 Hans Zöberlein, “Im Westen nichts Neues. Die Antworten eines Frontsoldaten auf das Buch




Aside from the comparisons between war novels from right and left that I have
been drawing, there are some significant differences that are worth noting. For example,
all the right-wing militarists novels discussed in this chapter are characterized by an
extreme reduction of complexity, where their left-wing counterparts occasionally tried to
get their readers to appreciate and understand the difficulties that a war presents. In these
books, the Great War, which was, of course, an enormously complex phenomenon, is
broken down into categories that appeared meaningful from the point of view of the
common soldier in the trenches -- which was then adopted by the novelists ten years later
-- and beyond that into simple black-and-white dichotomies. These binary contrasts
include the individual versus the group, the men in the front lines (Frontsoldaten) versus
the men behind the lines (Etappenschweine), the common soldier versus commanding
officers, the front line versus the home front, Germans versus other nationalities,
Germans versus Jews. In most cases, the militarist authors share a simple formula of
composition with regard to their image of the German front line hero: he is depicted as
super-human or super-masculine in the sense of physical and moral superiority over all
other men who differed from him in attitude or behavior. Besides that, he is also an
excellent Kamerad.
Since pro-war writers tend to avoid emotional complexity and contradictory
characters, the main protagonist, alone or in his peer group, always displays exactly those
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idealized characteristics his adversaries lack or only possess to a lesser degree. The
resulting impression is that World War I, despite the horror and the chaos, even despite
Germany’s defeat, was a locus amoenus of clear divisions between right and wrong,
between appropriate and inappropriate, manly or unmanly German reactions to the
experience.
Familiarly, this romanticized version of the war experience, which Mosse labeled
the “Myth of the War Experience,” is usually cast in the context of German national unity
and strength. As readers, we are encouraged to accept that heroic trench warfare
represented such a moment of national unity, but that it was flawed by forces outside the
front soldiers’ realm of influence, often by incompetence among the commanding
officers, or by insufficient support from the homefront. To varying degrees, the micro-
system of a functioning combat group, with or without a strong leader, is elevated into a
model for Germany’s political future (e.g. Zöberlein). But as a general rule, all the right-
wingers cite the war experience as evidence of Germany’s national strength, exemplified
by the men in the trenches, which was then sapped by the Weimar system and its
representatives. Hence they speak out in unison against the Republic, which seems to
them an injustice because it does nothing to honor their war memory. And hence their
hatred of Remarque, whom they perceived as besmirching their war memory.
It would be interesting to find out to what extent these writers knew they were
deluding themselves. The case of Hindenburg and Ludendorff is clear: both men simply
lied. Richthofen chose a clear redirect, distancing himself from his noble peers, so that
he, not the war, could be the issue. But all the writers who followed in their footsteps,
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even Hitler: did they really see the war this way? Why did it not occur to them to say:
“the war was traumatic, it hurt me emotionally, and I would appreciate help in
overcoming the trauma?” Did they really believe in irrational things, the loose
construction of the various Schlagworte, or those myths and legends about the German
Reich and the superior strength of its warriors? From a distance of almost ninety years,
this seems hard to believe.
I would argue that another interpretation is more likely, namely that the harrowing
war experience clashed too violently with the humiliating defeat and the sober Weimar
practice of getting back to business-as-usual without trying to assuage the painful
memory of the veterans. In this perspective, the leftist novels might be said to
acknowledge a people in a kind of post-traumatic stress, while the rightist ones deny this
trauma by promoting an illusion that it is worked through. Chapter three presents
abundant evidence to suggest that the ten million returning veterans needed precisely
such support, and that the warrior imaginary I have sketched here was particularly critical
for their self-image as men.
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Chapter Three:
The Second Generation of World War I Narratives:
Erich Maria Remarque
3.1 REFASHIONING THE RECENT PAST
In past analyses of Weimar culture, literary scholars have tended to underrate the
impact of the war experience on cultural and political developments, especially with
regard to the war novels it spawned. According to Hans-Harald Müller, it was military
historians, sociologists, and politicians who generally had a clearer idea of how central an
issue this was.
For example, the German historian Kurt Sontheimer emphasized as early as 1962
that the war experience, and the way it was “processed” in literary and other publications
of the time, assumed a central position in the antidemocratic potential of the Weimar
Republic.1 Along the same lines, Carl Hans Hermann asserted in Deutsche
Militärgeschichte (1968) that the literary re-writing of the war had a stronger impact on
public imagination than the earlier accounts by World War I officers: “[…] die
1 Compare Hans Harald Müller, Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller: Der Kriegsroman der Weimarer Republik
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), 1.
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literarische Verarbeitung des Weltkriegs hat auf die Vorstellung vom Kriege und dem
Kriegswesen stärker gewirkt als die generalstäblerische Auswertung der
Kriegserfahrungen” (Müller 1).2 And in 1974, Walter Laqueur stated that the second
generation of war books was the decisive factor in the shaping of Weimar Zeitgeist: “It is
possible to understand the spirit of the twenties without George, Hesse and The Magic
Mountain; it cannot be understood without reference to the mood of the survivors of
Langemark, Verdun and the Somme” (Laqueur 136).3
This chapter explores the question why (semi-)fictionalized narratives of the war
experience suddenly “touched a nerve” after 1928 while earlier publications,
documentary in style, had achieved little but create widespread fatigue with the whole
subject. Specifically, this chapter illuminates the literary strategies that rendered the
second generation of war books so effective in terms of mass appeal, to the point where
the narrative commonalities I described in the first chapter of the present study became a
kind of norm for the German World-War-I novel.
I will argue particularly that Erich Maria Remarque (1898-1970), the most
successful of the war novelists with his Im Westen nichts Neues (1928), devised a
narrative scheme that made familiar characteristics of “German-ness” appear in a new
light, and thereby changed the way popular imagination pictured the events of 1914-
1918. In fact, Remarque created very little that was new, but, in a touch of genius, he
reconfigured available building blocks from the German cultural repertoire in such a
fashion that most readers accepted the product as a "true" or somehow authentic
2 Müller, Krieg und Schriftsteller 1.
3 Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History 1918-1933 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1974).
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representation of the war. This also helps explain why, later on, Remarque could
straightforwardly be perceived as a (revolutionary) new voice on the old topic of war --
which he was indeed -- , and internationally hailed as a visionary writer and a pacifist --
which he was not.
As already noted, the shadow of World War I loomed large over the entire fifteen
years of the first German republic's existence. Despite people’s efforts to return their
lives to normal, the war remained an unassimilated national trauma beneath the surface of
everyday life. However, the amount of literary production it provoked and the public
attention this received varied greatly for the different phases of the Republic. Müller
reports that over 200 new war novels flooded the German book market between 1928 and
1933, while the previous ten years of the Republic had seen fewer than 100 publications
altogether (2).4
This sudden wave of war novels that helped to tell a new story of World War I
began with the phenomenal success of Erich Maria Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues
(1928/1929). What ignited the ferocious debate about this novel were not its literary
qualities, which are meagre, but its sociopolitical potential, which is enormous, especially
compared to the early right-wing accounts of the war that I discussed in the first part of
the last chapter of this discussion. Any of the activists in Weimar's political spectrum,
ranging from the ulta right-wing nationalists and militarists to the liberal republicans in
the (left) center to the revolutionary communists and pacifists on the far left, soon
realized that Remarque’s book held the key to an enormously important question, namely
4 Comp. Müller, 1. More recent research suggests that Müller underestimated the amount of war literature
publications, which probably goes into the thousands. His figures are only realistic if one strictly counts
war novels.
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who would come to dominate the discourse on the national trauma of the lost war. Im
Westen nichts Neues poured new fuel onto the smoldering embers of the hitherto
unanswered question of what had really happened during that war. Public debate, which
had lain dormant for the previous five years, was reinvigorated. Unlike any of the
officers’ war accounts, Remarque’s war narrative was close enough to ordinary readers’
horizons of expectation to facilitate identification. With mass identification came a mass
audience, and with the mass audience came considerable political significance.
For a brief period, while the public debate on “who owned Remarque” waged
back and forth, it seemed undecided who would get to refashion the recent memory of
war, and thereby make a powerful imprint on public opinion, even national identity, in
the present and the future. It was unclear who would determine the new truth, or what
that “truth” would be: the old elites were crumbling, the center parties dwindling, and the
extremists on both sides became more polarized. In this climate of disintegration, the
debate over Im Westen nichts Neues seemed to infuse new strength into the supporters of
the Republic, but it was not enough.
Only five years later, the struggle was lost, and the National Socialists seized total
control over Germany’s political and cultural institutions and thus secured for themselves
a position to create and dictate the official script of recent history.5 The book burning of
May 10, 1933, orchestrated by Goebbels, reduced the literary contributions of writers like
Remarque to ashes. Nevertheless, the early stages of the hate-filled struggle between right
-wing forces and defenders of the Republic hold important clues for our understanding of
5 I will argue in chapter three that the left wing really had no chance to succeed in this cultural struggle
because Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the creators of the original Dolchstoß, had successfully manipulated
public opinion in 1919/20.
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the late Weimar years. Nowadays, the publication of a controversial book may easily fall
beneath the radar of public awareness. But in the uniquely sensitive climate of the
Weimar Republic, with its multi-faceted spectrum of political and cultural activism,
public debate over one book could spread like wildfire, and even unleash a Culture War.6
3.2 1928: STRUGGLE OF ANCIENTS AGAINST MODERNS
There were historical antecedents to the Weimar situation which are useful to
reference to see what is at stake in such moments of transitions. For instance, Joan
DeJean describes, in her analysis of late seventeenth-century France, how the so-called
“Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns" (1687-1715) changed the face of
French society forever.7 In this particular societal crisis, the “Ancients” sided with the old
intellectual elite, first and foremost with the Académie Française, while the “Moderns”
were representatives of an evolving public sphere seeking access to the body of national
literature. This was the first time in history that a literary debate “touched a public nerve”
(8). DeJean explains:
A far broader spectrum of readers than ever before became involved in this
controversy – many of whom eventually even decided that they had a right to
express their opinions on the issues being debated. Indeed, just as has happened in
our Culture Wars, the public right to judge became a highly controversial issue
when the Ancients protested that only professional scholars had the right to
6 In 1997, the publication of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners caused a similar
storm of controversial reception in Germany. Like Remarque’s novel, the book itself is far from flawless,
but among many Germans in the 1990s, it was perceived as “the truth” about ordinary Germans’
involvement with the holocaust machinery. Christopher Browning’s work, Ordinary Germans (1992), on
the same subject and based on the same research, was less sensational, and remained widely unnoticed.
7 Joan DeJean, Ancients Against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle, (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997).
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pronounce on literary issues and the Moderns countered with the argument that
nonprofessional readers might even possess superior judgment. (8-9)
Like France in the 1690s, Germany underwent the turmoil of such a quarrel between the
Ancients and the Moderns in the 1920s.
The Ancients, in this twentieth-century historical moment, were embodied by the
various anti-republican forces, including Kaisertreue (loyalists to the emperor), Freikorps
(militiamen), former officers, militarists, as well as large portions of bourgeois elites
(students, physicians, judges, professors). Hitler’s National Socialists, when their
movement began to gain momentum in the mid twenties, opportunistically sided with
them to gain stature and social capital. The Moderns, on the other hand, were represented
by the defenders of the republican system, including liberals, leftist intellectuals, and
social democrats. The late Weimar Republic Culture War was fought to determine whose
(literary) version of World War I would emerge as the dominant discourse.
Drawing on their personal wartime experiences and under considerable pressure
to exculpate themselves, one might say that the Weimar Ancients had produced the
earliest publications right after the war (1918-1923). Diaries, reports, or memoirs were
their preferred literary genres, titles like Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (1920),
Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen (1919), Alfred von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen
(1919), and others. Through these, as I have sketched, they sought to authenticate and
corroborate their own position and to legitimize the outcome of the war or the role they
had played in it, being well aware that detailed references to factual information,
presented from an insider’s perspective, would be hard to refute by anyone who had not
shared similar experiences.
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These documentary writings did not entirely reach the goal of swaying public
opinion in their favor: the critics of the war and of the military establishment remained
unconvinced. The later readers of Remarque did not buy the generals’ stories. After 1928,
the Moderns launched their own literary campaign, namely war novels, which had a
seismic effect on the nation. Remarkably, partial fictionalization of the war produced a
higher level of credibility than the officers’ painstaking efforts at documentation (titles
like Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben [1920], Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen
[1919], and von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen [1919]). An author, like a politician, may claim to
present the facts, but this does not guarantee the audience is going to believe him; on the
contrary. As I will map out in this chapter, what is perceived, constructed, or universally
accepted as “truth” may be quite removed from actual events.
To gain the upper hand in such a conflict between opposing groups within one
culture, it is crucial to appropriate to one’s own cause images or texts to which most
people can relate, “die Dinge, die jeder kennt,” or, alternatively, to re-interpret existing
icons of popular imagination. Such a crisis tends to spark heightened cultural creativity,
even frantic attempts from both sides of the conflict, to gain the upper hand, or to debunk
the products of the adversaries. Culture wars typically arise during periods of societal
change that public opinion perceives with unease, although it remains difficult to pinpoint
its socio-political origins with any amount of precision. More likely than not, a particular
constellation of variables creates a climate that makes a societal rift seem imminent, or
inevitable. DeJean concludes:
Whether anxiety over societal change preceded or even gave birth to anxiety over
intellectual change, or whether the opposite is true, is less important than the fact
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that, during Culture Wars, these two anxieties become grafted onto each other – to
such an extent that it is in general impossible to define the point where one type of
anxiety ends and another begins. (4)
It is often stated that the ever fragile political system of the Weimar Republic enjoyed a
five-year period of relative stabilization between 1924 and 1929 (Stabilisierungsphase).
The assumption of political stability and social calm, however, would not explain the fact
that Remarque’s publication of Im Westen nichts Neues provoked such a volatile reaction
in 1928. Upon closer examination, then, it was precisely the years leading up to the great
economic depression of 1929 that set the course toward the Republic’s demise.
According to the historian Detlev Peukert, the impression of relative stabilization
in Weimar is an illusion, and can only be maintained when seen as relative to the
cataclysmic events before 1923, and after 1929. In fact, the years in between had to
withstand the corrosive forces of several smaller and larger crises that were indicative of
deeper-seated, structural rifts:
Weder konnten die Strukturprobleme des Friedensschlusses und der
Republikgründung von 1918/19 wirklich gelöst werden noch die
Strukturprobleme der Inflationsjahre und der zeitweiligen Konsolidierung von
1924. Alle diese Spannungen und Belastungen wurden in die Jahre der
‘Stabilisierung’ hineingetragen. […] Insofern läßt sich sagen, daß sich jenes
Widerspruchspotential, an dem die Republik 1930 bis 1933 scheitern sollte,
ausgerechnet in den sog. Stabilisierungsjahren akkumulierte. Die Weichenstellung
für den Untergang der Republik erfolgte, bevor die aktuelle Krise 1929/30
ausgebrochen war. Alles drängte bereits auf den ‘großen Knall’ hin. (Peukert
204)8
One could even argue that President Friedrich Ebert’s death (28 February 1925) was the
first step in a series of events that led to the eventual fate of the Republic.
8 Detlev J.K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1987).
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Ebert’s successor was imperial field marshal Paul von Hindenburg, who was 78
years old at the time. “The revered victor of Tannenberg, who […] had taken no part in
postwar political life, now came forward as the candidate of the right-wing-parties united
in the ‘Reich bloc’” (Kolb 74).9 Hindenburg’s election was testimony to the splitting of
the workers’ movement and the disintegration of political Catholicism. Eberhard Kolb
views Hindenburg in power as a clear victory for the Ancients and “as a serious setback
for the republic” (74). To be sure, his election did not result in an immediate “sharp
swing to the right,” which would have exceeded his official authority, but, nevertheless,
“there began with his presidency a ‘silent change in the constitution,’ whereby –
gradually and at first barely perceptibly – the balance shifted in favour of presidential
power” (ibid.). Kolb continues:
Given the precariousness of parliamentary majorities, the President was able to
bring his personal and political preferences to bear on the formation of
governments to an extent greater than the founders of the constitution had dreamt
of. Hindenburg’s preferences were clear from 1925 onwards: if at all possible, the
DNVP should be included in government, if at all possible, the SPD should be
kept out of it; this was a matter of principle, independent of parliamentary
constellations and concrete political requirements. (ibid.)
Hindenburg as President is emblematic of the Weimar predicament. Here was the
figurehead of the Ancients, the creator of the Dolchstoß, a stubborn old Prussian officer,
elected on old credentials, wielding power again to diminish the role of a republican
parliament he did not understand or approve of. He was not much of a politician, but he
could be relied on to loathe the Social Democrats. In fact, he became a buffoon whose
tragic role would end with the ceremonious handing over of power to Hitler.
9 Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
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Hence, Germany's increasing internal polarization about its history and future had
been institutionalized politically after 1925. In the realm of intellectual life, supporters of
the Republic had even more resistance to confront. As a rule of thumb, the Ancients
longed for the “Golden Age” of the old empire (or before), while the Moderns, absurdly
inexperienced, did not know how to strengthen their dream, the establishment of a
pluralist democracy. What weakened the Moderns in this culture war was the fact that
they could hardly ever agree on anything. They know their common enemies, but the
knowledge failed to unite them. The Ancients, however, had a clearer vision, and
presented a more united front. Henry Pachter summarized the situation as follows:
The aims of conservative intellectuals were mostly determined by the word
“anti”: They were anti-illuminist, anti-liberal, anti-Semitic, antisocialist, anti-
intellectual, antidemocratic, antiparliamentarian, anti-industrial – in a word, “anti”
everything that had happened since 1789. (126-127)10
Thus leftists and liberals reckoned with vehement opposition from the right, but they
could not count on solidarity among themselves.
In a real sense, the entire Weimar Republic is characterized by the failure to
resolve a position between these poles, bringing rapid fluctuations of catastrophic crises
and phases of promising potential (like Stresemann’s foreign policy efforts), ideological
contradictions and political conflicts on every level. It never enjoyed a period of relative
stabilization, at least not with respect to cultural developments. The cultural scene,
minutely stratified according to political opinion, equally failed to work out compromises
between opposing camps. Especially on the left, everyone toiled for himself. Early on,
10 Henry Pachter, Weimar Etudes (New York: Columbia UP, 1982).
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the leftist and the liberals had also failed to provide a convincing World War I-script of
their own, which they might have created if they had not focussed all their energy on
demonizing the right-wing militarist publications that existed. Symptomatically, Kurt
Tucholsky announced in a Weltbühne article on January 5, 1926:
Wer, wie wir, vom ersten Tag nach dem Waffenstillstand an für Aufklärung über
das Verbrechen der deutschen Militärs und ihrer Helfer gesorgt hat, ist wohl
berechtigt, vor den lawinenhaften Publikationen, Broschüren und Streitschriften
über den Krieg ein Wort zu sagen, daß erklärt werden muß, wenn man uns recht
verstehen soll. Dieses Wort heißt: Genug. (quoted in Müller 36)
Tucholsky is quite aware that the leftists, and especially the pacifist movement, had
missed their chance to convince fellow citizens of their beliefs.
In Tucholsky’s opinion, the right time to have done so would have been directly
after the war:
Da waren die Wunden frisch, und die Wunden schmerzten; da brannte die
Erinnerung, und da zitterte das ungeheure Erlebnis lebendig nach; da wußte jeder
zu bestätigen und zu erzählen und tats gern, weil er endlich, endlich sprechen
durfte – da war viel zu machen. Es ist so gut wie nichts getan worden. Als die
Generale ihre Memoiren beendet hatten und die Uniformierten ihre Reichswehr:
da war es zu spät. (Müller 36-37)
He misread the signs of the times. So did the publishing houses. Publishers, like
Tucholsky, were convinced that there was nothing more to be said about the war, at least
nothing that would spark public interest. For this reason, Im Westen nichts Neues was
rejected by a number of publishing houses. It first appeared in the Vossische Zeitung in
the late fall of 1928, until it was published by Ullstein, Berlin. The consensus at that time
was that no one wanted to read more of the same.
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But given the fact that none of the old officers’ and generals’ accounts had
contributed to the healing of national trauma, in retrospect the time was ripe for a new
approach. Remarque took advantage of the wide open space between the entrenched
factions in this Culture War. He knew that the public had grown tired of a particular kind
of war literature, and he also knew that the left had never landed a major success. So he
decided to write something in opposition to the Ancients, to the delight of the Moderns.
1928 was the perfect historical moment for Im Westen nichts Neues to come out.
3.3 LITERARY DEVELOPMENTS
This success came as a surprise. By 1923, after the Republic had overcome
periods of anarchy and revolution, public opinion had seemingly lost interest in war
literature.11 Between 1923 and 1929, survivors sought to rearrange their lives, overcome
the trauma, and heal the wounds they had suffered. Many of the war supporters gravitated
towards veterans’ clubs (Frontkämpferverbände), German heritage clubs
(Traditionsvereine), or right-wing paramilitary associations (Freikorps).12 But the broad
majority of the public expressed a fatigue with accounts penned by officers who had
fought in the war. Müller points out that Ernst Jünger, Ludwig Renn, and Josef Magnus
Wehner all complained “daß die belletristischen Verlage nach 1923 der Kriegsliteratur
überdrüssig waren und bei literarischen Preisausschreiben die Darstellung von
11 Compare, for example, Hans-Harald Müller, Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller, 35. He maintains that the
overall public interest in writings about the war dwindled in the mid 1920s. Thomas Schneider and Hans
Wagener, two more recent scholars on World War I literature, contradict that claim. (Compare Thomas F.
Schneider and Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I.
Weltkrieg [Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2003] 12.)
12 For more details on right-wing nationalist organizations, see Paul Bookbinder, Weimar Germany: The
Republic of the Reasonable (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1996) 41-53; 211-
225.
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Kriegserlebnissen generell ausschlossen”.13 This period of waning literary production
concerning the war lasted until 1929. Even one year earlier, the S. Fischer publishing
house had rejected Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues with the argument that “nobody
was interested in war novels” (Müller 35). Günter Blöcker adds:
Aber auch im Hause Ullstein hatte man sich nur zögernd und ohne große
Erwartungen zur Annahme entschlossen. Man war sicher, nichts mehr vom Krieg
wissen zu wollen – man hatte ihn, mitsamt seinen Ursachen und Folgen,
erfolgreich verdrängt oder meinte doch, es getan zu haben. (Blöcker 35)
Thus from several sides, the prospect of yet another war novel becoming a major factor in
establishing a new national consciousness was deemed unlikely.
The year 1928, however, marks the beginning of a new literary approach to the
national trauma of World War I. The old war books had dominated the past of an older
establishment. What was now at stake for a new generation was the question whose script
of the war would come to rule the present, at a moment where new crises were looming.
This cultural struggle was heavily politicized from the first.14 As a matter of credibility,
producers of war accounts still had to have fought in the trenches themselves. Otherwise,
their narratives would have been too easily dismissed by the old militarists as “fake” or
“invented.” Erich Maria Remarque, Ludwig Renn, Arnold Zweig, Edlef Köppen,
Theodor Plivier -- all of these writers had the authority to claim first-hand experiences of
war, yet they all used their expertise to produce a new genre of wartime narrative. While
the first generation of war diaries and officers’ memoirs had essentially hailed the war
13 Müller 35.
14 “Nach einer Periode, in der Seelenanalysen und Mythen aller Art Mode waren, wendet sich die Literatur
wieder der Realität zu. In Deutschland kommt diese Veränderung vor allem in der sogenannten Neuen
Sachlichkeit zum Ausdruck, im lebhaften Interesse der Schriftsteller – und ihrer Leser – an Problemen der
Gegenwart und der jüngsten Vergangenheit” (Pavel Peter, “Bemerkungen zu einigen deutschen
Prosawerken über den Ersten Weltkrieg” [Germanica Wratislaviensia, vol. 36, 1962, 19-34] 23).
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and created false excuses for personal failures or Germany’s defeat, this second wave of
books took a much more ambiguous stance toward it. Much will have to be said about
this ambiguity.
The older texts had come out while the atrocities and the devastation were still
fresh on everyone’s mind. The most important first-generation titles were: Walter Flex,
Der Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten: Ein Kriegserlebnis (1916), Gunther Plüschow,
Die Abenteuer des Fliegers von Tsingtau: Erlebnisse in drei Erdteilen (1916), Philipp
Witkop, Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten (1916), Manfred von Richthofen, Der rote
Kampfflieger (1917), Leonard Frank, Der Mensch ist gut (1917), Andreas Latzko,
Menschen im Krieg (1917), Martin Beradt, Schipper an der Front (written 1916,
published 1919).15
The second wave of narratives, actually starting with Georg von der Vring’s
Soldat Suhren (1927), Ludwig Renn’s Krieg (1927), Arnold Zweig’s Der Streit um den
Sergeanten Grischa, (1927), and then Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues (1928/29),
emerged almost ten years after the signing of the Versailles treaty. These newer books
were written in hindsight and aimed at rethinking the original war experiences, which
equipped the authors with a much keener idea of the socio-political landscape
surrounding them. In other words, unlike writers closer to the chaos of World War I
itself, this new generations could gauge more precisely what their readers’ horizon of
expectation would be. Any successful publication would have to be fine-tuned to the
expectations of this new generation of readers.
15 Leonard Frank’s and Andreas Latzko’s collections of novellas were humanist-pacifist books, but they
were forbidden in Germany immediately after their publication and thus failed to gain sufficient popularity
to counterbalance the many pro-war publications.
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One concession to “the new taste” seems minor, but I believe it should not be
underrated: the new narratives were written from the point of view of a common soldier,
not an arrogant officer’s.16 The old accounts had not satisfied the public because they had
not provided any answers to the truly important questions, i.e. who is to blame for losing
the war?, why were we in it for so long?, what was the point in fighting it in the first
place? So the new generation of writers seized the opportunity to refashion the collective
memory of the war, or at least to supply some missing pieces in the puzzle -- from the
soldiers in the trenches' point of view, not from that of the high command that had clearly
betrayed both those soldiers and Gernany as a whole.
Müller refers to these literary innovation of 1928 as the creation of a new “poetic
matrix”:
Die zweite Welle der Kriegsliteratur […] bedarf nicht länger einer poetischen
Matrix, die wahre Beschreibungen der Ereignisse und Erlebnisse von 1914 bis
1918 liefert, sondern einer poetischen Matrix, die für die Gegenwart wahre
Aussagen über den Krieg liefert, die Krieg und Nachkriegsexistenz miteinander
vermittelt und eine sinnstiftende Kontinuität zwischen diesen beiden heterogenen
Erlebnisbereichen herstellt.17
What Müller chooses to call a “matrix,” I will call a “script.” A script, in this context, is
a literary mechanism, the basic outline of a character and his or her typical story, crafted
to elicit certain emotional responses from the reader. Using such scripts as threads in the
cultural fabric connecting the author with his readers enables him to predict likely
responses to his text: that author and the readers share knowledge of the types of their
16 In fact, the aristocratic Prussian Captain Arnold Friedrich Vieth von Golßenau adopted the pen name




era, and what those characters will typically experience. Sharing such scripts within an
era's horizon of expectation gives an author the ability to read his own text with another
reader’s eyes, and to calculate at least the most probable ways in which the reader will fill
in the “blank spaces” (Leerstellen) in the text, i.e. which meanings that reader is likely to
attribute to it.
Müller makes two important observations about the scripts that would be initiated
by this second generation of World War I writers: their new war narratives would be
judged by whether or not they could supply new meaning (sinnstiftend), and whether or
not they could draw a picture of the war that was “true for the present” (für die
Gegenwart wahre Aussagen). In other words, the challenge for Remarque's generation of
writers was to maintain a required amount of authenticity and credibility about the
details of a war whose memories were still very much alive, while, at the same time,
fictionalizing the war experience sufficiently to generate a new popular image of it.
In this context, one should add that new scripts had to be created which would,
first and foremost, captivate male readers and help them make the connection of their
own experience and the script elements available in their horizons of expectation, as I
spoke of in the last chapter. In general, as part of this script, women are assumed not to
care for war novels. Too, these writers knew that they could not repeat the mistakes of the
early Weimar war accounts if they wanted popular success -- the memoirs of the old war
elite had proved themselves to be largely bankrupt for the current generation. Everyone,
except the small segment of the nationalists and militarists of the old guard, had come to
detest the old military elite, so the collective decision was made by these new-generation
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writers that the new script for German men would describe events from a more modest
perspective: a private’s instead of a lieutenant’s.
Most potential readers of 1929 and beyond also agreed that the older generation
had wielded undue authority over the younger men, who, lamentably, did as they were
told and then became cannon fodder. Also, accuracy or authenticity was not enough.
Ernst Jünger’s In Stahlgewittern (1920), for example, proved that war scenes without soul
seemed empty; above all, the story had to “seem right,” it had to be believable.18 Feeling
can be more convincing than facts or verbal artistry alone. But the most difficult
challenge would be to create a new type of hero. Germans, after all, had not only lost this
four-year battle that Jünger portrayed as still largely heroic; they had been butchered,
blinded, burned, maimed, and castrated, as the pictures of Georg Grosz and many other
artists documented. In the face of overwhelming evidence of total defeat, how does one
create a literary figure of an authentic, believable, yet heroic loser, or sustain the belief in
heroism at any cost?
Despite these obstacles, the emerging producers of the new war scripts had
substantial shaping powers. It was up to them to decide what the new version of the
German World War I warrior would look like, in the minds and hearts of the new
generation. From this perspective, then, it emerges that Remarque must be credited with
knowing the most popular recipe and executing it well. The main objective to be met in
18 Gerda Liebchen explains that Jünger basically had to lie about what war was like, and that his readers
realized this: “Die Verklärung des Weltkrieges zur Schule heldischer Männer war kein müheloses
Unterfangen. Jünger mußte hier mit schlecht gezinkten Karten spielen, um gerade jene neue Erfahrung, die
sich so negativ auf den Kampfmoral ausgewirkt hatte, die Erfahrung des Trommelfeuers, in die
Heldenideologie einbinden zu können” (Gerda Liebchen, Ernst Jünger. Seine literarischen Arbeiten in den
zwanziger Jahren. Eine Untersuchung zur gesellschaftlichen Funktion von Literatur [Bonn: Bouvier Verlag
Herbert Grundmann, 1977] 22).
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analyzing such a text -- a popular text gauged at meeting the horizon of expectation of an
audience and visibly successful in so doing -- is to shed light on the invisible, yet
traceable, mechanism that establishes the connection between a writer and his audience
through the medium of a semi-fictional narrative.
Therefore, it is crucial to gain awareness of the author’s intentions, the literary means he
used to reach the desired effect, as well as of the way the book was popularly received.19
But apart from the more or less accurate insights to be gained from intention-and-
reception analysis, the primary task at hand for my turn to Im Westen nichts Neues is to
unmask the gender-specific (in this case, masculine) cultural “buttons” this particular
war author seeks to “push.” Since there is indeed an invisible mechanism, or an
inaudible dialogue taking place between the author and his readers, one ought to be able
to identify the components of this interaction.
3.4 REMARQUE’S RECIPE
As Wolfgang Iser pointed out in his 1970 essay "Die Appelstruktur der Texte,"
ambiguity (Unbestimmtheit) is a central aspect of modern literary texts.20 He argued that
meaning is not an inherent feature of a literary text but a construct derived from the text
with the aid of the reader. The reader’s interaction with the literary text is determined by
19 Apart from interviews with the authors, there is not much evidence to identify the intentions behind
writing what they wrote. With respect to popular reception of a new book, one automatically reads
newspaper reviews first. But in this socio-cultural context, newspaper reviews may reveal the political
position of the given newspaper, but not necessarily what the ordinary reader felt when reading the book.
In what follows, however, I am following the lead of Wolfgang Iser, Der implizite Leser:
Kommunikationsformen des Romans von Bunyan bis Beckett (München: W. Fink, 1972), which argues that
each literary text carries within it an image of the readership for which it is intended.
20 Wolfgang Iser, “Die Appelstruktur der Texte: Unbestimmtheit als Wirkungsbedingung literarischer
Prosa,” Konstanzer Universitätsreden, ed. Gerhard Hess (Konstanz: Universitätsverlag, 1970).
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the degree to which his realm of experiences overlaps with the fictional reality presented
by the text. Modern literature challenges the reader to review his personal experiences
from the fictional perspective offered by the text. Iser continues:
Wird die Welt des Textes auf die eigene Erfahrung projiziert, so kann sich eine
sehr differenzierte Skala der Reaktionen ergeben, auf der die Spannung ablesbar
wird, die aus der Konfrontation der eigenen Erfahrung mit der potentiellen
Erfahrung entsteht. Zwei extreme Möglichkeiten der Reaktion sind denkbar:
Entweder erscheint die Welt des Textes als phantastisch, weil sie allen unseren
Gewohnheiten widerspricht, oder aber als banal, weil sie so vollkommen mit
ihnen zusammenfällt. Damit ist nicht nur angezeigt, wie stark unsere Erfahrungen
bei der Realisierung des Textes im Spiele sind, sondern auch, daß in diesem
Vorgang immer etwas mit unseren Erfahrungen geschieht. (Iser 12)
Since the fictional world of the text and the empirical world of the reader can never be
perfectly mapped onto each other, an element of ambiguity remains. Through the act of
reading, then, the reader attempts to “normalize” this ambiguity by integrating the text
into the real world, or whatever his subjective idea of “the real world” may be.
“Unbestimmtheit läßt sich ‘normalisieren,’ indem man den Text so weit auf die realen
und somit verifizierbaren Gegebenheiten bezieht, daß er nur noch als deren Spiegel
erscheint” (12). In other words, the reader interacts with the text in such a way that the
fictional world appears to mirror reality, and thereby loses its literary qualities.
The tendency to reduce the fictional world of the text to the level of one’s own
experiences is the most likely reader response. But whether the reader’s approach is
reductive or not, the essential quality of a literary text lies in its adaptability to the highly
subjective world of the reader. Iser concludes:
Daraus ergibt sich die Eigenart des literarischen Textes. Er ist durch eine
eigentümliche Schwebelage charakterisiert, die zwischen der Welt realer
Gegenstände und der Erfahrungswelt des Lesers gleichsam hin und her pendelt.
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Jede Lektüre wird daher zu einem Akt, das oszillierende Gebilde des Textes an
Bedeutungen fest zu machen, die in der Regel im Lesevorgang selbst erzeugt
werden. (13)
The act of reading this new generation of war novels, then, required the reader to rethink
and find meaning in a set of experiences that had been found meaningless in traditional
forms.
These thoughts on the nature and effect of literary texts aid in understanding
Remarque’s recipe. Im Westen nichts Neues offers a particularly high level of
Unbestimmtheit in the sense that the reader is disoriented with regard to space and time.
Exact dates, the names of places in Belgium or France, as well as the names of military
units are deliberately left out. The events depicted could have taken place anywhere on
the Western front, to any group of young infantrymen at any time between 1915 and
1918. In accordance with Iser’s analysis, the lack of time and space references in
Remarque’s novel provoked extreme reactions. Right-wing critics initially compared the
novel to the First Generation of war accounts and regarded the absence of space and time
markers in the narrative as a deficiency. Hence, they dismissed the text as “vague” and
“unaccountable.” Müller reports: “So moniert z.B. Herbert Kranz in der ‘Tat’ die
generelle ‘Unzuverlässigkeit’ von Remarque’s ‘Bericht’: ‘Er [Remarque] muß, weil er
die Wirklichkeit nicht meistert […] alle Situationen, was Ort und Zeit angeht, im
ungewissen lassen, was jede Nachprüfung unmöglich macht’” (Müller 67). Such right-
wing literary criticism typically sought to debunk war novels by emphasizing their lack
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of accuracy in comparison to the first generation Tatsachenberichte (factual reports).21
However, supporters of the war novel, the vast majority, did not criticize its lack of
referential markers. Most readers were willing to accept the events described in this novel
more readily and to participate in making meaning of the "facts" that they nonetheless
found in the text.
The relation of this book to its context is critical for our assessment of its possible
success. Spacial and temporal ambiguity in Im Westen nichts Neues was unacceptable to
the right wing because their horizon of expectation (Erwartungshorizont) had already
been defined by the First Generation of war books. To the right wing, only war diaries,
reports, and memoirs had established themselves as acceptable genres because they
contained “the truth” about the war, a truth firmly anchored in historical facts and known
to the generals and admirals who had led the war effort.22 In Iser’s terms, the right wing’s
realm of experiences was best reflected by the non-fictional accounts of the war, which
was not the case for anyone else. Therefore, the right wing had to react defensively when
the emerging new genre challenged the validity of the old accounts. What united the right
wing, in Iser's sense, was therefore the centrality of the war experience and the belief in
the non-fictional accounts of it:
[…] diese Erfahrung, die in allen möglichen Frontkämpfervereinen,
Traditionsverbänden und sonstigen Organisationen der militärischen
21 Müller brings this point into sharper focus: “Daß das Romangeschehen von Im Westen nichts Neues auf
Ort und Zeit nicht festzulegen war und eine Reihe von Episoden enthielt, die Vorgänge von geringer
Wahrscheinlichkeit beschrieben, wurde von der politischen Rechten nicht als legitime Eigenschaft eines in
fiktionaler Rede abgefaßten Romans, sondern als ‘Fälschung’ der historischen Realität betrachtet” (70).
22 However, this right-wing belief in factual accounts of the war was a phenomenon of the first post-war
decade. Remarque taught the right wing that fictionalized accounts of the war experience could be
extraordinarily effective in conveying a particular message. He opened the right wing's eyes to the fact that
a good story told by a nobody was more compelling than an accurate account given by a general. This is
what ultimately led to the flood of anti-Remarque novels between 1929 and 1932.
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Traditionspflege als unverlierbarer Besitz gepflegt und nicht selten wie ein
Fetisch kultiviert wurde, war nur einer ‘wahren Beschreibung’ zugänglich, wie sie
in Kriegstagebüchern, Kriegsberichten und Offiziersmemoiren geliefert wurde,
nicht aber der Überprüfung, Kritik oder reinterpretierender Fiktion. (Müller 71)
Based on internal evidence, however, Remarque was well aware that only the right wing
showed this allegiance to the First Generation of war books.
When Remarque decided to write a war book in a different style, effectively
creating a new genre, he seemed to know what readers would expect (what the horizon of
expectation would be) -- a more open, less determined account of the war. His assessment
was correct that only the right wing fringes would try to defend their set of expectations
while the vast majority was receptive to his innovation, especially to help them make
sense of their own experiences, which they had not found reflected in the tactics and
politics of the generals' and admirals' worlds. Such a Horizontwandel, as Hans Robert
Jauss pointed out in a 1967 essay, may result from “negation of familiar experiences or
the raising of consciousness (Bewußtmachung) with regard to experiences that have never
been articulated.”23 Im Westen nichts Neues did just that: it raised the level of
consciousness about the war experience in a way that it had never been articulated. It
created a new Erwartungshorizont for a mass audience.
Or so it seemed. What I claim in the next sections of this chapter is that Remarque
actually only had two original ideas. His first idea was to connect the war experience with
familiar narrative strategies of popular fiction, to bring war stories into the lives of his
readers in comfortable style. Events are related from the point of view of the first-person
23 Hans Robert Jauss, “Literaturgeschichte als Provokation der Literaturwissenschaft” (Konstanz:
Druckerei und Verlagsanstalt Konstanz, 1967).
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narrator, usually in the historical present to heighten the dramatic effect of the narration.
The novel is loosely structured into episodes that do not necessarily follow chronological
order, which is why it was well-suited to being published in a daily paper initially.
Nothing groundbreaking there in terms of literary innovation; it is obviously scripted
after nineteenth-century models.
But Remarque’s second, more significant idea was ideological rather than literary:
to relieve the common soldier from his responsibility of having lost the war, separating
his actions from those of the high command that had lost the war. Im Westen nichts Neues
takes the guilt, the shame, and the national trauma off the younger men and the common
soldiers, and reassigns the blame to the older generation. I will thus argue that Remarque
effectively rewrote Hindenburg’s Dolchstoßlegende for a mass audience. The
Dolchstoßlegende, like many conspiracy theories, initially left most people unconvinced -
- the generals had lost the war themselves, with the material situation of Germany, as the
trench soldiers had known.
Yet Remarque’s refashioning of that powerful political legend as part of the new
definitions of masculinity in Weimar contained far more persuasive power, as it made up
a new myth about loss. Hindenburg and Ludendorff targeted bolsheviks, Jews, and Social
Democrats – an eclectic mix of everyone they didn’t like. Remarque, on the other hand,
made a more convincing case without having to rely on fabrications; he did not need a
deus ex machina with a sense of menace from without: he simply said the younger
generation was driven into the war by the older generation who held positions of
authority and abused those positions, betraying the innocent youth delivered into their
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hands. There are no partisan politics, there is only a family drama. The older generation is
to blame for the war, the younger generation suffered the consequences -- a personal
refashioning of politics that appealed to the hearts of the readers rather than their minds.
3.5 Reading Im Westen nichts Neues
As a novel, Im Westen nichts Neues appears to the reader essentially as a coming-
of-age story, a Bildungsroman, or novel of formation, in the particular sense that the 19-
year-old main characters were drafted straight from school and had the misfortune of
coming of age during the Great War. While the term Bildungsroman has traditionally
been applied to novels that trace the spiritual, moral, psychological, or social
development and growth of the main character from infancy to maturity, Remarque’s
novel confronts us with extremely accelerated maturation resulting, paradoxically, in
stunted growth, even regression, on the part of the young men. It is, in fact, a
Bildungsroman of alienation and dehumanization, an Anti-Bildungsroman, as it were.
Other critics have preferred to label it a roman-à-clef because it is so openly
autobiographical. And yet another attempt to classify the genre of Im Westen nichts
Neues has created the term Stationenroman, analogous to Brecht’s Stationendrama,
because the development of the narrative is not rooted in plot or chronological
progression.24 In this context, plot has traditionally been understood as “developing
action culminating in a climax,” and followed by some sort of denouement, but the
unifying principle of this novel are “broader thematic links, such as characters or ideas”
24 Compare Christine R. Barker and R.W. Last, Erich Maria Remarque (London: Oswald Wolff, 1979) 49.
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(Barker and Last, 49). This description is in many ways less than convincing: Im Westen
nichts Neues consists of twelve chapters or sections, but these chapters or episodes are
“not necessarily related to one another causally” (ibid. 48). Still, Barker and Last refer to
this narrative scheme as “structural technique: a series of small episodes as building
bricks” (ibid.). They underscore as well that most of the episodes read like entries into a
fictitious diary, only that they are narrated in the historical present, not past tense.
The style was thus in many ways familiar, only that Remarque’s episodic writing
was fictionalized, while the old diaries were referential, closer to actual events. (2) Such a
structure lent itself well to publication in installments, which is precisely what the
Propyläen Verlag chose to do: Im Westen nichts Neues first appeared in the Vossische
Zeitung (November-December, 1928), before the first 50,000 copies were printed in
book-form.25 And episodes create suspense. Upon beginning every new section, one is
tempted to think, with mixed feelings, “hopefully it won’t be another terrible day in the
life of Paul Bäumer,” knowing full well it probably will be.26
The book tells the story of Paul Bäumer, Remarque’s autobiographical
mouthpiece, and three of his classmates – Kropp, Müller, and Leer – as well as of four
other men these schoolboys closely befriend over time (Tjaden, Westhus, Detering, and
Katczinsky). Katczinsky is already forty, twice their age, and he represents a father
figure. Some critics consider him the true hero of the story. What is significant about this
25 Comp. Barker and Last, 34.
26 The often graphic descriptions of deaths or injuries form an integral part not only of this novel, but of
war fiction in general. Therefore, it can be assumed that a (somewhat perverse) sense of yoyeurism is part
of the reader’s motivation. Not counting war veterans, who may have very personal reasons, what is it that
makes people want to read about such unimaginable atrocities? With very few exceptions, none of these
books are good literature.
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set of characters is the mathematical balance between the four representatives of the
bourgeoisie (schoolboys) on the one side, and the four working men on the other. Tjaden
is a locksmith, Westhus a peat-digger, Detering a farmer, and Katczinsky “maybe a
shoemaker, but that does not matter” – he is skilled and sly, “a jack of all trades.”27
Four milk-faced, preppy schoolboys meet four weathered, hard-handed,
uneducated workers – an unlikely union only the war could forge. But friendship and
solidarity among the schoolboys is the miracle recipe which gives them the strength to
endure the ordeals of basic training, sadistically administered by a drill sergeant named
Corporal Himmelstoß. They are subjected to, and initially appalled by, the random
abuses of power with which Himmelstoß tries to break their spirit. The effect is,
obviously, a general hardening, as well as disillusionment. The boys come to learn that,
as Remarque sententiously puts it, “a polished button is more important than four
volumes of Schopenhauer.”28 But the brutality and anti-intellectual environment of boot-
camp prepares them, in a sense, for what is to come; namely, trench warfare.29 Indeed,
Bäumer is going to observe, much later, that the final generation of draftees did not
receive such basic training, and thus died like flies when they got to the front lines.30
27 “Katczinsky ist der Gerissenste, den ich kenne. Von Beruf ist er, glaube ich, Schuster, aber das tut nichts
zur Sache, er versteht jedes Handwerk. Es ist gut, mit ihm befreundet zu sein” (Erich Maria Remarque, Im
Westen nichts Neues, Berlin: Ullstein, 1928), 41-42.
28 “Wir lernten, daß ein geputzter Knopf wichtiger ist als vier Bände Schopenhauer” (Remarque, 27).
29 “Wir wurden hart, mißtrauisch, mitleidlos, rachsüchtig, roh, - und das war gut; denn diese Eigenschaften
fehlten uns gerade. Hätte man uns ohne diese Ausbildungszeit in den Schützengraben geschickt, dann
wären wohl die meisten von uns verrückt geworden. So aber waren wir vorbereitet für das, was uns
erwartete” (Remarque, 32).
30 “Sie haben kaum eine Ausbildung, nur theoretisch haben sie etwas üben können, ehe sie ins Feld
rückten. […] Sie sind hilflos in diesem schweren Angriffsgebiet und fallen wie die Fliegen. […] Dieser
junge Ersatz weiß natürlich von alledem noch fast gar nichts. Er wird aufgerieben, weil er kaum Schrapnell
von einer Granate unterscheiden kann, die Leute werden weggemäht […]” (Remarque, 133).
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After basic training, the four of them stay together and get sent to the Western
front, were they unite with the other four men as soldiers of the same company. Daily
routine, be it tedious, pleasant, or dangerous, forges a strong bond between the men. They
come to rely on each other. The class difference that would divide them in civilian life
vanishes, as do age disparities. War strips away such vain and unnatural distinctions; it
makes them simply men. Men who know and trust each other perfectly. Men who fight,
sleep, and eat together, or preferably gorge themselves; men who play cards together
while defecating – in short: men in men’s paradise, if it weren’t for the ugly reality of
losing friend after friend in meaningless combat. Remarque’s depiction of the war
includes both these aspects: it is both an idyllic state of freedom, excess, and fulfillment
of basic (male) needs, blossoming in the blissful experience of camaraderie, as well as a
horrifying, mindless, and random annihilation of life. Camaraderie, a sense of trust and
belonging, is the stuff that got the soldiers through this. Remarque (Bäumer) concludes:
“Das Wichtigste aber war, daß in uns ein festes praktisches Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl
erwachte, das sich im Felde dann zum Besten steigerte, was der Krieg hervorbrachte: zur
Kameradschaft!” (Remarque, 32).
One crucial difference remains nonetheless. Even though the eight men in this
group of comrades are all buddies who accept each other regardless of social background,
Bäumer has one reason to worry more about himself and the other schoolboys. In his
mind, the four working men, by virtue of having a profession, wife, and children, are
going to have it easier to return a “normal” civilian life once the war is over.31 Müller,
31 “Kat und Detering und Haie werden wieder in ihren Beruf gehen, weil sie ihn schon vorher gehabt
haben. Himmelstoß auch. Wir haben keinen gehabt” (Remarque, 89-90).
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Kropp, Leer, and himself, on the other hand, were plucked straight out of school and do
not have a “normal” life to return to. Their lives were too young, too unfinished, not to be
tarnished, or extinguished, by the war experience. Now they all share a feeling of
foreboding emptiness, meaninglessness, and nihilism: “[…] Beruf, Studium und Gehalt
und so weiter – das kotzt mich an […] ist widerlich. Ich finde nichts – ich finde nichts,
Albert” (Remarque 90). The school friends represent the lost generation whose lives were
deprived of purpose and direction, “even if they escaped the grenades” (Remarque, 1).
According to Hans Harald Müller, the author counted himself among these victims of the
war: intact on the outside, but broken and confused within. The schoolboys in the story
discuss this issue repeatedly.32
Thankfully, there is one person on this earth who looms larger than life. He does
not worry very much, always knows what to do next, and never loses his cool. He is
monosyllabic, indestructible and somehow comforting.33 Frightened schoolboys look up
to him, and fall in love him, when he fries a stolen goose in the middle of the night.34
Such a benign giant is Stanislaus Katczinsky – Paul Bäumer’s idol and father figure. His
saccharine adoration for “Kat” is occasionally hard to bear for the reader, but not
32 Remarque articulates these thoughts with Schillerian pathos: “Albert spricht es aus: ‘Der Krieg hat uns
für alles verdorben.’ Er hat recht. Wir sind keine Jugend mehr. Wir wollen die Welt nicht mehr stürmen.
Wir sind Flüchtende. Wir flüchten vor uns. Vor unserem Leben. Wir waren achtzehn Jahre und begannen
die Welt und das Dasein zu lieben; wir mußten darauf schießen. Die erste Granate, die einschlug, traf in
unser Herz. Wir sind abgeschlossen vom Tätigen, vom Streben, vom Fortschritt. Wir glauben nicht mehr
daran, wir glauben an den Krieg” (91). Compare also 124-126.
33 “Kat horcht hinaus: ‘Diese Nacht gibt es Kattun’” (57). “’Schlamassel,’ sagt Kat” (62). “Kat klopft seine
Pfeife aus. ‘Es gibt Zunder’” (64).
34 “Wir reden nicht viel, aber wir sind voll zarterer Rücksicht miteinander, als ich mir denke, daß Liebende
es sein können. Wir sind zwei Menschen, zwei winzige Funken Leben, draußen ist die Nacht und der Kreis
des Todes” (98).
“Ich sehe im Halbschlaf Kat den Löffel heben und senken, ich liebe ihn, seine Schultern, seine eckige,
gebeugte Gestalt – und zu gleicher Zeit sehe ich hinter ihm Wälder und Sterne, und eine gute Stimme sagt
Worte, die mir Ruhe geben, mir einem Soldaten […]” (99).
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inappropriate in the context of young soldiers looking for a leader amidst the chaos.35 Kat
can see things clearly, and express them unpretentiously.36 If there were only people like
him, the war would have never happened, or it would have been over the next day. Kat is
a hero who epitomizes all the qualities Bäumer (hence Remarque -- or at least his
audience, as he judges it) finds desirable in a man, including courage, compassion,
modesty, calmness, loyalty, dexterity, resourcefulness, and non-academic shrewdness
(die deutschen Tugenden). He is also a working-class philosopher with a keen sense of
justice.37
It is clear what Remarque intended with this novel: it was meant to appeal to
simple folk, people like you and me. The simple people is the formula uniting the
schoolboys and the working men in this company. It is their common denominator, their
shared social fabric. It is also the formula that most readers of popular fiction would use
to describe themselves. Wir einfachen Leute creates a united front against die da oben,
the evil, often, gebildete, ones with authority up there, like the stupid officers and the
vain, effete Emperor himself.38 The whole narrative is strewn with evidence to support
35 Or, for that matter, a nation looking for someone to relate to and identify with in the middle of the
ongoing chaos.
36 Kat can predict consequences of misdemeanors: “’Drei Tage Arrest,’ vermutet Kat” (94). He can predict
attacks to come: “’Es wird wie an der Somme, da hatten wir nachher sieben Tage und Nächte
Trommelfeuer’” (107). He can diagnose injuries from afar: “Kat meint, er hätte entweder eine
Beckenzertrümmerung oder einen Wirbelsäulenschuß” (127).
37 The first time he is mentioned, one already gets the idea that this man is extraordinary, larger than life:
“und endlich Stanislaus Katczinsky, das Haupt unserer Gruppe, zäh, schlau, gerissen, vierzig Jahre alt, mit
einem Gesicht aus Erde, mit blauen Augen, hängenden Schultern und einer wunderbaren Witterung für
dicke Luft, gutes Essen und schöne Druckposten” (9). Katczinsky’s crudely existentialist philosophy is as
basic as his needs: “’Und wenn du einem Menschen ein Stückchen Macht gibst, dann geht es ihm ebenso;
er schnappt danach [wie ein Hund]. Das kommt ganz von selber, denn der Mensch ist an und für sich
zunächst einmal ein Biest […]’” (48).
38 At one point toward the end of the novel, Kaiser Wilhelm himself visits the troops to decorate certain
soldiers with Iron Crosses. Bäumer is disappointed because he had imagined a more manly man: “Wir
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this interpretation: If the world had more men like Katczinsky, a shoemaker - or whatever
he is, it doesn’t matter – if there were more Katczinskys in the world, this terrible war
would not have happened.
Katczinsky is the hero of the simple folk, die einfachen Leute, and as such, he
commands admiration. He is the same age as Kantorek, the schoolmaster who carelessly
urged these boys to sign up for the war. He is the same age as Himmelstoß, the mail man
turned corporal, who tormented these boys with his vile lust for power, but turns out to be
a pitiful coward.39 Because of his age, Katczinsky is a representative of the older
generation, but not the condemnable part of the older generation.40 Kat is a saint with a
trade and a nuclear family he wants to return to.41 Kat is the powerful German warrior
slain in this evil war. In the “tomb of the unknown soldier,” he is the soldier. Collective
imagination, or national consciousness, imbues “the unknown soldier” with a set of
characteristics that he should have, even if the war was lost. The idea of an “unknown
soldier” fulfils precisely that function: it is a free-for-all projection screen in the service
of national mourning and reconciliation. Remarque gave the unknown soldier a name, a
stehen stramm und der Kaiser erscheint. Wir sind neugierig, wie er aussehen mag. Er schreitet die Front
entlang, und ich bin eigentlich etwas enttäuscht: nach den Bildern hatte ich ihn mir größer und mächtiger
vorgestellt, vor allen Dingen mit einer donnernden Stimme” (201).
39 During one attack, Himmelstoß, who has recently been sent to the front, pretends to be wounded and
tries to hide in a shrapnel crater. Bäumer realizes this, and reacts with vitriolic rage: “Ich fasse ihn am Arm
und will ihn hochreißen. Er quäkt auf. Da gehen meine Nerven durch. Ich habe ihn am Hals und schüttele
ihn wie einen Sack, daß der Kopf hin und her fliegt, und schreie ihm ins Gesicht: ‘Du Lump, willst du raus
- du Hund, du Schinder, du willst dich drücken?’ Er verglast, ich schleudere seinen Kopf gegen die Wand –
‘Du Vieh’ – ich trete ihm in die Rippen -, ‘Du Schwein’ – ich stoße ihn vorwärts, mit dem Kopf voran
hinaus” (135).
40 Remarque carefully distinguishes between “good father figures” and “father figures gone bad.”
41 “Besaufen könnte man sich ja, sonst aber auf die nächste Eisenbahn – und ab nach Muttern. Mensch,
Frieden, Albert,” (80-81).
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face, and a definite set of qualities. The characteristics he chose for the unknown soldier
were universally acceptable (even outside of Germany); hence the success of this book.
This is Remarque’s own version of the Dolchstoßlegende für die einfachen Leute:
Katczinsky does not literally get stabbed in the back by some rogue enemy, but his skull
gets pierced by a tiny piece of shrapnel that does not even cause a visible wound:
Kat hat, ohne daß ich es bemerkt habe, unterwegs einen Splitter in den Kopf
bekommen. Nur ein kleines Loch ist da, es muß ein ganz geringer, verirrter
Splitter gewesen sein. Aber es hat ausgereicht. Kat ist tot. (Remarque, 284)
What Remarque accomplishes symbolically is to expose the Dolchstoß as an invention.
The way he debunked it was ingenious, yet simple: He created two good German friends,
two common soldiers, Bäumer and Katczinsky, who nine out of ten male readers could
easily relate to and gladly identify with. These two soldiers form part of a larger group, a
company of einfache Leute (like us), who are forced to fight in this war despite their own
better judgement. Thus, the new Dolchstoß suggests: It was us, simple folk like us, who
were stabbed in the back, and it was almost unnoticeable (like Kat’s wound). The
officers and the Emperor, die da oben, the authorities with a lust for power, bear
responsibility for this.
Im Westen nichts Neues facilitates identification with the common soldier. Since
common soldiers are the heroes, it is almost impossible to find fault with them; on the
contrary, the reader feels total compassion for their agony, or for their bereft mothers’
agony over having lost a son. The book makes it explicit that these young men should not
be in the war, and would prefer not to have been sent to war in the first place. They fulfill
their duty with courage and discipline, but invisible figures of authority direct their
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movements to the front line and back. The German reader, of course, is fully aware that
all of this absurd combat will ultimately result in catastrophic defeat. One feels
compassion for these likable soldiers. They are obvious victims, cannon fodder, lambs for
the slaughter. Any reader who sides with them, anyone who regards himself to be in the
caste of einfache Leute, becomes virtually a victim by proxy. Remarque redeemed the
German nation with Im Westen nichts Neues because he exculpated the common soldier,
be it schoolboy or working man. Kat never did anything wrong; he never wanted to go to
war. His head was pierced by a small piece of shrapnel. But if it had been up to him, he
would not have been anywhere near detonating shrapnel in the first place.
Because it gave voice to such individuals’ moments, Im Westen nichts Neues
proved to be a therapeutic book. Remarque himself explained in interviews that writing it
was a way to deal with his depression, or maybe, to generalize the term a little bit, with
his low self-esteem. In 1928, that kind of war-inspired low self-esteem was widespread
among the German population because the political system started to show signs of
disintegration, leaving the widespread impression that the war had been fought for
nothing, as the common man saw it. The war experience had not been mastered or dealt
with on the national level; in fact, it had not been dealt with at all since about 1923. The
nation longed for a self-esteem booster. Remarque provided it with his elaborate praise of
der einfache Soldat and die einfachen Leute. Katczinsky states in one of his longer
monologues:
Aber es darf keine Schikane werden. Und mach du das mal einem Schlosser oder
Knecht oder Arbeiter klar, erkläre das mal einem Muskoten, und das sind doch
die meisten hier; der sieht nur, daß er geschunden wird und ins Feld kommt, und
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er weiß ganz genau, was notwendig ist und was nicht. Ich sage euch, daß der
einfache Soldat hier vorn so aushält, das ist allerhand! Allerhand ist das! (49)
Katczinsky, in his primitive manner, provides simple explanations for the question that
had been vexing the German nation since the end of the war.
3.6 THE AUTHOR’S INTENTIONS IN THE HORIZON OF EXPECTATIONS
If the common man and his war experience was the key topic that Im Westen
nichts Neues worked through, there still remains the question about what the author
intended to do, if anything beyond simply selling a book.
Hans Harald Müller argues in his comprehensive analysis of Weimar war novels,
Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller (1986), that Erich Maria Remarque wrote Im Westen
nichts Neues for non-political, personal reasons. He portrays Remarque as a largely
unsuccessful literary amateur who suffered from frustration and depression because his
aspirations toward an artist’s life remained unfulfilled. In fact, Remarque’s petit-
bourgeois social background and the pitiful beginning of his literary career represent a
blatant contradiction to his documented biographical goal, his fanciful vision of
becoming a bohemian homme-des-lettres. Based on information concerning Remarque’s
personal life, Müller asserts that Im Westen nichts Neues was a therapeutic book for this
author-as-failure that, evidently, also worked therapeutically for millions of readers. He
validates his biographical approach to Remarque’s masterpiece by the fact that Paul
Bäumer, the hero of the novel, bears striking similarities to the author himself.
In the following discussion of Im Westen nichts Neues, I will draw on much of
Müller’s evidence because he researched the circumstances of the book’s creation and
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reception meticulously. However, I will also develop a more complex argument: that,
while Müller’s insights are perfectly valid, he does not account for the book’s mass
appeal. There is no a priori reason that Remarque's person should have been the model it
turned into for thousands of Germans. Most particularly, Müller's analysis can be relied
on as careful but positivistic, but he does not accommodate the readers' political and
social horizons of expectation, as I have begun to do, and so it does not see Remarque's
innovation: the new version of the stab in the back, the Dolchstoß für die kleinen Leute,
that Remarque so ingeniously created -- and I will argue, consciously, at least to a degree.
Müller draws upon several interviews that Remarque gave, in German and in
French, while everyone talked about the groundbreaking effect of the novel in 1929 and
1930. Remarkably, Remarque stated more than once that his book was purely personal,
subjective, and in no way political. For instance, he said to the interviewer from the
French magazine Revue d’Allemagne: “I have never pretended to speak for everyone. My
book is subjective.”42 In another interview with the magazine Les Nouvelles Littéraires,
Remarque did not want to be addressed as a “writer” and even denied having a “literary
vocation.” He made it seem as if the mass appeal of Im Westen nichts Neues was
accidental, a by-product of his written efforts of coming to terms with a highly personal
problem:
I am straining to repeat to you: I cannot begin to believe that I have a literary
vocation. If I have written a book, it was pushed by the one concern of discussing
with myself a problem that touches me personally. […] I do not worry over
42 Quoted in Müller, Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller, 40. “Je n’ai jamais prétendu parler au nom de tous.
Mon libre est subjectif” (my own translation).
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knowing if the book I am writing is interesting or not, the only thing I ask of it is
that it deliver a personal solution.43
What makes these responses noteworthy is the fact that they contradict other evidence
about Remarque’s intentions with the writing of this novel.
As Müller and others have researched, the artist as a young man wanted nothing
more than to become a writer. According to one anecdote about his many affected
behaviors, he had business cards printed, shortly after the war, which read “Erich Remark
– Schriftsteller,” even though there had not been any literary production worth
mentioning.44 And if it is true that Remarque did not want to “speak for everyone” but
only to resolve his personal issues, it is puzzling that the prologue to the novel promises
the story of “a generation destroyed by the war, even if it escaped its grenades.”45 On the
one hand, the author professes that the novel is apolitical and only about himself. On the
other hand, the book claims to be over “a[n] [entire] generation destroyed by the war.”
Such ambiguities or contradictions are symptomatic of this book and its author, and they
have contributed to the undervaluing of the strategic success of the book.
In dealing with his own publicity, it seems clear that Remarque had a tendency to
prevaricate, or at least to "manage" his publicity actively. In a German interview with
Literarische Welt on June 14, 1929, for instance, he was asked by the interviewer, Axel
43 Quoted in Müller, 40. “Je me tue à vous le répéter: je ne peux pas arriver à croire que j’ai une vocation
littéraire. Si j’ai écrit un livre, c’est poussé par le seul souci de discuter avec moi-même un problème qui
me touche personellement. […] Je ne me inquiète pas de savoir si le livre que j’écris est intéressant ou non,
je lui demande simplement de m’apporter une solution personelle.”
44 Müller, 46.
45 Erich Maria Remarque, Im Westen nichts Neues (Berlin: Ullstein, 1928). “Dieses Buch soll weder eine
Anklage noch ein Bekenntnis sein. Es soll nur den Versuch machen, über eine Generation zu berichten, die
vom Kriege zerstört wurde, auch wenn sie seinen Granaten entkam.”
219
Eggebrecht, if the author of a war novel would not necessarily have to reckon with its
political impact. Remarque said that was true, but only if the book claimed
comprehensive coverage of the war experience. Im Westen nichts Neues, he explained,
was by no means “complete.” It was “incomplete” because it only talked about a small
group of Schülersoldaten who were infantry soldiers in only one location during a very
brief and uneventful period of the war on the Western front. The events of the war,
according to Remarque, just serve as a backdrop to the personal experience these young
soldiers go through:
Der Krieg ist als Tatsache vorausgesetzt. Die wenigen Reflexionen, die in dem
Buch stehen, beschäftigen sich nur mit diesem rein menschlichen Erleben des
Krieges. Sie vermeiden jede politische, soziale, religiöse oder sonstige
Stellungnahme. Dazu halte ich mich ebensowenig für berufen, wie dazu, eine
Geschichte des Krieges zu schreiben. (quoted in Müller, 41)
No war, however, can be such a pure "fact" without an opinion (Stellungnahme),
Nonetheless, Remarque did not cast himself as a historian or a chronicler of the
war, only as a human observer. He laid no claims on the historical accuracy of the events
he described. As such, he positioned himself in opposition to the first generation of war
writings, which were officers’ first-hand accounts of what they had seen, usually in the
form of memoirs or diaries that purported to report the true facts of the war. References
to specific dates, places, people, strategies, or military units, which had helped
authenticate the officers’ accounts, were insignificant to Remarque. His omission of time
and place markers has two major effects, as noted: (1) the story becomes universal (this
could have happened to any infantry soldier on the Western front); (2) the story becomes
naïve and vague (it does not seem to matter which General decided what). On the more
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practical level, this also means he has invalidated any of his readers' attempts to contest
his facts -- he is not portraying "his war," but rather "his experience," a gesture which
makes his narrative essentially fact-proof.
Hence, Remarque claims to have been an author with no political opinion about
World War I. At least publicly, he upheld that position, when he professed that he did not
see himself as entitled to comment on such a vast and complex event. In a letter to the
British General Sir Ian Hamilton, he said: “I have not felt myself called upon to argue
about the war. That must be reserved for the leaders, who alone know all that is necessary
to know.”46 One is tempted to think that Remarque only pretended to be an apolitical
individual. Maybe he only acted aloof and detached from the highly political controversy
surrounding the success of his book so that he would not have to take sides. But, as
Müller observes, there is reason to believe that Remarque really did not have much of a
political mind. Around the same time that he was finishing Im Westen nichts Neues, in
June of 1928, he wrote reviews about five different war books. And despite the fact that
these five volumes were written by authors with grossly different political opinions, such
as Jünger, Schauwecker, and von der Vring, political terms did not enter Remarque’s
vocabulary. He really liked Jünger. “Jüngers Kriegsbücher In Stahlgewittern und Das
Wäldchen 125 bezeichnete Remarque in dieser Rezension als ‘von einer wohltuenden
Sachlichkeit, präzise, ernst, stark und gewaltig’” (Müller 41).
Even as late as September, 1930, Remarque afforded himself the luxury of living
without a political opinion. When a French interviewer asked him about the political
46 Quoted in Müller, 41.
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significance of Adolf Hitler, whose NSDAP had been the strongest party in that year’s
election, he replied:
I have no opinion on Hitler at all. I know nothing about him. I never occupy
myself with political questions. As a matter of honesty. Because I think that
politics is such a vast domain, and so complicated, that one would have to be a
politician to venture there. (quoted in Müller, 42)47
In these cases, he did not identify himself as a liberal or a pacifist. He merely stated that
he hated war and what it did to the soldiers having to fight it. When the Berlin newspaper
Tempo asked him in 1929 how he would react to a future war, he said:
Der Krieg erschien mir als die vollkommenste Negation des Lebens, gegen die ich
reagieren mußte. Und doch bin ich kein politischer Idealist. Wenn heute
feindliche Truppen in Westfalen einbrechen, so bin ich morgen wieder Soldat. Ein
friedlicher Mensch bin ich… kein Pazifist. (quoted in Müller, 42)
There is thus ample evidence that Remarque had indeed no interest in the war as politics.
He showed no desire to discuss or describe war in political terms.
The question is, then, what was it that compelled him to write a novel about
World War I? In the June, 1929, interview with Literarische Welt, he explained the
necessity of writing about the war as a personal experience:
An Hunderttausenden ist natürlich das Erlebnis Krieg abgelaufen wie eine
Dusche. Andere sind wenigstens ohne Bruch durchgekommen. Manche haben
sich ja auch so sehr daran gewöhnt, daß sie nachher ohne den Krieg nicht mehr
auskamen. Aber wichtig sind ja alle die anderen, die zahllosen Zerrissenen,
Getroffenen, Erlebnisfähigen, die dem Erlebnis Ausgelieferten. Die haben jetzt
erst angefangen, sich wiederzufinden. Ein Beweis dafür, daß – abgesehen von der
ersten Zeit revolutionärer Erhebung nach dem Kriege – fast zehn Jahre niemand
etwas davon hören wollte. Es war nicht möglich, nicht erwünscht, nicht dringend,
über den Krieg zu schreiben. Nur als ein Moment politischer Diskussion wurde er
47 “Je n’ai aucune opinion sur Hitler. Je ne sais rien de lui. Je ne m’occupe jamais des questions politiques.
Par honnêté. Parce que je pense que la politique est un domaine si vaste, si compliqué, qu’il faut être
politicien pour s’y aventurer” (my translation).
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verdammt, verteidigt oder verherrlicht. Mit dem persönlichen Erlebnis des
Krieges aber war besonders der junge Mensch unserer Generation noch längst
nicht fertig. Es wirkte in ihm dumpf fort, es blieb ein undeutlicher Albdruck, ein
Zustand der Unruhe, der Skepsis, der Härte oder schwankenden Ziellosigkeit.
(quoted in Müller, 43).
Nevertheless, he said in the same interview: “Ich hatte früher nie daran gedacht, einmal
über den Krieg zu schreiben.” And in another French interview, he announced: “I had
never had the intention of writing a book on war. Even on the day before I began, I did
not dream of it.”48 It is peculiar how the thought of using war as a literary subject had
never crossed his mind, but at the same time, he gives such compelling and philanthropic
reasons why a book on war ought to be written to help heal the wounds of the many
surviving victims. It is hard to believe that the same person who had never imagined
writing a war novel and who is not even that interested in politics would suddenly come
up with the literary idea and the considerable amount of social consciousness behind it.
The answer to this riddle may well be Remarque’s personal situation, or, more
specifically, his recurring depressions. He explains:
Ich war damals, im Frühjahr vorigen Jahres mit ganz anderen Arbeiten
beschäftigt. Ich war angestellt als Bilderredakteur einer Zeitschrift. Abends mühte
ich mich mit mancherlei Dingen. Zum Beispiel machte ich verschiedene Anläufe,
ein Stück zu schreiben, kam aber damit nie sehr weit. Ich litt unter ziemlich
heftigen Anfällen von Verzweiflung. Bei dem Versuch, sie zu überwinden, suchte
ich allmählich ganz bewußt und systematisch nach der Ursache meiner
Depressionen. Durch diese absichtliche Analyse kam ich auf mein Kriegserlebnis
zurück. Ich konnte ganz ähnliches bei vielen Bekannten und Freunden
beobachten. Wir alle waren – und sind oft noch – unruhig, ziellos, bald exaltiert,
bald gleichgültig, im tiefsten Grunde aber unfroh. Der Schatten des Krieges hing
auch und gerade über uns, wenn wir gar nicht daran dachten.
48 Quoted in Müller, 42. “Je n’ai jamais eu l’intention d’écrire un livre sur la guerre. La veille même du
jour où j’ai commencé, je n’y songeait pas” (my translation).
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Am selben Tage, an dem ich diesen Gedanken hatte, begann ich zu schreiben,
ohne lange Überlegung. Das ging sechs Wochen lang, jeden Abend, wenn ich aus
dem Büro kam. Dann war das Buch fertig. (quoted in Müller, 43)
Here a useful distinction might be drawn: he was not speaking about the war or for or
against its politics, but rather from the position that, practically speaking, was central to
the war -- he spoke of the war from the position of thousands of other soldiers, as
recovered memory, cast as if recovered from the moment in which it happened. He had
managed to recreate not what the war was, but how it felt, from in the middle of it.
Remarque was at the same time careful not to individualize himself or to cast any
one moment in that war experience as the war experience. Instead, he consciously
transposed his narrative back into the framework of an imminent reaction, not a
retrospective analysis. In a French interview, for example, Remarque attributed his
depression not to the war experience itself, but to a particular feeling of loss and solitude
that set in after the war.49 He said that even the war had moments of beauty, love, and
exaltation -- the war had not caused his depression, the peace had. Thus he was forced
out of his present and back to that conflicted space of experience As he knew the war,
many young men were drafted directly out of school, went through basic training
together, fought in the trenches, or even saw each other die. Warfare forms strong bonds
49 “[…] on réfléchit […] on se demande comment il peut se faire que la santé étant bonne, la matérielle
assurée, comment, tout allant bien, on n’est pas heureux cependant. On a l’impression d’être privé, séparé,
amputé d’un mystérieux je ne sais quoi. Pourquoi suis-je seul? Seul! Je me demande depuis combien de
temps je suis dans cet état. Je remonte lentement dans mes souvenirs, et je remonte jusqu’à la guerre et je
constate que pendant la guerre, je n’étais pas seul, j’avais des camarades” (quoted in Müller, 44).
“[…] you think […] you ask yourself how it can be that, being in good health, material life secure,
everything going well, you are not happy anyway. You get the impression that you are deprived, separated,
amputated from a mysterious I-don’t-know what. Why am I lonely? Lonely! I ask myself how long I have
been in this state. I climb slowly back into my memories, and I go right back to the war and I realize that,
during the war, I was not lonely, I had comrades (my translation).
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between men, and many of the survivors still had fond memories of war-time
camaraderie when the war was over.
Remarque cast himself as no exception, as no different than many others who
experienced it. It is possible that the biographical truth tells the whole story: he became
depressed over the loss of friends. But is it really true? Is it true that he missed the old
companionship so much that he fictionalized it to help him overcome his sadness? Such
a statement sounds too calculated without further conditions. In fact, Müller claims that
his depression actually revolved around his lack of success as a writer. Be that as it may,
one can assert that his personal experience of the war was ambivalent, and that it emerged
to him as a place from which he could speak with an audible voice and about a topic of
wide interest. It encompassed atrocities and pain as well as moments of beauty,
friendship, and joy. At the same time, his chosen voice was not without its own dangers
for an author. One of the many verbal assaults Remarque was exposed to after Im Westen
nichts Neues had become a success for the left and a provocation to the right addressed
the issue of camaraderie and whether or not the author had even been in the trenches.
In fact, almost every aspect of the author’s life became contested during the
heated debate following the publication of the novel and the controversial screening of
the American film version -- the critics would not let stand his self-imposed restriction to
the experience of the war rather than its facts. Probably because of the vehemence of the
right-wing slander against Remarque, a number of misconceptions remain to this day,
making it difficult to split out the marketer, the artist, and the person of Remarque. No
wonder, then that, with respect to the question of whether or not Remarque was a
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political figure, or what really motivated him to write a book about war, even today’s
scholars and biographers do not agree. Some see him as a braggart and a dandy who
shirked being sent back to the front after his injuries had healed. Others see him as a
devoted pacifist who spoke out loud and clear against the injustice of authoritarian rule,
the terror and destruction of war, and the threat of chauvinism. Data might support either
interpretation.
Thomas Schneider, a member of the Remarque archive in Osnabrück, Germany,
portrays the writer’s alleged lack of political consciousness as part of a promotional
strategy his publisher (Ullstein, Berlin) forced him to abide by. In a recent compilation of
letters and interviews of Remarque recorded between 1929 and 1962, entitled Ein
militanter Pazifist (1993), Schneider explains that it was Ullstein, not Remarque, who
aimed for maximum success by restricting the book as far as possible to its experiential
content. As part of their strategy, his editors made him rewrite the original manuscript in
the sense that he had to delete the passages expressing clear condemnations of the war.
The idea behind that was to make the narrative not as openly pacifistic, and to veil the
author’s true colors behind a smoke screen of ambiguity. According to Schneider,
Ullstein tried to market Im Westen nichts Neues as a semi-confessional report of an
apolitical common soldier:
[…] als Erlebnisbericht eines unpolitischen, einfachen Muschkoten zu verkaufen,
der den bislang marktbeherrschenden Offiziersmemoiren eine neue Perspektive
hinzufügen und für Kriegsgegner wie –befürworter akzeptabel sein sollte.
Entsprechend stimmte der Konzern in der Werbung auch die Informationen über
den Autor und seine Intention auf dieses Konzept ab. […] In den Selbstaussagen
und Interviews hielt sich Remarque zunächst an diese Vorgaben. (Schneider, ed.,
11-12)
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Clearly, though, Schneider seeks to exculpate the author from any charges of his being an
opportunist, while other critics, like Carl von Ossietzky, expressed disappointment about
the fact that Remarque did not take a clearer stance. Ossietzky said “Es war
verhängnisvoll, daß er vor den Kämpfen kniff, die eine ebenso unausweichliche
Konsequenz seines Erfolges waren” (qtd. in Schneider, 13).
The details of the original reception do support the idea that Remarque may have
been considerably more political than he (or Ullstein) allowed himself to be. Most
notably, he published a short statement, entitled “Haben meine Bücher Tendenz?” (1931-
32). In this commentary, he proclaims himself as a true patriot and discusses the
pointlessness of modern warfare in general. He seeks to explain the differences between
genuine and misunderstood heroism, as well as between healthy patriotism and
overblown chauvinism. He states that, in times of upheaval, it takes more courage to be a
declared pacifist than to be one of the armed fighters:
Aus solchen Überlegungen heraus erklärt sich, daß die äußersten Radikalen sich
gegen mich wandten, während die gemäßigten Elemente, sogar im konservativen
Lager, die Wahrheitstreue anerkennen, mit der ich die Schrecklichkeiten des
Krieges schilderte. Niemand kann leugnen, daß ich, was groß und edel in meinem
Lande ist, liebe und daß ich aus tiefstem Herzen wünsche, daß Deutschland sich
erholt von seinem augenblicklichen Elend. (Schneider ed. 64)
That statement, however, again subsumes the war's politics to its experiential content.
Ultimately, it does not become completely clear what Remarque’s intentions and
political opinions were, or which role his publisher played prior to the publication of the
novel in Ullstein’s Vossische Zeitung. It is clear, however, that Remarque did not have to
invent very much that was new in writing his great book. Large sections of the novel are
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based on his own life, without needing much expansion through research -- he narrates
from an individual's point of view, very narrow but intense. He himself admits freely that
the book is based on his memories of the war: “kann ich nur wahrheitsgemäß sagen, daß
meine spontanen Erinnerungen an den großen Krieg lediglich wiedergeben, was ich sah
und erlitt” (Schneider ed., 62). Thus the hero of the story, Paul Bäumer, is clearly
fashioned after Erich Paul Remark himself, making its deviations interesting to look at in
some more detail as a more indirect indicator of his intentions.
It is worth showing the correspondences between the author's biography and his
text, not to argue for its status as an autobiography, but to show how they share a
comman script of the war experience.
3.7 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ELEMENTS IN IM WESTEN NICHTS NEUES
Erich Paul Remark was born on 22 June 1898. His parents, Peter Franz and Anna
Maria, were poor – his father was a book-binder. Remarque adopted the French spelling
of his last name in 1923 (after his great-grandfather’s), and had previously substituted
“Paul” for his mother’s middle name, “Maria.”50 Those shifts reflect a taste for a slightly
more urbane and upper-class identity and a less overtly middle-class Catholic one. He
had two sisters, Elfriede and Erna, and, due to their financial plight, the family had to
move eleven times before Erich was nineteen years old. Up to 1914, the family lived in
several places on Jahnstraße in Osnabrück, and this street left the most lingering
impressions on young Erich (which he used in Im Westen nichts Neues and Der Weg
zurück).
50 Compare Christine R. Barker and R.W. Last, Erich Maria Remarque (London: Oswald Wolff, 1979), 5.
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Since his parents were Catholic, he attended two Catholic schools in Osnabrück;
from 1904-1908 the Domschule, and from 1908-1912 the Johannischule. Remarque was
a good student, but since his family was so poor, he did not have any career
opportunities, other than becoming a teacher. So he received his teacher training at the
Catholic Präparande between 1912 and 1915. The headmaster of the Präparande
(Rektor Korthaus) was nicknamed “Schlächter” (butcher), and Remarque reportedly had
many an argument with him.51 Another teacher named “Konschorek” would become
“Kantorek” in Remarque’s novel (the similarity is restricted to the name). Young
Remarque had the nickname “Schmieren” (smudge), a name he still used later on to sign
the letters he wrote from his hospital bed in Duisburg, where he spent time from 1917-
1918, recovering from shrapnel wounds.52 Until 21 November 1916, when he was
drafted, Remarque attended the Lehrerseminar, an institution for the training of
elementary school teachers.
All indicators concur that, like so many German authors from the middle classes
who embraced the concept of Bildung as a way to class improvement, Remarque always
wanted to be someone else, something better. His petit-bourgeois upbringing and his
career as a Volksschullehrer were not enough to satisfy his ambition. He always dreamed
about what it would be like to be a famous writer and to belong to a bohemian circle of
friends. As a child, “he collected butterflies, stones and stamps, and was interested in
painting and music. He was particularly gifted as a musician, and played both piano and




make a little money on the side with piano lessons. The money was spent on his
beginning obsession with outward appearance, especially extravagant clothes.
Around the same time, Remarque joined the Jugendstil art circle that Fritz
Hörstemeier (1882-1918) had founded in Osnabrück. Hörstemeier had rented some
rooms in Liebigstrasse that the members of the aesthetic circle affectionately dubbed the
“Traumbude” (dream den). The circle had about six members. “They were all idealists in
the Jugendstil (art nouveau) vein, seeking to transform drab reality into an idealized
world of beauty” (Barker and Last, 7). Later on, possibly during his stay at the Duisburg
hospital, Remarque would write a novel, entitled Die Traumbude – Ein Künstlerroman
(1920), and dedicate it to “Onkel Fritz.” Later Remarque, as well as his critics,
considered this book “really terrible.” One Remarque biographer, Armin Kerker,
describes the Hörstemeier circle as:
Zwischen vulgarisierter Natur- und Lebensphilosophie, verinnerlichter
Gottesmystik, überzeugtem Vegetariertum und flachem Nietzsche-Kult bewegte
sich ihr geistiges und künstlerisches Streben nach der ‘Schönheit’ – vornehmlich
nach der ‘adeligen deutschen Seele’ – in Kunst, Musik und Dichtung. (qtd. in
Müller 45)
Such were the circumstances of Remarque’s life before he became a soldier, and the self-
image of an author-to-be who was very concerned with public image. On 21 November,
1916, he was drafted for military service. So he did become a soldier, but he probably
only saw minimal action on the front line. After basic training in the Caprivi barracks on
the Westerberg (the Klosterberg of Im Westen nichts Neues) under Corporal Schwarze,
he was sent to the Reserve Battalion IR.78 to receive further training (compare Barker
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and Last 8). “But, as his mother was seriously ill, he obtained frequent compassionate
leave to return to Osnabrück” (ibid.).
In June of 1917, his unit was moved to the Western Front and “assigned to the
Second Company of the Field Recruiting Depot of the Guards Reserve Division, which
was located in Ham-Lenglet, behind the Arras front” (ibid.). Several of his friends and
acquaintances from Osnabrück were with him during this time, including
Georg Middendorf (Kropp in Im Westen nichts Neues), Wilhelm Katschinsky
(Kat), Seppel Oelfke (Haie Westhus), Detering, and Theo Troske. Troske was
badly wounded by grenade splinters in July 1917 and Remarque carried him back
behind the line of fire; but Troske later died in hospital of head wounds which at
first passed unnoticed, and was buried in Osnabrück on 24 August. (Barker and
Last 8)
Remarque himself was described by his best friend Middendorf as “a reasonably
competent soldier, always calm and self-possessed and valued by comrades, whom he
frequently entertained with playing the piano or by performing hypnotic tricks” (ibid.).
He was wounded during the Battle of Flanders, which began on 31 July 1917, while
attempting to carry a comrade out of the line of fire during a surprise attack by the
British. He suffered grenade splinter wounds in his arms and neck, but he recovered fully
from these injuries at St. Vincenz hospital in Duisburg. Apparently, he had a pleasant stay
there and even befriended the daughter of a hospital official. The war was over before he
could be sent back to the front. Shortly after the war, his mother died.
Hence, all the main characters and major narrative components of Im Westen
nichts Neues are based on people and events in Remarque’s biography, but were not
necessarily drawn from the perspective of the very heart of the Great War's battles. It is
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not unusual for a beginning writer to draw on personal experience as the main source of
literary output. It is also not unusual for a writer to employ “artistic freedom,” and alter
actual events to fit the narrative. These alterations are indeed informative in the case of
Remarque and his main character, Paul Bäumer. They clearly reveal Remarque's sense of
what "the war experience" ought to contain.
First of all, while Remarque survived the war more or less unscathed, Bäumer’s
life mostly takes place in the trenches and is generally less pleasant. Bäumer dies,
Remarque lived, and even became an impostor after the war by illegally wearing a
lieutenant’s uniform and decorating himself with the Iron Cross First and Second Class.53
Bäumer is definitely heroic, Remarque largely undistinguished, despite the possibility
that he might have dragged a friend to safety. Perhaps even more telling, Bäumer, like
Remarque, collects his own juvenile writings in his desk drawer and loves his book
collection, a bibliophilic passion the war experience brutally severed.
However, and this is a crucial difference, the war did not sever, stunt, or paralyze
much in Remarque’s life beyond the loss of some of his youthful friends and the fact of
his service. After the war, he continued “business as usual.” He finished his teacher
training and graduated in June 1919, “attaining average grades in every subject except art
and religious knowledge, in which he fared better, and took up his first appointment in
Löhne during August of that year” (Barker and Last 10). During this time, he never
managed to get his literary career off the ground, was bored with teaching, until he quit
53 Ibid., 9.
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and became a copywriter (Continental-Werke, Hannover) and a journalist (Sport
Illustrierte, Berlin) in the mid-1920s.
In the light of these developments in Remarque’s own life, Müller interprets Im
Westen nichts Neues as the author's therapeutic effort to rationalize his lack of success as
a writer. According to Müller, World War I served Remarque as a welcomed projection
screen onto which he could conveniently deposit the roots of his failure:
Remarque löst das aktuelle Problem des Scheiterns seiner künstlerische
Ambitionen, indem er die Ursache für dieses Scheitern in die Kriegszeit
zurückprojiziert. Mit dieser Projektion wird Remarque von seinen aktuellen
Depressionen befreit, da deren Ursachen nun nicht mehr von seinem persönlichen
Versagen in der Gegenwart oder der jüngeren Vergangenheit zu suchen sind,
sondern in einer säkularen Katastrophe, die nicht nur ihn, sondern seine ganze
Generation der Möglichkeit der Selbstverwirklichung beraubt hat. (Müller 48)
To think of Im Westen nichts Neues as a retroactive and backward-looking projection is a
helpful concept. Müller convincingly shows how it helped Remarque -- personally -- to
find a likely explanation of his generation’s failures, even if this particular explanation
does not necessarily apply to him. His generation had lost its chance; his own abilities
need not be considered separately from that. By embracing that perspective, his
generation could see themselves as hapless victims, and the older generation as
perpetrators. Remarque adjusts his self-fictionalization with constructions of masculinity
that would appeal to both right and left. This novel embodies most of the political and
personal clichés the the era's horizon of expectation provides him, even as he avoids the
difficulties of partisan politics.
His was not the only novel of his era to take on these stereotypes, but it was the
most successful. No wonder, then, that his sales figures far outreached those of his leftist
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contemporaries, to which I now turn. They were attempting to solve the problems of
national and personal identity to which Remarque also responded, but the comparison




Contextualizing the Narrative of Experience
4.1 OVERVIEW
In order to see how Remarque's novel spoke to its most probable readership, this
chapter examines eight battlefield novels that appeared around the same time as
Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues and illustrate the wide spectrum of different literary
approaches to the heretofore unassimilated block of World War.1
Familiarly, Remarque was hailed as the pioneer of German battlefield fiction by
the Vossische Zeitung in November 1928, which is when it began printing the newspaper
version of his soon-to-be famous novel. While it is true that Remarque’s book crushed
everyone else’s in terms of volumes sold, it is not true that he was the first to ever
fictionalize the war experience, or that it was he who single-handedly put an end to the
1 Despite the considerable variety of critical “takes” on the war, one should keep in mind that anti-war
fiction, with the exception of Im Westen nichts Neues, did not sell well between 1928 and 1933. Only
Ludwig Renn’s Krieg (1927/28) reached a volume of 155,000; most of the other novels discussed in this
chapter sold much less than 100,000 copies (see Appendix I). Müller claims that Ernst Glaeser’s Jahrgang
1902 (1927/28) also reached a sales volume of 125,000 by 1933, as well as translations into twenty-four
languages, but there is no conclusive evidence for or against it (see Müller 97).
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previously dominant genre of war memoirs. Four other leftist-bourgeois novelists had
actually accomplished that before him, even if they did not hit as big an artery of
publicity as he did.
Three of the precursors to Remarque’s Frontroman had been published by the
Frankfurter Zeitung, and a fourth had been written by one of its own journalists, Ernst
Glaeser, which again illustrates how restricted the range of leftist Publizistik was at the
time.2 These novels, discussed below, were Georg von der Vring, Soldat Suhren (Private
Suhren, 1927), Arnold Zweig, Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa (The Fight About
Sergeant Grischa, 1927), and Ludwig Renn, Krieg (War, 1927). Glaeser’s novel was
entitled Jahrgang 1902 (Class of 1902, 1928).3 These novels provide a broader indication
of how the Great War was being thought of, how authors of the time were beginning to
address the lot of the common soldier in that war and to tell a story of his generation that
fit its experience as remembered a decade after its close. Their existence supports my
contention that Remarque provided a compelling script for his audiences.
The other four novels treated in this chapter appeared shortly after Im Westen
nichts Neues, which makes them interesting as parallel works existing in the shadow of
the Remarque mania that seized the German nation in 1929. Unlike their right-wing
colleagues, the other Remarquians did not write responses to Im Westen nichts Neues.
Although parallels with regard to setting and perspective exist, it would be misleading to
classify the 1929 production of anti-war fiction as reactions to Remarque. In fact, some of
2 In terms of war-fiction, only Vossische Zeitung, Frankfurter Zeitung, and Weltbühne are the three
recurring names of leftist publications that had readers from the bourgeoisie.
3 Compare Müller, Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller, 94.
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them appear to have been written well before Remarque's novel existed but did not find a
publisher until Remarque’s success proved that the German public did want to read war
fiction. These novels are Ernst Johannsen’s Vier von der Infanterie (Four From the
Infantry, 1929), Edlef Köppen’s Heeresbericht (Army Report, 1929), Alexander Moritz
Frey’s Die Pflasterkästen (published under the title The Cross Bearers, 1929), and Karl
Federn’s Hauptmann Latour (Captain Latour, 1929).
Remember that Im Westen nichts Neues claimed to be representative of an entire
generation, an assertion that set it apart from the other battlefield novels in the bourgeois
anti-war camp. None of the other authors in this group made a similar claim. They were
content with fictionalizing the war experience in such a way that two things shine
through: (1) the author’s own war experience; (2) the author’s rejection of the war
resulting from that individual experience. That is, they were adding their fictionalized
experiences to the public archive of memoirs by generals and field marshals. Not
surprisingly, in some of these works, the author’s anti-war stance is intensely personal
and vehement.
Remarque, in contrast, intended Paul Bäumer, the central figure of Im Westen
nichts Neues, to be both his literary alter ego and a representative of the whole generation
of young German men who were “destroyed by the war.” That may be why Paul Bäumer
is the only hero among these war novels who actually dies: he dies tragically and
senselessly, on one of the last days of the war, in the line of duty, as a representative of
millions of other German soldiers like him. The other authors in this group let their
protagonists survive. Their heroes tend to be individuals that stand apart from the crowd,
239
have their own opinions, even learn to disobey orders (like Reisiger in Köppen’s
Heeresbericht), while Paul Bäumer is clearly part of his peer-group, a German everyman.
Yet Bäumer is a dead everyman whose experiences never were tested against the
homefront, as the other novels’ heroes would have to do.
Not surprisingly, then, others around Remarque also did not fictionalize (or edit)
the war as completely as Remarque did. He decided to leave out space and time markers
(except seasons), even references to military units, so that the disoriented reader is drawn
into an episodic impression of the war. In this sense, Im Westen nichts Neues operates at a
level of universality that conveys the message: “this could happen to any soldier, any
time, anywhere.” The other authors, in contrast, were careful to maintain an element of
authenticity through references to verifiable events, places, or military units. Remarque
paints his picture in broad sweeping strokes; the others are more precise in their
accusations. Both Remarque and the other authors in his group depict young individuals
who were torn from their pre-war social settings and dehumanized by what they saw and
endured in the trenches. To most of these protagonists, a return to bourgeois life would
seem incredibly difficult, if not impossible -- but only Bäumer is drawn so that this
question will never be asked of him.
All these authors loosely follow the literary model of the Bildungsroman, only
that their heroes do not return home wiser, tested, and good, but broken and cynical. In
this other handling, the modern Frontroman is thus a negative variant of the classical
Bildungsroman because it, too, describes a young man’s coming-of-age in unfamiliar
surroundings and under adverse circumstances. Unlike the Bildungsroman, however, the
240
Frontroman does not lead to a dissolution of the conflict between the individual and the
social order from which he has become estranged. In the classical Bildungsroman, the
process of maturity is arduous and gradual, and becomes manifest in repeated clashes
between the protagonist's needs and desires and the views and judgments enforced by an
unbending social order. Yet in the end, the spirit and values of the social order become
instilled in the protagonist, who is then (re-)accommodated into society. This type of
novel typically ends with an assessment by the protagonist of himself and his new place
in that society. The Frontroman never offers that possibility. Remarque, as well as the
other authors, repeatedly emphasizes in Im Westen nichts Neues that there will be no
possible route of return to the sheltered pre-war world. But Remarque closes off the
question where the other novels will necessarily lead their readers to ask what will
become of the heroes once they go home.
This is the extent to which Remarque and the other bourgeois anti-war writers
share common ground. In all of them, there was a clear historical moral: the safe
bourgeois existences of their protagonists were shattered and could never be rebuilt. As
was discussed in chapter one, Remarque’s personal reaction to this was one of
hopelessness and lament, conditioned most likely by his own bourgeois aspirations to
upward mobility. According to the characters in his novel, which are more or less his
mouthpieces, he was not depressed about his own abilities, but instead felt betrayed and
victimized by the society that did not value him, and so he easily found the culprits for
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the destruction among the figures of authority in the parent generation, a very common
political charge at the time, as well.4
The other authors around Remarque -- with the exception of Ernst Glaeser -- were
less interested in assigning blame for the war to an older generation, but focused on the
terrible thing called war itself. Their Frontromane move along much the same milestones
as Remarque’s, as the plot passes the same stations, yet they manage to take different
turns. Their characters are imbued with the same virtues as Remarque's hero, but, in
terms of their attitude and mentality, they really seem to harden and grow, so they do not
come across as lambs headed for the slaughter. Paul Bäumer often emphasizes how much
he and his friends have changed, but he keeps speaking with the same juvenile voice. He
is a pretender. In contrast, to today's readers, the soldiers in the other bourgeois war
novels seem real, and so their authors require that they take a real stand.
The result of this disparity reveals something about Weimar readers, since none of
the alternative Frontromane reached the broad readership that Remarque's book would;
they were probably seen as politicized rather than personal, and hence partisan in
inspiration. I have used the term “literary fast food” to apply to Remarque’s book because
it is soft, shapeless, innocuous, and designed to appeal to everyone, yet the publishing
landscape I am addressing here suggests that other writers knew that. The other novels
from the leftist-bourgeois camp have more character; each provides alternates to the set
4 Since the generational conflict in All Quiet on the Western Front is so salient, it is also a Jugendroman
(adolescent novel). This certainly added to its mass appeal, not only to war veterans, but also to readers
who were teenage boys in 1929.
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pieces of war experience and narrative that Remarque would use -- and each came closer
to a historical truth about the war rather than simply a human one.
Let me now turn to each in turn, to present this landscape of authors around
Remarque in closer to their own voices.
4.2 PRECURSORS, (A): GEORG VON DER VRING, SOLDAT SUHREN (1927)
Georg von der Vring (1889-1968) was a teacher, a painter, and a writer. As a
writer, he remained obscure, although some of his poems are relatively well-known.5 Von
der Vring did not volunteer for military service like so many others; he was drafted.
Private Suhren chronicles the author’s war experience, from basic training in Germany
and France, in the first half of the book, to months on the eastern front with not much
happening, in the second half. An actual firefight does not occur until the very end when
Suhren fires his first shot at the Russians and is wounded shortly afterwards. The last
section of the book, “Flucht” (“flight”), describes how Suhren marches back behind the
front line and catches a transport for the wounded back to Germany.6
In terms of its writing, Private Suhren is intimate and non-sensational. With
regard to genre, it is a hybrid between the first generation of war memoirs and the second
generation of more fictionalized war narratives. Its thirty-nine chronological sections are
not exactly diary entries, but they are reminiscent of a diary and clearly autobiographical.
5 Müller mentions that von der Vring completed the novel Private Suhren in 1923 but could not find a
publisher for it. Apparently, it was turned down by well-known literary publishers eighteen times until
Spaeth-Verlag Berlin finally published it in 1927. Two years later, 20,000 volumes of it had been sold,
which makes the book at least moderately successful. For more details, see Müller, 95.
6 Compare Müller, 95.
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Private Suhren, like the author, is painter and a lyricist who hates the war. He perceives
the transformation from sensitive artist to mindless soldier as a loss of identity, a loss of
his self (“Entselbstung”):
Suhren ist selber hin – was blieb denn von Suhren? – Er liegt im Stroh in einem
Kleide, das er nicht erwählt; trägt ein Gewehr, um Menschen damit totzuschießen,
die er nicht kennt; marschiert über Hügel, die nicht seine Heimat sind, und weiß
nicht, wozu. (Georg von der Vring, Private Suhren, 8)
This statement is clearly anti-war and anti-hagiographic; there is no reason that this
soldier is here, that his life of Bildungsbürgertum was destroyed.
Throughout the novel, von der Vring juxtaposes Private Suhren’s inner self with
the harshness of the environment, providing a continuous commentary that suggests that
German Bildung and destiny have nothing whatsoever to do with the heart of the German
nation as he wants to know it. He is disgusted with the monotony of military drills, the
details of strategic developments in the east, the stupidity of soldier-talk, and with the
very idea of uniformity. The prevailing mood is one of melancholy. Since the hero's
prevailing experiential reference point is bourgeois, the reader is constantly shown how
his aesthetic sensibilities are being offended. As a consequence, Private Suhren tries to
remain detached from what constitutes his daily routine -- an indictment of his ability to
report faithfully on the war at all. He continuously seeks refuge and comfort in his inner
world of poetic thoughts, childhood memories, descriptions of nature, or shreds of
highschool knowledge.7 Therefore, Private Suhren is essentially a Künstlerroman about
an artist trying to counteract and undo the corrosion wrought upon him by the war; as
7 Compare Müller 96.
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such, it valorizes his experience without accepting it as able to speak to the war in the
future.
Here, the Bildungsroman emerges as a comment on the Bildungsbürger. Private
Suhren is told from the unusual perspective of an artist in uniform, but that perspective is
nevertheless revealed as firmly planted in the bourgeois camp, not part of a political
critique or modern art. Yet the author does not overtly critique that perspective, even as
he memorializes it as past. Unlike their colleagues on the far left or on the far right,
bourgeois war novelists like von der Vring seemed content with first-person narrators
who openly profess their political ignorance and their adherence to higher callings (art).
In most cases, their political ignorance is used as a narrative tool to support the
impression that these soldiers were essentially good people – obedient, a little naïve, but
innocent.
The mechanism behind this, and its politically questionable tactic from today's
point of view, is that readers are supposed to sympathize with these beautiful characters
who suffered and died and tried so hard to make the best out of a terrible situation they
did not cause. Private Suhren may be somewhat of a special case. He is not a particularly
good soldier, like Paul Bäumer, Adolf Reisiger, or Renn, but he is portrayed as innocent
by virtue of vulnerability and aloofness – he is an artist, after all. To him, confusing
political questions are secondary. Like a romantic poet, he moves on moral high ground:
Eine Front aber gibt es, die ist klar, eindeutig und gerade, und ich finde sie an
heimlichem Orte – in meinem Gewissen finde ich sie. Und es ist die Front der
guten Gedanken und der menschenwürdigen Taten, der Händedrücke und des
treuen Glaubens. (Private Suhren, 10)
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His ideals thus reclaim a humanity from the war experience, something humane and
menschenwürdig that might be a guide for the new generation.
Not surprisingly, readers and critics in the appropriate demographic groups
among the educated responded positively to this blend of artistic self-pity, hurt
aestheticism, and romantic otherworldliness. It even earned Private Suhren the title of
“the unknown soldier.”8 Hans-Harald Müller speculates that the book was generally well-
received because it was the first truly subjective account of an individual violated by the
war. He believes it was a welcome change for normal people to read such a story after the
barrage of dully strategic officers’ accounts that dominated literary production between
1919 and 1923.9
This assessment may be so, but it is still beside the point, when seen as an index
for its possible reception. Above all, Private Suhren was a literary character with whom
readers were invited to sympathize and identify, which 20,000 readers apparently did.
That is what prompted Glaeser and others to say, “he’s one of us,” even though he clearly
was not. In other words, only 20,000 of those who wanted to think about their war
experiences (or those of their loved ones) did so in reading this novel, because it was too
distinct a person type, a member of the Bildungsbürgertum, not necessarily an "ordinary
German." The tone was right, but the hero was not -- he had not left his schoolhouse and
8 Ernst Glaeser suggested the title of “unknown soldier” in his positive critique of the novel. According to
him, von der Vring “presented the destiny of the common soldier, his loves and friendships, his fears and
craftiness, his desires and pleasures, and, moreover, the collective of these human beings: their
development toward becoming a suffering community, in which the individual is nothing – deprivation
everything. That is why this novel is not ‘romantic’, that is why it is one of today. […] Here you have the
story of the unknown German soldier” (Ernst Glaeser, “Soldat Suhren: Bemerkungen zu Georg von der
Vrings Roman,” Blätter für Alle No. 3, vol. 2, 1928, 23 [my translation, quoted in Müller 97]).
9 See also Müller 96.
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found his front comrades like Bäumer had. I would further speculate that the book
remained well below the radar of public awareness because it is by no means an
Abenteuerroman and it also does not provide a protagonist with heroic qualities. It
therefore has very little therapeutic power for male readers seeking to reinvigorate their
violated sense of masculinity, except for those bourgeois males who felt the world was
somehow more beautiful before the war -- a platitude, rather than an emotional truth of
any novelty.
(B) ARNOLD ZWEIG, DER STREIT UM DEN SERGEANTEN GRISCHA (1927)
Not all war novels sharing features with Im Westen nichts Neues represented the
classic, covertly Aryan Bildungsbürgertum. Nonetheless, Arnold Zweig (1887-1968) is
the only Jewish author in this group. This fact is significant in so far as it pre-
programmed the reception of his literary work in some parts of society: right-wing critics
spewed slurs of racial hatred when Grischa appeared in 1927.10 But apart from that,
Zweig’s Jewishness is interesting as part of the "German" war experience, because he
seems to have rediscovered it around 1916 as a result of the Jewish census the Prussian
war ministry conducted in the German armed forces; a measure which he perceived as
highly defamatory.11 Moreover, his military service brought him into closer contact with
10 Jost Hermand notes in one essay that Grischa was attacked as one of the “most pitiful efforts of
contemporary literature”: “Dagegen wurde der Grischa in allen völkischen oder präfaschistischen Blättern
als eins der übelsten Machwerke der gegenwärtigen Literatur angegriffen und sein Autor als ‘Thersites’
oder ‘asiatischer Schmutzfink’ abgekanzelt” [Jost Hermand, “Arnold Zweig: Der Streit um den Sergeanten
Grischa (1927); Eine ‘systemkritische’ Analyse” Thomas F. Schneider, Hans Wagener ed. Von Richthofen
bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg, Amsterdamer Beiträge zur neueren Germanistik
(New York and Amsterdam: Rodopi: 2003) 195-205.
11 At the time, there were approximately 100,000 Jewish soldiers in the German armed forces.
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the socialist and Zionist ideas of eastern European Jews around Willna and Kowna, while
his early childhood in Upper Silesia had only seen the edge of the non-urban, more
traditional Jewish world.
That recapture of a Jewish cultural perspective may express not only a cultural
sentiment, but a political conversion. Toward the middle of the war, Zweig grew
increasingly critical of the völkisch and nationalist-patriotic pretexts with which the
military leadership and national propaganda sought to justify the war effort.12 This
position represents a complete reversal of opinion, because Zweig had belonged to those
who welcomed the outbreak of the war and the heroic spirit of “the August Days,”
1914.13 In a letter to his friend, Helene Weyl, he had rejoiced about the return of “great
Germany,” which he saw as an opportunity to break open the loathed crust of “capitalist
greed” and “philistine mentality” of the Wilhelmine empire (compare Hermand 195). If it
had been up to him, he would have volunteered right then and there, but because he was
already twenty-seven years old and had very weak eyesight, he was put in the reserves
until April, 1915, when he was finally drafted.
During the first five months of the war, Zweig wrote seven war stories for
Simplicissimus and Die Schaubühne in which he subscribed to the prevailing propaganda
12 Compare Hermand, systemkritische Analyse 197.
13 Literary reflections of this excitement can be found, for instance, in Zweig’s novel Erziehung vor Verdun
(1935). One of the protagonists, Lieutenant Eberhard Kroysing, is depicted as follows: “Wenn je ein
Mensch, so hatte Eberhard Kroysing den Krieg nötig gehabt, um zu Grund zu kommen, Wesen
auszudrücken, Reichweite zu erproben, wie er sagte, aus dem Drang nach solcher Erfahrung heraus war
wohl eine ganze deutsche Jugend der Vorkriegsenge entlaufen, hinein in den unbändigen Krieg – […]. Alle
hatten 1914 das Gefühl gehabt, jetzt erst beginne des eigentliche Leben, das gefährliche, stählende.” See
Arnold Zweig, Erziehung vor Verdun (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2001) 87. For a detailed analysis of Zweig’s
own Kriegsbegeisterung, see Müller 125-127.
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about Germany’s strength and cultural mission.14 He first participated in the war
vicariously, but then he donned the uniform himself. After a comparatively calm period
as an armaments soldier in Flanders, southern Hungary, and Serbia, Zweig was
transferred to the trenches in front of Verdun in the spring of 1916. In the eponymous
title of a later war novel, he referred to the thirteen terrible months he spent there as the
Education at Verdun (1935). Like many soldiers from the trenches on all sides of the war,
Zweig came to realize that the war had nothing to do with cultural values or heroic ideals
but was fought over purely materialistic objectives (compare Hermand 196). He also
understood that soldiers from the lower classes often had a better understanding of what
was going on that the so-called intellectuals: “Schließlich sind die Mannschaften beider
Heere einander erbitterte Feinde nur während der Kämpfe.”15 Zweig survived the barrage
fire and then managed to get transferred back to the east, where he became a journalist
and joined the press department of the military high command.
Jost Hermand explains that three factors contributed to Zweig’s reversal of
attitude toward the war. First, he reflects general Kriegsmüdigkeit (war fatigue) that
began to spread in the armed forces in the summer of 1917. Just as importantly, he was
converted by his thirteen months in the trenches by Verdun, during which time he began
to appreciate the resilience and political common sense of the common soldier. Finally,
he was influenced by the revolutionary upheaval that took place in Russia between March
and October of 1917 and led to the peace treaty of Brest-Litowsk that was signed
14 These stories include Die Bestie (The Beast), Der Feind (The Enemy), Die Quittung (The Receipt),
Turkos im Park Schwetzingen (Turkos in Schwetzingen Park), and Die Schießbahn (The Shooting Range).
For more details, see Hermand, systemkritische Analyse, 196.
15 Arnold Zweig, Erziehung vor Verdun (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 2001) 12.
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between Russia and Austria-Hungary alongside Germany on December 2, 1917
(Hermand 196-197).
Hans-Harald Müller confirms that rampant anti-Semitism as well as Zweig’s
harrowing personal experiences contributed to his disillusionment with the German
bourgeoisie and the war, which he came to interpret as the embodiment of Prussian
imperialistic hegemony. In a letter that seems to contradict what Hermand said about
Zweig’s appreciation of the simple folk in the trenches, Zweig wrote to the writer Willi
Handl in February, 1916: “It is distressing for a sensitive human being to be part of a
platoon that is treated like a pile of broken glass, like we are. I am the only Mensch of my
class in this company, I mean, the only academic” (quoted in Müller 128). According to
Müller, Zweig’s re-discovery of his own Jewishness was indeed the main reason why he
quickly abandoned the national-militaristic mindset and joined the Jewish pacifists.
Above all, the intense correspondence with Martin Buber, the leading voice of cultural
Zionism at the time, convinced Zweig that pacifism was the only conviction appropriate
for spiritual Judaism.16
Arnold Zweig is a particularly interesting case of a writer who switched from
enthusiastic support to total condemnation of the war.17 It seems to be the case that his
ideological and political repositioning was set in motion by Zweig’s personal integrity.
He saw for himself that the official picture painted by warmongers and national
16 For more details, see Müller, Krieg und die Schriftsteller, 119-137.
17 Two other prominent figures who scaled back and then reversed their enthusiasm once they learned the
truth about the war were Thomas Mann, who had written the 1914 pro-war essay “Gedanken im Kriege,”
and the aristocratic officer Arnold Friedrich Vieth von Golßenau, who became a communist, adopted the
name Ludwig Renn, and wrote the popular novel Krieg (1927), which is also discussed in this chapter.
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propaganda simply did not match reality.18 Zweig’s most important novel, Der Streit um
den Sergeanten Grischa (1927/28), reflects his commitment to honesty, but also his class-
bound position. The book is an unflinching exposure of an execution helped along by
bureaucrats whose cowardice, obedience, and hypocrisy prevents them from intervening
in the unjust death sentence. Originally written as a drama some seven years before, Der
Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa is more properly a Justizroman (judicial novel), not a
Frontroman, since its events take place behind the lines.
The gist of the story is that a Russian Sergeant named Grischa Iljitsch Paprotkin
manages to escape from a German POW camp in the German-occupied zone called
Ober-Ost (“Upper East”). On his way home to Russia, he meets a woman named Babka,
who falls in love with him and advises him to assume the identity of a Russian defector
named Bjuschew in the event that he gets caught by the Germans. Grischa follows her
advice, not knowing that the German high command issued an order to have all defectors
shot. When the Germans apprehend him, he is sentenced to death. Grischa then makes his
true identity known, expecting his sentence to get revoked. Some honorable and dutiful
Prussian officers do support him, but General Albert Schieffenzahn, a caricature of Erich
Ludendorff, has him executed regardless to make a warning example of Sergeant Grischa
vis-à-vis the rebellious bolsheviki in the east.
While most of the other novels discussed here are restricted to the narrow
perspective of the common soldier in the trenches, Der Streit um den Sergeanenten
Grischa examines the larger picture of the war and its politics. Zweig’s analysis is
18 A total commitment to personal honesty also drove Edlef Köppen and Ludwig Renn.
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especially poignant because he painstakingly investigates the injustice done to one man,
yet manages to reveal the entire merciless machinery of national "justice" behind that one
act of injustice. The reader watches from a distance as the judicial case unfolds: the
bourgeois proponents of moral principles and humanitarian ideas, in this case, Prussian
officers, are overwhelmed by the military machinery. In this, Zweig exposes several
Schreibtischtäter, bureaucrats who would not have executed Grischa on their own, but
whose unquestioning obedience contributed to the implementation of his death-
sentence.19 We realize: these people are guilty, too! According to Michael Gollbach,
Zweig’s objective is to criticize a social system that has militarism, inhumanity, and
unfairness woven into it. This broad accusation of German society stirred critics to
passionate reactions. Even more so than with Remarque, the “critical” reception of Zweig
is frustratingly predictable along political and ideological lines.
The radical left, like Paul Friedländer in the Rote Fahne, conceded that Der Streit
um den Sergeanten Grischa, to be sure, was the work of a bourgeois writer, but that he
was “anständig gesinnt” and “geistreich.” The Jewish press proudly hailed Zweig as “one
of their own.” Lion Feuchtwanger lauded the novel as “masterly composed” and as
testimony to the author’s “profound humanity.”20 And the leftist-bourgeois press, in its
typical fashion, found many things good and some things wrong. Kurt Tucholsky, for
19 Zweig’s novel is the first major work to emphasize the moral responsibility of the German bureaucracy.
The phenomenon of Schreibtischtäter (= bureaucrats implicated in an evil machinery) is certainly not only
a German problem. But Germany became notorious through the vast bureaucracy erected by the National
Socialists. Schreibtischtäter do not feel personally responsible: “I only did my job. I did not have the
authority to change anything.” Even Adolf Eichmann used that as an excuse during his 1961 Jerusalem
trial. The Fight About Sergeant Grischa is prophetic in that sense; it warns us that people will get killed
when good people are not resolute enough to fight for their humanitarian ideals.
20 Compare Hermand 201.
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example, chooses such an angle in his Weltbühne review of Zweig’s novel. He
appreciates Zweig’s work not so much as a moral revelation, but as an act of honest
labor, a solidly crafted piece, and a genuine effort at telling the truth, hence a welcome
contrast to the dry and dusty officers’ memoirs. But he also regards it as superior to the
efforts of other (unnamed) novelists -- disparagingly referred to as Neumänner and
Modeschluderer21-- who, Tucholsky suspects, would carelessly render the war-
experience in too “novel-esque” a fashion:
Warum wird der Roman von Zweig überall gekauft? Weil er ein anständiges
Stück Ware ist. Weil er gut gearbeitet ist. Weil das Publikum einen fast
untrüglichen Instinkt für sorgsame Mühe hat (die ein Künstler sich gibt) – weil
keine Seite, kein Satz hingeschwindelt ist. […] Wie groß der Kunstwille bei
Autoren dieser Gattung ist, steht dahin – ihre handwerkliche Anständigkeit ist
unbestreitbar. Aber lockert die Schleusen nicht! Ströme von Schweiß ergössen
sich durch das Land, denn fleißig sind sie bei uns. Beschütze uns, heilige
Staatsbibliothek, vor den Neumännern, die die Geschichte romanisieren. Also so
geht das nicht. Die Modeschluderer lassen es allerdings doppelt schätzen, wenn
einer arbeitet. Der Dichter Zweig hat gearbeitet.22
In his praise for this author from the Bildungsbürgertum, Tucholsky thus borrows a virtue
that is not normally associated with the upper bourgeoisie, but with the working class,
namely “doing good work.” By granting readers the “instinctual” ability to distinguish an
honest and diligent effort like Zweig’s from either embellished war chronicles or
disingenuous novels, and by granting Zweig the status of “honest craftsman,” Tucholsky
stakes the parameters of what he sees as an opportunity for productive author-reader
21 “Neumänner” means “new men,” hence authors who are not “old school” but decidely modernist in their
perspective, and “Modeschluderer” refers to authors who produce shoddy work after the current fashion,
men who are prone to work disingenuously.
22 Kurt Tucholsky, “Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa,” Die Weltbühne, 23, vol. 50, 1927 in Kurt
Tucholsky, Gesammelte Werke vol II (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1960) 975.
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interaction across social classes. He makes the Jewish bourgeois author a “worker” and
elevates his readers, who may really be from the working class, to the status of competent
literary critics. This creates the impression that there is considerable common ground
between the two, including the working class ability to fathom and comprehend Zweig’s
moral charge against the Schreibtischtäter who witnessed such injustice but failed to
prevent it.
The völkisch right wing, of course, detested the Der Streit um den Sergeanten
Grischa novel, so much so that some of the critics did not waste time actually discussing
the characteristics of the text but went straight for the author: the aim of their criticism
was to destroy his masculinity -- a fairly typical anti-Semitic strategy -- which
underscores my argument that these attacks and counter-attacks between left and right
were not really about literature, but only catalyzed through it. The central issue in this
political rejection of Zweig's work was who would win the privilege to say what a
German man was and was not. Joseph Magnus Wehner (1891-1973), himself the author
of sixty-four völkisch-militaristic novels, including Sieben vor Verdun (1930), is a typical
representative of the right. He created one of the most hateful comparisons between
Zweig and Thersites, a hideous figure from Greek mythology:23
23 As Christopher Bungard explains on a website: “Thersites was the son of Agrius. He is the only rank and
file soldier that Homer gives a graphic depiction of. Thersites was bow-legged, lame, and his shoulders
caved inward. His head was shaped like a sugar loaf, coming to a point. Atop his head tufts of hair sprouted
up. Homer mentions that he was a vulgar man whose ‘head was full of obscenities, teeming with rant’.
Thersites incurred Odysseus’ wrath when he called Agamemnon greedy and Achilles a coward. Odysseus
struck Thersites upside the head with the royal scepter of Agamemnon. Later, Achilles struck Thersites
upside the head for mocking his sorrow at the death of Penthesilea. No one grieved for Thersites when he
spat out teeth and fell to the earth dead.” Viewed February 23, 2006, at 9:30 pm,
<http://www.pantheon.org/articles/t/thersites.html>.
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An Stelle der Toten aber, die irgendwo in fremder Erde einem neuen deutschen
Tage entgegenfruchten, erheben sich jetzt überall die Thersitesse des Krieges, die
zahllosen Simulaten, die ihr erbärmliches Leben retteten, um den Tod der
unverstandenen anderen, die auch für sie starben, zu schmähen; kleine
Wichtigtuer und Gernegroße, die den Stachel angeborener Feigheit und eine
blinde Befangenheit in der eigenen süßen Existenz dadurch rechtfertigen
möchten, daß sie wie nur ein internationaler Kriegsgewinnler, die ethischen Werte
des kämpfenden deutschen Volkes, Vaterlands- und Freiheitsliebe, auf dem
Markte des Pazifismus verschachern.24
Wehner forgets that Zweig was neither a “malingerer” (Simulant), nor did he feel the
“sting of inborn cowardice” (den Stachel angeborener Feigheit); in fact, Zweig fought
longer in the Verdun trenches than Wehner did himself. Needless to say, Zweig was also
neither a little braggart nor an impostor (kleine Wichtigtuer und Gernegroße), but a
humanist who personally witnessed gross acts of injustice and decided to follow his
conscience by articulating them. The tale of sergeant Grischa is based on an actual
event.25 What passed as “literary criticism” in these extreme right-wing circles were mere
(anti-Semitic) harangues; it takes an effort to discuss them seriously, but they were well-
gauged to keep one segment of the readership away from the novel by invalidating its
author.
To be sure, the novel was gauged at a generally liberal bourgeois audience,
judging by this humanitarian cast. Arnold Zweig himself was trying to appeal to some
kind of German humanity, while criticizing the German war machine, as well as the
bureaucracy in its service. His picture of the German army attributes to it opportunism
24 Joseph Magnus Wehner, “Kriegsromane” (excerpt), Süddeutsche Monatshefte, March 1928, quoted in
Annie Voigtländer, ed. Welt und Wirkung eines Romans. Zu Arnold Zweigs “Der Streit um den Sergeanten
Grischa” (Berlin und Weimar, Aufbau-Verlag, 1967), 87.
25 Compare Müller 162.
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and ethnic discrimination; it is a dehumanizing rather than a liberating force. He
explained: “Aber eine von früher Jugend genährte Überzeugung hatte bisher [bis Herbst
1917] standgehalten, daß für die Rechtspflege im deutschen Heer die Begriffe
Gerechtigkeit und Humanität maßgebend zu sein hatten” (quoted in Müller 162). His
erroneous conviction that strict adherence to justice was a military virtue was finally
shattered when he heard of the illegal execution of a Russian prisoner of war, who was
made an example to scare off the advancing bolsheviki. Zweig concludes: “Dieser Bericht
öffnete mir die Augen, wie man zu sagen pflegt. Ich erkannte zunächst, daß der
Mißbrauch des Menschen durch den Menschen im Kriege unbedingt bekämpft und
beendet werden müsse, wenn wir unsere Epoche vom Mittelalter abgrenzen und als
Neuzeit loben” (ibid.).
Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa is thus unique in its subtlety and unsettling
in its ethical implications. As in Soldat Suhren, an uneventful section of the eastern front
serves as the setting. Zweig did not want to show exploding shrapnel and scenes of
carnage, but the murderousness of the war through the senseless death of one individual.
He was interested in painting a nuanced picture of different players weighed down by
gradations of responsibility according to their role in wartime, as well as their individual
reactions to that responsibility. In fact, he strained to complete his work on another
important novel, entitled Erziehung vor Verdun (1935), precisely because he
fundamentally resented certain elements of Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues and
Renn’s Krieg as too adventure-like: “Er meinte darin, nur wenig abgewandelt, ‘die alte
Freude am Krieg als unbürgerlicher Lebensform, als Gelegenheit zum großen Abenteuer
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zu erkennen’.”26 Ullstein Verlag, Remarque’s publisher, realized that this would not
satisfy popular taste and withdrew from the contract on Der Streit um den Sergeanten
Grischa when Zweig had completed work on it in 1927.27
(C) LUDWIG RENN, KRIEG (1927)
Of the four better-known novels that appeared before Remarque’s best-seller,
Renn’s Krieg is the one that bears some similarity to it on the surface, but which could
not have come from a more distant place. On the literal level, Krieg encompasses World
War I from August, 1914, when mobilized German troops cheered with excitement and
hopped on the train cars, to the final days of the war, when the surviving troops ached to
reach German soil before the pursuing soldiers of the Entente could capture them. Like
Remarque’s and Köppen’s narratives, Krieg is set on the Western front. The story is told
from the point of view of a first-person narrator. In fact, the experiences of the main
figure, the private Ludwig Renn (later promoted to Sergeant and Master Sergeant),
amount to literary modifications of the author’s personal wartime memories. Due to its
resemblance to previously-known wartime diaries, readers debated if Krieg should even
be considered a novel.28 Yet there is no doubt that fiction is in play -- not in the diaries or
the military action depicted, but in the person of the author himself.
What is extraordinary about this book is that its author abandoned his real identity
to become the communist Ludwig Renn. Arnold Friedrich Vieth von Golßenau was born
26 See Arnold Zweig, “Kriegsromane,” Die Weltbühne 25 (April 16, 1929) 16, 598, quoted in Arnold
Zweig, Erziehung vor Verdun (Berlin und Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 2001) 555.
27 Compare Müller 163.
28 Compare Müller 198-99.
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into the Saxon aristocracy in 1889 and joined the military in 1910. He quickly climbed
the military career ladder and participated in all the major battles of the Western front.
After the war, he was not accepted into the greatly reduced army but became a police
officer. He then quit the police force to study law and economics. He finally decided that
bourgeois society was no longer a place for him after he witnessed a brutal massacre in
1927, when the Viennese police opened fire on protesting workers. Around the same
time, he also read John Reed’s Ten Days That Shook the World (1922), which describes
the Russian revolution.29 Renn later professed that the Vienna experience and the reading
of Marxist literature converted him into a devout communist within a few days.30
Originally, the novel had been a diary, which Golßenau/Renn had completed by
1924. No publisher was interested in yet another officer’s memoir, so he was unable to
publish it even after he had fictionalized the diary to render it into a novel. When he had
given up hope, one of his friends submitted the manuscript to the Frankfurter Zeitung,
whose editors responded with enthusiasm. When they learned that the author really was
an aristocrat and former Captain in the army, they urged him to choose a pen-name and
withdraw from public scrutiny for six months, so that their promotional strategy of
advertising Tage und Jahre im Krieg as “a true story by a complete stranger” would have
time to pay off. The editors were worried that the public would otherwise mistake the
book for another officer’s memoirs and the author for a “Nazi und Antisemit” (Müller
29 Compare Ulrich Broich: “Hier spricht zum ersten Male der einfache Mann,” Die Fiktion vom
Kriegserlebnis des einfachen Soldaten in Ludwig Renn: Krieg (1928),” Thomas F. Schneider and Hans
Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New
York: Rodopi, 2003) 207-209.
30 Compare Müller 196-197.
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186). Renn obliged, and both the newspaper version and the book sold well. The
Frankfurter Zeitung thus employed the same strategy that the Vossische Zeitung would
use to promote Remarque: both he and Renn were presented as common men speaking
the plain truth. The Frankfurter editors originally phrased it as follows:
Wir beginnen in diesen Tagen mit den Aufzeichnungen eines völlig unbekannten
Mannes, des Ludwig Renn, die den Titel tragen ‘Tage und Jahre im Krieg’. Es ist
uns selbst unbegreiflich, wie diese Aufzeichnungen haben nach so langen Jahren
niedergeschrieben werden können. Es ist der Krieg eines einfachen, beschränkten
Mannes, eines mutigen Mannes, dem deshalb die Feigheit nicht unbekannt blieb.
Es ist der Krieg aus der engen horizontlosen Perspektive des Infanteristen, der
Krieg aus Grabenhöhe. […] Hier ist aber vor jeder Tendenz geschrieben worden,
und hier spricht zum ersten Mal […] der gemeine Mann. […] Wir bringen diesen
Bericht der Jahre 1914 bis 1918, weil wir das Gefühl haben, ihn nicht
verschweigen zu dürfen, weil wir glauben, es sei hier die biblia pauperum unserer
Zeit uns übergeben worden. (quoted in Müller 187)
Both the Frankfurter and the Vossische editors figured that only a petit bourgeois
perspective on the war would interest the readers and entice them to overcome their
reluctance to pick up the war issue again. This assessment was exactly right. The German
bourgeoisie demanded that if the war was to be made into literature, this should be done
by one of their own. What remains to be seen is why Renn’s Krieg sold 100,000 copies
and Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues, 1,000,000.
In the beginning, the hero of the story is in favor of the war: “Bin ich nicht
glücklich daran, einen Krieg zu erleben! Es ist doch irgendeine Loslösung. Wie schlimm
für die, deren Jugend ohne das vergeht!”31 He regards his soldiering as a profession, a
trade, and he strives to fulfill this trade to the best of his abilities. Not until later, after he
31 Ludwig Renn, Krieg, (Frankfurt a. M.: Societäts Druckerei, 1929), 14.
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has been promoted for his outstanding performance, does he begin to feel doubt: “Ich
war nicht mehr wütend auf die Belgier, wenigstens meistens nicht, sondern mich grauste
vor ihnen und vorm Kriege, diesem gräßlichen Kriege mit seinem Völkerhaß.”32
However, there is no evidence that this Ludwig Renn, the main figure, has much of a
political consciousness. Like most human beings would, he hates the atrocities of war,
but he does not begin to question warfare as a means to achieve political objectives. On
the contrary, like Remarque, he professes to be entirely unpolitical: “Ich hatte auch noch
nie über Politik nachgedacht. Ich hatte einen Ekel davor, wie vor etwas Schmutzigem.”33
Like Paul Bäumer in Im Westen nichts Neues and Adolf Reisiger in Heeresbericht,
Ludwig Renn can sense the injustice of the war, but he cannot put his finger on the source
of this injustice. He does not begin to question the politics of the Wilhelmine Empire; it
does not occur to him that these politics may benefit the few while harming the many.
What, then, is the intention Renn had in mind when he wrote the book? In an
article discussing the preconditions for writing the book, the author describes an incident
where the official log book of his regiment fell into his hands during the war: “Was da
stand, war ganz richtig, aber alles Wichtige war ausgelassen […] Damals setzte ich mir
vor, einmal die Wahrheit über den Krieg zu schreiben.”34 His intention was to write the
full truth, depict everything the way “it really was,” as it would be recognizeable to the
ordinary soldier. Renn was, however, not able to make his realism psychologically
compelling to the readers. Occasionally, his literary realism degenerates into
32 Renn 53.
33 Ibid., 189.
34 Ludwig Renn, “Über die Voraussetzungen zu meinem Buch ‘Krieg’” (1929), Ludwig Renn zum 70.
Geburtstag (Berlin: Malik, 1959), 112.
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onomatopoeic verbalizations of shrapnel explosions, like “S! S! Sch! – Preng, pamm!
Rammsss! krachte, zischte, zirpte es.”35
Nevertheless, that Renn used his diary materials and set out to paint a truthful
picture of the war for precisely the audience who had experienced it first-hand. To
illustrate: he describes, in the first section of the book, an attack that was successfully
executed by his platoon. His depiction of this attack, however, conveys the impression
that the soldiers do not even know where to direct their rifles. They take cover on the
ground in some shell hole somewhere, without knowing where they are. They suffer
losses from the invisible enemy. Then they jump up and advance because they see the
others advance. Then, suddenly, they are called back and told that they won the battle that
was just finished. This rather standard picture of the chaos of war actually comes close to
disenfranchising the soldiers he hoped to valorize.
Or perhaps he is drawing analogies about the senselessness of war by showing the
warriors as insensate. In the next scene, for example, one of the officers keeps staring at
a house burning down. Others make conversation about everyday things, without the
slightest interest in details of the attack that just happened. Eventually, the soldiers crawl
into their dugouts to sleep. Renn concludes laconically: “[…] und ich schlief ziemlich
feucht und kühl” (37). Disorientation, ill-directedness, and confusion in combat; apathy,
indifference, and mindless routine after combat, that is the daily bread of the front line
infantry soldier. Renn is disgusted with particulate aspects of the soldierly life, especially
35 Renn, Krieg, 72.
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with sloppiness and cowardice among his comrades, but his rejection stays at that level.
He also never supports the war, or takes pride in successful attacks. He just does what he
is supposed to; in fact, that makes him an excellent soldier.36 His descriptions are in one
sense an accurate, factual, camera-eye view of events. But Renn, the author, came to
realize that this style did still not yield a more “truthful” or “accurate” picture of the war,
which is what he had attempted so painstakingly.37
Renn, the soldier, grapples with the same inability to construct meaning when
realizes: “[…] dieses Schema nützte für die Darstellung der wichtigsten Dinge gar nichts.
Dafür fehlten mir stets die Worte. […] Was fehlte, war immer im Grunde dasselbe, und
doch wußte ich nicht, was es war. Gewiß, dachte ich, fehlt es mir nur an irgendeiner
Erkenntnis” (119). Renn, the soldier, is by no means ignorant. He may not be educated,
but he has a keen sense of right and wrong. When he arrives at the insight that his
positivistic approach to reality is “not the whole truth,” he seeks additional corroboration
in philosophy. He senses that his lower-middle class outlook on life cannot support him
any more. However, the philosophy book does not provide for meaning and leaves him
disappointed -- this soldier would not find comfort among the humanism claimed by the
bourgeois. Communist ideology would later fill that gap in reality.
Renn’s book has a number of features in common with Remarque’s, including the
setting of the Western front, the first-person point of view of an apolitical but courageous
36 At one point, someone hands him a copy of Simplicissimus and tells him: “You are just like that guy.”
37 Müller quotes Renn’s explanations to the communist periodical Rote Fahne: “’Mein Krieg ist nicht der
Krieg, wie er war’,” as well as to Die Linkskurve: “‘eine Dichtung, die ihre richtigen und ihre falschen
Seiten hat’” (Müller 198). Renn, the author, also did not claim to be identical to Renn, the soldier in the
book. The soldier in the book is not from the aristocracy but a common cabinet maker from a village.
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infantry soldier whose attitude toward the war disintegrates into despair and disgust,
extremely positive descriptions of male-male bonding and experiences of camaraderie, as
well as the glorification of one particular individual. Remarque’s real hero was also not
the main protagonist himself (Paul Bäumer), but the father-figure he adores (Katczinsky).
The parallel in Renn’s book is between Sergeant Ludwig Renn and Lieutenant Fabian,
who is the likely alter ego of the author.38 While most of the other men die, Fabian
remains the leader of Renn’s unit for a longer period of time. Fabian, like Katczinsky,
embodies leadership qualities, strategic wisdom, and paternal love for his comrades. He
is the only one who elicits warm feelings in Renn. Throughout the novel, Renn
understates his emotional responses to painful experiences, for instance when his friend
“Perle” dies:
“Wir haben heute im Regiment über zwanzig Offiziere verloren,” sagte Fabian
wie von ferne. Ich nippte am Becher. Der Rotwein war herb und kalt. “Die Perle
ist auch gefallen,” sagte der Feldwebel. “Das war doch Ihr Freund, Renn,” sagte
Fabian. Die Flasche war ausgetrunken. “Gute Nacht!” sagte der Leutnant und
stand auf. Wir legten uns auch schlafen. (Renn, Krieg, 77-78)
In this scene, Renn’s emotional response is strikingly absent. In a different, mildly
homoerotic scene, when he and some others join Fabian on a patrol and Fabian gives him
a piece of boiled meat, he reacts with noticeable affection:
“Da hast du ein Stück Wellfleisch!” flüsterte er. “Aber’s tropft!” Er gab mir das
warme, wabblige Stück in die Hand. “Ich danke dir,” sagte ich. “Aber was soll ich
jetzt damit tun?” “Steck’s doch in den Feldbecher!” sagte er und blieb zurück. Ich
hakte den Feldbecher vom Brotbeutel ab, drückte es hinein und steckte den
Becher aufrecht in die rechte Rocktasche. Es wärmte mein rechtes Bein. Ich
lächelte in mir, wegen des warmen Gefühls, und auch weil er mir das
nachgebracht hatte. (Renn 21-22)
38 Compare Müller 205-206.
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Fabian’s power to soften Renn’s stoic resolve is one of the more subtle motifs of the
novel.
Otherwise, however, Renn does not feel close to his comrades and also distances
himself from officers he regards as lazy or incompetent. Therefore, the most significant
differences between Remarque and Renn are that Renn’s book is minimalistic,
understated, and strictly subjective. Renn, the soldier, invites identification to an extent
because he is a common foot soldier from a low social class, but he is not particularly
likeable and does not evoke sympathy. He is by no means an everyman, and there are
clear references to actual places, dates, battles, and military units. Moreover, Renn’s
Krieg does not scapegoat anyone for the war going catastrophically wrong, but only
criticizes certain individuals, including other soldiers, while Remarque blamed authorities
from the parent generation. And finally, Renn does not die but comes home in 1918, so
he does not bear the hallmarks of a tragic hero. In terms of masculine appeal, he is less
boyish than Bäumer, but also less approachable, even cold, so male readers would relate
to him more reluctantly.
In his book review of Krieg, Arnold Zweig typified Renn as the archetypal
soldier, “als Urbild eines deutschen Soldaten.”39 The 100,000 copies sold argue to a
degree for that truth. But Renn's soldiers were perhaps not exemplary enough, because
they were withdrawnvictims, but not warm-hearted and "human" enough to lead identify
39 Compare Müller 199.
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with and to a broad readership into a new vision of the camaraderie and mlae-bonding
resulting from war.
(D) ERNST GLAESER, JAHRGANG 1902 (1928)
The other most popular of this group of novels takes a clearer perspective on just
these issues than does Renn, offering the picture of a soldier who is more clearly placed
as part of Germany: Jahrgang 1902. Its author, Ernst Glaeser, was himself born in 1902.
He studied German and Theater, wrote theater pieces of his own and eventually became a
journalist for the leftist-liberal Frankfurter Zeitung. His novel, Jahrgang 1902 (Class of
1902 [1929]), was pre-published in two short segments by the Weltbühne and appeared in
book-form in autumn, 1928. According to Sigrid Schneider and Hans-Harald Müller, this
book reached a sales volume of 125,000 and had been translated into twenty-four
languages by 1933, although the statistics compiled by the literary historian Helmut
Müssener’s do not support this.40
Class of 1902 is a classic coming-of-age story told from the point of view of a
first-person narrator who is twelve years old at the beginning of the book. Two-thirds of
the story take place before the outbreak of the war, and even the remaining section only
describes a vicarious experience of the war through its impact on the Heimatfront, a small
town in Hessia. While some of the more adult novels feature the occasional sexual
situation or oblique references to homoerotic feelings among the soldiers (e.g. in
Remarque and Renn), Glaeser’s novel is a genuine Jugendroman in which the
40 Compare Müller 97 and Appendix.
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problematic development of sexual identity emerges as a central theme.41 Yet this is not
a novel that will uncritically support the coming of age of the bourgeois or mourn its
passing.
The main protagonist’s best friend is a boy named Ferd. He is the “Red Major’s”
son, hence a young aristocrat, who becomes ostracized by the stuck-up petty-bourgeois
society in the village who flock around the anti-Semitic schoolteacher Heini Brosius. The
reason why the villagers reject the Major and his son is that he hates Kaiser Wilhelm and
what he regards as the Emperor’s idiotic political ideas, as well as the pomp and vanity
with which he builds up the fleet or talks about Germany’s colonial aspirations. Ferd’s
father is from another part of history, an old-school Prussian officer who has traveled the
world, believes in fairness even toward the enemy, and is fond of the British. The Major
becomes notorious because he publishes essays in radical papers that expose Wilhelm’s
folly. Ferd, who was brought up in his father’s image, is treated as an outcast on the
surface, yet feared for his bravery and secretly admired by most of the schoolboys.
The narrator is caught in the middle but takes sides with Ferd early on. He is
clearly attracted to Ferd, both spiritually and physically:
His hand was lying on my shoulder. I felt helpless and dejected; my head yielded
to that winning pressure. His lips were before me; I could see nothing but those
red lips, which had a duskier gleam where they joined the white of his skin. […]
And suddenly I felt a stab of curiosity amid my bewilderment; what would
happen if I were to touch those lips? Must lips be touched in order to learn the
mystery?42
41 Compare Müller 97.
42 Ernst Glaeser, Class of 1902 (New York: The Viking Press, 1929) 40-41.
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This passionate attraction to Ferd is soon replaced by lust after village girls -- this is not
an aristocrat who can "seduce and betray" the bourgeoisie, as so many fictional ones do.
Yet throughout the novel, the leitmotivs of (sexual) disorientation and identity-confusion
continue to surface as a kind of dual coding, balancing off identity and morality in a
class-bound world. The narrator is often torn between different choices regarding his
rejection of the adult world, his feelings of friendship toward Ferd or Leo, the weak
Jewish boy, and ultimately in his worldview regarding Germany and the war during the
“August Days” of 1914. This novel, therefore, situates the dilemma of the soldier solidly
as part of a more diverse German population, not only within one class.
Yet Glaeser is not simply anti-war. Like Remarque, with whom the term “lost
generation” is associated, Glaeser chalks up the identity-loss of the Class of 1902 to the
parent generation, specifically to the fathers. The first-page motto of the book says: “La
guerre – ce sont nos parents.” No wonder, then, that Glaeser chooses as his mouthpiece a
narrator who rebels against the adult world and their mysterious affairs: “What did I care
about war? What did I care about the affairs of the grown-ups? It was their war, and I had
had enough of it. It is true, I thought for a moment of the Red Major, […] of Ferd too,
who believed what his father said.”43 The narrator is trying to come to terms with his own
confusing and contradictory loyalties.44
43 Ibid. 196.
44 In a later confessional scene with his friend Gaston, the narrator feels the pressure of all the unresolved
conflicts he struggles to keep inside. By the end of the outburst, he seems to succeed in finding the answer
to these questions. What prompted him to open up was Gaston’s using the cathartic formula “’La guerre, ce
sont nos parents – mon ami…’: Then something broke inside me, for I knew that in a few minutes I should
lose him. Everything that I knew about the grown-ups I told him, all of it; their fighting with each other, the
mystery – things which I had long forgotten, I told them: the life on the farm, Ferd’s great friendship, Leo’s
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Glaeser's message is, however, more complex than Remarque's. Ferd’s father, the
aristocratic Herr von K., whom the villagers stupidly call the “Red Major,” emerges as
the only positive (father) figure of the parent generation. This identity is central to the
understanding of the book because he is the one who openly attacks Wilhelm’s and the
villagers’ misguided Hurrapatriotismus, an attitude for which he is banished from the
community as a radical. Again the tug-of-war about this controversial figure unfolds on
the level of masculinity. The village women contest it by making fun of his Indian shirts
and his clean-shaven face: “’He looks like a play-actor’. […] “’Calls himself a man, does
he?’ said the women, mincing proudly in the tight bodices. ‘He’s un-German’, answered
the men, twirling their moustaches fiercely. This was another habit they had caught from
the Kaiser.”45 The narrator, on the other hand, perceives Herr von K. as the epitome of
elegant and worldly masculinity: “He was wearing a tussore silk shirt under a coffee-
coloured jacket, and no waistcoat. That shirt of his was my delight. […] An adventurous
shirt!” (Glaeser 43). Later on, he also comments on the way he speaks: “I admired his
clear and manly language, which was not smothered under a rank growth of ideology”
(114-15). This "manly" hero can be an aristocrat and a bit of a dandy, yet a voice of clear
reason (a type that will recur as late as Das Boot, in the elder generation of submarine
commanders who remember the good old days).
sufferings, August’s bravery, the Red Major’s isolation, my breaking my promise and why it had happened
[…]. I concealed nothing, I admitted all my meannesses, but the undertone which ran through this




As these examples illustrate, Glaeser sets up a simple dichotomy between the
chauvinistic and anti-Semitic petty bourgeoisie, who appear as a tight-knit group, and the
free-thinking ostracized individual, represented by Herr von K. and the younger
generation correlative, his son Ferd. From the perspective of the narrator, Herr von K. is
the “real man,” cosmopolitan, elegant, well-spoken, courageous, and strong, while all the
other male figures tend to be provincial, fat, sweaty, weak, or bow-legged.46 The
narrator’s admiration of Herr von K. as a man evokes nineteenth-century ideals of
masculinity rather than bourgeois Bildung: the old-school Prussian officer who is capable
of independent thinking, withstanding social pressure, and respecting the British. Since
Herr von K. dies in combat47, the ideals he stood for, including his disdain for
Wilhelminian chauvinism, die symbolically with him. It is the other type of man that
prevails in this conflict, the petty, the weak-willed, the anti-Semites, the Gebildete, and
the vain.
Glaeser thus constructed a profound amalgam of war-politics and masculinity-
politics. The masculinity debate is cleverly hidden behind the perfectly normal confusion
that accompanies the narrator’s puberty and search for a sexual identity. Throughout two-
thirds of the book, the young protagonist feels strongly drawn toward the free and
46 One example is Dr. Hoffmann, the Social Democrat from the Landtag, who is friends with Herr von K.:
“His hat was pushed back off his forehead, for he sweated easily. He weighed almost two hundred pounds.
His fleshy hands were pink and soft. He was always smiling” (44). The narrator’s description of the Jewish
family Silberstein is a chilling mimicry of the prevailing anti-Semitic tone in the small town: “All that was
ridiculous in Herr Silberstein’s appearance had vanished; I saw no longer his funny little legs, and I forgot
the unmanly crook of his shoulders; even the mother, whose blurred face always offended me, had a fine
air, and Leo, standing pale, thin and weary between his anxious parents, looked as if he were gazing into a
tomb” (70).
47 Compare Glaeser, Class of 1902, 262-263.
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powerful masculinity that Glaeser suggests defined pre-Wilhelminian Prussian officers,
but because identification with that type would entail enormous social pressure and
isolation, he ultimately fails to live up to it. Swept away by the general enthusiasm of the
“August Days,” he abandons his ideals, ultimately betraying Ferd, his best friend.
Glaeser’s characters are overdrawn so much they resemble caricatures, hence the novel
lends itself to allegorical interpretation. His message, then, is that there once was a
species of German men like Herr von K. with sons like Ferd, but that this type became
extinct during the reign of Wilhelm II.
4.3 PARALLELS: (A) ERNST JOHANNSEN, VIER VON DER INFANTERIE (1929)
Another very visible war novel of the era takes on Germany from a perspective
other than the bourgeois, as well. Its author, Ernst Johannsen (1898-1977), was an
electrician’s apprentice when the Great War began and is nearly forgotten today. Writing
from the bottom end of the middle class, he published two anti-war novels in 1929, one
entitled Vier von der Infanterie: Ihre letzten Tage an der Westfront 1918 (Four
Infantrymen on the Western Front), which sold 20,000 copies the first year and served as
the model for Georg Pabst’s film adaptation (1930), as well as the curious
Fronterinnerungen eines Pferdes, which actually does “describe the war from the
perspective of a female horse on the Western Front.”48 According to Johannsen himself,
he wrote Vier von der Infanterie in the summer of 1928, so there cannot be any direct
48 Compare Brian Murdoch, “Tierische Menschen und menschliche Tiere. Ernst Johannsen: Vier von der
Infanterie und Fronterinnerungen eines Pferdes (1929)” Thomas F. Schneider and Hans Wagener, eds. Von
Richthofen bis Remarque: Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi,
2003) 249-260.
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influence from Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues.49 The Hamburg Fackelreiter-Verlag
chose to advertise it as an explicitly pacifist work “to keep the picture of war reality alive
and combat the evil of war at its root.”50 Although it remained rather insignificant in
terms of its sales volume, the novel is included in this discussion because it makes heroes
of the protagonists in a similar fashion as Im Westen nichts Neues: these four men form
friendships across social class boundaries51 and endure the terrors of the war even though
they know, intuitively, that they are lambs being led to a senseless slaughter.
According to Brian Murdoch, Johannsen’s novel differs from Remarque’s and
others’ because it does not feature a first-person narrator but relies heavily on dialogues.
As the title suggests, there are four main protagonists: Lorsen (an engineer), Job (a
worker), der Student (called Philosoph), and Müller (a farmer), whose conversations are
intended to compel the reader to empathize with their hopeless outlook on the war
surrounding them. Remarque’s narrative strategy involved a loose first-person narration
that cut back and forth between Ich (= Paul Bäumer/ Remarque) and Wir (= Bäumer’s
peers/ the Lost Generation in general).52 Reading Johannsen’s work, readers have a more
immediate version of this tactic, as they overhear what these soldiers say to one another,
as if it were a film, with the author’s comments functioning like sub-titles:
49 Ibid. 251.
50 Ibid. 250.
51 I believe that Johannsen was aware that class differences did not just disappear even in wartime. The
integration of the student (Philosoph) into the group thus needed to be accounted for: “This sergeant-major,
nicknamed the ‘Trench-Hound’, threatened to shoot a man about a year ago. The chap would not go over
the top in an attack, and Trench-Hound held the revolver to his head. Not long after somebody shot him
from one of our own support trenches. He got a slight wound. They were never able to prove who did it,
but it was shrewdly suspected to have been the student. The student was thereupon voted one of the
fraternity and so came to be the fourth in the group” (Ernst Johannsen, Four Infantrymen [New York,
Alfred H. King, 1930] 93-94).
52 See also 252.
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The men are weary almost to death; they would like to drop the things where they
are and quit. But the enemy can afford to run day and night shifts. Five German
divisions will oppose the attack; five German divisions no longer exist. Even now
the last remnants might hold were the opposing numbers not so great. The life is
not yet all extinguished in the German trenches. Man is tougher than steel, harder
to master even than gas.53
As can be seen from this quote, Johannsen’s soldiers too have heroic qualities (“tougher
than steel, harder to master than gas”) yet, at the same time, the author acknowledges that
these men did not stand a chance against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.
Both novels run roughly parallel, but with very strategic divergences. Johannsen,
like Remarque, juxtaposes fine, upstanding soldiers with the brutality and senselessness
of the war as such. His soldiers are older, however, so they are not as naïve as Bäumer
and his friends. Their discussions of the war are thus less puerile, even profound. Job,
father of three and foreman in a factory, for example, explains that he did not shout
“Hurra!” in 1914. He is quite aware that it is mostly workers and other Muschkoten
(“grunts”) who do the dirty work in this war. He also says that ideas like Vaterland and
Heimat do not exist for workers, “industrial guys” (Industriekerls).54 In one longer
monologue, the student expounds his viewpoint on the riddle about how European men,
who supposedly stood so high, could have fallen so low within two years of war:
In 1914, people thought they had the measure of this delicate, tame, Christian
European. Then lo! suddenly, overnight, he became an unexplored mystery. And
what became of that pre-August man? The tame man, the man from whom the last
feeble rudiments of savagery had been removed by schooling, education,
profession, law, public opinion and the fear of ghosts. The man, so well broken in,
who wore his harness unprotestingly, only thankful to be allowed to live at all.
Workmen, mildly agitating for a fair wage, and scattering in haste at the mere
53 Ernst Johannsen, Four Infantrymen (New York: Alfred H. King, 1930), 214.
54 Murdoch, “Tierische Menschen” 253.
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approach of the gendarme […]. And that other man, the fellow in the forefront of
progress, trumpeting against corporal punishment, basement-tenements, child
labor […]. The man who founded societies for the prevention of cruelty to
animals, blubbering over the death-penalty; and then, good citizen, submitting to
two or three years’ military service for Fatherland, God, and King, with as mild a
grace as to the rain and the sunshine. Little … in a word. Little, unassuming,
tame, scared of the rod. (Johannsen 67-68)
The student goes on to explain that the Hurrapatriotismus and the Kriegsbegeisterung of
1914 made heroes out of everyone, or so they thought: “And then suddenly in the
twinkling of an eye, these tame, domestic fowls, these men turned to veritable heroes,
roaring ‘Hurrah!’” (Johannsen 68).
He compares the illusion of heroism to wearing masks: “Jeering they went,
sneering at the enemy; transfigured overnight, unrecognizable, masked. Yes, masked is
the word” (68). The student brilliantly exposes the mechanism with which the German
male bourgeoisie could be so easily manipulated by Prussian militarism.55 Along with the
over-use of the word “Held” (hero) came the over-use of the word “Feigling” (coward).
Military service became the one and only criterion of male valor, a black-and-white
scheme: whoever did not or could not enlist was simply not a real man, not a hero, but a
coward, a weakling, or a traitor. Kriegsbegeisterung was a gigantic mechanism of peer-
pressure from which no man could escape, not even the “tame fowl”: “These poor tame
creatures put on the mask of heroes born, and bravely would they play the part that was
given them. War! Here was a real sensation at last, and the Fatherland blameless as
usual” (68).
55 The promise of heroism represents an irresistible temptation to early twentieth-century man: “The Hero’s
mask is a congenial one, and well-drilled domestic fowls are hardly to be distinguished from true heroes.
Words can do most things; with a mob words can do anything, small wonder then if for the first year none
doubted but that he was a hero” (Johannsen, Four Infantrymen, 68-69).
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Two years into the war, as the novel portrays it, the mask came off and soldiers
grew tired of the war, the dirt, the deprivations, the permanent terror. Yet the hero-trap
continued to work because, at this point, men had already endured too much not to be
considered heroes, even if the concept had become hollow on the inside: “What! You
dare tell me that men who went out to face such things as this, with scarce a penny a day
to put in their purses, are not heroes? Well, let me tell you, though they may not have
been heroes before, now they have become them” (69).
The importance of this insight cannot be underestimated as a central component to
how the memories of World War I were reworked in Weimar. What Johannsen draws
attention to is precisely the issue that fueled the masculinity culture war of the 1920s:
what is a hero? The right wing, as already argued in Chapter two, would argue that the
German soldier hero mustered the strength, courage, and endurance to hold out under the
most gruesome circumstances. The fact that men did continue to fight proves that they
were heroes willing to die for the fatherland. The left wing/pacifist position, as we will
see in the following excerpt from the student’s monologue, argues that such a definition
of heroism is, in fact, a misconception that was encouraged by the military elite and its
war propaganda:
What actually happened was this: All the glamour, the glory, the ardor –
everything of 1914 slowly perished. The hero’s death has become a byword;
slight wounds are welcomed as ‘home-shots’ a chance of escape; men whose jobs
kept them away from the front were pitied then as being shut off from glory, but
now they are the ‘lucky bastards’; the hated enemy has become the ‘Comrade’
lying in the same mire; the ‘calling-up paper’ is now used as a threat, a thing of
terror, menacing; decorations are called ‘tin-ware’ to be issued along with the new
mess-tins; and the ‘holy war’ has turned into this ‘God-damned mess.’ (69)
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The student argues that “real heroes” would understand the mechanism, realize that they
were deceived, and consequently refuse to carry on: “They would knock off, go home.
And though they might get shot, what is mere death to heroes who have endured so
much?” (70).
This explanation completely reverses the masculinity ideal that was used during
World War I to keep men in line, and that men desperately clung to to keep themselves in
line. In fact, Johannsen argues that a hero is actually the opposite of what the military, or
the right-wing nationalists, claimed.56 According to Johannsen, these men were not
heroes but slaves, too afraid to rebel against military authority and too afraid to abandon
the false concept of manhood they had believed in:
Now too cowardly, too slavish to turn homeward, we go forward once again.
What else can such sorry cattle do? But in the meantime we have found out that
we are no heroes. And if some naïve soul should say to one of us ‘you hero’ we
would merely grin. We know better. More than that – we sneer at ‘heroes’, at the
‘hero’s death’, at what they call ‘love of the country’, at the whole rigmarole. We
have penetrated behind the war, behind patriotism, behind the heroes. The shells
have taught us day by day. (70)
This begs the question, of course, why there were not more deserters.
For soldiers who shared Johannsen’s point of view, desertion would have been an
honorable thing to do. He suggests that there were no true heroes to lead the many, “born
heroes, such as cannot be otherwise. It is for them we have been waiting” (71).
(B) EDLEF KÖPPEN, HEERESBERICHT (1929)
56 The same reversal of the term “Held” serves as a leitmotif in Lothar Günter Buchheim’s novel Das Boot,
as well as in Wolfgang Petersen’s 1981 film version.
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One hero in the mode of Johannsen plays the main role in Edlef Köppen’s
Heeresbericht, another of the novels trying to capitalize on and extend Im Westen nichts
Neues for a more discriminating audience. A pacifist, he may not lead or encourage
anyone else to lay down arms, but he does arrive at that decision for himself,
demonstrating a process of Selbstbildung to a non-militaristic cause. His name is Adolf
Reisiger, and he, like Paul Bäumer, is a young student who chose to volunteer for army
duty. But Reisiger, unlike Bäumer, also takes responsibility for it as he makes his
Bildungsreise through the trenches. He is a volunteer, twenty-one years old, and after a
few weeks of basic training, in the fall of 1914, he arrives at his assigned artillery unit
somewhere on the border between Belgium and France, south of Arras -- familiarly, the
scene of some of the fiercest battles of the war. Here, a real man and a real soldier will
come to choose differently than Germany itself had.
The story is mostly told in third-person narration. In the beginning, Reisiger feels
genuine war excitement: he enjoys the new surroundings, the soldierly lifestyle, the thrill
of approaching the front lines, watching artillery fire in the distance. What frustrates him
during his first few weeks are routine drills that are obviously senseless, such as washing
and repainting the ammunition truck, or shoveling dirt off the road. Reisiger can’t wait to
see “the real war.” He is anxious to get to the front lines, but, first and foremost, he is
happy to be part of it all. In his first letter home, he writes, "Feuerstellung vor Arras. Bin
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sehr glücklich. Nette Kameraden (ja, es gibt wirklich so etwas; alles wie eine grosse
Familie, auch hier an der Front).”57
The first time he is assigned to night-time trench digging, a comrade reminds him
that the enemy is only a few yards away, and that even small noises travel far at night.
They listen, and indeed they can hear the noises of people coughing, dogs barking, carts
rattling. Reisiger reflects on the clashing concepts of “familiar sounds” and “strange
enemy”: “Das also ist der Feind? Aber keinen Augenblick kommt das Bewusstsein
‘Feind’ in Reisiger auf. Das alles klingt wie friedliches Leben. Hundebellen,
Lokomotivenpfiff, Geräusch von Wagen: das alles ist fast eine Vision der Heimat” (34).
Thirty pages into the story, Reisiger has not seen a single enemy soldier, he has only
heard them working on their trenches in the middle of the night. But his keen perception
informs him that, despite his bubbling Kriegsbegeisterung, the French are people like the
Germans. He senses familiarity, not hostility (a trope picked up in the recent film Joyeux
Noël [2005], about the Christmas truce and its anti-war implications). This initial
realization, a not unusual pre-war sense of European internationalism, lies at the heart of
his growing dislike of the war.
His first sighting of dead German infantrymen leaves him feeling uneasy and
aesthetically shocked, but mostly because these men had died in surprisingly life-like
positions, as if they were still aiming to fire their rifles. Reisiger receives his first real
shock, however, during his “baptism of fire” when a surprise attack hits his artillery unit.
A commanding officer had just raised his hand to indicate “ready to fire” when a French
57 Edlef Köppen, Heeresbericht (München: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 2004) 32.
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shrapnel explodes nearby. When Reisiger opens his eyes a second later, he hears the man
groaning in pain, and he sees a fountain of blood gushing out of the stump where his left
hand used to be. To Reisiger, this first jolt is an eye-opener:
Reisiger hat ein Zittern in den Knien, das ihn schüttelt. Und im Hals würgt etwas. Das
also ist der Krieg! Da steht ein Mensch, laut und kräftig, mit provozierendem Mut.
Die Sonne scheint, und es ist blauer Himmel. Plötzlich liegt der Mensch am Boden.
Und Blut spritzt. Und der Mensch wird nach Hause gehen und niemals im Leben
wieder eine linke Hand haben. Das ist ja ekelhaft! (43)
After this initiation into the reality of war, Reisiger has come to two important
realizations: the enemy makes the same sounds we make -- he is entirely like us -- and
war will maim and kill in a disgusting and random fashion -- it is therefore wrong. These
insights continue to fester in him until he eventually refuses to participate another day.
For the time being, he is proud to be in the front lines and excited to contribute to the
German war effort.
It becomes increasingly clear that Reisiger has the qualities outstanding soldiers
are made of: he is intelligent (tedious drills insult his intelligence), he always follows
orders, he is a loyal comrade, and, above all, he is absolutely fearless. One time, under
particularly heavy enemy fire, Reisiger gets injured and separated from his unit. Luckily,
a field doctor finds him and sends him to a dressing station where he could easily stay
until full recovery. But the thought of his battery being short of soldiers haunts him, so he
leaves the hospital early to return to his unit. If he has one flaw, from a military point of
view, it is the fact that he thinks too much.
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Like Paul Bäumer, Reisiger derives satisfaction and a sense of belonging from the
military environment. Belonging to the German artillery forces gives his existence a
place and a function it never had; the things he used to worry about are now remote:
Er war so glücklich wie selten vorher in seinem Leben. Er hatte sich niemals so
unbelastet gefühlt. Was kann mir geschehen? Es gibt keinerlei Sorgen. Alle
Menschen müssen gut sein, denn alle Menschen sind deutsche Soldaten und
Kameraden. Man kann sich hinlegen und schlafen: man weiss, man wird aufwachen
wie im sichersten Zuhause, nicht bestohlen, nicht überfallen […]. (93)
Taking seriously the notion of a Bildungsreise through the course of the war, Reisiger
stays in the war almost from beginning to end. His unit moves from here to there.
Sometimes they become trapped in heavy fire, other times they are fortunate enough to
be stationed in relatively calm positions. Reisiger fulfills his duty, survives his injuries,
visits his parents, even spends some time on the Russian front. He likes some comrades
better than others, but he is generally on good terms with all of them. His courage never
fails him, but his attitude toward the war deteriorates. In the end, he has become a
Lieutenant, but too bitter and disillusioned to continue his duty. After a particularly
devastating tank attack and heavy losses among his men, he cannot stand the absurdity
for another day. So he decides to ignore orders, to never follow another order again, and,
consequently, is sent to an insane asylum: “Da Reisiger, wie man ihn findet und zum
Generalkommando führt, erklärt, dass er den Krieg für das grösste aller Verbrechen hält,
verhaftet man ihn und sperrt ihn ins Irrenhaus” (388).
Significant for the reception of the novel, this story is largely autobiographical.
Edlef Köppen is indeed one of the few German war time authors who experienced World
279
War I from start to finish (Remarque served from 1916-18). When the war ended, he was
in fact behind the walls of a mental institution in Mainz, Germany. In September, 1918,
he had taken to open disobedience in an attempt to resolve the conflict between fulfilling
one’s duty as a soldier and contributing to the amorality of war. He was discharged as
Lieutenant of the Reserves and decorated with the Iron Cross. Due to the chaotic times
following the war, he never had to face the legal consequences of what he had done. The
injuries he had suffered during the war, especially the contusion of his lungs, led to
continuous health and career problems, and to his untimely death in 1939. Not
surprisingly, Heeresbericht was blacklisted and burned by the Nazis, and it was
unavailable in Germany until the 1970s.58
Heeresbericht is thus inspired by much the same pacifist passion that fuelled Im
Westen nichts Neues, but it is in a different league as a literary achievement and as a
fictionalized account of the war. Like Döblin in Berlin Alexanderplatz and Dos Passos in
Three Soldiers, Köppen uses montage to offset the narrative -- to make his realistic
depiction of the war experience without claiming complete authority over the experience
or giving the impression that "everyone" would reach the same conclusions. The material
he employs for this montage stems from “the world back home,” mostly newspaper
clippings, advertisements, or cabaret menus. Be he also inserts official government
communication, e.g. army reports, announcements, or guidelines on censorship. What
makes this technique so effective is the startling juxtaposition it reveals -- how the novel
58 Compare Roman Schafnitzel, “Die vergessene Collage des Ersten Weltkriegs: Edlef Köppen,
Heeresbericht (1930),” Thomas F. Schneider and Hans Wagener, eds., Von Richthofen bis Remarque:
Deutschsprachige Prosa zum I. Weltkrieg (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2003) 325.
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aims at educating its readers through its own consciousness-raising. If readers believe the
narrative about Reisiger, which switches between first and third person narration, then it
is difficult for them to give any credence to what the “official” discourse makes of the
same events.
Even today, this montage approach remains challenging for the reader who must
watch the mechanics of propaganda at work and and gradually realize how remote and
how detached these front line soldiers were from the impoverished, but normal, life at
home. But where this novel tries for balance in the parties through its montage, others
took more overtly partisan viewpoints.
(C) ALEXANDER MORITZ FREY, DIE PFLASTERKÄSTEN (1929)
Perhaps the most interesting forgotten novel of the era connects Weimar and the
Nazi era most overtly. Before the war, Alexander Moritz Frey (1881-1957) had been
attracted to the realm of the fantastic in his poetry and prose. In 1907, he moved to
Munich and became friends with Thomas Mann. Frey published a much-lauded
collection of short stories, entitled Dunkle Gänge, in 1913, as well as a novel, Solneman
der Unsichtbare, in 1914. During the First World War, he actually got to know Adolf
Hitler because both served in the same regiment. Hitler attempted to befriend Frey and
take advantage of his literary talent, but Frey refused and kept his distance, disgusted by
Hitler’s ideas and opportunistic demeanor. This explains why Frey had to flee into exile
(Austria and Switzerland) after Hitler came to power. Frey died in Zurich, impoverished
and nearly forgotten.
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In 1929, he published the novel Die Pflasterkästen: Ein Feldsanitätsroman, which
takes an unflinching look at the gruesome reality of the Western Front between
September 1915 and the near end of the war, seen through the eyes of the first-person
narrator, the paramedic Funk. The novel is quite openly autobiographical, though Hitler
plays no role in it.59 Unlike Remarque’s episodic structure, Pflasterkästen follows a
strictly chronological narrative scheme, like Köppen’s Heeresbericht or Renn’s Krieg,
but it is not based on a diary-format. In this story, a more classic Bildungsroman about
the front experience from a purportedly neutral point of view, Funk emerges as a total
individualist and a keen observer. He rejects the constraints of any ideology, including
those of pacifism, although he did decide to join the paramedics so that he would not
have to participate in the madness of shooting at people.60
Of all the protagonists described in this chapter, Sergeant Funk most closely
resembles Reisiger because both are individualists as well as courageous and sober
observers who manage to stay in control until one final order pushes them over the edge,
and they decide to rebel. In Funk’s case, he is sent to the front because he failed to greet
an officer in the communications zone. Müller describes his reaction as follows:
In diesem Augenblick brennen bei Funk alle Sicherungen durch, er will “nicht
mehr mitmachen.” Seinem Stabsarzt schreit er entgegen: “Ich will, will, will die
Wahrheit sagen – ich will sagen: Militär und Krieg sind die albernste,
schamloseste, dümmste Gemeinheit von der Welt. Dieser Ausbruch des
Sanitätsunteroffiziers Funk – der von dem verständnisvollen Stabsarzt mit einem
“Persilschein” in die Heimat geschickt wird – enthält zugleich die These von […]




Die Pflasterkästen, der ein pazifistischer Roman von beachtlicher literarischer
Qualität ist. (Müller 100)
Funk’s loss of control, however, is carefully built up throughout the narration. He has
over two years front service behind him at this point, so it is understandable he has
reached his breaking point -- the point where he becomes politically aware.
With regard to their approach to the unspeakable horror of the war, Frey, Köppen,
and Renn are diametrically opposed to Remarque: where he wailed “poor me!” they said
“just look at this.” Frey, Köppen, and Renn created protagonists whose emotional
expressions remain understated, yet due to their more convincing psychological
development, these soldiers’ responses are entirely plausible. What they say rings true
and accurate because, throughout their military service, they distinguish themselves as
critical observers of their environment, including the shortcomings of fellow soldiers.
This does not make them likeable, but it does make them credible. Remarque’s Bäumer,
by contrast, is neither an individualist nor a critical observer. If readers want to relate to
him, their only choice is really to pity him as victim, a passive witness to events.
In this case, Frey's Funk, like the student in Johannsen’s Four Infantrymen, sees
through the military establishment’s façade of decorating men for the wounds they
suffered, for instance. In this scene, he is engaged in conversation with Doctor Lipp about
a soldier named Pöffel, who still has not been decorated even though he was severely
wounded while cleaning weapons. Funk does not seem to understand:
“And why didn’t he get it?” he asks. “Can’t you understand that?” asks Lipp
impatiently. “It was only an accident. He might just as easily fallen off a ladder or
swallowed a shoe-nail in his food. They don’t decorate you for that. They must
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draw the line somewhere. Or why not include among the distinguished the boil
champions, or the appendix operations.” “They all surely deserve to be
decorated,” says Funk in a low voice. “You’ve got some queer notions,” says the
staff surgeon. “And what remains of the idea of heroism?” “Yes – what does
remain?” retorts Funk.61
His superior feels provoked by this, of course, and emphasizes that he himself applied for
decoration. Funk is not interested in an argument, so he deflates the situation:
“It was talking about the idea of heroism that introduced the personal element. It
wasn’t my doing, anyhow, Sir. Isn’t the hero nowadays always someone who’s
had an accident, so to speak? If I go up to the line and come back whole, I’m in
luck. Just in the same way as Pöffel was out of luck.”
The staff surgeon speaks condescendingly through his hooked nose: “You’re a
Jesuit, Funk – a sophist, I can see. To merit a decoration there must be the will to
accomplish something.”
“Quite right, Sir. But Pöffel had the will. So has every man out here. He had the
will to be a soldier, the willingness to conform to a soldier’s life. To split up this
mass of willingness into parts and call some men heroic and others unheroic is not
logical.” (81)
At this point, most readers would realize, Funk is right! He expresses many valuable
insights throughout the book, like Reisiger, but both are too engaged in fulfilling their
duties (Pflichterfüllung) to stage open rebellion sooner than they do. That is, these heroes
may actually see less than the audience does, and so, although they are heroes of the war
era as opposed to supermen for a future utopia, their readers can still identify with them.
One stylistic feature sets Die Pflasterkästen apart from the other novels in this
group, namely the sub-plot about the staff surgeon, Dr. Lipp, and his proclivity for secret
gardening, which casts into relief the abysmal absurdity of the war in an almost
Expressionist fashion. Lipp is often absent from duty because he is busy tending to his
61 Alexander Moritz Frey, The Cross Bearers: A Story of the Medical Corps (New York: The Viking Press,
1930) 80-81.
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mushroom, strawberry or asparagus patches, which are the true joy of his existence.62
Lipp finds his job aesthetically offensive:
“They can’t expect me to spend my days coaxing abscesses ripe like my
strawberries, and then lovingly opening them and gently pressing out the core into
absorbent cotton. It makes me sick […]. Who is it that really doing something for
the men’s health? Look you, Funk, it’s I! All the stomach complaints we have to
combat here are due to the soldiers having to stuff tinned meat into their bellies
and getting no fresh vegetables with it. And who grows vegetables, unwearyingly,
day and night? Who, Funk? I do.” (82-83)
The absurdity of such comparisons underscore for a reader the hopelessness and anguish
of meaningless suffering.
Ironically, readers come to understand that Dr. Lipp is right, too: whether or not
he carefully treats the soldiers’ boils makes no difference. His work, like any
humanitarian effort, is a drop in the ocean in such a political environment. He might as
well be growing strawberries. Such alternative expressions of despair also play a role in
the remaining novel to be discussed in this chapter, as part of a group of novels that
connects the past front with the present homefront emotionally as well as politically.
(D) KARL FEDERN, HAUPTMANN LATOUR (1929)
Not surprisingly, a novel that connects the home and warfronts will again take a
broader picture of German history. Hauptmann Latour is the product of a joint effort
made by the Austrian writer and translator Karl Federn (1868-1943) and the Officer
Hubert E. Gilbert (born 1889), who was a cynic, had a Scottish mother, adored
62 Dr. Lipp is to The Cross Bearers what Milo Minderbinder is to Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 (1961).
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Shakespeare, and fought in the war for four years.63 His literary correlative, Fritz Talbot
Freiherr Latour von Saint-Aubin, works for the Berlin General Staff and is sent to Britain
for reconnaissance work on British war preparations. His assessment displeases his
superiors and he is transferred to an artillery regiment. He does his job well, both in
France and on the Eastern Front, but he lives in inner exile because he had already
decided in 1914 “wie sinnlos eigentlich diese ganze Schießerei in Europa ist.”64
Taking his characterization from a time well before the Great War, Captain
Latour embodies the noble spirit of a knight. He is the figure that Ferd’s father, the “Red
Major” in Glaeser’s Jahrgang 1902 would have become if he had lived to fight in the
war. His disenfranchisement from his peer-group, fellow Prussian officers, is brought
about by his colleagues’ narrow-mindedness and Germano-mania. Unlike these Prussians
who resemble the German general staff of World War I, he is brave, highly educated and
a competent officer, but completely disillusioned with Germany’s leadership and mission
in the war. Like Arnold Friedrich Vieth von Golßenau alias Ludwig Renn, he decides to
abandon his military career after the war to become a student because he is “fed up with
the whole thing”: “Ich hab keine Lust, mich von den Kerls, die jetzt im K.[riegs]
M.[inisterium] und in den Stäben oder sonstwo rumsitzen, schurigeln zu lassen.”65
It is clear to him that his political and moral convictions contradict what his job
demands of him. He also knows that the war cannot be won for Germany, yet it never





and a defining aspect of his personality: “Der Krieg ist nicht zu gewinnen. Aber ich
drücke mich nicht. Darüber ist gar nicht zu reden.”66 He thus adopts a jovial and
somewhat cynical perspective to cope with the irreconcilable clash between his mindset
and his duties. He even ponders whether the war could be considered a sport.67 However,
he is too much of a humanist to actually begin thinking that way: “[…] aber ihm ist klar,
daß der moderne Krieg sich nicht in der Metaphorik eines sportlichen Wettstreits
interpretieren läßt. Den Gaskrieg empfindet er als ‘Gemeinheit’; den Sinn strategisch
nutzloser, aber überaus verlustreicher Gegenangriffe, in denen Soldaten einer
‘Prestigefrage’ geopfert werden, vermag er nicht ‘einzusehen’” (Müller 103).
Like Ludwig Renn, Hauptmann Latour becomes a champion of the anti-war
bourgeoisie because he turns away from the aristocracy and their military equivalent, the
arrogant officers’ clique. In the eyes of the middle-class reader, this makes him more
human and a more convincing candidate for possessing common sense. Yet ultimately,
neither Renn nor Latour facilitate working-class reader-identification, however, because
their personal careers are too unusual, and their characters intellectual and aloof. No
wonder, then, that the novels' sales did not reach the heights of either those with a
broader cast of characters, or Remarque's own, with its carefully controlled focus on the
guilt of the older generation and the innocence of its sons, eliminating externalized
politics in favor of the politics of the personal.
66 Ibid.
67 Both Manfred von Richthofen and Ernst Jünger adopted the attitude that warfare represented the ultimate
sport (comp. chapter three).
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4.4 CONCLUSION
My main argument is that Remarque’s Im Westen nichts Neues far exceeded other
anti-war novels in popularity precisely because it appealed through its universality to
working-class and bourgeois readers alike. Paul Bäumer is not even necessarily German:
he stands for any innocent boy soldier who was drafted into an unjust war under false
pretenses; what happens to him has allegorical undertones. As such, the novel is a wide-
open projection screen for anyone who also felt victimized by the war in any way. Im
Westen nichts Neues seems to address the plight of these young soldiers as much as the
future plight of the survivors, but only ostensibly. Bäumer and his comrades die in the
war, so there is no connection between them and the Weimar Republic or any other
political vision, other than in Remarque’s and his readers’ minds, cleverly emphasized
through the dedication: “Dieses Buch soll weder eine Anklage noch ein Bekenntnis sein.
Es soll nur den Versuch machen, über eine Generation zu berichten, die vom Kriege
zerstört wurde – auch wenn sie seinen Granaten entkam.” Through this invitation to the
reader, Remarque created a perfect victim’s tale that intentionally eschews historical
place and time references.
The eight other novels discussed in this chapter, with the possible exception of
Glaeser’s Jahrgang 1902, are not made for mass taste. They do not exploit the common
soldiers victim status as fully or as sentimentally as Im Westen nichts Neues does. On the
contrary, their protagonist develops an understanding into the mechanisms that drew
them into the military. They thus accept a measure of personal responsibility, and, with
the exception of Soldat Suhren and Jahrgang 1902, they engage in more classical
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processes of Bildung into a community of some sort, and do not put forth blanket
accusations. Whichever judgments they pass tend to be nuanced and developed from
within the story. Even Der Streit um den Sergeanten Grischa, which does target the weak
moral resolve of the German war bureaucracy, is not a black-and-white picture.
A common denominator for all these novels is, of course, their rejection of the
war as an atrocious and senseless business, as well as a sense of alienation from families
and familiar surroundings. But more importantly, with the exception of the artist in
uniform, Soldat Suhren, all these novels also lavish a generous measure of male virtues
onto the protagonists. I argue that the development of the male protagonists remains a
sub-text, but that this sub-text carries the messages that were really important to German
readers in the late 1920s: they wanted to see proof of valor and integrity even in those
who came to despise the war as such. Johannsen’s Four Infantrymen openly suggests that
desertion would have been the bravest choice in light of trench warfare's absurdity.
Reisiger in Heeresbericht and Funk in Pflasterkästen reach their breaking-points and
subsequently refuse to participate in the war, yet not a single one of these men ever
shows signs of cowardice or egotism. Not one of them mutilates himself or deserts. They
continue to do the best they can, regardless of the circumstances, and that is what
ultimately accounts for their therapeutic appeal to the readers.
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Conclusion
Previous research on Weimar Republic war fiction tended to approach it as
intertwined with the political debate that waged back and forth at the time. The
exploration of the nexus between literary production and socio-political developments is
certainly worthwhile, but it tends to forget other important functions of reading literature.
One of my main arguments in this project is that the typical middle-class German man of
1928 did not consume war fiction in order to determine his own political standpoint with
regard to the lost war -- his views were already firmly in place, inherited from his fathers
and grandfathers.
Instead, the war fiction summoned up these older stereotypes to deal with a
current psychological problem rather than present a new political and social idea.
Through these novels, the front veteran was given a tool, however inadequate, to fathom
the decline of his status as a German man, as well as by the desire to derive some sort of
meaning from the enormous sacrifices most people had made. The bottom line indicated
by the success of Im Westen nichts Neues and its peers from left and right is thus a severe
political consequence for Weimar Germany: a generation of veterans (and presumably
their families) were habituated to think in terms of personal politics, not national
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politics.1 Their horizon of expectation was receptive to human messages addressed to
them as men, not to political messages addressed to them as Germans.
This lack of a political or collective vision of what the war meant for the country
would be critical, I believe, in explaining the utter failure of the Weimar Republic to be
able to craft a viable political vision for the country, and the ease with which a low-
ranking individual war veteran -- Hitler -- could present his own war experience as
paradigmatic and have it taken as a viable political program by so many readers. The
Germany that read Remarque and made him the best-seller of an era knew that its
manhood had been left in the trenches and that the ongoing legacy of the Great War for
the survivors was only a sense of personal loss and betrayal, not any larger connection
with political and economic realities of the world after the Great War.
What I have presented as a culture war about World War I (1919-1932) thus took
its public dynamics from a heavily politicized debate over all kinds of literary production,
including letters, diaries, memoirs, plays, poems, and novels. The only genre that gained
fundamental importance and large-scale resonance (judged by sales figures), however,
was the novel, much more popular because it possessed qualities that the other genres
lacked vis-à-vis a broader public. These qualities included the flexibility to adapt
traditional narrative models (e.g. Bildungsroman, Abenteuerroman, Episoden-Erzählung,
Künstlerroman) to the new and overwhelming topos of World War I, as well as the
1 I firmly believe that readers continued to think what they already thought about the war and the political
system of the Weimar Republic. Public opinion was already too polarized in 1928 for the novels to have
much swaying power. Again, the opposing factions were firmly entrenched. There was no member of the
Stahlhelm or the early SA who read Im Westen nichts Neues, thought about it, and then changed his political
ideology.
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ability to incorporate subtle sub-texts -- in this case: therapeutic messages for German
men -- into a set of narratives that effectively used personal experience to occlude
political rhetorics of any sort beyond the Dolchstoß.
I have argued here that the entire critical debate about the different authors’
political viewpoints or intentions was a wildly exaggerated and misguided surface
phenomenon that actually rested on a fairly limited set of variables defining Germany and
the German public and almost equating that "German public" almost exclusively with
"the German male." The fabled instability and vacillations of Weimar politics may
actually be less a sign of creativity and reformation than one of a male public sphere that
was based on a stubbornly preserved sense of Germanness, a stereotype impervious to
political redefinition. In this reading, the Dolchstoß becomes less a political narrative
than a claim that the German male "died on the front" due to political ineptitude.
Erich Maria Remarque himself is the best example of the pose that may have been
typical for this generation, whether left or right, bourgeois or lower nobility (and
probably less so for the proletariat which was more actively confronting the economic
failures of Weimar): he professed over and over again that he knew nothing about politics
and did not want to interfere with national politics. Not surprisingly, however, his critics
permanently attempted to support or discredit him as if his message had a nuanced
political message beyond "war is bad" for individuals' health. The bourgeois anti-war
camp supported him, the bourgeois pro-war camp discredited him as a pacifist, and the
radical left (often including the pacifists) viewed warfare as endemic in capitalist society
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and thus rejected anything from the bourgeois camps that might have pointed out a link
between the bourgeois cultural identity and war.
Critics at the time were unable to disassociate themselves from the moral
imperative of echoing their political convictions in their literary criticism -- or rather,
they were unable to see the distance between this psychologized literature and anything
like an analysis of what politics might actually correlate with the trench experience of the
First World War. Once Im Westen nichts Neues became the focus of a power struggle
between the political left and the völkisch-nationalist right wing -- hence immediately
after its publication -- , public reception ceased to be anything but reactive. The novel's
critics could not reach out beyond their own political molds; the novel never was able to
reveal itself as a simple tear-jerker with little political content, or to spur a serious
investigation of why all those Paul Bäumers were sent to the trenches (to fill in the
narrative and political blanks that I pointed to briefly near the end of the last chapter). All
reviewers were concerned with the political implications of the novel and sought to
appropriate it to their respective cause, but hardly any of them analyzed its literary
characteristics or its subliminal (let alone overt) political and social messages. Therefore,
it is not surprising that the extant scholarly analyses of that critical reception have yielded
the same results.2
In an effort to complement the existing debate, I aimed to bring to the foreground
one of the reasons why I believe Im Westen nichts Neues hit a sensitive spot with German
2 Compare, for example, Hans-Harald Müller, Der Krieg und die Schriftsteller, and Michael Gollbach, Die
Wiederkehr des Weltkriegs in der Literatur.
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readers. By providing both a new explanation that actually did not require change (a
diagnosis of German masculinity under fire that actually reinforced conservative
elements originating a century earlier) and a new scapegoat, namely the parent generation
and the Dolchstoß, it filled a large vacuum for all those who had not otherwise bought
into the Dolchstoß-myth. Remarque’s idea was brilliant because it fed two strata of
readers exactly what they wanted to hear: by making forty-year-old Katczinsky the true
working-class hero of the story, Remarque exculpated the petite bourgeoisie and the
German workers from war guilt. At the same time, the younger generation of bourgeois
Germans -- Paul Bäumer and his friends -- emerge as innocent victims, abused and
sacrificed by their recklessly authoritarian fathers, the evil “Wilhelminians.” Being the
cultural chameleon that he was, Remarque thus harked back to a discourse from the late
nineteenth century by adopting the humanist voice of the liberal reform pedagogues in
the generational debate (see chapter four, section three). In other words, he (with a little
help from his publisher) positioned his bland narrative at the intersection of the
traditional, apolitical Bildungsroman and the reformist, even iconoclastic
Generationenroman, a crossroads that turned out to be a neuralgic cultural area. In this
sense, it also seemingly contributed to resurrecting German masculinity in purely human
terms, without relying on völkisch-nationalist messages. It delineated the aspects of
German masculinity that, handed-down from the nineteenth century as they were, could
still be counted as functioning male virtues, especially courage, camaraderie, and
resourcefulness.
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This, at least, is what Remarque and his fellow bourgeois novelists would have us
believe. In hindsight, it appears that the limited scope of this masculinity model left
German men ill-equipped for the challenges of modernity, and vulnerable to the heavily
aestheticized Nazi-allure. By weaving an early nineteenth-century concept of German
masculinity into their early twentieth-century battlefield discourse, the novelists on the
left as well as the right essentially constructed a backward-looking utopia.3 For the right-
wingers, this utopia also encompassed an imagined state of national unity, a concept
which surfaces in their novels as the microcosm of the Frontgemeinschaft. The leftist-
liberal writers generally pushed the same concept, but not for its political implications.
To them, the Frontgemeinschaft rather served as (imagined) evidence that even the
gruesome reality of the war had not shattered the core concepts of pure German
masculinity. The Frontgemeinschaft epitomizes “how good men treat each other” and is
presented as something precious and beautiful amidst the horror.4 In other words, most of
the bourgeois writers intentionally withdrew from the political discussion about the
origins and consequences of the war in order to distill what they regarded as the pure,
innocent essence of their imagined front soldiers. This distilled essence was, as Im
Westen nichts Neues proved, a much desired tonic for hundreds of thousands of male
readers at the time.
3 This utopian vision is relatively subtle in Remarque and his leftist-liberal colleagues. Moving further to
the right on the political spectrum, the utopian dream of German masculinity becomes so heavily
mythologized that it loses its connection to (historical) reality altogether. What seems to have fanned the
fantasies of Schauwecker, Beumelburg, Wehner, and other right-wing militarists were not only visions of
Jahn and other anti-French fighters, but also archetypal warrior images, like Arminius defeating the Roman
legions.
4 The only author that we have seen breaking this mold was Adam Scharrer in his Vaterlandslose Gesellen.
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The boiling-down of a complex historical phenomenon to a mere essence of
masculine, and allegedly German, characteristics presented an ideal loophole through
which the bourgeois stratum of society could escape acknowledging the need for political
solutions other than war. Concepts and institutions of national politics were, in effect,
dissolved in favor of a common denominator of personal politics, manifest in the
fictionalized representations of the German male. Like the acerbic political debates of the
apolitical battlefield fiction it embraced, the public mind had stopped to distinguish
between what was and what was not actually political. Due to the immensity of the
unassimilated trauma, everything pertaining to the war simultaneously affected the
personal politics of its veterans. At this point, war fiction came to their rescue. Through
their stories of “deformation” (Rückbildungsromane), the bourgeois novelists essentially
turned back the clock by a full century, to an unverifiable state of masculine intactness
that supposedly existed during the Wars of Liberation, as if that would compensate for
failed political action. Like a snail retreating into its shell, they created an “inside world”
-- impenetrable to criticism by non-veterans -- in which there were no women, no public,
no masses, no Weimar Republic, no Bildung, not even a bourgeoisie, and, of course, no
lost war -- hence an ahistorical utopia of man’s paradise; men in the bliss of innocence
before the fall.
The implications of this withdrawal from national politics are enormous.
According to my argument in Chapters three and four, one of the major differences
between Remarque and the other authors like him was that Im Westen nichts Neues
radically dissolved the individual in favor of the Paul Bäumer everyman. As we can see
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now, this “trick” accomplished more than just generate identification, or popular appeal,
on a mass-scale. It also effectively erased the individual and its role in the war discourse.
In Remarque, the individual ceases to exist not only symbolically, but quite literally, by
merging with a collective and seeking refuge behind a smoke-screen of ignorance.5 This
vanishing individual remains beyond reproach because he is a “good German,” only did
his duty, and was thrown into the carnage and the chaos by someone else. If Paul
Bäumer is a bourgeois everyman, than everyman fled into a political vacuum at the
precise historical moment when he could have and should have taken a political stance on
the stage of the real world.
Since Paul Bäumer fails to take a stance, Remarque ultimately betrayed his
audience. With the superficial air of an iconoclast, he presented a new Dolchstoß aimed
at the belligerent and authoritarian Wilhelminians, but his dagger hurt no one. On the
textual level, Bäumer and the other boys do get their revenge, both on Himmelstoß, the
evil drill Sergeant, and on Kantorek, the schoolmaster, but it amounts to beating up the
one and gaining authority over the other. Such juvenile fantasies mark the limit of
Remarque’s “political” analysis of how to deal with, or retaliate against, the men who
brought about the catastrophe. However, Remarque revealed his true political weakness
by failing to offer ideas about political and social changes needed to deal with
catastrophe. Given that it was the best-selling book on the war, many Remarque-fans
apparently appreciated this shallow message of victimhood, as long as it exonerated them
5 The other Remarquians, who did create believable individuals, remained rather insignificant in terms of
popularity and also failed to offer a political vision with which the destruction of the individual could be
historicized or otherwise addressed.
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from participation in democratic resolutions for conflict. Bourgeois Germans, for
whatever reasons, were still in a political slumber when the next catastrophe was already
visible on the horizon.6 They were content to be mollified into thinking that the symbolic
punishment of Kantorek or Himmelstoß somehow set the record straight.
This degree of political inertia, or politische Unmündigkeit, exacerbated by the
bourgoisie’s exclusive focus on personal (gender) politics, did not pass unpunished.
Right-wing militarists were swift to exploit this middle-class state of indecision for their
purposes: within a decade, they had effectively blotted out the remaining leftist-liberal
and pacifist traces in mainstream bourgeois culture with a much more powerful vision of
what German men were or should be. This vision followed a trajectory from
aestheticized hyper-masculine militarism (Jünger, In Stahlgewittern [1920]), to anti-
bourgeois neo-nationalism (Schauwecker, Aufbruch der Nation [1929]), to racist, anti-
Semitic, and anti-communist fascism (Zöberlein, Der Glaube an Deutschland [1930]).
Klaus Theweleit’s Männerfantasien (1977) /Male Fantasies (1989) is certainly
one of the most compelling and original analyses of these developments. His work was
ground-breaking in the sense that it opened up a new view of German Nazism, arguing
that Hitler was no accident, and that National Socialism grew out of more factors than a
German Sonderweg, the Great Depression, or the public resentment of the Versailles
Treaty. Theweleit focused on the period from 1918 to 1923, during which the
paramilitary Freikorps wielded largely unchecked military aggression, including political
6 As we have seen, only few leftist-liberal writers drew attention to the seriousness and scope of this
misjudgment, for example Ernst Johannsen in Vier von der Infantrie and Edlef Köppen in Heeresbericht.
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assassinations, in many regions of the Weimar Republic, for example in Berlin, during
the Kapp-Putsch, in Upper Silesia and other areas of the future Baltic states, in the
Ruhrgebiet during the communist uprising, and during Hitler’s “Beer-Hall Putsch” in
1923.
His view of developing fascism is intensely personal. He develops his argument
through a psycho-analytical reading of individual case-studies of seven prominent figures
in the Freikorps-movement. The men he focused on were Hermann Ehrhardt and Gerhard
Rossbach, both Lieutenants and infamous Freikorps-commanders, Martin Niemöller,
who was a pastor in Münster, Rudolf Höss, the future commander of Auschwitz, Ernst
von Salomon, an aggressively fascist ideologue, General von Lettow-Vorbeck, and
Lieutenant Manfred von Killinger, who would become prime minister of Saxony in 1933.
Through a vast collection of textual evidence, Theweleit cements his main argument that
these Freikorps-men shared a particular socio-psychological pathology vis-à-vis their
various groups of enemies, including Bolsheviks, proletarian workers, Jews, and, above
all, women.
Drawing on a number of psychoanalytic concepts, including the “Male Armor,”
which is a psychological and cultural construct that helps protect the Freikorps-men
against the subversive threats exerted by “Rifle-Women” (Flintenweiber), “Red Nurses,”
and various floods and swamps, Theweleit arrives at an interpretation that posits as a
psychological imperative the fighting-man’s desire to continue fighting even after the
war’s end, given that he cannot allow the dissolution of the male armor. The male armor
had a double function for the Freikorps-fighters: while it did protect them against the
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influence of undesirable forces, it also tormented and imprisoned the men in a rigid,
lifeless world:
The Germans were united in the anti-eroticism of their marital relationships, the
formal quality of their neighborly relations; in the chilly distinctions demanded by
German’s ubiquitous hierarchical systems; in their unspoken knowledge of the
proximity of impenetrable prisons. They were united as wearers of granite
expressions.7
Theweleit emphasizes repeatedly that he does not want to equate the core engineers of
fascism with the masses of future followers. However, he does insist that there must
have been a number of psychological parallels, or common denominators, that
contributed to the merger between active forerunners and passive supporters:
If we accept that fascism cannot be treated simply as a form of seduction or
misrecognition, but that, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, it is a specific
form of production of reality, then analyses of its “core” must be assumed to be
representative -- at least in part -- of the condition of its “followers.”8
According to my own analysis of late Weimar Republic battlefield fiction,
Theweleit correctly directed our attention away from the political sphere and its
institutions to the level of psychology and personal politics. My own findings also
support his claim that it was not, in fact, the war experience that created the hyper-
aggressive male mindset. As described in chapter four, the masculinity model that
regained the upper hand in the late 1920s was actually only a backlash to the nineteenth-
century precursor. In Theweleit’s words:
Yet any analysis that claims the foundations of German fascism to have been laid
by the war and its aftermath, or subsequently by the world economic crisis,
obscures the fact that the type of man who contributed decisively to fascism’s
7 See Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989) vol. II, 348.
8 Ibid., 349.
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triumph existed in essence long before the beginning of the war in 1914.
(Theweleit, vol. II, 351)
The men who were boys and adolescents during the Wilhelmine Empire suffered from
the impossibility of realizing their personal potential or any sense of freedom because the
socio-cultural restraints under which they grew up were too severe. Although the forty-
three years between the founding of the Empire and the outbreak of the First World War
were superficially peaceful and culturally productive, Theweleit compares this kind of
capitalist authoritarian society to a covert form of war. The Freikorps-man, he argues,
“[was made] by the superficial peace that is the normal form of the permanent state of
war waged by capitalist male society against its youth, its women, and its wage laborers –
and, indeed, against its men” (Theweleit, vol. II, 351).
Despite certain alternative models of child-rearing and pedagogy that began to
emerge in the final decades of the nineteenth century, the military model of masculinity
remained for many the only viable route to manhood, gaining power, and breaking free
from the stifling environment of their families. Prussia’s army and the semi-militaristic
student organizations crushed the liberals and the Wandervögel. Free-thinking
individuality was extremely difficult to either reach or maintain given the high price of
social ostracism. Theweleit concludes: “But even everyday life in the Prussian military
denied them true tests of strength, true victories, explosive advances. Men of strata on
two fronts between the ages of around eighteen and thirty-five demanded nothing short of
war” (351). Most other endeavors seemed unattractive as long as they did not entail
existential tests of manhood.
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Yet while my own findings largely support Theweleit’s results, his eclectic corpus
of data is personal and private rather than public and fictionalized, his method is psycho-
analytical and interpretative rather than literary, and his general perspective points in the
opposite direction. His case-studies follow a forward trajectory toward the coming age of
German fascism, whose roots he sees in the largely dysfunctional relationship between
German men and women before and directly after the Great War.9 I have argued that late
Weimar Republic battlefield fiction, at least from the leftist-liberal bourgeois camp, was
almost entirely apolitical, oblivious of women, and in fact looked backward to a previous
golden age of intact masculinity and self-appreciation. In Theweleit’s words:
The Great War touched the masculinity of several German male generations in its
most sensitive area; in the conviction that German men were born to be warriors
and victors. It deprived them of the victory they considered their “birthright” and
subjected them, as Germans, to a narcissistic wound of the first order. (Theweleit,
vol. II, 357)
My own study therefore complements Theweleit’s earlier research on masculinity and
sharpens the focus on the mechanisms with which fictionalized accounts of the traumatic
war experience were used to bypass politics and come to terms with the recent past.
While Theweleit primarily bridges the Weimar years to show how the Freikorps-
male ideology manifested itself during the civil war period from 1918 to 1923, then
disappeared from the scene for five to six years, only to resurface full force after 1928, I
9 Theweleit posits: “The process whereby the relation between women and men becomes a perverted
relation of anti-production – a process that consolidates prevailing prohibitions on the flowing of the stream
of desire – is of far greater significance for the rise of fascism than any changes wrought by war on the
soldier’s nature.” See Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vol. II, 358.
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argue for much deeper and more continuous historical roots.10 According to my analysis,
the cultural script that informed German men of “what they should be” harks back to
Jahn’s Turnerbund and the early stages of German nationalism. More importantly, these
männliche Eigenschaften were not originally Prussian or military ideals: they were
German ideals. Therefore, they had considerably more adhesive power; any young man’s
attempts to develop his individuality outside of that dominant mold would be castigated
as both “unmännlich” and “undeutsch.”
As I described in chapter one, these forces grew so powerful within the German
bourgeoisie, especially because the many sports clubs, gymnasts, and student
organizations increasingly aligned themselves with the Prussian military code of honor
and behavior, that any outsider would be socially isolated and condemned to failure in
virtually any higher career. By the end of the nineteenth century, the “deutsche
Tugenden” were as sticky as fly-paper. Every man “knew”: A real German does his duty
and submits his manhood to the test. Very often, such tests consisted of mock-combat,
like student fencing, or duels, both of which spread uncontrollably because they provided
young men with the much desired opportunity to display their courage and assert their
honor. While the upper echelons of the military had been traditionally reserved for
10 According to Nicolaus Sombart, the cultural phenomenon of the Männerbund dominated Prussia since
the French Revolution: “War, bei Lichte besehen, diese ‘Krisis der europäischen Kultur’ nicht überhaupt
eine Erfindung der ‘deutschen Männer’? Es ging doch immer um das schreckliche Unheil, das die Ideen
von 1789 über die Welt gebracht haben – die böse Trinität von Freiheit, Gleichheit und Brüderlichkeit, die
sie als apokalyptische Bedrohung empfanden. Warum? Freiheit hieß für sie Befreiung der Frau, Freisetzung
der Sexualität, Libertinage; Gleichheit Emanzipation der Juden; und Brüderlichkeit die demokratische
‘Cochonfrèrerie’, die gesellschaftliche Anarchie, die Religion der Pöbelverehrung. Davor hatten sie Angst.
Dagegen mußten sie sich zur Wehr setzen. Ihre Gegenposition ist generell antidemokratisch, antiliberal,
antiparlamentarisch natürlich, im speziellen aber, und das ist viel wichtiger: antifeministisch, antisemitisch
und elitär. Das ist das deutsch-konservative Syndrom.” Compare Nicolaus Sombart, Jugend in Berlin 1933-
1943: Ein Bericht (München und Wien: C. Hanser) 181-182.
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aristocrats, changes in the military and academic codices opened up the door to bourgeois
men to climb that high.
Theweleit describes Freikorps-leaders who, for the most part, already belonged to
the higher levels of the Prussian military hierarchy, they were members of the upper class
or upper middle-class; his case-studies are therefore not necessarily representative of the
wider bourgeois phenomenon. My own analysis describes the segments of the
bourgeoisie, thus providing a more nuanced picture of the (largely imagined) dissolution
of class boundaries in war time, as well as the characteristic of popular Frontliteratur to
reduce political ideas of German nationality to masculine ideas of Germanness.
Ultimately, Theweleit’s psycho-analytical interpretation of the Freikorps-men’s
correspondence only illuminates one side of the picture. It does not account for the
enormous importance of the various myths (of Germanness, of masculinity) with which
the bourgeoisie operated throughout the nineteenth century, the Weimar Republic, and
the Third Reich. As I have argued, after the failure of the 1848 Revolutions, myths
largely displaced any real argument about the role of democracy in national politics..
Even within the political parties, these myths resonated on a deeper level than
Parteipolitik, thereby affecting German men on a personal identity level regardless of the
changing political landscape. While Theweleit focuses on the oedipal struggle between
sons and fathers during and after the Wilhelmine Empire, I argue that the older and more
flexible myths of Germaness/manhood represent a deeper key to identity politics, and that
these were used to circumvent, or to undermine, any other analyses of the public sphere.
304
The adhesive forces of these myths came to the foreground, as I have shown, in
the characteristic ways in which bourgeois novelists attempted to come to terms with the
national trauma of the lost war. Remarque and the other writers from the leftist-bourgeois
camp displayed a complete lack of faith in politics as a way of coping with the political
catastrophe. To them, the centre of pain was located deep in the German male psyche,




This list of World War I literature ranked by volumes sold was compiled by Helmut
Müssener in 1987.1 The titles with asterisks are discussed in this project.
*003 Remarque: Im Westen nichts Neues (1929) 900,000
006 Flex: Wanderer zwischen den Welten (1917) 682,000
009 Plüschow: Flieger von Tsingtau (1916) 610,000
*026 Richthofen: Der rote Kampfflieger (1917) 420,000
032 Luckner: Seeteufel (1921) 392,000
039 Peckelsheim: Kriegstagebuch U 202 (1916) 360,000
047 Mücke: Ayesha (1915) 332,000
049 Beumelburg: Sperrfeuer um Deutschland (1929) 328,000
085 Ettighoffer: Gespenster am Toten Mann (1931) 249,000
087 Schmöckel: Ein Lebensbild (1915) 249,000
094 Dwinger: Die letzten Reiter (1930) 225,000
097 Dwinger: Zwischen Weiß und Rot (1930) 225,000
110 Bloem: Kriegserlebnis – Trilogie (1916) 205,000
114 Dwinger: Armee hinter Stacheldraht (1929) 200,000
*144 Beumelburg: Gruppe Bosemüller (1930) 170,000
*147 Hindenburg: Aus meinem Leben (1920) 170,000
167 Peckelsheim: Oberheizer Zenne (1917) 160,000
1 Helmut Müssener (ed.) Deutschsprachige Kriegs- und Antikriegsliteratur in Deutschland und Schweden
1914-1939 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1987) 18-19.
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*168 Renn: Krieg (1928) 155,000
173 Lettow-Vorbeck: Heia Safari (1920) 151,000
174 Dohna-Schlodien: Der “Möwe” 2. Fahrt (1917) 150,000
192 Fendrich: Wir. Ein Hindenburgbuch (1917) 145,000
195 Beumelburg: Mit 17 vor Verdun (1931) 142,000
213 Beumelburg: Douaumont (1923) 135,000
*229 Wehner: Sieben vor Verdun (1930) 130,000
287 Dwinger: Wir rufen Deutschland (1932) 110,000
315 Salomon: Die Geächteten (1930) 104,000
328 Dohna-Schlodien: M.S. “Möwe” (1915) 100,000
337 Heimburg: U-Boot gegen U-Boot (1917) 100,000
344 Nerger: M.S. “Wolf” und “Wölfchen” (1919) 100,000
407 Fendrich: Mit dem Auto an die Front (1915) 90,000
481 Sommer: Fliegerhauptmann Boelcke (1916) 80,000
495 Beumelburg: Deutschland in Ketten (1931) 77,000
502 Frank: Der Mensch ist gut (1919) 75,000
*511 Remarque: Der Weg zurück (1931) 75,000
529 Euringer: Fliegerschule (1929) 72,000
539 Keller: Grünlein (1915) 71,000
550 Frei: Unser Fliegerheld Immelmann (1916) 70,000
559 Neubau: Kriegsgefangen (1916) 70,000
570 Fendrich: An Bord (1916) 68,000
573 Lettow-Vorbeck: Meine Erinnerungen (1920) 65,000
*652 Jünger: In Stahlgewittern (1920) 60,000
719 Semsrott: Der Durchbruch der “Möwe”(1928) 56,000
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